WHAT DOES NIETZSCHE PROMOTE  
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL IN THE UNITY OF THE SELF?

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Abstract

This article examines the intrinsic relationship between Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of ‘beyond good and evil’ and his distinct view of the self. First, it focuses on Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of morality, and by scrutinising this historical account of moral valuations the article then endeavours to present Nietzsche’s concrete philosophical standpoint on the fundamental necessity of value judgments which are constantly realised by individuals in their interactions with each other and with life. In this regard, it discusses the strong need to differentiate Nietzsche’s dismissal of the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals, as good and evil, from his firm advocacy for creatively and only personally actualised valuations of good and bad. After delineating this essential distinction, the article portrays how Nietzsche’s view of the becoming self is interconnected with his proposal of the formation of moral valuations beyond good and evil. Finally, it conclusively elucidates how Nietzsche considers the self’s endless revaluation of morals beyond good and evil for the affirmation of life as its primary means to attain the unity of its selfhood, and it further illuminates his comprehension of this process as the prerequisite step for the self to realise the unity of its selfhood in its endless becoming.

Keywords: Nietzsche; Morality; Beyond good and evil; Becoming of self; Unity of self; Affirmation of life.

Resumo

Este artigo analisa a relação intrínseca entre a conceptualização de Nietzsche de “para além do bem e do mal” e a sua visão distinta do Self. Em primeiro lugar, centra-se na análise genealógica de Nietzsche da moralidade, e examinando este relato histórico de avaliações morais, o artigo esforça-se para apresentar o ponto de

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vista filosófico concreto de Nietzsche sobre a necessidade fundamental de juízos de valor que são constantemente realizados pelos indivíduos nas suas interações uns com os outros e com a vida. Neste sentido, discute-se a necessidade premente de se diferenciar a demissão de Nietzsche do esquema judaico-cristã da moral, como bem e mal, a partir da sua convicção para actualizar as valorações de bem e mal de forma criativa e pessoal. Depois de delinear esta distinção essencial, o artigo retrata como a visão de Nietzsche de tornar-se self está interligada com a sua proposta de formação de valorações morais, além de bem e mal. Finalmente, elucida de forma conclusiva como Nietzsche considera a revaloração interminável da moral além de bem e mal para a afirmação da vida como seu principal meio para atingir a unidade da sua individualidade, e ilumina ainda mais a sua compreensão deste processo como passo pré-requisito para o self perceber a unidade de sua individualidade em seu devir interminável.

**Palavras-chave:** Nietzsche, Moralidade, Para além de bem e mal; Formação do self; Unidade do self; Afirmação da vida.

**Introduction**

In this article I will examine what Friedrich Nietzsche promotes beyond good and evil in the unity of self from the perspective of the self’s affirmation of life. Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of ‘beyond good and evil’ as the fundamental understanding of his philosophy is often regarded as the complete withdrawal of moral values in the philosophical studies of ethics. In the face of this common interpretation of ‘beyond good and evil,’ throughout this article I will aim to show how Nietzsche suggests a concrete formation of an ethical life which transcends the substantial and antithetical valuations of good and evil only by looking at his own literary and philosophical works.

To do that I plan to separate my examination of Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of ‘beyond good and evil’ into three parts. In the first part, I want to portray Nietzsche’s positive reasoning for the necessity of the valuations of good and evil. In this reasoning, I will show how Nietzsche considers the valuation of good and evil as a necessary measure of individuals in their attempts to grant an anthropomorphic meaning to life. From this perspective, I will analyse Nietzsche’s ontological rationale...
‘the will to power’ in relation to the characterisation of moral values, and I will discuss how Nietzsche sees the composition of good and evil as the creation of the self in its will to power rather than the supposition of the given nature of moral values. Therefore, in the second phase of my discussion, I will delineate the main tenets of Nietzsche’s firm rejection of the predetermined and intrinsic nature of the Judaeo-Christian morals. Throughout this section of my article, I will describe Nietzsche’s rejection of moral values as his negative outlook towards morals, and I will stress the difference between his broad understanding of moral values and his reactionary attitude towards the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals. By promoting the divergence of the Judaeo-Christian morals from the self’s primal necessity to grant values in life, in Nietzsche’s genealogical account of morality I want to scrutinise the process of how the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals gradually replaces the plurality of moral values by making them universalised, and how this scheme results in the substantiation of ‘good and evil’ only in its reference to the existence of God. Finally, in the last component of my examination, I want to delve into the constructive nature of Nietzsche’s conceptualisation ‘beyond good and evil’ in relation to the unity of the self. In actualising this attempt, I will depict the transcendental claim of this conceptualisation as Nietzsche’s cardinal aim to destroy the unchanging and unitary nature of good and evil for making moral values in flux and plural. Consequently, contrary to the main critiques which assess his concept of ‘beyond good and evil’ as the promotion of the absence of moral values I will promote the view of ‘beyond good and evil’ as Nietzsche’s endless endeavour to make moral values the part of the constant becoming of self and to liberate moral values from the monopoly of the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals.

