Cadernos de Estudos Africanos (2025) 49

"In Mozambique, We Still Have To Find Our Sound": Sounding out *moçambicanidade* after socialism

Ellen Hebden
Syracuse University
900 South Crouse Ave
Syracuse, NY 13244, USA
eehebden@syr.edu

"In Mozambique, we still have to find our sound": Sounding out *moçambicanidade* after socialism

This article examines the evolving sonic politics of moçambicanidade — defined as Mozambican national identity — through popular music and sound after independence. Drawing on ethnographic research, media analysis, and interviews with musicians and audiences, it explores how national identity has been sonically constructed, corporatized, and contested. The article traces the ideological legacy of FRELIMO's post-independence project of cultural nationalism through debates over youth dance genres, like pandza, *in the mid-2000s, and the increasing alignment of music with corporate and state agendas during Armando Guebuza's presidency (2005-2015). It argues that competing interpretations of a "Mozambican sound" reveal deep class, regional, and generational tensions, and that listening has become a key site for negotiating belonging, dissent, and the limits of state-imposed unity.*

Keywords: Mozambicanness, cultural nationalism, popular music, sonic politics, post-socialism, identity and belonging

"Em Moçambique, ainda temos de encontrar o nosso som": Sonoridades da moçambicanidade após o socialismo

Este artigo examina a evolução da política sonora da moçambicanidade — definida como identidade nacional moçambicana — através da música popular e das práticas sonoras no período pós-independência. Com base em pesquisa etnográfica, análise mediática e entrevistas com músicos e público, explora de que forma a identidade nacional tem sido construída, corporativizada e contestada através do som. O artigo traça o legado ideológico do projeto de nacionalismo cultural promovido pela FRELIMO no período pós-independência através de debates sobre géneros de dança juvenil, como o pandza, *em meados da década de 2000, bem como o crescente alinhamento da música com agendas corporativas e estatais durante a presidência de Armando Guebuza (2005-2015). Argumenta-se que interpretações concorrentes de um "som moçambicano" revelam profundas tensões de classe, regionais e geracionais, e que a escuta se tornou um espaço central para negociar a pertença, a dissidência e os limites da unidade imposta pelo Estado.*

Palavras-chave: moçambicanidade, nacionalismo cultural, música ligeira, política do som, pós-socialismo, identidade e pertença

On October 24, 2024, Mozambique's preliminary presidential and parliamentary election results were released, indicating that the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the ruling party, had won by a significant margin. The results were widely contested, with European Union observers flagging "unjustified alteration" at some polling stations (Magome, 2024). Nationwide demonstrations first began on October 21, 2024, two days after senior opposition officials, Paulo Guambe and Elvino Dias, were assassinated in Maputo.[1]

The protests quickly accelerated in size and intensity, with people from all sectors of society joining street marches, economic boycotts, and nightly *panelaço*, or pot-clanging, in Maputo's cement city. As police and military crackdowns on public demonstrations became more violent and chaotic, using tear gas and live ammunition against protesters, the *panelaço* emerged as a comparatively safe and effective way to sonically demonstrate the strength of dissent.[2] Videos circulated nightly on WhatsApp of residents in high-rise apartment buildings banging on pots and pans and blowing whistles in the dark, generating a sense of unity among residents. As student protester Henrique Amilcar Calioio told Aljazeera reporter Qaanitah Hunter, "It was inspiring to hear people come together for a greater cause" with the pots representing the "voice of voiceless" (Hunter, 2024). At the height of the *panelaço* protests, one widely circulated image showed a reimagined version of the Mozambican flag, where the AK-47 — a symbol of self-governance and vigilance — was replaced with the image of a pot, acknowledging its revolutionary potential. On the eve of Mozambique's fiftieth anniversary of independence, the protests revealed how citizens frustrated with the socioeconomic and political status quo were reimagining some of the foundations of *moçambicanidade* (Mozambicanness), rendering visible and audible the deepening fissures in FRELIMO's power.

Sonic practices, and popular music in particular, have played a role in citizen mobilization, resistance and protest in Mozambique, with hip-hop at the forefront of demands for government accountability in response to an increasingly authoritarian state since the mid-2000s (Bussotti, 2025; Manhiça et al., 2020; Rantala, 2014, 2024; Rosario, 2025; Taela, 2025). While music and sound have been powerful contributions to collective political action as the *panelaço* example demonstrates, the state has exercised artistic control over "Mozambican music"

[1] Paulo Guambe was a senior PODEMOS party official, and Elvino Dias was legal advisor to PODEMOS presidential candidate Venancio Mondlane.

[2] *Panelaço* (pot-banging protest) gained prominence in Brazil in the mid-2010s, when residents used them to voice opposition to Presidents Dilma Rousseff and Jair Bolsonaro (Cháirez, 2024; Rocha, 2020). However, collective pot-banging as protest has a longer transnational history, with roots in 19th-century Europe and later widespread use across Latin America (Sandoval, 2019).

through patronage and media channels since independence, rewarding artists that support the party. For example, in 2014, one popular artist aligned with FRELIMO, whom I'll call Miguel, showed me an official letter from the government exempting him from prosecution and authorizing police escorts when needed.[3] By contrast, artists critical of the government, like the late rapper Azagaia, have frequently been censored (Malauene, 2021, p. 205), though his widespread popularity — especially among working-class youth — reveals how music also circulates outside of state channels of control, creating alternative aesthetic and political modes of identification.

Moçambicanidade is a historically contingent cultural project, with its meanings and uses changing across time and context. While a burgeoning Mozambican nationalism circulated among intellectuals during the late colonial period, the idea of *a "Mozambican personality"* (Simbine, 1976, p. 50) developed as part of FRELIMO's cultural nationalist movement that accompanied its political drive for independence. Although *moçambicanidade* has been expressed through a range of cultural forms — most notably through the literature of José Craveirinha, Noémia de Sousa, Mia Couto, and Ungulani Ba Ka Khosa (Matusse, 1998) — this article focuses on its sonic dimensions. It examines how the concept has been defined and mobilized by the state apparatus, and how it has been articulated, understood, and challenged by musicians and listeners as a political project of (dis) alignment following Mozambique's transition to a multiparty political system. I attend to sound as both a medium and method of political orientation that reveals existing tensions between state-controlled constructions of national unity, and the experiences of citizens excluded along class, party, and regional lines, who differently hear and sometimes actively resist *moçambicanidade*.

FRELIMO has maintained political power since Mozambique's independence in 1975, successfully navigating the transition from single-party socialism to a multi-party market system through gaining control of the state. FRELIMO officially declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party at its Third Congress in February 1977, fusing the party and state, and then nationalizing the formal economy (Chivangue & Cortez, 2015; Harrison, 1999). Yet, local opposition to FRELIMO's socialist projects quickly turned into a much larger conflict fueled and financed by Cold War politics, and by May 1977 Mozambique was engulfed in a war between the state and the militant organization, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), that continued until 1992.[4] The war quickly intensified, Soviet support waned

[3] Pseudonyms are used for some interviewees and for all interlocutors in ethnographic examples to protect their privacy; pseudonyms are indicated in formal interviews.

[4] RENAMO formed in 1976 as an insurgent movement opposing FRELIMO's Marxist policies, initially backed by Zimbabwe's Ian Smith regime and later supported by apartheid South Africa and the Reagan administration.

(Ottaway & Ottaway, 1986), and after President Samora Machel was killed in a 1986 plane crash, the government turned to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank-backed structural adjustment programs. In July 1989, at their Fifth Congress, FRELIMO abandoned Marxism-Leninism, privatizing state assets and ensuring the party maintained economic and political control of the state after the multiparty system was approved in 1990. As a result, democratic reforms increased FRELIMO's hold on power and crystallized class structures as elites developed internal solidarity to maintain their hegemonic position (Sumich, 2008, 2010).

