On the Origins of Late Modernity: Environmentalism and the construction of a critical global consciousness

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that environmentalism as a worldview has played an important and often underappreciated role in the transition from early to late modernity. Specifically, we posit that environmentalism was one of the first discourses to directly challenge early modernist 'grand narratives' about progress, predictability, and the triumph of humanity over nature, and to establish competing narratives about globalism, uncertainty, cosmopolitanism, and scepticism of authority. In helping to establish and legitimize these themes, environmentalism has shaped modern society in ways that go well beyond specific environmental issues.

KEYWORDS: Late Modernity; environmentalism; critical global consciousness

RESUMO

Neste estudo, defende-se que o ambientalismo (environmentalism) como cosmovisão desempenhou um papel central, e por vezes subestimado, na transição entre a primeira fase inicial da modernidade e a assim denominada "modernidade avançada". Propôe-se que o ambientalismo foi um das primeiras abordagens teóricas que contestou os "grands récits" da primeira modernidade no que toca ao progresso, à historicidade e ao triunfo do Homem sobre a Natureza. Da mesma maneira, estabeleceram-se "récits" alternativos sobre a globalização, a insegurança, o cosmopolitanismo e a autoridade.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Modernidade avançada; ambientalismo; consciência crítica global

1. Introduction

A staple of contemporary social theory is that the current historical moment - that of modernity - has gone through more than one phase or stage. Prominent scholars such as Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, and Zigmunt Bauman have argued that we ought to distinguish between an early and a late modern period (although the label for the latter sometimes varies to high modernity, reflexive modernity, or the suddenly-unfashionable term postmodernity). There is much continuity across the early and late modern periods, for example the predominant trends toward everrefined rationalization, calculation, and disenchantment, which Weber argued characterized his epoch at the turn of the twentieth century and continue unabated today (particularly in the spheres of economy and politics). But there are important differences as well. The late modern period is generally understood to be a more complex time, where long-held beliefs and 'grand narratives' about progress, predictability, and identity have come under pressure, and new ideas about cosmopolitanism, relativism, risk, and globalism have become prominent.

Any singular explanation of how and why this transition has occurred is bound to be incomplete. Various theorists have focused on changes in the economy (Bell, 1976; Lash and Urry, 1987); in politics, both with respect to the collapse of communism (Held et al.,1999) and the emergence of more reflexive or selfcritical grassroots politics (Beck 1992); in technology, namely the rise of digital information and communication technologies (Castells, 2000); and in culture, with regard to the emergence of relativism as the predominant critique of the modernist worldview (Rosenau, 1992). In this article, we argue that environmentalism has also played an important and often underappreciated role in this transition. We are not the first to make this argument, as Beck (1992) uses public and state responses to environmental degradation to illustrate the emergence of reflexivity and its challenge to formal rationalization and presumptions of linear and cumulative progress. In contrast with Beck, who places degradation at the core of his argument arguing that changes to the environment then prompt social and political change - we take a step back and suggest that environmentalism as a set of ideas about the natural world has profoundly shaped the worldview of what we now call late modernity. Essential to our argument is a broadening what is generally meant by environmentalism. Whereas most conceptualizations of environmentalism are tied to an identity or a behaviour, as in to be an environmentalist or to behave environmentally, a broader view of environmentalism sees it as a set of propositions, assumptions, and accepted "conventional wisdom" - in other words, as a discourse - that extends throughout the social world and affects even those who are not committed to an environmentalist identity. Yearley (2003) argues that despite worsening global environmental degradation, environmentalism should be considered the most successful social movement in human history (rivalled only by the feminist and human rights movements) given that it is now impossible to publicly adopt an anti-environment stance. The fact that even the most polluting companies and irresponsible governments try to cloak themselves in green rhetoric is testament to the discursive (if not substantive) success of environmentalism as a narrative and worldview.

In the following, we argue that environmentalism has foreshadowed, prompted, and reinforced many of the key political and cultural changes involved in the transition from early to late modernity. First we outline the history of contemporary Western environmentalism and argue that rising environmental awareness in the mid 20th century represented a strong challenge to core early-modernist principles. We then discuss how the environmentalist worldview moved from the fringes to the mainstream in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s and laid the groundwork for the emerging late modernist consciousness. Finally, we discuss how environmentalism reinforces many of the key themes of late modernism in the present day, including globalism, uncertainty, cosmopolitanism, time-space compression, and scepticism of authority.

