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Irene María Vicente Martín 

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Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas

Universidade NOVA de Lisboa | Universidade dos Açores

Av.^a de Berna, 26-C | 1069-061 Lisboa, Portugal

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Fortifying the city of Salvador: municipal constraint or 'informal imposition'? State-building and long-distance governance in early 17th century Brazil (c. 1604)*

Irene María Vicente Martín**

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Abstract

This paper examines the Portuguese empire's political administration by studying the negotiations between the local and royal authorities in the city of Salvador, capital of Brazil, during the so-called Iberian Union (1581-1640). By focusing on Salvador's defense plan, implemented by Philip III in 1604, this article deals with the role of cities in colonial Brazil, studies the boundaries and overlapping of royal authority and municipalities in America, and proposes new insights on the control of space as an essential dimension of early modern state formation. In conclusion, the article claims that local power joined the defense of the city pursuing its own benefits: since there was a need to ensure territorial protection, Bahian municipality sought to obtain concessions and high status while enlarging royal sovereignty.

Keywords: Salvador da Bahia, cities, power, Hispanic Monarchy, Union of the Crowns.

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Resumo

Este artigo estuda a administração política do Império Português no Brasil, com enfoque na relação entre as autoridades locais e régias na cidade de Salvador da Bahia no período da União Ibérica (1581-1640). Centrando-se no plano defensivo implementado por Filipe III de Espanha em Salvador (1604), este artigo analisa o papel das cidades no Brasil colonial ao estudar as fronteiras e a sobreposição das autoridades real e municipal. Deste modo, traz uma nova perspectiva sobre o controle do espaço como sendo uma dimensão essencial do Estado moderno. No final, argumenta-se que, apesar de o poder local consentir a intromissão do poder régio na política da cidade, o fazia perseguindo o objetivo de obter concessões e um maior status no grande império sob o domínio dos Habsburgos.

Palavras-chave: Salvador da Bahia, cidades, poder régio, Monarquia Hispânica, União de Coroas.

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** European University Institute, Italy.

ORCID:<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0075-0966>. Email: irene.vicente@eui.eu.

**Fortifying the city of Salvador:
municipal constraint or ‘informal imposition’?
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in early 17th century Brazil (c. 1604)**

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The city was the main tool of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns to occupy and politically control America in the Early Modern period (Munck 2016, 1-19). Towns such as Santo Domingo, Mexico or Lima were founded by Spain with the goal of creating new population centers in New Spain and Peru, while Portugal established São Vicente (1532) and Olinda (1535) to strengthen its dominion in Brazil. To complement the occupation, local governments – Spanish *cabildos* and Portuguese *Senados da Câmara* – were also instituted, in order to administer the space and control the increasing population (Parry 1966, 192-212; Boxer 1969, 273-295)¹. Nevertheless, in the specific case of Portuguese America, towns were initially conceived as commercial settlements, in a similar way to the Asian *feitorias*, rather than political entities. Its coastal location made them important spots for the overseas traffic system that had been evolving since 1500 (Polónia 2011, 382). The main investments in Brazil were thus made in warehouses, docks and defensive towers to guarantee the trading of goods, leaving aside the central *plazas*, the large churches and the impressive fortresses typical of Spanish colonial metropolises (Lockhardt and Schwartz 1983; Kagan 2000; Sánchez Gómez and Santos Pérez 2010).

The foundation of Salvador da Bahia as capital city of Brazil changed the occupation pattern substantially in Portuguese America in 1549². During the previous decades, the mercantile nature of the colonization had resulted in private land grants and thinly populated towns. In the Bay of All Saints, the failure of the *Vila do Pereira* (1534-1536), together with

¹ According to Renaissance patterns, politics materialized in cities, also seen as synonymous with political communities.

² In this text, the terms Bahia and Salvador are used to indistinctly refer the city, as contemporaries did. When referring to the captaincy of Bahia or the Bay of All Saints instead of the city, it will be stressed. At the same time, Portuguese kings are referred by their English name. However, the Habsburg monarchs that ruled over Portugal are referred according to their Spanish order, since this is the English-language convention (i.e. Philip II of Portugal and III of Spain is just Philip III in the text, and so on).

the increasing trade of Brazilwood and sugar generated a renewed interest in the area. With the purpose of founding a capital city, king John III dispatched Tomé de Souza as Governor General, equivalent in status to a Viceroy in 1549. Salvador was born with a strong administrative character: it was created as the center for providing justice, defending the land and supporting populations. However, by this nature of city-fortress (“povoação e fortaleza”), Salvador also emerged as a *res publica* in the sense of a community of citizens governed by law (Kagan 2000, 132)³. Progressively, it became the heart of the *Estado do Brasil*, the seat of a wide-range of executive bodies and an organized citizenship from then onwards (Marques 2016, 26; Puntoni 2009, 372; Salvador 1627, 90).

For decades, the royal character within the creation of Salvador was read as an attempt to place the Brazilian territories under the direct rule of the Portuguese Crown (Cosentino 2009, 67). By the establishment of the Governorate General, comprised of the Governor, the Royal Magistrate (*Ouvidor-geral*) and the Royal Treasurer (*Provedor-mor*), the presence of the Crown materialized in Portuguese America (Puntoni 2008, 45-47). However, by using the city as the spatial and political framework of these ends, all the urban tradition inherited from Portugal was transferred to Brazil (Magalhães 1986; Monteiro and Oliveira 1996). The *Senado da Câmara* therefore emerged in Salvador as a corporate entity with strong decision-making capacities (Bicalho 2000, 125-127), and the conflicts the Crown was facing to regulate towns in Portugal were, if possible, aggravated by the distance, the colony frontier conditions of Bahia and the increasing power and status of the municipality and society it represented⁴.

Collision between the authorities and their potential contradictions within Salvador existed from the moment of its foundation, but strongly increased at the dawn of the 17th century (Schwartz, 2008; Krause, 2014b). At that moment, Portugal and its empire were firmly in the hands of the Habsburg kings, who also ruled in Spain and its American territories. The Agreements of Tomar (1581) maintained all Portuguese previous institutions, freedoms and privileges in both the mainland and its domains, spread across Africa, Asia and America (Cardim 2017, 43-78). Theoretically,

³ “Ordenei ora de mandar nas ditas terras, fazer uma povoação grande e forte, em um lugar conveniente, para daí se dar favor e ajuda às outras povoações, e se ministrar justiça”. Arquivo Historico Ultramarino [AHU], Cód. 112, fls. 1-9 (*Regimento do Governador e capitão General Tomé de Sousa, dado em Almeirim, Portugal, a 17 de dezembro de 1548*).

⁴ In this text, “colony” or “colonial world” has the meaning of “social universe based on traditional Portuguese patterns yet molded to accommodate and overcome the peculiarities of a society and economy in formation” (Schwartz 1973, 171).

Brazil did not undergo significant changes in its internal organization during the Habsburg rule. And in Salvador, the unique initial alteration was the appointment of a new Governor General in 1583, much more connected with a power vacuum than with the dynastic change in Lisbon. However, this seemingly changeless situation was not as immutable as it may appear. Political and institutional reforms in Portugal modified the institutional framework in Brazil (Serrão 1994; Schaub 2001; Stella 2000). For its part in Bahia, administrative bureaucratization, increase of royal officers and even the establishment of the High Court (1609-1626) were policies issued by the Habsburg kings. They all responded to Brazil's own needs, but were undoubtedly related to the political situation resulting from Portugal's incorporation into the Hispanic Monarchy (Marques 2002, 8; Marques 2009, 121-146).