Moral Values as The Will to Power

Nietzsche fully establishes his quest of ‘beyond good and evil’ as one of the main components of his philosophy for the first time in his literary work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche questions the place of moral values in the self’s affirmation of its existence and of life itself. According to him, the affirmation of the self and thus the self’s affirmation of life can only be provided beyond good and evil, since only beyond good and evil can the self attain its unity, and concomitantly, only there can the self affirm the unity of life. From this perspective, Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of ‘beyond good and evil’ has to be considered in relation to his fundamental goal for the unitary formation of the self and its affirmation.
of life. ‘Beyond good and evil’ thus manifests itself as a prerequisite understanding of self on its way to realising the complete affirmation of self and of life, rather than as an end itself. To explain this relational nature of ‘beyond good and evil’ in depth, firstly I want to focus on the opening discussion of moral values in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In the first part of the literary work throughout the speech of On The Thousand and One Goals, Zarathustra touches upon the ontological basis of the creation of moral values by looking at their historical roots. For Zarathustra, good and evil are the most powerful creations of individuals, since he thinks that in accordance with these valuations individuals rule themselves and obey to their own measures. Zarathustra suggests that the valuation of good things is determined based on their overcomings, since individuals value something as good only when there are certain things which are difficult and indispensable to attain for them. Zarathustra says: “Praiseworthy to them is whatever they consider difficult; what is indispensable and difficult, is called good, and whatever stems from the highest need and still liberates, the rarest, the most difficult – that is praised as holy” (Z, I, 15).

By discussing the foundation of the value of good, Zarathustra focuses on the ontological ground behind it. According to Zarathustra, individuals exerts power on themselves for the attainment of the value of good. This will to power on themselves, or ‘the self-conquest’ as Zarathustra defines it, is also realised for the will to power on their neighbours. Zarathustra states: “Whatever lets them rule and triumph and shine, to the dread and envy of their neighbour, that they consider as the high, the first, the measuring, the meaning of all things” (ibid). From this perspective, Zarathustra identifies the compositional nature of morals in relation to the intrinsic drive of individuals for power. This power cannot be primarily evaluated in the sense of the preservation of life and the survival of the fittest as it could be understood from the perspective of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, since for Zarathustra individuals ‘can risk honour and blood even for evil and dangerous things' (ibid). By comprehending ‘beyond good and evil’ in individuals' will to power, Zarathustra underlines the creative essence of the formation of moral values. In the historical process of moral values, Zarathustra recognises that individuals create their own values to rule themselves for the attainment of power, and this creation takes its main roots from their high degree of valuations. Individuals' strong reverence of the things paves the way for their creation of moral values, thus their morals represent their anthropomorphic meaning of life. In this sense, Zarathustra rejects any form of predetermined nature of moral values, since according to him moral values are
historically created in the immediate relationship between individuals and life. In the section of On The Thousand and One Goals, Zarathustra directly promotes this view in these words:

“Indeed, humans gave themselves all of their good and evil. Indeed, they did not take it, they did not find it, it did not fall to them as a voice from heaven. Humans first placed values into things, in order to preserve themselves – they first created meaning for things, a human meaning! That is why they call themselves ‘human,’ that is: the esteemer. Esteeming is creating: hear me, you creators! Esteeming itself is the treasure and jewel of all esteemed things. Only through esteeming is there value, and without esteeming the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear me, you creators!” (ibid).