2. Environmentalism as a Challenge to the Early Modernist Worldview: Preservationism, Conservationism, and Catastrophic Change

The beginnings of Western modernity are not altogether clear, and have been variously located at the period of the European Enlightenment (17th century), the Scientific Revolution (17th and 18th), the Industrial Revolution (18th and 19th), and the political upheavals that established the modern state (most notably the French Revolution). Similar debate surrounds the emergence of modern environmentalism. While many cultures have long traditions of environmental respect and engagement, particularly in animistic or totemistic societies, these ideas entered the modern Western consciousness indirectly (for example, through Rousseau's writings on the State of Nature).

Several scholars have argued that Western environmentalism is in fact a direct consequence of modernity (Cronon, 1995; McCormick, 1995). One of the earliest forms of organized environmental advocacy was the preservationist movement, which, according to Macnaghten and Urry (1998), "was a [romantic] Victorian reaction against the Enlightenment mentality which assumed that nature was to be improved through human reason and interference." In particular, the preservationist movement reacted against the spread of industry and urban development, arguing that built environments were unnatural and artificial spaces that blighted God's majestic natural and wild landscapes (Cronon, 1995). These ideas resonated with many members of the 19th century intelligentsia, and were instrumental in establishing national parks and other protected 'wilderness areas' in Europe and North America.

While preservationism made some clear gains in establishing a "fragility of nature" narrative, a second competing philosophical approach rose to prominence in the early 20th century that was expressly modernist in orientation. This movement, labelled conservationism, sought to impose limits on development and the exploitation of natural resources so that they may be "conserved" for future use. Generally speaking, conservationsim draws on a rational and scientific view of the environment, namely "a utilitarian desire to regulate nature through rational and efficient management" (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998, p. 34). In a sense, conservationism significantly expanded the environmental narrative. While preservationism sought to protection 'special' places – areas that were to be set apart and protected from the march of human progress - conservationism sought the management of 'productive' environments based on the understanding that natural resources were not inexhaustible. Conservationism, however, has proven difficult to implement. The idea of rational management implies a certain hubris with respect to human capacities to know and predict the natural environment, and reflected early modernist assumptions that humans were the anointed custodians and masters of the natural world. The incompleteness of scientific knowledge and inability of governments to prevent ecological degradation would later become key themes in a new environmentalism.

While both preservationism and conservationism opened up new perspectives on nature, neither could be described as a worldview. Kearney's (1984, p. 10) classic definition of worldview is as "a set of images and assumptions about the world ... that constitute 'macro-thought'", or "an abstract structure of knowledge that people use as the [primary] means of organizing what they know" (Grunig and White, 1992, p. 33). According to Macnaghten and Urry (1998, p. 37), "preservationism [was] less a critique of modernization in the face of tradition, and more a 'modernist' concern to regulate boundaries, especially between town and country, settlement and wilderness" (see also Cronon, 1995). While conservationism broadened the scope of environmental discourse and management, its instrumentalist approach to nature was conservative rather than radical and aimed to extend and reinforce state managerial power over the whole of their territory (Young, 2008, p. 8). In other words, both movements can be understood as products of their time that reflected rather than challenged dominant ways of thinking.

Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, however, the environmental narrative began to shift away from the early modernist mould. Importantly, these changes allowed environmentalism to become more of a worldview, to become an interpretive prism or 'primary means of organizing' people's thoughts about the world. This transition is described by McCormick (1995, p. 56) as follows:

If preservationism had been a moral crusade centred on the non-human environment, and conservationism a utilitarian movement based on the rational management of natural resources, New Environmentalism addressed the entire human environment. For preservationists, the issue was wildlife and habitats; for conservationists, the issue was natural resources; for the New Environmentalists, human survival itself was at stake.