When the Agreements were signed in 1581, Habsburg Spain was facing wars against England, France, and the Netherlands, while Portugal was experiencing a long and painful drought that resulted in epidemics and political crisis. By taking advantage of this situation, European enemies started to attack key positions in both Spanish and Portuguese overseas possessions with the aim of obtaining economic and military benefits. The Caribbean Sea, the Mexico gulf and the Pacific coast were the main objectives. Brazil, the buoyant Portuguese colony because of its sugar production, was deliberately attacked as well. Specifically Salvador, one of the less defended enclaves at the time, was the target of English and Dutch attacks in 1587, 1599 and 1604. The political and socio-economic role of Salvador within the Portuguese empire was well known in Lisbon, but after the attacks the Crown also found out that the capital of Brazil was crucial to maintain the integrity of its empire in the Americas (Schwartz 1968).

During the Habsburg's rule, Salvador revealed itself as a key link for the defensive chain of Spanish American possessions. Improvements regarding the construction of fortresses, the pacification of Indian populations and the supply of weapons and artillery were common during the terms of Governors Teles Barreto (1582-1587) and Francisco de Sousa (1592-1602). This process, however, was far from finished when the English attacked Salvador in 1587, and then the Dutch in 1599 and 1604. Initially, it was up to a wide-range of authorities in Brazil, such as the Governor, the municipality and the local militias, to protect the city under some guidance of the king. However, right after the third attack in 1604, Philip III launched a new defense plan for Salvador that went beyond his colonial representative and the local powers (Santos Pérez 2012; Santos Pérez 2016). To prevent further

assaults, the plan consisted in the appointment of two royal engineers, the construction of new fortifications and the use of income from the sale and distribution of wine from Salvador in order to finance it all. In the logic of the empire, Salvador, the Bay and thus the American domains would be protected. In the logic of the city, on the contrary, it meant a direct intervention of the king into its local affairs and municipal competencies.

At the time Philip III's project reached the city, communications between the municipal council and the Crown started. A series of letters were sent to Lisbon demanding the repeal of the disposition and the removal of the engineers, requiring compliance with the local statutes and challenging the desires of the king. The initial issue was the use of the municipal wine tax to fund the fortifications, but the dispute very soon showed the limits of royal authority in Brazil, as well as its dependence on local powers and vice versa.

Compared to the little interest that the urbanization of colonial Brazil has received from scholars, the role that Brazilian cities like Salvador, Natal or the current João Pessoa played in the Hispanic Monarchy's defensive system has been a well-studied subject (Oliveira 2008; Gomes 2006; Moura Filha 2004). Accordingly, authors have highlighted the active role of the Spanish kings in drawing up castles and forts as a tool of empowerment and reaffirmation of their dominion in Brazil (Ruiz González 2002, 107-125; Cámara Muñoz 2005). At the same time, the expenses of such an undertaking have been studied under both qualitative and quantitative approaches (Lenk 2009; Magalhães 2016). And further, the construction and design of forts has been the topic of analyses about space, urbanism and military architecture style in Spanish Brazil (Reis 2000; Mattoso 2010; Moureau 2011). Nevertheless, studies that look at the multicontinental or polycentric nature of empires and the process of state building 'from below' seek to go beyond those approaches (Fragoso and Gouvêa 2009, 36-50; Holenstein, Blockmans and Mathieu 2009; Cardim et al. 2012; Gitlin *et. al* 2013). According to all this, it is true that the fortresses making up the defenses of Salvador constitute the most emblematic representation of the Crown's presence in cities, due mainly to their imposing design, their dominant position in the urban landscape and their role as symbols of occupation (Mattoso 2010, 175). But concepts as overlapping or negotiated authorities, together with latest studies about local sovereignty and representation, royal presence in the Americas and Early Modern state-building forces us to introduce fresh insights in such questions (Pike 1958; Green 1994).

The aim of this paper is to find what the city of Salvador can tell us about the political role of Brazilian cities at the moment the Dutch began to challenge Habsburg territorial dominance in the Americas. The case study will be the conflict that arose between the king Philip III and the municipality of Salvador regarding the defense plan of 1604, especially about the use of a local income on wine sales to fulfill what was supposed to be a royal responsibility, i. e. the construction of fortresses and the salary of royal engineers. Following an updated reading of the state-of-the-art, the objectives are to approach the role that the city played in supporting the authority of the Crown; to offer insights into the planning of space and its control by the different powers with jurisdiction over it; and to see how local and royal power joined for common political purposes in colonial Bahia. Further, together with filling the historiographical gap and proposing new insights for understanding the policies towards Salvador, this article attempts to improve the understanding of the Early-Modern state building in Portuguese America, using the city of Salvador as a mirror to study some of the effects Portugal's incorporation in the Hispanic Monarchy had in Brazil.

The local scenario: the city of Salvador and its municipality

At the beginning of 17th century, Salvador's opposition to the new defensive plan of 1604 was due to the strength of the Bahian society and its municipality within the Habsburg Empire. As mentioned, Salvador was born as a city oriented towards centralizing the forces of the Portuguese royal authority in Brazil. Models coming from Portugal and its overseas holdings became central pillars of its early colonization. However, as the city evolved, the character of those models changed from those initially conceived in Tomé de Sousa's Instructions (*Regimento*) to another strongly influenced by the specificities of Salvador (Russell-Wood 1977, 25-27). Its unique geographical, demographical, and political features would change the initial pattern of its institutions. At the same time, the economic importance of the Bay of All Saints within the empire determined a new set of responsibilities and duties for its municipality (Russell-Wood 1977, 33). It also provided greater privileges and capacities for its members, which would result in an improved status for the entire society they all represented (Novais 1997, 13-39; Ricupero 2008, 55-92; Krause 2014b, 205-207; Raminelli 2015, 65).

At the moment of its creation, the municipal council of Bahia had a wide range of prerogatives and competencies. In a similar way to those

in Goa, Macao, Porto or Luanda, the Bahian council was the ruler of the local life. It supervised the distribution and leasing of municipal lands, fixed the scale-price of commodities, dispensed building licenses, maintained roads, bridges, jails, and other public works, regulated over public festivities and was responsible for public health, while funding this by municipal taxes (Boxer 1965, 73-74). In case of need, the municipality also had the capacity to impose new levies for its own expenses, something that resulted in a strong capacity for handling fiscal affairs in a similar way to the Spanish *cabildos* (Grafe 2017, 169-180). In that sense, the *Câmara* of Salvador could levy certain indirect taxes on sales of wine and other products, oriented to construct the Cathedral, the council building or grain stores for the population⁵. This set of competences displayed an undeniable tendency towards *decentralization*, making the municipality acquire a leading position at the local level of governance (Bicalho 2001, 189-222; Raminelli 2015, 10). Nevertheless, the character of the city as seat of the royal authorities implied that the municipality had also a crucial role in the Crown's overseas rule (Magalhães 2016, 18-21; Bicalho 2001, 194-201). In addition to responding to local needs, the Bahian *Câmara* was the fiscal entity entitled to levy royal taxes in the city, its surroundings and the entire captaincy. This was not just a handful of duties. Among all the taxes enacted to support the Crown in Brazil, it was the tithe, traditionally used to pay the clergy⁶; several port customs, especially on sugar and whale oil, and the third part of the municipal income (*terça*). The municipality of Salvador was the institution in charge of collecting these crown taxes, but it was the Royal Treasurer who supervised it and organized its expenditure.