In examining the creative nature of moral values, Zarathustra points out the plurality of moral values. The divergence of moral values from one neighbour to the another fascinates Zarathustra, since the difference between their valuations of good and evil represents the richness of their grasp of world. According to him, the plurality of moral values is the result of the constant strife between neighbours, since a social grouping or unity of individuals does not want to accept the other’s moral values. Zarathustra identifies the difference between the two separate social groups in their moral valuations with their distinct reverences to the things. On this point, one social group’s necessity to revere something which its neighbour does not is regarded as the preservation of its social identity. Similarly in the individual level, the self forms and manifests its unique selfhood by distancing its preference of good and evil from the other. Zarathustra describes the healthy necessity of the plurality of moral values in these words: “No people could live that did not first esteem; but if they want to preserve themselves, then they must not esteem as their neighbour esteems. Much that was called good by this people was called scorn and disgrace by another: thus I found. Much I found that was called evil here and decked in purple honours there” (ibid). From this perspective, Zarathustra provides a completely different account of morality compared to the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals. By looking at the historicity of the creation of moral values, he underlines the anthropomorphic character of morals and their plurality in accordance with Nietzsche’s ontological substance ‘the will to power.’ In this sense, Zarathustra’s account of morality provides the necessity of granting moral values for individuals, since based on his comprehension these moral values make the lives of individuals meaningful for them. Zarathustra's standpoint of morality
is later solidified in Nietzsche’s subsequent philosophical work *Beyond Good and Evil*. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche revisits the same notions of Zarathustra’s view of morality as the creative and personalised nature of moral values and their plurality by touching upon the individual’s strength of character in its morality beyond good and evil:

“(…) these days, the concept of ‘greatness’ will include: being noble, wanting to be for yourself, the ability to be different, standing alone and needing to live by your own fists. And the philosopher will be revealing something of his own ideal when he proposes: ‘Greatest of all is the one who can be the most solitary, the most hidden, the most different, the person beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, the one with an abundance of will. Only this should be called greatness: the ability to be just as multiple as whole, just as wide as fulls’” (BGE, 212).

In Zarathustra’s initial and positive evaluation of moral values, Nietzsche promotes his understanding of morality in which the valuations of good and evil are only applied to certain individuals who accept their validity. In other words, Nietzsche’s view of morality rejects any form universal and unconditional sense of moral values which are validated in the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals and Kantian morality. With *Beyond Good and Evil* and later *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche builds another layer onto Zarathustra’s principal speech on morality. In these later works Nietzsche creates another differentiation in moral values, and he applies it to the antithetical nature of good and evil. He separates the master morality’s good and evil from the slave morality. Later Nietzsche identifies the master morality’s evil as ‘bad’, and then he makes reference to the valuation of evil only in the sense of the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals which is the slave morality itself. Zarathustra’s inceptive and historical outlook on morality does not include the religious perception of morals, since his observation of moral values is restricted to their pre-religious formations. Similar to Zarathustra’s understanding of morals in relation to the will to power, in *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche describes the master morality’s valuation of good as ‘noble,’ and accordingly he characterises its valuation of evil as ‘despicable.’

With this additional separation in the later historical outlook of moral values after

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1 *BGE*, 260.
Christianity, Nietzsche rejects the view that morality has always been intrinsically related to the actions of humans. Rather Nietzsche argues that in the early formation of morals, moral values were always applied to human beings and their selves. According to him, the whole existence of the individual personality was evaluated in accordance with moral values, and there was no distance between the self and its action. The self was considered together with its actions, and in this sense the self's action was not alienated from the individual to be judged morally.