McCormick's concept of a 'New Environmentalism' addresses two key shifts in the environmentalist movement that occurred in the 1960s and helped to establish it as a worldview: the emergence of a global consciousness, and a heightened concern with dramatic or apocalyptic environmental change. Macnaghten and Urry (1998, p. 45) point to the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962 as a particularly important watershed moment in the new environmentalism. Carson's book, which sold half a million copies worldwide, outlined the consequences of industrial usage of pesticides on wildlife, particularly among animals occupying high places on the food chain, which would be exposed to damaging and even lethal concentrations of chemicals. For Carson, the boundaries of place, region, nation and continent that had been presumed under preservationist and conservationist conceptions of environment were nonsensical, given the cumulative dangers unleashed by unfettered global industrial development. In short, the globality of the problem spoke directly to its apocalyptic potential, as this was not a problem that could be fixed or regulated in any one place. Even the metaphor of a "silent spring" implied the mobility and transnationality of this issue, as toxins migrated along with their avian victims. According to Macnaghten and Urry (1998, p. 45),

Carson painted a picture of a world in mortal danger, a danger systematically and cynically produced by the greed and self-interest of the pesticides industry. Even more significant was the diagnosis that these 'elixirs of death' were a direct by-product of the post-war zeal for modernization and technological improvement. While previous concerns had centred on the aesthetics of suburbanization, or local pollution incidents, or the loss of particular habitats, Carson's critique centred on a representation of nature as systematically threatened by modern industrial processes.

Carson's message was soon joined by other "prophets of doom" such as Paul Ehrlich (on world population growth), Garret Hardin (on "the tragedy of the commons"), and Barry Commoner (on pollution and toxins), each of whom shone light on serious globalscale environmental problems during the 1960s and 1970s.

The transformation of environmentalism into a worldview was also facilitated by the emergence of the new science of ecology, which provided a language for criticizing industrial development and for linking local and global environmental issues. The basic idea behind ecology - that organisms be studied in their environment and in relation to other living things - is an old notion that can be traced back to Aristotle (McIntosh, 1985, p. 10). But while ecology's subject matter is not revolutionary, its attention to context and interrelationships goes against the reductionist approach that has dominated modern scientific inquiry (Forsyth, 2003, p. 5). Reductionism involves the simplification or breaking down of objects and problems to their simplest components in order to better understand "the fundamentals" of observed phenomena and thus improve the generalizability of findings (Gallagher and Appenzeller, 1999). Ecology's emphasis on systems and environments resists reductionism and tends to a more "holistic" or complex view of the phenomena under examination (Ward and Dubois, 1972; Lawton, 1999).¹ The notion of an interactive ecosystem is also spatially fluid, and can be observed at very small scales (with microscopic amoeba) and at very large scales; an idea that culminated in James Lovelock's popular Gaia hypothesis that Planet Earth and all of its terrestrial, aquatic, and atmospheric systems could be understood as a single self-regulating organism.

The rise of ecology and holism is also notable because it belatedly brought human impacts into environmental science (Forsyth, 2003, p. 5). While most early ecologists focused exclusively on understand-

¹ Strictly speaking, ecology and ecosystem science do engage in reductionist analysis (McIntosh 1987). That is, ecology often "seeks explanation for phenomena by looking to smaller scales than those at which the observations were made" (Wiegert 269). This is a key source of knowledge and theorization in ecology, but even the suggestion of reductionism grates with some ecologists, and debates continue within ecological sciences about the place of "reduction versus holism" (Wilson 1988).

ing ecosystems in and of themselves, this eventually led to concerns over how they were being disrupted or changed. Beginning in the 1960s, human interference in the biophysical world became an overarching theme in ecological research and education (Worster, 1994, p. 340). According to Forsyth (2003, p. 4), this combination of resistance to reductionism and de facto critical stance towards human activities meant

theme in ecological research and education (Worster, 1994, p. 340). According to Forsyth (2003, p. 4), this combination of resistance to reductionism and de facto critical stance towards human activities meant that ecology, at the time of its rise to prominence in the postwar period, had a tense and even "subversive" relationship with other fields in the natural and applied sciences (Shepard and McKinly, 1969). This new science posed a strong challenge to traditional narratives of technological and industrial progress, as well as the role of scientists within these narratives. According to Worster (1994, p. 340):

After two centuries of preparation, ecology burst onto the scene during the 1960s. By then scientists of every sort were accustomed to appearing as society's benefactors. They were expected to show nations how to increase their power and citizens how to increase their wealth. But [ecology] took on a new role in a more nervous, anxietyridden time, ... [based on] a grim hopefulness that ecological science would offer nothing less than a blueprint for planetary survival.