As time went by, the Recôncavo, which is the coastal region surrounding the Bay of All Saints, came into profitability with the sugarcane industry, the construction of sugar mills and the subsequent population movement from the city to the countryside (Schwartz 1986). This phenomenon not only enlarged the territorial horizons of the city itself, but also the political prerogatives of the local municipality. From the urban

⁵ Biblioteca Nacional de Rio de Janeiro [BNRJ], Ms. I-4, 3, 4, n. 16. (*Carta da Câmara da Bahia, a El-Rei, em que dá conta em como puseram os moradores sobre si a imposição dos vinhos sem colherem até o presente algum fruto disso por lhe impedirem os que mais senhoreando-se do dinheiro e dando informações a Sua Majestade conforme a sua tentação e se tirou à Câmara a administração do dito dinheiro e se conferiu nos Governadores, sem dêle usar coisa alguma proveitosa a terra e sobre os Soldados, dada em Bahia a 27 de janeiro de 1610.*)

⁶ Arquivo Nacional de Rio de Janeiro [ANRJ], Cód. 538, vol. 1, doc. c-200. fls. 1r-1v. (*Arrecadação do 1% das obras pias, s. l., 10 de abril ano 1592*)

planning standpoint, Salvador was a settlement initially divided in the *Alta* (Upper city), where Civil and Ecclesiastical buildings were emplaced, and the *Baixa* (Low city), with the seaport and the same mercantile character as a *feitoria*. Salvador became a city dispersed beyond its own walls. Settlers engaged in sugar production were the same as those occupying seats on the municipality. Explorers in search of mines into the interior lands (*sertão*) were part of the people involved in decision-making as well. Rich traders, who arrived in the city for business reasons, did not take long to become cattle ranchers in the islands of the Bay (Flory and Smith 1978, 571-591), and this new social configuration created a specific juncture of the capital, its social body and thus the municipality (Schwartz 1986; Krause 2015). Connections between the city and its surroundings became habitual. Salvador became a city spread across both urban and rural areas, and its municipality acquired greater prerogatives in order to rule over this growing territory and population, both bigger than originally conceived in 1549.

This economic evolution, territorial expansion and demographic growth of Salvador gave its citizenship a strong corporate entity. Leaving aside slaves and foreigners, the citizens of Salvador were asymmetrically divided into two groups. The first one consisted primarily of sugar planters, slavers, landowners and rich traders. They were the so-called ‘principal persons’ of Salvador and their municipal functions, properties, local status and personal proximity to the Governor General gave them a specific life-style that was not easy to imitate (Schwartz 1986, 91-92; Krause 2015, 75-79). The second group were the ‘people’ (*povo*), which included Indians, *mestiços*, New Christians and the rest of the Portuguese inhabitants. Their economic activities and properties could be diverse, but what held them together as a body was that they enjoyed no representation in the municipality: the duty and the privilege of the ‘principal persons’ were to elect and, being elected, to speak on behalf of the entire community (Schwartz 1986, 97). For the people it meant that their administration was unrepresentative and that dialogue or cooperation was simply impossible. However, for the highest ranks, aware of their significance and their rights, it implied being the unique intermediates between the urban republic and the king. Councilors were not just the staff of the municipality. They were individuals whose power emanated from speaking on behalf of the capital of Brazil, soon-to-be a point of interest for the king of Spain and its European competitors (Raminelli 2015, 65-67).

The global situation: Bahia in the Hispanic Monarchy

Salvador's importance within the empire was firmly reinforced during the first decade of the 17th century. It was the direct consequence of the economic growth of the Bay and the increasing status of Salvador as capital city (Marques 2016, 17-22). But it was also due to the interest shown by the European powers in it, motivated by the profitability of the Recôncavo and the geostrategic benefit of its ports. Bahia's location right between the Atlantic Ocean and the Spanish possessions in South America awakened the ambitions of English and Dutch, who regarded it as an achievable capture due its lack of defenses. For its part, the Hispanic Monarchy, afraid of losing its silver mines in Potosí to its two great political enemies, began to turn its attention to Brazil. From that moment onwards, Salvador was considered one of the crucial enclaves for Spanish geopolitics in America, position confirmed when the English attacked it in 1587 (Santos Pérez 2016). That year, a fleet commanded by Robert Withrington and Christopher Leister unsuccessfully besieged the city, bringing the concern of its protection to the Habsburg court (Andrews 2011).

Despite the English withdrawal, the attack revealed some features concerning Salvador's citizens and the defensive needs of the city in the late 1580s. First, it strengthened the self-conscience of the Bahian inhabitants due to their participation in the militias that defended the port and the Recôncavo. Individuals such as Cristóvão de Barros, Gaspar de Freitas de Magalhães and Miguel González Bravo obtained substantial remunerations because of their involvement in the fights (Sousa 2010 [1587], 158; Novoa 2016, 127-184). They were *nobres e fidalgos* in Portugal, but their high status in Bahia made them stay in there, giving rise to three powerful local lineages: the Cardoso de Barros, the Freitas Magalhães, and the Bravos, which would henceforth hold a wide range of powers and properties (Salvador 2008 [1627], 127; Calmon 1985, 120, 127, 699). Such compensations in exchange for services greatly enhanced the 'principal persons' of Bahia, whether allowing some of the 'people' to become part of their community or expanding the capacities of those already considered *principais* (Raminelli 2015, 86-87). Due to the greater powers and status of the only group who had the vote and could be elected to the local government, the municipality came out as a reaffirmation of the community branding, a matter of local pride and a personification of the city in front of its enemies.

Second, the 1587 attack also revealed that the Europeans had strong interests in Salvador and the Bay of All Saints. It was the first time that

Brazil became the focus of the English-Spanish war (1585-1605) that was taking place in Europe. As a result of the attempt, Philip II enacted the 1591 ban on non-Spanish ships docking in American ports. In reply, the English attacked Azores (1591), Trinidad (1595), and Caracas (1595), even devising an expedition to capture Recife and Olinda in 1606 (Andrews 2011, 77)⁷. But third, it also became clear that apart from European's interests in the Bay, defenses existing in the city and its surroundings were not enough to prevent counterattack or expel the invaders, but just to resist them.

Some months after the attack new defensive improvements started. The fort of Santo António da Barra, right in the mouth of the Bay, was enlarged and fitted with long-range artillery. In the northern part of the city, Governor General Francisco de Sousa (1592-1602) started the construction of the Fort of São Filipe – what is today the fort of Our Lady of Monserrate – projecting its canyons to cover both the sea and the land. Finally, a new wall was designed around the perimeter of the city (Mattoso 2010, 176). However, as landowner and municipal councilor Gabriel Soares wrote, no such works were necessary: just the geographical layout of the Bay would prevent future attempts to take Salvador (Sousa 2010 [1587]). He also stated that as long as local militias were ready to defend the seaport, the city and the Bay would be able to continue with its everyday activities, like sugar production, livestock farming or searching for minute traces of precious metals in the shores of rivers. In this sense, it is true that some construction commenced. But it is even truer that the lack of interest in Salvador's defense was shared among the inhabitants and the Crown representatives in Salvador. The large majority of them were focused on sugarcane farming and its quick benefits. In fact, both councilor Gabriel Soares and Governor Francisco de Sousa were about to make history, mainly because of their large farms and their attempts to find silver, rather than the military improvements made during their terms in Salvador (Vilardaga 2010, 103-143)⁸.