In Nietzsche's understanding of morality this stands an important difference between master morality and slave morality worth examining, with respect to how differently these two moralities determine their own moral valuations. The member of master morality experiences its entire self as the main determiner of morals, and consequently this individual creates its own values based on the personal existence of its self. In this regard, Nietzsche states that: “The noble type of person feels that he determines value, he does not need anyone's approval, he judges that 'what is harmful to me is harmful in itself,' he knows that he is the one who gives honour to things in the first place, he creates values. He honours everything he sees in himself: this sort of morality is self-glorifying” (*BGE*, 212). The creation of values is thus creatively realised by 'the noble man', and his creation of values affirms life, to which he grants his personal meaning. From this perspective, Nietzsche suggests that master morality does not aim to provide moral facts, and its values do not refer to the truthful nature of human actions and behaviours. Rather, master morality manifests a personal interpretation of certain phenomena, and by this personal interpretation it ossifies the distinct formation of self. For Nietzsche, the dominance of selfish actions resides at the centre of the valuation process of master morality, since the self always posits its personal taste in the determination of morals. To put it differently, the valuations of good and bad in master morality are defined over the personal preference of the self, and it has a binding nature only for the individual who can affirm life by these valuations. It is evident that Zarathustra's initial appreciation of moral values finds its comparable equivalent in Nietzsche's later works as master morality, and the conceptualisation of master morality and Nietzsche's admiration of its good and bad values complements Zarathustra's early assessment of morality. In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche finalises the development of Zarathustra's positive evaluation of

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2 *TI*, sec. The 'Improvers' of Mankind, 1.
morality in relation to the formation of self in these words:

“Rather it was “the good” themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebeian. It was out of this pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create values and to coin names for these values: what had they to do with utility!” (GM, I, 2)

**Nietzsche’s Rejection of the Judaeo-Christian Scheme of Morals**

Nietzsche’s primary rejection of the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals is focused on its postulation of self on the basis of its valuations of good and evil. Nietzsche observes that the valuation of the good in this scheme is structured on selfless human actions. Good actions are only verified in the absence of the self’s personal interest, and the disinterestedness of the self is promoted as the intrinsic valuation of the good. From this perspective, good actions are supposed to belong to individuals whose characteristics represent ‘the commonness’ in society. Any different kind of deployment of self compared to the common traits of the individual in society is already regarded as evil. Therefore, from the beginning in this scheme of morals the distinct formation of self is considered as an evil foundation against society’s valuation of good. The disinterested contemplation of moral values is provided as the key thinking device for understanding the validity of the foundation of the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals. Nietzsche argues that the valuations of good and evil thus reject the underlying nature of the self’s creation of values, since these valuations enforce the complete withdrawal of self. On this point, Nietzsche still insists that the composition of moral values stems from human creation and its will to power, but he promotes the view that Christianity rejects the anthropomorphic nature of morals, and it represents that its moral values are given to human beings as a predetermined way to improve mankind. According to Nietzsche, this predetermined and universal insight of Christian morality prevents any form of further development of moral values and their becoming. In the constant becoming of self and of life itself, Christian moral values personify the

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4 TI, sec. The ‘Improvers’ of Mankind, 2.
truths of eternal existence in the face of the temporal flow of being. In this sense, the values of good and evil forcefully become moral facts, and concomitantly, the fundamental truths of life in the perception of individuals. When moral values are thus regarded as the unchanging unconditional truths of humanity, everything which does not fall in the antithetically stationed valuations of good and evil becomes false, unreal and delusory.

Nietzsche characterises ‘the truthfulness’ of Christian morality with ‘the will to truth’ as the extension to his conceptualisation of ‘the will to power.’ However, for him, Christianity justifies itself as the sole representation of ‘truth,’ and by asking the prerequisite faith to see ‘the self-evident necessity’ of its moral values Christianity veils the questioning faculty of individuals by which they can realise the will to power and this power’s will to truth in its overall composition of morals. On this point, Nietzsche does not negate the necessity of the composition of any moral valuation along with ‘the will to truth,’ since he suggests that even the morals of master morality strives to actualise this will, but only for itself not for everyone. Nietzsche clearly asserts that any kind of human judgment on truth has to involve in false, mis-interpretive and erroneous reasoning, since there are no possible truths to be reached outside the anthropomorphic realm of creation.\(^5\) In this regard, it is important to underline the point that Nietzsche’s objection to ‘the will to truth’ of good and evil is directed against its transcendental valuations. In the transcendental nature of beyond good and evil, all of the valuations are directed to everyone independent of individuals’ commitment to these moral values. In the predetermined and universal characteristics of the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals, Nietzsche recognises the most creative and at the same time the most reactionary trait of good and evil, ‘the ressentiment’ of slave morality. For him, ‘the ressentiment’ of slave morality is the fundamental substance of the valuations of good and evil which enables slave morality to reject everything different than what it promotes by its moral values. To prove ‘the truthfulness’ of good and evil, slave morality thus denies every distinct moral valuation, and subsequently ‘the ressentiment’ of slave morality finds the ground to adjudicate each valuation of the different moralities as a transgression to its moral codes. ‘The feeling of ressentiment’ in slave morality embodies the related baggage of the past by holding the external responsible for what has been done against itself. Its claim of unfair treatment