Another key component of FRELIMO's strategy for navigating "the break" is through what Anne Pitcher describes as the "organized forgetting" of socialism (2006). Official government documents, the national hymn, state speeches, and corporate advertisements have all erased socialist-era references in favor of populist language that furthers the merits of capitalism and appeals to international donors, effectively building a "new national identity around the main constructs of neo-liberalism" (Pitcher, 2006, p. 88).

Moçambicanidade has been one of the concepts that survived the reinvention and continues to be utilized as a rhetorical tool in times of civil unrest, when the government needs to appeal to a shared history of revolutionary struggle and post-independence nation building. After the 2010 protests in Maputo over rising fuel and bread prices, and the start of the RENAMO resurgency in Sofala in 2013, then-President Armando Guebuza used his State of the Union address to reassure Mozambicans that his administration was responding to their demands for economic reform. In his speech, he invoked the concept of National Unity, a key concept for FRELIMO since its First Congress in Dar es Salaam in 1962, where Eduardo Mondlane envisioned a new Mozambique would be unified by the common experiences of colonial oppression and exploitation, and operationalized through armed struggle and collective work (Machel, 1975). In Guebuza's refashioning of National Unity, oppression and exploitation were replaced by poverty, which he positioned as the country's primary struggle:

> National Unity is the cement of *moçambicanidade*. It is the mortar that holds together the strong and enduring building that we have been constructing since 1962. It was the guarantor of all our past achievements and victories, and therefore, by continuing to consolidate [our Mozambicanness], we reinforce the certainty that our fight against poverty, today and tomorrow, will be crowned with success. (Reafirma o chefe do estado: Paz é insubstituível, 2013)

Large domestic corporations like Moçambique Celular (Mcel),[5] a telecommunications company, and The BCI (Banco Comercial e de Investimentos Moçambique), a bank, owned by former FRELIMO ministers, followed suit with advertising campaigns promoting national unity. Optimistic slogans like "There is a smile that connects us" (Mcel) appeared on billboards around Maputo, depicting a happy, unified, upwardly mobile citizenry.[6]

The state and corporate media rhetoric "from above", however, glossed over the socioeconomic divide that the 2010 protests confronted "from below." Contrasts in wealth in the nation's capital remained visibly jarring: homeless youth sold plastic bags underneath towering plasma screen TVs on Maputo's major intersections, while luxury cars sped down the city's main arteries, swerving to avoid fruit vendors tugging their carts by hand. Mcel's slogan, "*Estamos Juntos*" (we are together) found little resonance among working-class Mozambicans, who continued to shoulder the growing pains of the economic transition and disastrous structural adjustment policies.

In this article, I follow how disjunctures in experience become audible in the sounds of — and debates about — "Mozambican music," asking: in ongoing processes of consolidating Mozambican identity, who has been left out? What political conditions gave rise to alternative feelings of unity, as occurred during the 2024 *panelaço* protests? Following Steven Feld's methodology of "listening to histories of listening" (Feld, 2015), I trace how Mozambicans learned to listen to different versions of postcolonial national identity as they emerged through formalized sonic expression. I draw on magazine, newspaper, and online media articles; interviews with popular musicians from different generations; and ethnographic research conducted in Maputo City, Zambézia, and Nampula provinces, as well as online, primarily between 2013-2014 and again from 2016-2018, when I spent eighteen months in Pebane Vila, Zambézia, conducting fieldwork on women's mobility as a member of a *tufo* group. I put these sources in conversation across key moments before and after independence when music was central to debates about Mozambican identity.

I begin my analysis in 2013 and 2014, when the corporatization of national unity through music and musicians dominated Maputo's sonic and visual landscape, in what seemed like a coordinated rhetorical panacea to escalating tensions in the country. I then historicize the origins of *moçambicanidade* as a concept, tracing its

[5] In 2019, Moçambique Celular (Mcel) merged with Telecomunicações de Moçambique (TdM) to form Moçambique Telecom SA (Tmcel). I retain "Mcel" to reflect the company's branding in advertisements observed in Maputo in 2014.

[6] Mcel's long-running slogan, "*Há um sorriso que nos liga*" was developed by Agência GOLO in the early 2010s and visible in public advertisements in Mozambique by 2013 (Agência GOLO, 2013).

semantic connection to collective, largely traditional artistic production after independence, as FRELIMO implemented its socialist experiment. Next, I follow the meanings of *moçambicanidade* after the transition to a multiparty market system and into the early years of the Guebuza presidency (2005-2015), when debates over a Mozambican musical identity re-emerged as new hybrid dance styles like *pandza* burst onto the scene. In particular, I analyze the highly publicized "war" between two generations of musicians debating changes in "national" sounds: the *guarda velha* (old guard) who were active in cultivating national culture in the post-independence socialist period, and the *nova geração* (new generation) of youth born after independence who create contemporary dance music. I conclude by moving beyond Maputo City, drawing on ethnographic examples from Zambézia and Nampula that highlight non-hegemonic perspectives on *moçambicanidade* among those listening and creating from marginal positions shaped class, region, and personal politics. Listening to *moçambicanidade* as a sonic text with multiple shifting meanings and an irreducible plurality, I argue, challenges the state-promoted notion of national unity and Mozambican identity that remains largely confined to middle classes in urban Maputo, and the political elite.[7]

The corporatization of moçambicanidade during the Guebuza presidency

Armando Guebuza, nicknamed Mr. Gue-Business from the immense personal fortune he accumulated during the privatization of state-owned enterprises in the 1990s (Mosse, 2004) began his presidency in 2005 focused on rebuilding FRELIMO, tackling corruption, and quelling poverty through economic nationalism. He transitioned the country to a new style of elite capitalism that was dominated by Guebuza family companies and other members of the political elite, ensuring enterprises are "national champions" (Hanlon & Mosse, 2009). His corporate development strategy promoted national identity through consumption — that is, buying Mozambican products, supporting Mozambican businesses, and listening to Mozambican music.

The 2007 launch of "Orgulho Moçambicano. Made in Mozambique", a registered mark displayed by select companies, products, or events to promote Mozambican products in domestic and foreign markets, best exemplifies

[7] Here, "urban middle class" refers to a nebulous social group in and around Maputo defined less by income than by relative proximity to political power, access to education and employment, and a shared, yet ambivalent, investment in FRELIMO's symbolic world and vocabulary (Sumich, 2018). Those who identify as middle class also tend to live in different neighborhoods, have stable income and jobs, and more educational investment than those in the working classes (Manuel, 2023).

Guebuza's vision of corporate nationalism. During its first year, 82 entities met the quality requirements and were granted the right to use the mark, and members consisted of both public and private bodies. Membership conferred a plethora of benefits such as involvement in mark promotion campaigns, priority for training and quality management programs financed by the state, invitation to a "Made in Mozambique" Gala and Expo, among other opportunities and advertising support (WIPO, 2007, p. 95).

In 2010, Mozambique's premier publicity agency, Agência GOLO, launched a similar marketing initiative spearheaded by CEO/Chief Creative Officer Thiago Fonseca, called "Think Local" that aligned with the "Orgulho Moçambicano. Made in Mozambique" mark.[8] During my first visit to Maputo in 2013, I encountered symbols of these "Think Local" campaigns plastered on buildings and on billboards. What I found most intriguing, however, was that music — and specifically, the genres of *marrabenta*[9] and *pandza*[10] — served as a primary vehicle through which *moçambicanidade* was being defined, asserted, and semiotically linked to depictions of national progress, well-being, and consumerism. For example, the image of Neyma Alfredo, Mozambique's "queen of Marrabenta", was plastered on BCI billboards alongside the slogan "Marrabenta is from here, my card is too." The advertisement presented both *marrabenta* and Neyma as uniquely Mozambican to cultivate a similar sense of national pride in banking domestically (Figure 1), in line with a broader marketing campaign to "*moçambicanizar*" (mozambicanize) the bank (Tivane, 2015).