At the crux of this situation, a second army appeared in front of the city in 1599. Dutch commanders Hartman and Broer reached the port and attacked warehouses and sugarmills along the entire Bay. It was the second European attack, but it was the first Dutch army that had sacked and bombed Salvador,

⁷ Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo [ANTT], Corpo cronológico, Parte 1, Maç. 112, doc. 27 (*Carta de João de Teive sobre os danos à Fazenda Real por irem estrangeiros comerciar ao Brasil, dada em Lisboa a 9 de setembro de 1587*); ANRJ, Cód. 798, fls. 1-3 (*Cópia do Alvará de 9 de Fevereiro de 1591, sobre a proibição de ida de navios estrangeiros aos Estados do Brasil, e portos da Guiné, Ilhas de Cabo Verde, e São Tomé, sem licença Régia, dada em Lisboa a 23 de março de 1591*).

⁸ Archivo General de Simancas [AGS], Secretarias provinciales, Liv. 1466, fl. 288 (*Alvará de Felipe II concediendo privilegios a Gabriel Soares de Sousa, s. l. a 1 de abril de 1581*).

something that would become habitual during the next three decades in Brazil. The objectives of attacking Bahia were many. First, the Dutch would be fighting an enemy, since the Habsburg Empire was at war against the Netherlands, and Portugal was part of that vast Spanish empire at that time (Mauro 1960; Schwartz 1986; Ruiz González 2002, 135-137). Second, by reaching America, the invaders sought to force Philip III to divert resources away from its attempts to quell the ongoing revolt in the United Provinces. But lastly, as long as the defense of Salvador was just a local militia, the city would be an achievable capture, as well as an unprotected path to the silver mines of Potosí, into the eyes of the Dutch (Schwartz 1973, 171; Santos Pérez 2012, 143-145).

Even though the attack ended, once again, with the withdrawal of the invaders, the arrival of the Dutch army motivated a new set of measures, not only towards the fortifications in Salvador, but towards the Portuguese empire as part of the Hispanic Monarchy. The enactment of the *Ordenações Filipinas* (1603) and the creation of the *Conselho da Índia* (1604-1614) should be understood within this context, as well as the second embargo on Dutch trade with America in 1603 (Ebert 2008, 48)⁹. To rule over Brazil and replace Francisco de Sousa, Philip III appointed Diogo Botelho as the new Governor General (1602-1607). Together with him, Francisco Frias da Mesquita was to go to Brazil as Chief Engineer of Brazil, with the task of supervising the construction of forts and garrisons, managing the stock of weapons, and increasing expenditure on military and coastal surveillance¹⁰.

In such a context, the need for new defensive measures was as clear as the inability of the Crown to afford them (Moreira 1989; Bueno 2001)¹¹. Remembering the statutes of the municipality of Salvador, the defense of the colony was the responsibility of the king and should be paid for by royal taxes. These taxes aimed to subsidize public works, repairing fortresses and building trenches, together with paying for coastguard ships, troops and garrisons, repelling indigenous attacks or assisting cities under siege. Even its

⁹ Biblioteca da Ajuda [BA], Cód. 51-VIII-6, fl. 105v. (*Carta do Conde de Bicalho, sobre uma provisão que S. Mgde mandou fazer, proibindo a ida de navios estrangeiros ao Brasil e outras partes de conquista, dada e Lisboa a 2 de abril de 1605*).

¹⁰ “Provisão régia de 24 de janeiro de 1603 de Francisco de Frias, engenheiro, pela qual se declara o ordenado que ha de ter”, *Documentos Historicos da Bibliotheca Nacional de Rio de Janeiro*, vol. XV, 1930, pp. 155-157; BA, Cód. 51-V-48, fl. 90. (*Certidão que D. Martim dos Diaguez passou depois de ter sido Tesoureiro Geral de todo o Estado do Brasil, em como o Governador Geral Diogo Botelho fêz duas armadas de sete navios grossos cada uma, e mandou correr a costa por nela andarem navios de corsários, dada em Lisboa a 5 de julho de 1603*).

¹¹ The fortification of the city was a common issue in the 16th century, as demonstrated with the writings of Diogo de Campos Moreno, like “Relação das Praças Fuertes” (1609) or “Livro que da razão ao Estado do Brasil” (1612).

collection was up to the *Câmara*, the Royal Treasurer had to orchestrate its expenditure together with governor Diogo Botelho. The municipality, as customary, was involved in its own constructions paid for by its local incomes.

At the time Governor Botelho and Engineer da Mesquita started their activities towards the improvements of the fortifications, the municipality of Salvador was involved in the expansion of the Cathedral (*Sé Catedral*). According to the founding premises of Salvador, the city was not only the political capital of the colony. It had also been conceived as the religious center, its Bishopric being the first of Brazil and its cathedral the symbol of such status (Hoornaert 1990, 208-220). The religious building was thus a matter of concern for the settlers, the Church and the Crown, and for almost fifty years the municipality had been taxing sales on wine to pay for its maintenance. At this point, it could be said that both the Crown and the municipality had clear and well-defined sovereignty over Salvador. But this would soon be a matter of conflicts, especially when the city became not only the stage of the war against the Dutch, but also that of the local response to a very remote king's desire in 1604.

The project of Philip III: local funding for royal needs

On the morning of July 20, 1604, Salvador woke to a second Dutch army, this time commanded by Paulus van Caerden. As happened in 1587 and 1599, the city of Salvador got ready for another round of struggle¹². Throughout forty-two days Dutch troops bombed the city, sunk Portuguese boats and looted coastal warehouses. They also jumped into the *Recôncavo* and sacked and burn sugar mills and crops. Finally, in a desperate intent to take the city, some forces even landed near the main port. To face this last assault, Governor Botelho brought together the experienced militias in the port and bravely fought until forcing the invaders to leave the *Baixa*¹³.

¹² BA, Cód. 51-V-48, fl. 2 (*Carta do Bispo Conde, em nome de El-Rei, ao Governador Diogo Botelho, avisando que o inimigo se aprestava com trinta navios nas Ilhas de Holanda e Zelandia, com muita gente e munições para ir acometer o Brasil pela Baía ou Rio de Janeiro, e pelas duas carabelas que se mandam e levam este aviso, vá uma a Pernambuco e outra à Baía, com cartas para os Capitães estarem prevenidos, enviando cem quintaes de pólvora para repartir pelas outras capitanias, feita em Lisboa 12 de dezembro de 1603*).

¹³ BA, Cód. 51-VII-15, fl. 5 (*Carta de El-Rei ao Conselho da Índia, tocando ao aviso que Alexandre de Moura enviou de terem chegado ao porto da Baía sete naus inimigas; e que por Diogo Botelho o avisar que estava prestes para lhas defender, feita em Lisboa 24 de novembro ano 1604*); BA, Cód. 51-V-48, fl. 8 (*Carta de El-Rei ao Governador Diogo Botelho, e pelos relevantes serviços e esforço como procedeu agracede, feita em Lisboa 21 de março ano 1605*); “Declaração de serviços de Diogo Botelho em Salvador, feita a 20 de dezembro de 1607” (Botelho 1910 [1609], 4).

After two months of siege, the Dutch went back to the Netherlands, mainly as a result of a lack of supplies rather than a military defeat¹⁴.

Despite the Dutch retreat, the attack showed both the municipality and the king that Salvador remained unprotected (Behrens 2013, 80; Santos Pérez 2012, 141-171). According to letters sent by Governor Botelho to inform king Philip III, the city lacked weapons, ammunitions and explosives¹⁵. The two fortresses – Saint Anthony of Barra (fig. 1), and the fort of Saint Philip – and the two batteries – the Saint Albert and Saint James towers – seemed to serve more to demarcate Salvador's boundaries than for its effective protection¹⁶. And the local militias could not prevent the Dutch from either entering the Bay or disembarking. After rewarding Governor Botelho for having resisted the invaders with little human resources¹⁷, pre-existing concerns about defense and city fortifications deepened in the court of Philip III¹⁸.