\(^5\) BGE, 2 & 4.
constitutes the basis for the generation of further moral values. Nietzsche describes this specific characteristics of slave morality in these words:

“The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is “outside,” what is “different,” what is “not itself”; and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-posing eye—this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of ressentiment; in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction” (GM, I, 10).

Due to ‘the ressentiment’ of slave morality, compared to master morality, the valuation of evil becomes the main driving force of this morality instead of its valuation of good. Nietzsche thinks that evil takes its foundational valuation from its accusatory essence, whereby it contains a serious tone of enmity in its definition. The concept of evil tends to alienate and surrender whenever it posits valuation of something, and thus for Nietzsche it constitutes the original deed of slave morality. Evil creates its own structure of truth only from what it refutes in the first place. From this perspective, Nietzsche observes that the slave morality’s valuation of evil determines the entire framework of its morals, and this valuation makes individuals neither will nor act the way in which they realise their distinct selves. According to him, the valuation of evil forces individuals to contemplate their actions in accordance with evil’s moral codes, and by its supposition of ‘free will’ responsibility emerges as the prime measure for the judgement of these actions. As the supreme freedom of choice is granted to the self in thought to be able to characterise its will as ‘free’ before the self determines its acts, for Nietzsche, all of the individuals are held accountable for what they do. When the self is detached from its actions, and thus actions are measured in accordance with moral values in slave morality, the responsibility for the moral duty is assigned to individuals for their acts. Nietzsche is highly critical of the understanding of moral duty in slave morality, since he sees that the freedom to act for moral duties is conditionally given in order to make individuals to “a certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like,
regular, and consequently calculable." He argues that morals of slave morality constitute *a priori* duties which are expected to be fully complied with by individuals; consequently, the responsibility to which individuals are entitled, in fact, is demanded to accord with these duties. Although an individual is presented as the agent who is fully responsible for its actions, actually its responsibility refers only to the judgement based on its compliance with its moral duties. To put differently, ‘free will’ is not given to the self to posit its personal and thereby free moral valuation outside the strict valuations of good and evil.

Nietzsche realises that when actions are moralised by judgements of good and evil in slave morality, the intentions of individuals are immediately scrutinised in accordance with their ‘free will’ to act for moral duty. After the self-questioning process in this scheme of morals, guilt in the sense of remorse triggers the fundamental aspect of moral control over the self. The strong emotion of guilt arises when the self recognises the wrongness of its actions after comparing them with its moral duties. For Nietzsche, this recognition is related with the perception that the self could have always acted in a different manner so that the injury to moral norms would not have taken place. However, for Nietzsche, this is not solely a recognition of wrongness, rather it is a transformation of the feeling of wrongness into the inward infliction and affliction of suffering. Nietzsche interprets the feeling of guilt as the attempt to balance out the inferred harm done. The feeling of guilt is actually the self’s internalisation of punishment as revenge to its will, nevertheless paradoxically the self's internal punishment realises itself in the form of outward execution. Nietzsche traces the source of guilt to the commercial balance of ‘the relationship between creditor and debtor.’