The rise of ecology as a science and as an ideology has been central to the establishment of what Beck (1992, p. 156) has called "a science-based critique of science" that was not widely present or accepted prior to the 1960s. Simply put, ecology established 'the consequences of science and technology' as a legitimate field of scientific study. Ecology became a way for both experts and activists to talk against the excesses of science-guided development – industrialism, technology, and an unwavering faith in progress – using the authoritative language of science itself (Hannigan, 2006, p. 45).

3. From the Margins to the Mainstream: Towards a Late Modern Consciousness

It is important to recognize just how strongly the environmentalist worldview that coalesced in the 1960s went against the prevailing politics of the time. As noted by Jasanoff (2004), this was a time when national and international boundaries were unusually pronounced. With the Cold War well established, the Iron Curtain firmly drawn across Europe, and proxy conflicts between the United States and Soviet Union brewing in multiple regions of the Third World, political lines on the map were as solid as they have ever been. Against this, and the government-militaryindustrial complex that was pushing nationalistic technological ambitions, stood an emerging mindset that saw these modernist preoccupations as part of the problem.

This minority view was sustained from the 1960s to the 1980s by a series of issues and events that re-

inforced these emerging late-modern themes. One of the best-documented events of this time was the Space Race, which pitted the United States and the Soviet Union in a technological competition to advance space exploration. This was a deeply modernist endeavour, involving the extensive application of state, scientific, and military resources to nationalist objectives. However, as Jasanoff (2004) argues, the Apollo missions to the moon in particular forever altered humanity's environmental imagination. On several of these voyages, astronauts turned their cameras back towards the Earth and captured some of the most iconic and recognizable images ever taken. These photographs, in which political boundaries are both imperceptible and irrelevant on a fragile-looking blue and white Earth, have had a profound cultural impact in establishing a global environmental imagination. In the words of astronaut William Anders, who filmed the ubiquitous "earth rise" video clip from the Apollo 8 mission: "We came all this way to explore the moon, and the most important thing is that we discovered the Earth".

This same period (mid-1960s to mid-1970s) also saw the resurgence of the nuclear issue. While the atomic age had been born in moments of unspeakable violence with the 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, most popular and political discussions of nuclear technology in the 1950s and early 1960s were utopian rather than catastrophic (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p. 14). The terrifying build-up of nuclear weaponry during the Cold War was countered by a widelyaccepted "atoms for peace" discourse that suggested that nuclear technology was "a benevolent servant" that would produce "more comforts, more leisure, better health, and ... a much happier life" (Waymack cited in Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p. 15). While the horror of a potential nuclear strike was never far from people's minds, nuclear technology did not become an environmental issue until concerned scientists, science fiction writers, and some media outlets began speculating on the effects of wind-borne radioactive fallout from atomic bomb testing (Weart, 2008, p. 40-41). Nuclear fallout and radiation were major themes of the first Earth Day in 1970, and public attention to nuclear issues accelerated dramatically following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and again following Chernobyl in 1986 (Renn, 1990). The globality of the issue was reinforced in 1983, when a group led by celebrity scientist Carl Sagan publicly argued that nuclear disaster could affect world climate over the long term by initiating a global nuclear winter "of such cold and darkness that it might threaten the very survival of humankind" (Weart, 2008, p. 140).

The nuclear controversy thus reinforced public awareness of unpredictable, boundary-less ecological disasters that could only be permanently addressed by global action. Several issues followed on the heels of the nuclear debate that bear an eerie thematic similarity. The problem of acid rain was first 'discovered' in the late 1800s, but lay dormant as an issue until 1962 when Swedish researcher Svante Oden, prompted by observations from a low-level fisheries inspector, linked dying rivers and lakes in Scandinavia to heavy industry in Central and Western Europe (Hannigan, 2006, p. 68). The issue then migrated to North America, where the slow death of otherwise pristine and remote places was exposed as being a direct consequence of distant and cross-border pollution. The acid rain issue was soon joined by two other global atmospheric problems of potentially catastrophic magnitude: ozone depletion and climate change. The ozone problem was particularly salient in the 1980s following the release of a NASA-generated image of a growing "hole" in the ozone layer over Antarctica (which was in reality more of a thinning). According to Ungar, the ozone depletion issue more than any other cemented environmentalism as a mainstream public and political discourse. The ozone problem literally came from everywhere (the worldwide use of carbofluorocarbons or CFCs) that if unaddressed would pose a universal threat to human health and natural ecosystems. The hole in the ozone layer was a powerful metaphor that resonated with existing cultural tropes (such as the penetration of shields in popular science fiction or the sexual assault of "Mother" Nature) in a way that made the science-heavy issue understandable and urgent for the general public (Ungar, 2000).