¹⁴ BA, Cód. 51-V-48, fl. 8. (*Carta de El-Rei ao Governador do Brasil Diogo Botelho, respondendo à 8 de setembro de 1604, em que daba conta em como a 5 de julho do dito ano chegara àquele porto da Baía uma armada de corsários holandeses de sete naus grossas e um patacho, com intento de saquear e pela dita carta se entende o bom ânimo com que resistiu, provendo de gente e artilharia por onde os ditos corsários podiam desembarcar, assistindo pessoalmente sem se recolher à cidade durante os quarenta e dois dias que estiveram naquele porto, e pelos relevantes serviços e esforço como procedeu, agradece. Dada em Lisboa a 21 de março de 1605*).

¹⁵ “Carta de 28 de fevereiro de 1606, respondendo às cartas vindas por Diogo de Campos, onde trata do estado em que ficou a Bahia depois da partida da armada hollandeza, sem munições nem medios de defensa, e manda por o dito Diogo Moreno, duzentos mosquetes, trezendos arcabuzes, duzentos picas, 50 quintães de morrão e chumbo e pólvora” (Botelho 1910 [1609], 44).

¹⁶ “El-Rei responde a carta escripta por Botelho em 4 de setembro de 1604, dada em Lisboa em 10 de maio de 1605” (Botelho 1910 [1609], 42-43); Mattoso 2010, 46.

¹⁷ BA, Cód. 51-VIII-6, fl. 58v. (*Carta de El-Rei a D. Pedro de Castilho, louvando os serviços de Diogo Botelho, gentil homem de bôca, e Governador do Brasil, sôbre o procedimento que teve contra a armada holandesa que foi à Baía de todos os Santos, s. l., a 2 de fevbrero ano 1605*); BA, Cód. 51-VII-15, fl. 22 (*Carta de El-Rei ao Conselho da Índia, sôbre o sucesso da Armada dos rebeldes da Holanda, que foi à cidade do Salvador, se agradeça o procedimento com que Diogo Botelho, Governador do Brasil, se houve. Em 22 de fevbrero de 1605*).

¹⁸ BA, Cód. 51-VII-15, fl. 5 (*Carta de El-Rei ao Bispo D. Pedro de Castilho, respondendo a duas Consultas do Conselho da Índia, uma sôbre as doncelas órfãs [...], e outra sôbre o sucesso da Armada holandesa que foi ter à cidade do Salvador, feita em Valladolid 15 de novembro ano 1605*).



1 Map of the city and the Bay of All Saints, with the floor of the four fortresses built around 1610.
Source: *Cartografia de Albernaz*.

In a letter dated July 1604, Philip III announced his decision to get involved with a new defensive plan¹⁹. For the Crown, the attack had showed the Dutch interest in Brazil. But it had also highlighted the inefficiency of the colonial emissaries to carry on with the defensive system of the city²⁰. Continuing with his strategy of enlarging royal control on the matter, Philip III sent the Chief Engineer of Castile, Tiburcio Spanocci, together with the Chief Engineer of Portugal Leonardo Turriano, to be responsible for the fortifications of Bahia. Their mission was to devise the new fortresses and oversee its construction, leaving the Brazilian Engineer Frias da Mesquita with no real decision-power. Their mission also included the construction of a coastal network of batteries, the conclusion of those forts still in the making and the building of at least four towers fully provided

¹⁹ Evidence of that “royal decree” only appears in a letter – and its copy – dated in January, 1605, when saying “como tenho mandado por carta em junho passado de seiscentos e quatro”. BA, Cód. 51-VII-17, fl. 17 and Cód. 51-VIII-6, fl. 38v (*Carta de El-Rei ao Conselho da Índia, mandando continuar a execução da provisão para os moradores pagarem o direito da imposição dos vinhos para a fábrica da Sé da Baía, e sera justo aplicá-lo a outras obras, principalmente á fortaleza de Lagem, no Recife, s. l., a 31 de janeiro ano 1605*).

²⁰ BA, Cód. 51-VIII-6, fl. 80. (*Carta de El-Rei ao Conselho da Índia, ordenando se veja as cartas, informações e petições que o governador Diogo Botelho enviou pelo Sargento-môr do Brasil, Diogo de Campos, sobre o pedido de artilharia, mosquetes e outras munições que deseja para a fortificação e defesa da cidade de Salvador, dada em 15 de março de 1605*).

with artillery²¹. However, expenditure on engineers, construction works, and other military support items implied costs, and thus new measures, to defray the plan and sustain the garrisons²². That is why, justified by the vulnerability of the city and the common good of the *res publica*, Philip III decreed that the municipal council should use its indirect tax on the sales and distribution of wine in Salvador for the next six months to afford all of the above²³. Theoretically, this new usage of the wine imposition would bring benefits for the two parts involved²⁴. It would allow the Crown to have a properly fortified Bay of All Saints; while resulting in privileges, grants and concessions for the councilors and the citizens²⁵. On paper the agreement seemed to work, but reality very soon proved that it was not as simple as it may have appeared: it showed that what really was at stake was the sovereignty of the two institutions involved in Salvador's taxation system.

It did not take long for tensions to arise over who had the prerogative to use the money from the wine sales and how it should be spent. In January 1605, only six months after the promulgation of the royal decree, a letter of complaint signed by the local councilors of Bahia arrived directly to the Council

²¹ Cód. 51-VIII-19, fl. 166v. (*Carta do Bispo a El-Rei, tocante à consulta do Conselho da Índia, sobre as fortificações que Diogo Botelho, Governador do Brasil, lembra que se devem fazer na Bahia, e com esta vão os traços delas, parecendo-lhe que antes de se resolver esta materia, deve ir àquele Estado, Leonardo Turriano, para ver os sítios e informar do que houver mais conveniencia, e depois mandar escrever às Câmaras sobre as imposições dos vinhos para as despesas, dada em Lisboa a 2 de junho de 1605*).

²² It is clearly difficult to discern the cost of the fortifications works around 1604 with the remaining sources. First, because no fiscal surveys have been kept for Bahia before 1607; and second because the total values of such surveys did not include taxes administered by the municipality. Estimations from other cities, like Rio de Janeiro or Pernambuco, are also complicated, since preserved sources only refer to late 1620s. For further information about these three cities, see Carrara 2009, 61-72.

²³ It has not been possible to find evidences on the wine tax revenues for this period, either actual ones nor expected. As this was a tax levied by the municipality, it is most likely that the records were lost during the Dutch invasion of 1624-5. The only reference in this regard is made by Diogo de Campos Moreno when he informs that 1\$000 réis were obtained from each pipe (around 15 liters) of wine in 1612. However, information about wine consumption is lacking. For more information about mid1-17th century wine revenues, see Lenk 2009, 201-204.

²⁴ “Os moradores pagarem o direito da imposição dos vinhos [...] para outras obras, principalmente fortalezas”, in BA, Cód. 51-VII-17, fl. 17 (*Carta de El-Rei ao Conselho da Índia, mandando continuar a execução da provisão para os moradores pagarem o direito da imposição dos vinhos para a fábrica da Sé da Baía, e sera justo aplicá-lo a outras obras, principalmente á fortaleza de Lagem, no Recife, s. l., a 31 de janeiro ano 1605*).