The self penalises its own selfhood for its failure to abide by the moral duties, and it executes this penalty as physical punishment on its body. The strong pain which stems from the additional sacrifice of bodily instincts is extensively moralised as the punishment of guilt. On this point, guilt becomes the active consciousness which constantly oversees the further actions of the self, rather than a passive sorrow with regard to past. The profound feeling of guilt generates the endless necessity of punishment in the perception of self, and accordingly guilt gains the characteristic of a

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perennially active and external force on the individual. In slave morality, Nietzsche thus discovers that guilt starts to govern all individual actions uniformly instead of paving the way for individuals’ active and changing moral valuations. Although the self assumes the internalisation of the self as the primary result of its ‘free will’, guilt ultimately limits the entirety of the freedom of its will. In light of Nietzsche’s complete critique of slave morality, guilt alienates even its founding notion, ‘free will’; finally ‘free will’ is compelled to restrict itself to ‘the will to nothingness’, the main premise of nihilism. In Nietzsche’s literary work Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra’s speech On Redemption describes the entirety of this transformative impact of guilt on individuals, which results in the complete eradication of the self’s will to life.

The Creative Will, The Liberator from Good and Evil

Nietzsche’s rejection of the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals is thus structured on this scheme’s eventuation in nihilism; the absolute withdrawal of the self’s will and consequently its depersonification of self along with its denial of life. On this point, it is important to underline that Nietzsche’s strong standpoint on the valuations of good and evil does not indicate his categorical negation of the existence of moral values. Rather, for him, the moral valuations of individuals are intrinsically necessary in their constant encounter with life. The composition of moral valuations is immediately related to the fundamental faculty of the self, its creativity. Nietzsche highly appreciates this faculty of the self which generates moral values, since he observes that, in the absence of any kind of reverence which the self has toward the things and actions with which it is involved, life would become completely meaningless, another form of nihilism. Therefore, Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of ‘beyond good and evil’ cannot be regarded as a total lack of moral values, rather it needs to be understood that his conceptualisation refers to the principal denial of the Judaeo-Christian scheme of morals. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche clearly underlines that his conceptualisation does not imply a world view which is devoid of any moral values; on the contrary, he further solidifies his initial position on master morality: “Whoever begins at this point, like my readers, to reflect and pursue his train

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8 GM, II, 4.
of thought will not soon come to the end of it—reason enough for me to come to an end, assuming it has long since been abundantly clear what my aim is, what the aim of that dangerous slogan is that is inscribed at the head of my last book Beyond Good and Evil.— At least this does not mean ‘Beyond Good and Bad’” (GM, I,17).

To destroy the moral valuations of good and evil in his attempt of the realisation of ‘beyond good and evil,’ Nietzsche promotes the idea of ‘creative will’ and its value positing strong individuals. According to him, only the individual who negates the values of good and evil by reaching the realm beyond of their morals can feel the intrinsic power in its will to create its own valuations. On this point Nietzsche suggests that this creative process has to be endlessly adjusted to the becoming of self, since the valuations of morals cannot remain fixed in the constant flow of the becoming of self and of life. The idea of becoming in Nietzsche’s philosophy constitutes his fundamental view of life, and the existence of becoming realises itself in ‘Dionysian play.’

Nietzsche ontologically thinks that becoming in itself affects the constant change in the world of things, and it gives form to things in their appearances. While becoming represents the infinity of change in itself and for itself, its impact in the world of appearance results in the recurring finitude of change. His understanding of the

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11 In The Will to Power, Nietzsche gives the complete characterisation of his Dionysian world in these words: “And do you know what "the world" is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise without increase or income; enclosed by "nothingness" as by a boundary; not something blury or wasted, not something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a sphere that might be "empty" here or there, but rather as force throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms; out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex, out of the stillest, most rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory, and then again returning home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this uniformity of its courses and its years, blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my "beyond good and evil," without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will toward itself—do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men?— This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!” WP, 1067.

12 Nietzsche claims that: “I believe in absolute space as the substratum of force: the latter limits and forms. Time eternal. But space and time do not exist in themselves. "Changes" are only appearances (or sense processes for us); if we posit the recurrence of these, however regular, nothing is established thereby except this simple fact, that it has always happened thus. The feeling that post hoc is propter hoc can

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Dionysian world substantially signifies this finitude in the transience of things. Nietzsche regards the world as “a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller.”\textsuperscript{13} From this perspective, the world provides a definite and finite amount of forces, however for Nietzsche the interplay of the finite forces generates infinite transformations.\textsuperscript{14} As the world contains unity in the quantum and the conglomeration of its definite forces, the constant relationship of the forces with each other which is yielded by becoming engenders multiplicity in the world of appearance.\textsuperscript{15} In this sense, this multiplicity embodies the perpetual creation and destruction as a result of the infinite transformation of definite forces. The flux of life necessitates the ceaseless creation and destruction of things due to the actuality of the definite amount of forces in the world, but for Nietzsche life derives its \textit{poiesis} character from the creation and destruction of things in their transience and impermanence.