In sum, the 1960s-1980s were a time when the 'new' environmentalism went strongly against prevailing early modern institutions and presumptions about the world. Narratives of progress, predictability, boundaries, mastery of nature, and deference to science and expertise were challenged by a rising awareness of lurking dangers that seemed to defy this logic. Environmentalism suggested that what appeared to be progress could in fact be regressive, what seemed to be a regional or national problem was in fact globally significant, and that the interactions between human and natural systems were far more complex and unknowable than previously believed. As an emerging worldview, environmentalism foreshadowed, prompted, and reinforced the transition from early to late modernity.

4. Environmentalism and Late Modernity: Uncertainty, Time-Space Compression, Local-Global Interactions, and the Disenchantment of Expertise

As mentioned earlier, the transition from early to late modernity is by no means a total break. Beck argues that we are now using the same tools that have caused environmental degradation to address these problems (science, technology, rationality, capitalism, democracy). But some things clearly have changed with the rise of late modernity, and we argue that environmentalism plays as strong a role in the emergence of this new consciousness as it did as a challenge to the old one.

One of the most important and definitive characteristics of late modern consciousness is a preoccupation with uncertainty (Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, 2009). While the early modern period was characterized by "grand historical narratives" (the march of progress, the rise of democracy, triumph over scarcity, liberal capitalism versus state socialism, etc.), the late modern consciousness is much less sure of the future (Rosenau, 1992). Giddens (2000) uses the metaphor of the juggernaut to describe late modern society – a big unwieldy force possessing its own momentum that is difficult if not impossible to steer around as-yet unperceived obstacles. Homer-Dixon uses the similar metaphor of driving a car in the fog, where unforeseen but potentially-devastating hazards (a financial crisis, an industrial accident) seem to appear without warning even if, with the benefit of hindsight, warning signs were clear (see also Jasanoff, 2006). Beck correctly argues that the late modern preoccupation with uncertainty has been strongly influenced by environmental problems that have cast the future of the planet in doubt. Public opinion surveys over the past thirty years have consistently shown that a sizable minority of young people expect to be materially worse off than their parents, despite tremendous global economic growth in this same period (Pew Research Centre, 2006). The environmentalist worldview has helped to institutionalize uncertainty and a generally critical view of the future (an essential component of reflexivity) as a cultural norm that extends well beyond specific environmental issues.

In addition to uncertainty, environmentalism has also shaped late modern conceptualizations of time and space. According to theorists such as Harvey, Giddens (1990), and Castells (2000), late modernity is characterized by "the conquest of space by time" (Jessop, 2000, p. 70) or, put another way, by "time-space compression" that allows vast spaces to be transcended in real time. While this change is often linked to new information and communications technologies, we argue that environmentalism reinforces and deepens it. As suggested by Macnaghten and Urry, the environmentalist worldview advances two interpretations of time: the instantaneous and the eternal. Instantaneity refers to the fact that many contemporary environmental crises can happen suddenly and without warning. A nuclear accident, for example, can occur in a matter of seconds (Chernobyl), as can an industrial disaster (Bhopal), or an oil or chemical spill (Exxon Valdez). In contrast to the realm of technology, however, instantaneity in the environmentalist discourse is embedded in an longerterm eternal timeframe. While environmental disasters may be unleashed in any given instant, their effects are felt on an evolutionary timescale. Issues such as climate change and species extinction have put an emphasis on extremely long cycles and rhythms in the Earth's history, against which humanity's recent activities seem like an abrupt shock. Moreover, problems such as nuclear radiation, toxicity, and genetic modification are themselves temporally unbound (in Beck's famous articulation, "not all the victims of Chernobyl have even been born yet"). This dynamic of instantaneous irreversibility contrasts profoundly with the linear and progressive notions of time that characterized the early modern period.