²⁵ From that moment on, a lot of fortresses appeared along the Bay of All Saints, such as Santa Maria and São Diogo (1614), São João, and São Bartolomé (1615) (Moureau 2011).

of India, in Lisbon²⁶. As the institution in charge of the Portuguese overseas territories, the Council transferred the grievances from the Bahian municipality to the king. In the letter, municipal officers, wealthy men and many others involved in the local administration and decision-making refused not the new defensive plan but the way in which it was being funded. Tax on the sales of wine, they said, could be used for the fortresses and the garrisons, but only after a local decision, not via royal decree. At its core, grievances arose not because of the imposition itself, or even against the forts, the engineers or the garrisons. Rather, they were contrary to the use of the wine tax to pay all that, since it meant removing the income for the Cathedral construction. And thus, it also meant depriving the municipality of the ability to pursue its own decisions. Exchanges of letters between the Council, the Crown and the city of Salvador started then, giving rise to a debate about jurisdiction, limits of sovereignty and the capacity of local institutions within the city limits. After all, Salvador was not willing to accept this Crown's intrusion into the local arrangements established in its founding statutes.

In order to understand what was at stake in this conflict between the municipal council and the Crown regarding the payment of the fortifications, it is necessary to address three issues beyond the facts already mentioned. First, contrary to what might be believed, defense of the urban territory was the responsibility of the municipal council, not of the Crown. The Royal Treasury had to pay for the naval forces and maintain maritime security and defense in the rural areas, but the defense of towns was the responsibility of the local municipalities (Costa 1985). For instance, Bahian citizens were required to have their own weapons and gunpowder to be used in case of necessity, while remaining documents show that the *Câmara* often received private funds to pay the militias²⁷. And that is pre-

²⁶ A copy of that letter can be found in BA, Cód. 51-VIII-19, f. 182 (*Carta do Bispo D. Pedro de Castilho a El-Rei, sobre a consulta do Conselho da Índia, tocante a uma provisão que se passou a fim de continuar o pagamento da imposição dos vinhos que os mercadores da Baía puseram para que a fábrica da Sé, passasse para a do Forte do Recife, dada em Lisboa 2 de junho de 1605*).

²⁷ The ordinations of Governador General Gaspar de Sousa, enacted in 1612, was the first compendia in referring the Ordinations of 1570, in which Brazilian inhabitants were compiled to receive military instructions on Sundays and storage the powder initially conceived for fests and celebrations, under penalty of exile in Angola (Salvado and Miranda 2001, 109); ANRJ, Cód. 538, vol. 2, doc. 33-35 (*Carta régia del príncipe regente al Provedor-mor da Fazenda Real. Arrecadação de donativos dos senhores de engenho e proprietários de embarcações para o aperfeiçoamento na infantaria da praça da Bahia, 26 de Maio de 1582*), ANRJ, Cód. 538, vol. 2, doc. F-66 (*Lei de proibição do uso de fotos de pólvora em festas, sob penalidade de degredo para Angola, cópia feita em 1610*); AHU, *Bahia-Luiza Fonseca*, Cx., 1. doc.4-5 (Requerimento de Antônio Cardoso de Barros ao rei, solicitando o dinheiro que seu pai emprestou para a fortificação da cidade da Bahia, dada em Lisboa a 28 de maio de 1603).

cisely the reason why Philip III initially tried to improve Bahian defense appointing Frias da Mesquita and suggested the necessity to build new fortresses. However, the critical juncture in Europe, together with the Dutch arrival, made the Crown require a properly defended Bay of All Saints.

Since both Philip III and the municipal council shared the purpose of defending and protecting Bahia, the royal disposition of 1604 could seem fairly reasonable. As explained, Salvador was a city spread in both urban and rural areas, so it did not seem unfair to use the municipality to pay for defenses in the Recôncavo. However, the direct involvement of the Crown in the protection of territory also fitted in with a royal strategy for improving its dominion over the city, not only in terms of defense, but of jurisdiction too. Other ways to finance the plan could have been implemented, like a new set of taxes or an increase in the existing duties. But the use of the municipal income for the fortresses was clearly an informal appropriation of the institution in charge of municipal affairs, including its taxation system. Apart from halting the Cathedral works for six months, it meant a direct challenge to the management capacity of the *Câmara* of Salvador within its own sphere of power.

The second issue to address is that even if the urban defense was the responsibility of the *Câmara*, its rejection of the new use of wine-tax money was fair and well sustained. As the institution in charge of fortifying the city, it was the municipality's duty to bear the expenses of the constructive works, as was previously done with the Fort of Saint Philip and Santo Antônio da Barra. For these fortresses, the council used other indirect taxes, mainly from textile and salt sales and exports, since the wine tax had been conceived specifically for the Cathedral²⁸. Moreover, after the attack of 1599, the municipality was already paying further taxes to the Crown for the defense of the coastal enclaves, such as the above-mentioned tithe, the *terça* and many other indirect taxes on sugar and whale oil. In that sense, the new use of the incomings from the wine tax meant not only an unscheduled change on how the colonial fiscal system was built and maintained, but also a direct attack on the decision-making powers of the council of Bahia, one of the strongest and most important municipalities within the Portuguese empire.

²⁸ BA, Cód. 51-VIII-7, fl. 111 (*Carta de El-Rei ao Bispo D. Pedro de Castilho, tocante a uma consulta do Conselho da Índia, sobre se continuar o pagamento da imposição dos vinhos que os moradores daquelas partes puseram para a fábrica da Sé da Baía, e para também se continuar na Capitania de Pernambuco a fortificação do Recife, dada em Lisboa a 16 de agosto de 1605*).

Since neither the letters nor the minutes from the municipality are available for this period, it is difficult to assert what was the first reaction of the council, regardless of the ‘reluctance that the inhabitants showed while paying’²⁹. However, it is appropriate to think that, aside from the formal complaints sent to the king, it was perceived as something both unfair and abusive, a feeling that strongly conditioned the Crown itself. In order to be respectful as much as possible of council’s jurisdiction, the use of wine tax to pay for the fortresses was initially established as something temporal, with a duration of 6 months. The fact that Philip III did not manage to establish it for a longer period, even if it was well known that Bahia could not be properly fortified in six months, allows us to think that the respect for the freedoms of the city was essential. The tax was thus initially conceived – both for the Crown and for the city – as a ‘provisional sacrifice’ the Bahian people should make in order to protect the land from the attacks in 1604³⁰.

As could not be otherwise, just a month after its expected expiration the king renovated the imposition for another six months in January 1605 for the time being³¹. The motivations were basically the same: the slowness of the fortresses construction and the rumors about another Dutch attack on Brazil, soon to be joined with the costs of occupying the recently discovered lands of Maranhão³². However, this time the plan included a new clause: together with a specific order to use the money to pay for the construction of the fortresses, it also said that it would be ‘fair’ (*justo*) to use it to build fortifications in other captaincies, such as the Fortress of Lagem

²⁹ BA, Cód. 51-V-48, fls. 9-10v. (*Carta de El-Rei ao Governador do Brasil Diogo Botelho, aprovando as plantas das fortificações e o pagamento da imposição dos vinhos para a Fábrica da Baía e Igreja Matriz de Pernambuco, dada em Lisboa a 19 de maio de 1605*).

³⁰ BA, Cód. 51-VII-15, fl. 22 (*Carta de El-Rei ao Conselho da Índia, sobre o sucesso da armada dos rebeldes da Holanda, que foi à cidade do Salvador, dada em Lisboa a 22 de fevereiro de 1605*).