This campaign coincided with the release of her music video "Como Anima A Marrabenta", which evoked *moçambicanidade* through sounds and embodied practices from multiple national traditions.[11] The chorus, "Djin ki dji ki dji" was a vocal imitation of the tin-can guitars that first played the *marrabenta* rhythm during the colonial era, while the sequence of dancers that appear on screen perform *marrabenta* and *makwaela* among other dances. Midway through, the song adopts an electronic house rhythm that sonically references the "modernization"

[8] Agência GOLO was founded by António Alves da Fonseca in 1957 and operated as an advertising company producing radio commercials and live sports broadcasts until it was nationalized in 1977. It returned to private ownership in 1986; Fonseca also worked for *Rádio Moçambique* for five decades, eventually serving as commercial director (Miguel, 2023).

[9] *Marrabenta* developed in the suburbs of Lourenço Marques as a hybrid urban dance rhythm blending local rhythms (*majica, zukuta*) with Western popular music circulating through Mozambican-South African labor migration (Laranjeira, 2014). Today, it is celebrated as national heritage.

[10] *Pandza* is a popular urban dance genre that combines a fast-paced version of *marrabenta*'s *zukuta* rhythm with elements of hip hop and South African *kwaito*.

[11] NeymaMusic, "Neyma-Como Anima A Marrabenta," YouTube Video, 3:31..https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Toax6Vtnpjk

of Mozambique through contemporary electro-dance genres like *pandza*, that emerged around 2005.

Figure 1: BCI storefront with image of Mozambican popular singer, Neyma. Photo by author

The most striking example was "Força" (2013), a popular Mcel commercial produced by Agência GOLO that played on constant repeat on the giant plasma screens overlooking the major intersections in Maputo's *baixa* (downtown).[12] DJ Ardiles, the song's artist, is one of the founders of *pandza*, and frequent campaigner for FRELIMO. In the video, the camera pans across an enthusiastic crowd of Mozambican youth, their faces painted yellow, red, green, and white — the colors of the Mozambican flag. As the crowd raises their hands in rhythmic unison to the beat of the music, some wave small Mozambican flags while others flaunt their cell phones decorated in nationalistic regalia. DJ Ardiles clenches the mic in his fist while spouting off lyrics that indexically link *pandza*, *marrabenta*, the *capulana*,[13] the national flag, and the *machamba*[14] to *moçambicanidade.*

> *É só para lembrar que nosso orgulho nosso filho*/ It's only to remember that our pride, our son
> *Que nossa maior riqueza na vida nosso filho*/ That our biggest riches in life, our son
> *É só para lembrar que temos Moçambique nosso filho*/ It's only to remember that we have Mozambique, our son
> *A machamba onde trabalhamos nosso filho*/ The garden where we work, our son

[12] Golo Mozambique, "Mcel 'Força' 2 minutos," YouTube Video, 2:02. youtube.com/watch?v=Wp5x1bzykNQ

[13] A *capulana* is a brightly colored cotton fabric, about 1.7 by 1 meter, that is an important symbol of beauty and national identity in Mozambique (Arnfred & Meneses, 2018).

[14] Large garden plots that are central to rural economies and subsistence farming.

O pandza nosso filho/ Pandza, our son
Marrabenta nosso filho/ Marrabenta, our son
A capulana nosso filho/ The capulana, our son
A nossa bandeira nosso filho/ Our flag, our son

Força! Força!/ Strength! Strength!
Na nossa moçambicanidade/ In our Mozambicanness
Força! Força!/ Strength! Strength!
No nosso orgulho pela terra (2x)/ In our pride for the land

As the song reaches its climax, the chants are dubbed over with a woman's friendly voice saying, "Our smile connects us," and the bright yellow and green Mcel logo appears on the screen, followed by "Mcel. Mozambican Pride." The video exudes a vision of the collective effervescence and nationalism that the state and corporate sector (one and the same) were trying to evoke through buzz words like "strength" and "unity." These words loosely recall the struggle for independence as a shared history, but the image of *moçambicanidade* conveyed through the video is youthful, modern, jubilant, and always accompanied by a smile. While such optimism resonates with Mozambique's political elite, it fails to capture the experiences of the working-class majority, and Mcel's video masks the significant tensions that exist beneath these smiling images. In particular, cell phones played a powerful role in the 2010 riots — subverting state power by organizing protests via text in a country where, at that time, most people did not have registered cell phone numbers.

Cosmopolitanism, clubs, and the beginnings of national identity in colonial Lourenço Marques

The origin of *moçambicanidade* has long been debated in Mozambican historiography. Severino Ngoenha argues that the concept originated with the founding of FRELIMO in 1962 as a project aimed at overcoming ethnic, regional, cultural, linguistic, racial divisions, seeking to "unify all political micro-communities and integrate them into one single political dynamic" (Ngoenha, 1998, pp. 20-23, as cited in Filipe, 2012, p. 24). Yet, Samuel Ngale traces Mozambican nationalism back even further, as an aesthetic manifestation in the poetry of José Craveirinha (Ngale, 2011, p. 10). While FRELIMO and post-independence ideas of national identity are generally considered the "high point of *moçambicanidade*," its development forms part of a longer, ongoing process of identity formation rather than

a fixed identity deriving from a single historical moment (Filipe, 2012, pp. 25-26; Macamo, 1998; Ngoenha, 1998; Serra, 1998).

A culturally and politically situated sense of *moçambicanidade* began to take shape in the 1950s in urban Lourenço Marques, initially through the literary output of a racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse group of predominately male intellectuals who expressed the concept through ideas about music (Filipe, 2012, p. 4). Although colonial policies and ideology sought to enforce racial, social, and cultural segregation, music production and consumption were among the few spaces of exception (Mendes, 2021). As the city expanded, absorbing white settlers, Muslim Comorian immigrants, and African labor migrants, a vibrant nightlife developed (Sopa, 2013). African musicians became proficient in Mozambican genres like *majika, zukuta* and *marrabenta,* and in foreign styles like Portuguese *marchas,* South African *marabi* and *kwela,* Brazilian *samba,* Cuban *rumba*, American jazz and swing, that they performed at suburban night clubs. In the 1930s and 40s, clubs in the *caniço* neighborhoods became popular spaces where people from diverse racial, religious and national backgrounds congregated to listen to music and dance.[15]

The 1950s and 60s are often recalled as the "golden years of Mozambican music," with styles like *marrabenta* demonstrating potential as a "cosmopolitan dance" that could circulate internationally (Craveirinha, 1970, p. 9).[16] However, the growing popularity of foreign music genres among local musicians also concerned Lourenço Marques intellectuals — a diverse group who "breached the cultural divide between *assimilados* and *indígenas,* and between Africans and white settlers and Europeans" (Filipe, 2012, p. 180).[17] Committed to the promotion of Black culture, many began advocating for musicians to perform "authentic" Mozambican music that resisted foreign sonic influence and persistent Portuguese cultural values (Sopa, 2013, p. 15; Filipe, 2012, p. 220), ideas that proved to be durable in FRELIMO's creation of a national culture.

[15] *Caniço* refers to the "cane" neighborhoods where most Africans resided; many clubs were owned by the Comorian Muslim community, and the *Clube dos Zambezianos* was also popular.

[16] I follow Turino's definition of cosmopolitanism as "objects, ideas, and cultural positions that are widely diffused throughout the world and yet specific only to certain portions of the populations within given countries" (Turino, 2000, p. 7). In Mozambique, like Zimbabwe, a shared cosmopolitan *habitus* is linked to social power, prestige, and an educated elite, and "became a central basis for a corporate, black, middle-class identity and for nationalism itself" (Turino, 2000, p.11).