7

Environmentalist visions of space are similarly malleable. As we argued earlier, environmentalism presented one of the first major challenges to the hypernationalism of the early modern period. The insistence that environmental challenges such as pollution transcended borders and threatened the planet as a whole represents one of the first "globalist" claims that are now so familiar in popular and political discourse. But it is important to note that environmentalism's ability to scale problems "up to the global" is matched by an equal ability to scale "down to the local". That is, environmentalism makes big claims about what is good and what is bad "for the planet" that are thought to apply universally in all spaces. For example, regional and national spaces such as the Amazon rainforest have been claimed by environmental groups as "the lungs of the planet", which implies that non-local actors have a legitimate stake in the forest's future survival (read: economic use). As argued by Jasanoff (2004), this descent of global claims and demands onto local spaces occurs overwhelmingly in one direction: from the First World to the Third. Therefore, while environmentalism has been one of the drivers of late modern globalism and cosmopolitanism (arguing that we are all "in this together"), this is at best an asymmetric and at worst a chauvinistic cosmopolitanism that has extended Western claims over less developed and less powerful regions of the globe.

Finally, environmentalism reflects and reinforces changing views towards expertise and authority. Weber argued that one of the defining characteristics of modern society has been the disenchantment of the world, as natural and human systems gave up their secrets to science, bureaucracy, and technology. In late modernity, science and expertise have themselves been subject to this fate, robbed (although not completely) of the mystery and privilege that surround them (Collins, 1983). According to Beck (1992), this has happened largely because the shortcomings of science and expertise have come home to roost in the form of unforeseen environmental problems generated by science itself. At its most extreme, this trend exposes even the natural sciences to claims of relativism, where science is understood as just one form of knowledge equivalent to any other (Hacking, 1999). This kind of logic can be seen in current controversies over the links between childhood vaccination and autism, or cellular telephone use and brain cancer, both of which continue because of 'lay' or non-expert claims that reject the authority of official medical and epidemiological claims. According to Yearley (1992), environmentalism has a foot in both camps. On the one hand, the environmentalist consciousness is sceptical of the ability of experts to predict and manage ecological problems, particularly those coming from heavy industry. On the other hand, environmental groups rely strongly on science to discover ecological problems and articulate their severity and urgency. In this way, environmentalism has been a driving force in a new agnostic view of science, expertise, and authority more generally, whereby the public is more open to alternative claims and narratives that diverge from official expert and political lines.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have argued that environmentalism has played an important and often underappreciated role in the transition from early to late modernity. In our view, this contribution has been driven less by environmental degradation or particular events (although these are important), and more by the emergence of an environmental mindset or discourse that have challenged the 'grand narratives' of the early modern period with alternative themes of uncertainty, cosmopolitanism, globalism, and scepticism of expertise and authority. In this way, environmentalism has shaped late modern society in ways that go well beyond specific environmental issues.

The influence of environmental discourses on late modern society continues to evolve. According to Beck, environmental concerns are contributing to the general dissatisfaction with official politics and contributing to an emerging "subpolitics" that is authentically grassroots and expressed in everyday activism. Young and Matthews (2010) argue that environmentalism is also forcing decision-makers to defend the legitimacy of political and expert processes by opening them up to ordinary citizens and alternative forms of knowledge. At the same time, environmentalism has failed to address, and has even reinforced, some unfortunate tendencies of late modernity. One of the greatest accomplishments of environmentalist discourse, for example, has been to prompt a more global consciousness - to see ecological problems (and by extension political and social problems) as extending beyond borders and boundaries. Yet environmentalism's globalist orientation has allowed for an extension of Western claims onto less privileged localities (an outcome sometimes labelled "eco-imperialism") backed by an uncritical 'we know what's best' attitude. In our view, environmentalism's next great challenge is to turn its critical eye onto itself on this issue and become more open to a "symmetrical cosmopolitanism" that is accepting of cross-cultural variations without falling back into relativism. In so doing, environmentalism would avoid itself becoming an inflexible grand narrative that risks running afoul of the late modern consciousness it helped to establish.

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