³¹ BA, Cód. 51-VII-15, fl. 17 (*Carta de El-Rei ao Conselho da Índia, mandando continuar a execução da provisão para os moradores pagarem o direito da imposição dos vinhos para a fábrica da Sé da Baía, e se será justo aplicá-lo a outras obras, principalmente à fortaleza da Lagem do Recife, dada em Lisboa a 31 de janeiro de 1605*); BA, Cód. 51-VII-15, fl. 23 (*Carta de El-Rei ao Conselho da Índia, ordenando se veja as cartas, informações e petições que o governador Diogo Botelho, enviou, dada a 15 de março de 1605*).

³² BA, Cód., 51-VIII-7, fl. 31 (*Carta de El-Rei sobre o papel dos avisos que os navios das ilhas de Holanda e Zelândia estavam prestes a sair com destino à Índia e mais conquistas da Coroa deste reino, e estarem os seus governadores prevenidos de pólvora. Dada em Lisboa a 24 de maio de 1605*); BA, 51-VIII-6 fls. 233-235 (*Carta de El-Rei ao Bispo D. Pedro de Castilho, informando que teve aviso que em Holanda se aprestavam com toda a pressa trinta e seis navios com o intento de passar ao Brasil a acometer à Baía de Todos os Santos, por ter conhecimento que está muito falta de ordem e fortificação e munições, s. l., s. d.*).

in Pernambuco³³. As expected, complaints were not long in coming. And the reaction of the Bahian municipality was now stronger, especially when the tax was renewed for a third time in June³⁴, and a fourth in December 1605³⁵. It was at this moment that Turriano and Spanocci's designs were approved and the works, thus the costs, started. This implied not only that the imposition became regular and involved paying for other captaincies as well, but also that a direct presence of Royal authority – and not in the form of a Governor – became explicit from then onwards in Salvador³⁶.

This tug-of-war over the use of the money, the capacity of the Bahian citizens to protests against the new rules, and the Crown's necessity to proceed cautiously and in a logical manner towards the development of the regulations demonstrates two things. The first is that the use of the money for anything else than the Cathedral was something perceived as unfair and unscheduled for both institutions involved. Bahian citizens and its municipality knew which were their prerogatives and obligations, and so did the Crown: this can be seen in the temporary nature of the first royal decree, as opposed to a permanent one. The second is that the municipality of Bahia started to appear in the documents as a corporate entity, always referring itself as the institution speaking in name of the people (*'povo'*) and having its letters signed not only by the councilors, but by other inhabitants with no formal representation³⁷. It is for this reason that the municipal council cannot be simply understood as a political institution, having in mind that it was comprised of people who had been elected by the worthy men of Bahia and many others with informal decision-making capacities. Thus, at this criti-

³³ BA, Cód. 51-VII-15, fl. 17; BA, Cód. 51-VIII-7, fl. 111.

³⁴ BA, Cód. 51-VIII-19, fl. 182 (*Carta a El-Rei, sobre a Consulta do Conselho da Índia, tocante a uma provisão que se passou a fim de continuar o pagamento da imposição dos vinhos que os mercadores da Baía puseram para a fábrica da Sé, e passase para o Forte de Recife, dada em Lisboa a 2 de junho de 1605*).

³⁵ Cód. 51-VIII-7, fls. 227-229, 230. (*Carta de El-Rei ao Bispo D. Pedro de Castilho, relativa as fortificações de Salvador, Bahia, ordenando que se ponha em efeito, ordenando que se ponha em efeito pela ordem e maneira declarada nos apontamentos do comendador Tibúrcio Spanocci, conforme a suas traças, e quanto a despesa necessária para esta obra se continue com a imposição dos vinhos em Bahia e Pernambuco, dada em 24 de dezembro de 1605*).

³⁶ BA, Cód. 51-VIII-19, fl. 23. (*Carta do Bispo D. Pedro de Castilho a El-Rei, relativa à consulta do Conselho da Índia sobre o que escreveram os oficiais da Camara da Cidade da Baía de Todos os Santos, acerca da imposição que está posta nos vinhos para as obras da fortificação daquela cidade, dizendo que a cobrança dos direitos deve ser feita pela Câmara, dada em Lisboa, a 13 de outubro de 1607*); AHU, Bahia-Luiza Fonseca, Cx., 1. doc. 81. (*Carta do desembargador da Relação do Brasil, Afonso Garcia Tinoco ao rei, D. Filipe III, sobre a obra pia que se paga na Bahia, refere-se à baixa dos açúcares e à imposição dos vinhos, dada em Bahia a 6 de setembro de 1614*).

³⁷ BA, Cód. 51-VIII-19, fl. 23.

cal moment, the Hispanic Monarchy, understood as the king and its closest institutions, had to face the city of Salvador, understanding it as a more or less corporate entity with its own rights, privileges, and self-perception.

The facts presented above are a direct route to the third issue, which is no more than the clear existence of a contractual relationship between the Crown and the Bahian municipality. Since Middle Ages, *consensus populi* and corporatism had been fundamental conditions for legitimate government in Castile and Portugal (Annino 1995, 28-29; Hespanha 1984). According to this theory, it is not possible to understand Salvador as either a despotic nucleus contrary to the Crown, nor the policies of the Crown as the instruments of a centralizing government of the Habsburg kings. In that sense, the municipal obligation of using the wine tax to pay the fortresses should be defined not as an informal imposition, but as a product of a consensual government that united peripheral administration and central policies to achieve local protection, which resulted in imperial prosperity and wealth for the king and the empire.

As explained, around 1605 the use of the money from the wine and its renewal were extraordinary and temporal measures. However, its renovation continued indefinitely. From six to six months, the royal decree was extended, and it eventually became a responsibility of the Governor³⁸. During the 1630s it was jokingly known as the ‘old imposition’, and its continual and periodical renovation became more or less accepted by everybody, since complaints about the wine tax ceased to be the central matter of the letters (Krause 2014a). Fortification and protection of the Bay were still necessary for the Crown, especially when the Dutch occupied Pernambuco in 1630-54 and tried repeatedly to conquer Salvador³⁹. The fact that the Laje Fort, which was the main project of Frias da Mesquita, was still under construction when the Dutch took Salvador in 1624-5, allows us to think that constructions within the city were not being carried out as expected (Moureau 2011, 166-168). Financing the constructions and the

³⁸ “Eu tenho encomendado [...] que se fortefique a cidade da Baya [...] e tenho dado as ordens necessarias pera se tirar o dinheiro que convira despender nestas fabricas [...] vos encomendo que as faças continuar”. (Salvado and Miranda 2001, 109).

³⁹ BA, Cód. 51-X-1, fls. 97v-98 (*Carta de El-Rei, ordenando que a imposição que se por na Baía, de dois reais no vinho, or tempo de seis meses, se estenda também às mais Capitanias do Brasil, assim como um vintém por cada arroba de açúcar para o mesmo sustento dos presídios, dada em Lisboa a 19 de novembro de 1631*); BA, Cód. 51-X-1, fls. 274-275 (*Consulta do Conselho de Estado acerca do que avisou o Governador Diogo Luís de Oliveira, tocante à despesa que ali faz o presidio da Baía, e imposição que a Câmara pús de dois reais em cada canada de vinho, e um vintém em cada arroba, dada em Lisboa a 20 de novembro de 1631*).

defenses led the citizens to obtain privileges (Raminelli 2015, 62). So, it was precisely the relationship, the negotiation, and the contractual association between the municipality of Bahia and the Crown that allowed the Habsburgs to guarantee its dominion over the ultramarine territories, at least at the beginning of the 17th century.