[17] Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Portuguese colonial policy introduced a series of labor laws that classified *indígenas* (natives) — a legally inferior status defined in opposition to nonnative *civilizados* (civilized persons) — and subjected them to customary law, taxation, and forced labor. In 1926, under the *Estatuto do Indigenato,* a new legal category, *assimilado* (assimilated), was introduced granting limited citizenship rights to a small number of Africans deemed to have adopted Portuguese language, religion, dress, and social customs (Obarrio, 2014, pp. 36-46).

Moral music, productive laborers, and the old guard

FRELIMO was founded in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on June 25, 1962, as an intellectuals' party, merging three pre-existing liberation organizations: Mozambique African National Union (MANU), African National Union for Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), and Mozambique National Democratic Union (UDENAMO). With each movement representing groups from different regions of Mozambique, their unification as FRELIMO was read as signaling the beginning of a single, modern nation of Mozambique. However, leadership was largely asymmetrical, dominated by the new, urban elites of the far South and marginalizing those from the Zambezi valley and the Islamicized north, consequently establishing long-lasting fissures in FRELIMO's national unity agenda (Cahen, 2000, Chichava, 2008).

Within FRELIMO, nationalism was fundamentally a cultural project — one spearheaded by a small, educated elite concerned with forming the nation as a distinct moral community (Hutchinson, 2013). As Leerssen (2006) has shown in European nationalist contexts, the "cultivation of culture" is a political strategy that invests cultural forms with national symbolism at moments when national identity is still unstable. In postcolonial contexts, where there is no pre-existing common identity unit, cultural nationalism — the "semiotic work of using expressive practices and forms to fashion the concrete emblems that stand for and create the 'nation'" — becomes a primary means through which citizens are socialized into national sentiment (Turino, 2003, p. 175). Cultural nationalism is therefore serious political work, and as the independence struggle waged on, FRELIMO adopted a more militant approach, and the definition of Mozambican national culture narrowed in scope: content must be revolutionary and anti-tribalist, it should militarize and discipline people, and songs and dances "should be weapons of mobilization in the fight against ignorance and superstition" (Israel, 2014, p. 154).

Central to FRELIMO's cultural and educational agenda was the creation of the *Homem Novo* (New Man), a person liberated from the corruption and exploitation of capitalism (Vieira, 1978). Graça Simbine, then Minister of Culture and Education, explained:

> Next to creating a "Mozambican personality," FRELIMO concentrates on bringing into being a "New Man," the Socialist Man, the Man free from all superstitions and obscurantist subservience…[who displays] the "values of the working and peasant class". (Simbine, 1976, p. 50)

Yet, at the same time, traditional social practices like initiation rites, bride-wealth and polygyny were deemed obscurantist and backwards because they were antithetical to scientific socialism, exposing inconsistencies in FRELIMO's claims to represent *o povo* (the people): the peasants, and rural workers (Freitas & Carvalho, 2022, p. 218).

These modern/traditional and urban/rural binaries ultimately alienated large portions of the population and shaped moral assessments of music and dance. After independence, commercial artists that performed *música ligeira* ('light music') — urban, popular music, featuring Western electronic instruments, and played for entertainment purposes — were considered by the regime to be compromised by capitalism and therefore unfit to represent "true Mozambican culture" (Freitas & Carvalho, 2022, pp. 218-219). For example, a report produced by the Coordinating Commission of United Mozambican Musicians that was programming musical performances for the 1975 Cultural Festival of Independence positioned 'evolved' urban musicians as enemies of the state. The report reads:

> The Commission has had good reception from the bulk of musicians, but unfortunately there are some 'evolved' musicians who don't participate in the meetings and injure elements of the commission by circulating all types of rumors: they are the musical reactionaries, that are completely alienated and are holding on to 'Soul Musics', forgetting that we have similar rhythms for lyrics that are purely Mozambican (Músicos Moçambicanos organizam-se politicamente, 1975).

These statements point to a clear definition of who the ideal musician was — rural, free of elitism, committed to producing music consistent with the revolutionary ideology — while also delineating which musicians and genres, like *marrabenta,* were outside the regime's restricted definition of "authentic" Mozambican music (Freitas, 2023a, p. 413).

Urban musicians were further targeted when FRELIMO shut down most of Maputo's nightclubs after independence as a part of Operation Production, an initiative aimed at removing unproductive residents — such as drunks, vagabonds, and prostitutes — from cities. Many were sent to rural areas to undertake agricultural labor (Sheldon, 2002, p. 155) or were subjected to ideological reformation through prolonged stays in re-education camps (Machava, 2024). Cabarets and nightclubs were likewise framed as "'living museum[s]' of colonial exploitation, where 'vices' such as alcohol, drugs, and prostitution thrive in consonance with nocturnal, bohemian, and 'bourgeois' features" (Freitas, 2023a, p. 411). Musicians working in Maputo's few remaining night clubs were particu-

larly vulnerable during this period because they were not issued official work papers for the first few years after independence and faced arrest when traveling to and from work at night. Women were at greater risk for arrest, as their presence in clubs after dark was frequently conflated with prostitution (Mingas, musician, personal communication, Maputo, 4 August 2014).

By contrast, rural musical practices, broadly categorized as "traditional music," "were seen as the most suitable musical field to build the 'new Mozambican man'" insofar as they were understood as cultural expressions of *o povo* (Freitas & Carvalho, 2022, p. 218). In 1977, the National Institute of Culture —housed within the Ministry of Education and Culture — launched a five-week campaign called the Cultural Offensive of the Working Classes, aimed at involving workers in discussions about the definition of culture and its manifestations, while consolidating musical activity under state oversight (Ofensiva cultural das classes trabalhadoras, 1977). Under this program, musicians were sent to rural regions to learn "purely Mozambican" rhythms and songs to incorporate into the national culture. Additionally, culture groups were formed within state institutions like communal villages, schools, and factories, and *Casas da Cultura* (cultural houses) were established around the country as formative centers for the creation of new culture (Ofensiva cultural das classes trabalhadoras: Casas de cultura, 1977).

Many of the musicians commonly referred to as the old guard were active participants in the creation of the new national music after independence. Through their involvement in FRELIMO's cultural programs, they developed a specific understanding of how *moçambicanidade* materializes through sound: Mozambican music should utilize rural rhythms, lyrics should be overtly political and socially critical, and there should be no audible foreign influence. At the same time, they established a relationship with the state based on patronage. Some musicians were employed as cultural workers, traveling the country to boost morale during the civil war, performing at official functions, and composing music for state radio (Freitas, 2023a). For Grupo Rádio Moçambique, the 1980s were a productive period despite war time constraints, as they were employed by the government to perform Mozambican music for ministries and political audiences. By 1989, however, the Ministry of Education and Culture stopped promoting music and organizing shows, and Grupo RMs subsidiary group, Orchestra Marrabenta Star de Mozambique, and other popular groups like Ghorwane and Eyuphuro sought opportunities abroad within the burgeoning "World Music" market in Europe (Freitas, 2023c).

As the public sector diminished, state support of the arts almost entirely disappeared. The war had disastrous effects on the national economy, and the clo-

sure of shops in Maputo limited access to musical instruments, accessories like guitar strings, and sound equipment (Freitas, 2023a, p. 418; 2023b, p. 88). With no accessible recording studios and few performance venues, the music industry stagnated, and some musicians migrated to South Africa or Europe. For those who stayed, the 1990s were a difficult period for cultural production, as economic liberalization and austerity measures weakened the public sector and culture industries. Yet within this difficult period, heated debates began to emerge about Mozambican musical identity in the media, as people attempted to define what is Mozambican in "Mozambican music" (Langa, 2006, p. 6), especially as socialism, and its revolutionary values, were being actively erased from official memory (Pitcher, 2006).