A municipal constraint or an 'informal imposition'?

Struggles, negotiation and changes in institutions' competencies were common in the 17th century, both in Europe and the Americas. It was all part of the evolution in the relationship between the *res publica* and the governments, a critical shift that would eventually define what is called today the Modern State. From big mainland cities to small colonial towns, episodes of paper-based disputes like the one analyzed above actually evidence such dynamics. However, historiography has traditionally conceptualized state formation as the result of the increasing capacity of centralized administrations to impose themselves over local powers, by limiting their decision capacity and forcing them to compete against each other. The making of states has therefore been understood as the emergence of a political superstructure with the capacity to enforce its jurisdiction within a given territory. And struggles, negotiation and transformations have been defined as challenging outcomes, whether as resistance, corruption or direct opposition to the central forces.

The case study presented here contributes to shifting the focus towards the relationship between local actors and central governments, while trying to identify who took part in decision-making in Salvador during early 17th century. Analyzing the reasons why the Crown decreed a new defensive plan in the city in 1604, and the reluctance with which the *Câmara* paid it through the wine tax contribute to understanding the competencies within different levels of Brazil's colonial administration. At the same time, the dialoguing nature between the two institutions involved is manifested by the amount of letters exchanged, the progressive renewal of the tax and the gradual acceptance by the municipality thereof. Finally, regardless of initial disputes and later tolerance, the fact that the imposition was maintained and the defenses gradually improved proves another thing: central government and local institutions had similar concerns, reflecting to different solutions to solve shared problems.

Salvador's foundation changed the role of cities within Brazil in 1549, while later Portugal's incorporation to the Hispanic Monarchy gave Salva-

dor a new part within the empire. From 1581 onwards, the city joined the global scenario that was emerging in the Atlantic. This opening towards the world implied transformations in the city, such as a higher level of urbanization in rural areas and the formation of a community organized according to its own patterns. However, these shifts in Salvador, along with the progressive economic development of its nearby Recôncavo, also implied a change in the politics that had previously ruled over it. Governors acquired greater prerogatives over the militarization of the town; the *Câmara* communicated directly with the *Conselho da Índia* without mediators; and the Crown appropriated part of city politics through its changes in local taxation. All of this, coupled with the challenges the Spanish Empire was facing, gave new meanings to the relationship between Salvador and the monarchy of the Habsburg in the early 17th century in Brazil.

This case study brings us closer to the dynamics of this political and social relationship, as well as the balance of power in the colony over the length of this period. However, due to the lack of sources, it is not possible to access the complete image of this relationship for later decades. Letters from the municipality are scarce for the period prior to 1625, and Biblioteca da Ajuda in Lisbon only treasures some of them for the period 1604-5 and 1610 that raise the question of the wine tax, the arrival of the engineers and the Dutch threads. Since this documental collection is not enough to draw a complete picture of all parties involved, it was thus necessary to complement the study with royal decrees and correspondence between the Crown and the leading authority in Portugal, speaking on behalf of the *Conselho da Índia*, or the Crown and his Governor General in Brazil. In an attempt to study how the capital of Brazil was integrated within the empire, how the municipality reacted to Philip III's plan and what the final outcome was, all available sources were addressed.

An initial and non-contextualized reading of the letters exchanged between the municipality and the Crown about the wine-tax and the works it should finance, could lead to the idea that Philip III imposed his solution on Salvador to overcome two problems in one. Since the defense of Potosí needed to be done as soon as possible, and Salvador lacked defenses, protecting the city against future assaults became a priority. The economic and population growth that Bahia was undergoing suggested that the fastest and most convenient way to fund the defense was by using an already existent tax. With the incomes from the sales on wine, a new set of positions, fortresses and bastions could be built, the city would thus be protected without unforeseen expenses and the Crown would ensure over-

all defense on its silver mines in America. Under this perspective, the Hispanic Monarchy would be functioning as motor for political centralization, since Bahian municipality paid for the Crown's fortifications as soon as the king ordered it. Such practices would directly lead to the later Modern State, understood as the domination of a unique central power over a given and well-defined territory.

However, a more exhaustive study as the one conducted here demonstrates a very different reality in the case of Salvador. After the previous analysis it is clear that Philip III could not have handled the situation without respecting local practices and municipal prerogatives, or he would have created a very new imposition. At the same time, the *Câmara's* capacity to take action against the decree or, at least, send its grievances directly to the king demonstrates that the institution was essential in policymaking, something known in Madrid. Further, the impossibility of changing the use of the money earned through the tax is visible as well. From the very beginning it was intended as an extraordinary and temporary measure, something that needed to be renewed each six months and that would fall into oblivion as soon as the circumstances changed.

The situation of the city of Bahia within the Hispanic Monarchy as a Brazilian enclave was therefore more complex than traditionally proposed. On the one hand, as the rest of the Portuguese colonial settlements, Bahia was subject of the Crown in administrative or jurisdictional terms, something reinforced by the presence of the Governor General within the walls of the city. On the other, however, the council of Bahia achieved to maintain its prerogatives, even extending them over the years. In fact, granting the wine tax and the supervision of its expenditure to the municipality together with the Royal Treasurer, encouraged the enlargement of its political prerogatives. From 1604 onwards it was up to the councilors – and therefore, to the main citizens – to determine what types of local and royal taxes prevailed, who should pay them and what they should be used for.

According to this, it was fragmented authority, in terms of custom tariffs and taxes, and negotiation the essences of government in Salvador at the beginning of the 17th century. It is true that relationship and communications between Bahia and Madrid was at this time troubled and with setbacks, but that didn't impede progress and agreement. If the overall picture was one of dialogue and understanding, governance in the capital of Brazil thus relied on continuous negotiations, making the Hispanic Monarchy have one of its basic pillars in the local powers and its own prerogatives in there.

This new reading of the situation may be sounder than others traditionally supported by scholars. It contributes to surpassing the ‘centralization’ of the Hispanic Monarchy in this period, and restores the position the municipality of Bahia had as the other side of the coin of the government of the empire. This also allows the assertion that the Bahian society was dominated by local agents that had abdicated political power on the imperial level while maintaining a position of control over the sources of power. Nonetheless, this ‘contractual’ notion could also lead to a more in-depth elucidation. In fact, the weaknesses of the Crown strongly contrast with the large autonomy of the Bahian municipality. This notion gives a great insight into the mechanisms through which power was produced. Looking from a long-term historical perspective, the result of this situation was that the *Câmara* lost its wine income but Bahia ended up fortified.

Thus, after the analysis of the tax initially levied to afford the Cathedral but then used for the fortifications, it is possible to claim that negotiations were the mechanism that the Hispanic Monarchy, an Early Modern State in the making, had to rule in Salvador, understood as an increasingly defined corporate city with its own rights and privileges. This case study demonstrates that the dynamics of state building did not emanate from the top down, nor were they scheduled simply from below. Rather, it was a process that simultaneously involved both sides, strongly conducted in compliance with the interests of the two parties involved. Within this tricky scenario, the municipal council of Salvador, as the one in charge of defending the colony itself, became the crucial tool of a Crown’s empire spread all over the known world. The city, which had for so long stood as a bulwark against royal power in medieval Europe, became in a welcomed way, the most effective tool for maintaining the Habsburg dominion in Brazil at the time of Philip III.

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