At war over sound? The old guard, new generation and Mozambican music identity in the "País do Pandza"

Around 2005, new urban dance styles began to flood Maputo's music scene. *Pandza* quickly became a constant in Maputo's soundscape, circulating in clubs, parties, on the radio, and in "chapa 100" — the semicollective transportation minibuses that traverse the city. The genre quickly came to represent a new form of *moçambicanidade* that aligned with members of the *nova geração* (new generation) born after independence. For historian Rui Laranjeira, *pandza's* success was an indication of the economic innovativeness of the younger generation: "They severed the umbilical cord that linked them to the old generation, to 'marrabenta', and created a new rhythm that they identify with, and that expresses their desires, frustrations and fears" (Laranjeira, 2010, para. 3). I observed the sustained enthusiasm for *pandza* at *Festival d'Ouro, Música Mocambicana* at Ma Tchiki-Tchiki in Maputo on June 28, 2014. The festival was produced by Mcel, with the first lady, Maria da Luz Dai Guebuza, listed as the patron — offering an excellent example of how corporations and the government worked together in crafting corporate cultural nationalism. The festival was held outdoors and showcased many of Mozambique's best-known live artists like Stewart Sukuma, Mingas, Ghorwane, Eyuphuro and Wazimbo — mostly members of the "old guard" who started their careers during the single-party system. The audience was supportive of the live bands but in between sets the DJ blared *pandza* from the loudspeakers and the crowd went wild, coming to life.

Mozambican music has long held a marginal position within the broader Portuguese-speaking music industries, overshadowed by the global popularity of music from Cape Verde, Angola and Brazil, and regionally by the dominance

of South African genres. As the first Mozambican dance music to receive significant airtime in Maputo's clubs, *pandza* was Mozambican music that youth were proud of, elevating both their sense of Mozambican identity and burgeoning cosmopolitanism. Wanda, a young, middle-class woman from Maputo told me:

> Before pandza it was always Angolan, South African, or American tunes. With pandza, however, a lot of young people became excited and proud to be able to dance to something made in Mozambique. The lyrics are basic, of course, but that's not the point of the music. It's purely dance music — it's electronified Mozambican rhythms turned into club tunes and that's what is exciting. (Wanda (pseudonym), personal communication, Maputo, 25 July 2014)

Wanda's comments point to several key shifts in debates around Mozambican musical identity after 2005. First, popular music increasingly came to be defined in relation to that of other nation-states, accompanied by a growing anxiety over the production quality of its musical exports and how Mozambican music — and by extension Mozambicans — would be perceived abroad. As Cláudio A. Rodrigues wrote in a 2010 article in *Revista Musical*, the official publication of the Mozambican Musicians' Association, "The musical level of the country should be measured by the quality of its musical production, creativity and capacity for innovation… What place do we occupy in the international arena?" (Rodrigues, 2010, p. 3). While Rodrigues attributed the international music success of other African countries like Congo, Nigeria, and South Africa to their developed music industries, a report titled *The Contract Guide for the Mozambique Music Sector* (International Trade Center, 2010) highlighted the many obstacles faced by musicians in Mozambique: lack of copyright legislation, commercial recording infrastructure, and national music policies all hindered the quality of music production and potential for international success.

Second, many musicians and listeners from the older generations expressed unease with the artistic quality of the new dance styles promoted as Mozambican, particularly with respect to song lyrics and rhythms. During the socialist period, lyrics had been central to the circulation of revolutionary ideas, national consciousness and social values. This point was emphasized by musician and composer Chico António of Grupo RM, who described his lyric writing process as directly drawing on conversations he heard around town in order to respond to people's problems and important social issues (Chico António, personal communication, Maputo, 30 July 2014).

Youth music, in contrast, was widely criticized for its watered-down lyrics, musical repetition, and oversexualized content, rendering older sounds of

moçambicanidade nearly inaudible. FRELIMO Secretary-General Filipe Paúnde articulated this position directly in 2008:

> Musicians are supposed to contribute to combatting crime and poverty and rectify moral vicissitudes through their lyrics, but all the Mozambican youth want to do is sing about pleasure. This is not what music is about. It is supposed to develop and project an image of the country — of *moçambicanidade* — as courageous. (Moyana, 2008, p. 29)

Popular artist MC Roger, who was one of the most heavily promoted artists in 2008 and 2009, was often singled out for being lyrically unimaginative; the chorus to his song "Moçambique, I love you" is "I love you Moçambique /I love you, I love you." Yet, as sociologist Patrício Langa observed, MC Roger's lyrics are passionate and filled with evocations of the nation and his homeland (Langa, 2006, p. 6), indicating that emotional expression can be as important as lyrics.

Moreover, for many *pandza* listeners, lyrics were secondary to the beat — its danceability — which became the primary marker of musical quality. This shift reflected changing production and consumption practices, as emphasis moved from complex rhythmic structures to beats that were easily produced, circulated, and danced to. The reduction of Mozambique's rhythmic diversity into a more standardized and marketable sound troubled representatives of the old guard. As Chico António observed, "There is not much attention to the complex rhythms of Mozambique as there was before. Everything is the beat now" (Chico António, personal communication, Maputo, 30 July 2014). Musician Hortêncio Langa similarly described a growing rhythmic homogenization as styles such as *pandza* drifted toward hip-hop and jazz, losing what he viewed as distinctively Mozambican elements (Hortêncio Langa, personal communication, Maputo, 2 July 2014).

Debates over lyrics and rhythm revealed a generational divide in how music mediated the political. Musicians shaped by the socialist period associated *moçambicanidade* with "pure" traditional expressions and rural rhythms linked to *o povo*, where politics were expected to be explicit in lyrical content and aesthetic form. Youth invested in urban dance genres, by contrast, located music's political potential in the beat itself, which enabled moments of escape, creating opportunities for reimagining identity, pleasure and belonging — an orientation comparable to electronic dance music scenes elsewhere (Livermon, 2020; Garcia-Mispireta, 2023). At the same time, young Mozambicans situated these sounds within a regional African landscape, comparing fast-paced styles such as *bon-*

doro[18] from Beira with dances circulating on Angolan and South African television. Participation in urban dance music therefore became a way of positioning a Mozambican identity within a wider African cultural landscape.

However, the broader societal acceptance of *pandza* as an expression of *moçambicanidade* — and one eligible for scarce funding sources — was interpreted by some as evidence of moral decline in Mozambique. As a result, what has been called the "war" between the old guard and the new generation over the sound of *moçambicanidade* emerged in tandem with *pandza*'s popular success, playing out in interviews, editorials, and blog posts by journalists and public intellectuals such as Patrício Langa (2006) and Carlos Serra (2007). Writing in *Revista Musical*, journalist Ilídio Jossai observed that tensions between *antiga geração* (old generation) and the *nova vaga* (new wave) had become "a subject that in recent times has characterized the musical class" (Jossai, 2010, p. 4). Others, including Wazimbo — one of the most prominent singers of the old guard —dismissed the "war" as a media invention, dramatized by journalists and writers who did not understand music (Jossai, 2010, p. 5). These debates over *moçambicanidade* in music nevertheless became an important cultural touchpoint, bringing to the foreground ideological tensions produced by the economic transition.

However, the broader societal acceptance of *pandza* as an expression of *moçambicanidade* — and one eligible for scarce funding sources — was interpreted by some as evidence of moral decline in Mozambique. As a result, what has been called the "war" between the old guard and the new generation over the sound of *moçambicanidade* emerged in tandem with *pandza*'s popular success, playing out in interviews, editorials, and blog posts by journalists and public intellectuals such as Patrício Langa (2006) and Carlos Serra (2007). Writing in *Revista Musical*, journalist Ilídio Jossai observed that tensions between *antiga geração* (old generation) and the *nova vaga* (new wave) had become "a subject that in recent times has characterized the musical class" (Jossai, 2010, p. 4). Others, including Wazimbo — one of the most prominent singers of the old guard —dismissed the "war" as a media invention, dramatized by journalists and writers who did not understand music (Jossai, 2010, p. 5). These debates over *moçambicanidade* in music nevertheless became an important cultural touchpoint, bringing to the foreground ideological tensions produced by the economic transition.

MC Roger, who has close ties with FRELIMO, was the only musician from the new generation invited to the meeting. In reflecting on the state of Mozambican

[18] See, for example, Lagartos Bondoristas' video for "Como se dança em Moz" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C3JBPtDSPGE

music, he argued that contemporary music was more developed than that of the past:

> What happens is that the old-timers don't want to integrate with the new wave, which is the wave of innovation. We're in the 21st century and we can't continue clinging to things of the past, even though we can build on that past and recreate it. (Moyana, 2008, p. 29)

His remarks offer insight into the ways FRELIMO's project of "organized forgetting" (Pitcher, 2006) operates within the cultural sphere, positioning musical styles and musicians associated with the nation-building period and socialist era in opposition to innovation and the "new wave" of capitalist-era cultural expression. Roger's perspective also captures a broader transformation in music as a nationalist tool after the transition: from an art form that builds a national cultural identity through creation, to one that contributes to the development of the national economy, through consumption.

Listening for difference: class, region, and the dismantling of *moçambicanidade*

The varied ways in which people hear, practice, and experience *moçambicanidade* reiterates how differing historical, economic and political contexts shape cultural citizenship and listening practices. The idea of a unified Mozambican sound — whether articulated by the old guard, new generation, or FRELIMO — becomes further destabilized when considered from the perspectives of those furthest removed from the nucleus of state power: working-class Mozambicans and residents of the central and northern provinces. Ethnographic fieldwork revealed that those who understood *moçambicanidade* as something tangible and expressible through music had closest proximity to the state, whether spatially, by living in Maputo; politically, as FRELIMO affiliates; or socially, as members of the educated middle and elite classes. For cultural, political, and economic outsiders, however, many of the debates about a sonic national identity that were evident in Maputo — such as, whether Mozambique is the "Country of Marrabenta", or the "Country of Pandza" — were largely inaccessible and irrelevant, pointing to multiple, uneven experiences of *moçambicanidade.*

One night, in July 2014, I was riding home with Angelo, a young singer from Laulane, a neighborhood on the outskirts of Maputo, who was trying to make ends meet as a taxi driver. He spent time in South Africa taking singing lessons, but upon his return, found it impossible to survive as a musician in Mozambique

— a sentiment expressed by musicians from all levels of society. When I asked Angelo why that was, he responded: "In South Africa, they have kwaito, or other forms of music that you can perform that people listen to. Sure, marrabenta is popular, but the problem is that here in Mozambique, we still have to find our national sound." At the time, I found his comment surprising given that musicians from the old guard and new generation seemed to have such well-defined understandings of moçambicanidade, and what Mozambican music was. But these musicians, often by virtue of their proximity to FRELIMO, are also a part of Mozambique's middle and upper classes.

Young, working-class musicians in Maputo, by contrast, struggled to define *moçambicanidade* through music. Manecas, an aspirational producer who had set up a make-shift studio in his one-room apartment in Maputo's Chamanculo neighborhood, didn't hear Neyma's music — or even *marrabenta* — as communicating a strong sense of *moçambicanidade.* Instead, he saw her corporate sponsorship positively because it meant musicians would have a mechanism to support themselves through music alone. Manecas explained that he connected more to American hip-hop because it was created by artists from a social class similar to his own, whereas *moçambicanidade* today seemed to reference "smiley, nice" Mozambicans (and implicitly, those from a different class position).

Adelson, a musician from Beira, insisted that *moçambicanidade* was a Maputo-centered political affiliation rather than a national cultural identity. From his perspective, artists in the capital maintained close ties to FRELIMO and were willing to "sell themselves" for money. As everyone knows, he added, the only ones who are supported praise FRELIMO. He also pointed to the regional exclusion in Mozambique's popular music economy, noting that artists from the central and northern provinces are rarely visible in national media and advertising — "It's very Maputo-centric." (Adelson (pseudonym), personal communication, Maputo, 17 June 2014). Recent research by Luca Bussotti and Laura Antonio Nhaueleque (2023) situates these exclusions within longer histories of regional and ethnic marginalization in Mozambican nation-building, dynamics that continue to shape cultural participation in the present.

Regional divides in music making and consumption in Mozambique became especially apparent when traveling through Zambézia and Nampula provinces, where genres associated with Maputo, such as *marrabenta* and *pandza*, were largely absent. In Maputo in June 2014, CD hawkers reported that their best-selling disc was *Moz Jovem* (Moz Youth), a compilation featuring *pandza* artists like Ziqo because, as one hawker explained, "he has a good beat." When I asked for additional examples of Mozambican music, vendors offered burned CDs by

Maputo-based artists such as Mingas, Dilon Djindi, Mr Bow, and Azagaia. Yet just a month later in Quelimane and Nampula, these recordings were nowhere to be found on the black market. Instead, hawkers in Nampula identified their top-selling disc as *Macua Original* — regional pop sung in Makhuwa that I had never encountered in Maputo's markets.

The clearest illustration of the regionalization of musical identity occurred at Zalala Fest, an annual music festival near Quelimane. I attended in 2014 with local friends who were eager to show me what they described as "the real Mozambique" outside of Maputo. Late one night, an artist from Maputo performed to a lukewarm response from the audience. Attempting to energize the crowd, he announced that his two back up dancers — also from Maputo — had learned *nhambaro*, a rhythm/dance associated with Quelimane, and were going to show off their skills on stage. Reluctantly, they began to dance, but within a minute, a man from the audience pushed past the on-stage security to demonstrate how *nhambaro* should properly be danced. Too embarrassed to continue, the dancers were replaced by several people from the crowd who were eager to display their skills on stage. My friend Domingo, a Quelimane native who had grown tired of my questions about *moçambicanidade* in Maputo, smugly turned to me and said, "Look! What have I been telling you! Mozambican music doesn't exist. And see how impossible it is for these dancers from Maputo to learn our dance? The rhythms up North are much more complicated than they are in the South."

Domingo, like many other listeners and musicians I've encountered, resists the dominant narrative of "Mozambican music" promoted by state and corporate institutions. This refusal to hear *moçambicanidade* as imposed from above is also a refusal of cultural homogenization, and the streamlining of Mozambique's diverse musical styles into a single, state-sanctioned sound. Following Josh Kun, this is a "critical listening" that does not reject unity outright, "but questions its default functionality as an apparatus of obligatory group belonging and nationalist solidarity" (Kun, 2005, p. 16). Kun, writing about the U.S. context, describes how a nationalist model of music can repress diversity. But he argues that popular music can also cultivate what Chela Sandoval calls, "differential consciousness": "an oppositional consciousness of self, citizenship and nation that actively refutes and re-orders oppressive hierarchies of power and control" (Kun, 2005, p. 17). "Differential consciousness" in Mozambique emerges when a listener from Quelimane or Beira actively rejects *marrabenta* as Mozambican, hearing it only as an artform from Maputo. It is also evident when a women's *tufo* group from Pebane, Zambézia chooses an event program that includes revolutionary hymns,

a *qasida* in Arabic, popular Swahili music, and wedding songs sung in Makhuwa — collectively resisting any singular notion of citizenship (Hebden, 2023). It emerges, still, among musicians from the new generation who understand *mocambicanidade* as nuanced, practice-based and subjective. In her 2015 artist statement, singer Isabel Novella explained:

> For me, *moçambicanidade* is the way Mozambicans think, feel, and express themselves, and it varies from person to person. In general, I would say that *moçambicanidade* is something that is not discussed, but rather practiced. (Isabel Novella, personal communication, 11 December 2015)

Conclusion

This article has traced the shifting meanings of *moçambicanidade* across historical periods and political transformations, showing how the concept has repeatedly been mobilized by the state as an appeal to national unity while remaining unstable in practice. From its emergence in urban cosmopolitan circles to its consolidation during the socialist revolution and its later commodification under the Guebuza presidency, *moçambicanidade* has never been a fixed or unified project. Rather, it has functioned as a contested ideological field shaped by state actors, corporations, musicians, and listeners advancing competing visions of what it means to sound Mozambican.

I have shown how this transformation became especially visible in Maputo between 2013 and 2014, when cultural nationalism gave way to corporate nationalism amid political uncertainty. Genres such as *marrabenta* and *pandza* — both criticized in the past for their hybrid aesthetics — were reframed in advertising and media campaigns as sonic foundations of a modern national identity. Initiatives such as Agência GOLO's "Think Local" and music videos like Neyma's "Como Anima Marrabenta" and DJ Ardiles' "Força" presented *moçambicanidade* less as an explicit political project than as an affective experience enacted through consumption, dance, and everyday participation. In these representations, national unity appeared cheerful and exuberant, redirecting attention away from conflict and inequality toward shared symbols of belonging.

Yet debates among musicians revealed that this redefinition was neither uncontested nor complete. While socialist references were erased from official rhetoric, the aesthetic and political values cultivated by musicians of the old guard endured, shaping their expectations of what *moçambicanidade* should sound like. Conflicts with younger artists and audiences were therefore not simply generational disagreements over style, but reflected a deeper shift in music's relation-

ship to the state: from a cultural expression that is part of a broader strategy to construct a national community (Hutchinson, 2013; Leerssen, 2006) to a cultural industry aligned with market logics and new patterns of consumption among urban middle and upper classes. For younger listeners, Mozambican beats offered spaces of creativity, escapism, and regional connection through dance, situating *moçambicanidade* within broader African music and dance styles rather than within a singular national tradition.

Moving beyond Maputo further destabilizes state-centered definitions of national culture. Ethnographic encounters across class and regional contexts demonstrate that the idea of a unified Mozambican sound — asserted in state rhetoric and debated by prominent musicians — often holds little relevance for those positioned outside political and economic centers of power. Listening practices in central and northern provinces reveal multiple, sometimes conflicting ways of hearing the nation, exposing the limits of national unity as a lived experience. Such divergences are what state-led cultural and corporate nationalist projects attempt to smooth over, even as Mozambicans continue to hear and articulate difference in everyday musical life.

The *panelaço* protests described at the outset make this tension audible. Struggles over how Mozambique sounds remain inseparable from struggles over how it is imagined politically, demonstrating that national identity is negotiated not only through institutions and discourse but through collective acts of listening. Hearing *moçambicanidade*, therefore, requires moving beyond official narratives of unity toward the layered "histories of listening" that shape Mozambique's sonic imagination. Rather than expressing a stable national identity, "Mozambican music" emerges as a contested process structured by unequal access to visibility, mobility, and recognition. As musicians, audiences, and protesters continually reconsider what Mozambique sounds like, *moçambicanidade* remains an ongoing negotiation through which social and political alignments are made — and unmade.

References

Agência GOLO. (2013, May 17). *O novo anúncio da Mcel liga-nos ainda mais à cultura local moçambicana*. [Image attached] Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/GOLOthinklocal/photos/o-novo-an%C3%BAncio-da-mcel-liga-nos-ainda-mais-%C3%A0-cultura-local-mo%C3%A7ambicana-arte-feit/514865655241403/

Arnfred, S., & Meneses, M. P. (2018). Mozambican capulanas: Tracing histories and memories. In S. P. Khan, M. P. Meneses, & B. E. Bertelsen (Eds.), *Mozambique on the move* (pp. 186-210). Brill.

Bussotti, L. (2025). Movimentos sociais urbanos em Moçambique. O radicalismo político depois da morte de Azagaia. *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*, 47, 93-119.

Bussotti, L., & Nhaueleque, L. A. (2023). The hidden music of a hidden people: The case of Amakhuwa of Northern Mozambique. *Ethnomusicology*, *67*(3), 358-382.

Cahen, M. (2000). Nationalism and ethnicities: Lessons from Mozambique. In E. Braathen, M. Beas, & G. Saether (Eds.), *Ethnicity kills? The politics of war, peace and ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa* (pp. 163-187). Palgrave Macmillan.

Cháirez, C. B. (2024). "So let's bang on some pots": Sound, intimacy, and the public life of affect in Brazil's panelaços. *Ethnomusicology*, *68*(3), 458-481.

Chichava, S. (2008, April). *Para uma leitura sócio-histórica da etnicidade em Moçambique*. Discussion Paper 1/2008. Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE).

Chivangue, A., & Cortez, E. (2015). *An analysis of Mozambique's political and economic networks*. Working Paper 136/2015, CEsA - Research center part of CSG/Research in Social Sciences and Management.

Craveirinha, J. (1970, July 7). A revolução folclore. *O Brado Africano*, p. 9.

Freitas, M. R. de. (2023a). Being a musician in socialist Mozambique: From invisibility to unfeasibility (1974-1994). *Popular Music and Society*, *46*(4), 407-430.

Freitas, M. R. de. (2023b). 'In heavy rotation': Uncovering the phonographic industry and the 'NGOMA national label' in socialist Mozambique (1978-1990). *Ethnomusicology Forum*, *32*(1), 73-96.

Freitas, M. R. de. (2023c). Between war, politics, and "something nice back home": Uncovering the first Mozambican experiences within the "World Music" market (1987-1994). *Yearbook for Traditional Music*, *55*(2), 193-219. https://doi.org/10.1017/ytm.2023.23

Freitas, M. R. de, & Carvalho, J. S. de. (2022). Performing a culture, staging the revolution: Choral singing and traditional music as nation-building tropes in post-colonial Mozambique. *Nations and Nationalism*, *28*(1), 211-230.

Filipe, E. (2012). Where are the Mozambican musicians? Music, marrabenta and national identity in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique (1950s-1975). Doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, Minnesota, USA.

Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison* (A. Sheridan, Trans.). Allen Lane/Penguin Press.

Hanlon, J., & Mosse, M. (2009). *Is Mozambique's elite moving from corruption to development?* Paper presented at UnU-WIDER Conference on the Role of Elites in Economic Development, Helsinki, Finland, June 12-13.

Harrison, G. (1999). Corruption as 'boundary politics': The state, democratization, and Mozambique's unstable liberalization. *Third World Quarterly*, *20*(3), 537-550.

Hebden, E. E. (2023). Swahili covers, Sufi prayers, and liberation hymns: Women's mobilities in competitive tufo dance associations in northern Mozambique. In J. Sykes, & J. Byl (Eds.), *Sounding the Indian Ocean*: *Musical circulations in the Afro-Asiatic seascape* (pp. 77-98). University of California Press.

Hunter, Q. (2024, November 15). Clanging pans: Why Mozambique's election protesters refuse to go away. *Al Jazeera*. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/11/15/clanging-pans-why-mozambiques-election-protesters-refuse-to-go-away

Hutchinson, J. (2013). Cultural nationalism. In J. Breuilly (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of the history of nationalism* (pp. 75-96). Oxford University Press.

Feld, S. (2015). Acoustemology. In D. Novak, & M. Sakakeeny (Eds.), *Keywords in sound* (pp. 12-21). Duke University Press.

Garcia-Mispireta, L. M. (2023). *Together, somehow: Music, affect and intimacy on the dancefloor.* Duke University Press.

International Trade Center. (2010). *The contract guide for the Mozambique music sector*. UN-Millennium Development Goals.

Israel, P. (2014). *In step with the times: Mapiko masquerades of Mozambique*. Ohio University Press.

Jossai, I. (2010, November/December). Wazimbo elogia novo elenco da Associação dos Músicos. *Revista Musical*, 3, pp. 4-5.

Kun, J. (2005). *Audiotopia: Music, race, and America.* University of California Press.

Langa, P. (2006, February 8). Reflexão sobre a música e identidade moçambicana. *Notícias*, p. 6.

Laranjeira, R. G. (2010, August 15). O Dzukuta-Pandza está a bater em Moçambique. *Buala.* http://www.buala.org/pt/palcos/o-dzukuta-pandza-esta-a-bater-em-Moçambique

Laranjeira, R. G. (2014). *A marrabenta: Sua evolução e estilização, 1950-2002*. Minerva.

Leerssen, J. (2006). Nationalism and the cultivation of culture. *Nations and Nationalisms*, *12*(4), 559-578.

Livermon, X. (2020). *Kwaito bodies: Remastering space and subjectivity in post-apartheid South Africa*. Duke University Press.

Macamo, E. (1998). A influência da religião na formação de identidades sociais no sul de Moçambique. In C. Serra (Ed.), *Identidade, moçambicanidade, moçambicanização* (pp. 35-69). Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Livraria Universitária.

Machava, B. (2024). *The morality of revolution: Reeducation camps and the politics of punishment in socialist Mozambique, 1968-1990.* Ohio University Press.

Machel, S. (1975). *Mozambique: Revolution or reaction?: Two speeches by Samora Machel, FRELIMO President*. LSM Information Center.

Magome, M. (2024, October 22). European Union observers flag irregularities and "alteration of results" in Mozambique election. *AP News*. https://apnews.com/article/mozambique-election-irregularities-results-protest-killings-50ea2d587e563dece5454253547897d4

Manhiça, A., Shankland, A., Taela, K., Gonçalves, E., Maivasse, C., & Tadros, M. (2020). *Alternative expressions of citizen voices: The protest song and popular engagements with the Mozambican state.* IDS Working Paper 541, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.

Manuel, S. (2023). Embracing prosperity: The cosmopolitan lifestyle in Maputo. *Cities*, *139*(1), 104357.

Malauene, D. M. (2021). *A history of music and politics in Mozambique from the 1890s to the present.* Doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, Minnesota, USA.

Matusse, G. (1998). *A construção da moçambicanidade em José Craveirinha, Mia Couto e Ungulana Ba Ka Khosa*. Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Livraria Universitária.

Mendes, P. A. (2021). Music and the performance of aspiration: The case of Os Monstros in late colonial Lourenço Marques, Mozambique. *Popular Music and Society*, *45*(2),146-159. https://doi-org.libezproxy2.syr.edu/10.1080/03007766.2021.1982848

Miguel, A. (2023, September 13). Maputo: Morreu António Alves da Fonseca, embondeiro da rádio e publicidade. *VOA Português.* https://www.voaportugues.com/a/maputo-morreu-ant%C3%B3nio-alves-da-fonseca-embodeiro-da-r%C3%A1dio-e-publicidade/7266142.html

Mosse, M. (2004). Armando Guebuza: The new FRELIMO candidate. *African Security Studies*, *13*(1), 79-82.

Moyana, A. (2008, May 14). Músicos 'choramingam' à FRELIMO. *Magazine Independente*, p. 29.

Músicos moçambicanos organizam-se politicamente. (1975, May 11). *Tempo*, p. 241.

Ngale, S. (2011). *From Tsonga to moçambicanidade: Civil religious dynamics in Mozambican nationalism.* Doctoral dissertation, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa.

Ngoenha, S. E. (1998). Identidade moçambicana: Já e ainda não. In C. Serra (Ed.), *Identidade, moçambicanidade, moçambicanização* (pp.17-34). Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Livraria Universitária.

Obarrio, J. (2014). *The spirit of the laws in Mozambique*. University of Chicago Press.

Ofensiva cultural das classes trabalhadoras. (1977, April 17). *Tempo*, p. 341.

Ofensiva cultural das classes trabalhadoras: Casas de cultura. (1977, May 22). *Tempo*, p. 346.

Ottaway, M., & Ottaway, D. (1986). *Afro-Communism* (2nd ed.). Africana Publishing Co.

Pitcher, M. A. (2006). Forgetting from above and memory from below: Strategies of legitimation and struggle in postsocialist Mozambique. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, *76*(1), 88-112.

Rantala, J. (2014). Rapper Azagaia e seus críticos: Debate sobre Moçambique. *Lusotopie*, pp. 297-316.

Rantala, J. (2024). A sonic biography of an afterlife: The expelled liberation leader Uria Simango in Mozambican rap. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *50*(1), 153-177.

Reafirma o chefe do estado: Paz é insubstituível. (2013, December 20). *Notícias*.

WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization). (2007). *Regulation on the criteria for granting the right to use the "Orgulho Moçambicano. Made in Mozambique" mark.* World Intellectual Property Organization. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mz/mz005en.pdf

Rocha, S. (2020, July 1). Breve história dos panelaços e o caso brasileiro. *HH Magazine.* https://hhmagazine.com.br/breve-historia-dos-panelacos-e-o-caso-brasileiro/

Rodrigues, C. A. (2010, November/December). A problemática do músico urbano moçambicano. *Revista Musical*, 3, p. 3.

Rosario, C. (2025, March 25). Songs of fire and rice: Post electoral song protests in Mozambique. *Public Anthropologist.* https://publicanthropologist.cmi.no/2025/03/25/songs-of-fire-and-rice-post-electoral

Sandoval, T. (2019, November 27). A journey around the world with the history of the cacerolazo. *The Bogotá Post, Política*.

Serra, C. (1998). *Identidade, moçambicanidade, moçambicanização*. Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Livraria Universitária.

Sheldon, K. E. (2002). *Pounders of grain: A history of women, work, and politics in Mozambique.* Heinemann.

Simbine, G. (1976, December). New social relations in Mozambique. *Ikwezi, II, IV.*

Sopa, A. (2013). *A alegria é uma coisa rara. Subsídios para a história da música popular urbana em Lourenço Marques (1920-1975)*. Marimbique.

Sumich, J. (2008). Politics after the time of hunger in Mozambique: A critique of neopatrimonial interpretation of African elites. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *34*(8), 111-125.

Sumich, J. (2010). Does all that is solid melt into air? Questioning 'neo-liberal' occult economies in Mozambique. *Kronos*, *36*(1), 157-173.

Sumich, J. (2018). *The middle class in Mozambique: The state and the politics of transformation in Southern Africa*. Cambridge University Press.

Taela, K. (2025, January 9). *Understanding the gendered dimensions of post-election protests in Mozambique*. Institute of Development Studies. https://www.ids.ac.uk/opinions/understanding-the-gendered-dimensions-of-post-electionprotests-in-mozambique

Tivane, F. (2015). *Bci é daqui ou está aqui?: Uma etnografia da recepção da publicidade do Banco Comercial e de Investimentos (BCI) veiculada nas televisões, rádios e nos outdoors em Moçambique.* Master's thesis in Social Anthropology presented to the PPGAS at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Turino, T. (2000). *Nationalists, cosmopolitans, and popular music in Zimbabwe*. Chicago University Press.

Turino, T. (2003). Nationalism and Latin American music: Selected case studies and theoretical considerations. *Latin American Music Review*, *24*(3), 169-209.

Vieira, S. (1978, May 21). O Homem Novo é um processo. *Tempo*, 398, p. 27.