Nietzsche relates this character of life to ‘the tragic spirit’ through its identification with Dionysian play, since Dionysian play affirms the entirety of life in its affirmation of the necessity of creation and destruction together.\textsuperscript{16} Dionysian play not only affirms the mere creation and destruction of things but also their eternally recurrent creations and destructions. Although this play suggests the transience of any

easily be shown to be a misunderstanding; it is comprehensible. But appearances cannot be "causes!" WP, 545.

\textsuperscript{13} WP, 1067.

\textsuperscript{14} WP, 1049.

\textsuperscript{15} WP, 551.

\textsuperscript{16} In \textit{Twilight of Idols}, Nietzsche explains his symbolism of Dionysius in these words: “For it is only in the Dionysian mysteries, in the psychology of the Dionysian state, that the basic fact of the Hellenic instinct finds expression — its "will to life." What was it that the Hellene guaranteed himself by means of these mysteries? Eternal life, the eternal return of life, the future promised and hallowed in the past; the triumphant Yes to life beyond all death and change; true life as the continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries of sex. For the Greeks a sexual symbol was therefore the most sacred symbol, the real profundity in the whole of ancient piety. Every single element in the act of procreation, of pregnancy, and of birth aroused the highest and most solemn feelings. In the doctrine of the mysteries, pain is pronounced holy: the pangs of the woman giving birth consecrate all pain; and conversely all becoming and growing — all that guarantees a future — involves pain. That there may be the eternal joy of creating, that the will to life may eternally affirm itself, the agony of the woman giving birth must also be there eternally. All this is meant by the word Dionysus: I know no higher symbolism than this Greek symbolism of the Dionysian festivals. Here the most profound instinct of life, that directed toward the future of life, the eternity of life, is experienced religiously — and the way to life, procreation, as the holy way. It was Christianity, with its heartfelt resentment against life, that first made something unclean of sexuality: it threw filth on the origin, on the essential fact of our life.” TI, sec. What I Owe to The Ancients, 4-5.

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created or destroyed thing, it directly solidifies the notion of permanent change in Nietzsche's philosophy. In this permanent change, Nietzsche finds the joy of life in itself and for itself as the ground of eternal flux, and he transforms the joy of life into the love of eternity with his conceptualisation of eternal recurrence. Therefore, in Nietzsche's mirror, Dionysian play portrays the tangible path of becoming, and it concretises the nature of flux with the affirmation of life in its becoming. The concretisation of becoming in Dionysian play not only refers to the antithetical form of the change in things but it also corresponds to the change in human values. According to Nietzsche, human values are constructed as anthropomorphic responses to the continuous impact of becoming on the Dionysian world. Therefore, human values require constant creation and destruction in their meanings. The river of Heraclitus as the image of becoming carries everything with itself, and in this never-ending stream of becoming, nothing can remain as it is, not even the values of individuals. As Nietzsche primarily promotes the idea that things are eternally bound to change, he further develops this standpoint with the claim that individuals's values, which are associated with things and actions, for the anthropomorphic understanding of the world must realise their becoming by their 'creative will'. On this point, Nietzsche's persistent

17 Again in Twilight of Idols, Nietzsche continues: “The psychology of the orgiastic as an overflowing feeling of life and strength, where even pain still has the effect of a stimulus, gave me the key to the concept of tragic feeling, which had been misunderstood both by Aristotle and even more by modern pessimists. Tragedy is so far from being a proof of the pessimism (in Schopenhauer's sense) of the Greeks that it may, on the contrary, be considered a decisive rebuttal and counterexample. Saying Yes to life even in its strangest and most painful episodes, the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustible vitality even as it witnesses the destruction of its greatest heroes — that is what I called Dionysian, that is what I guessed to be the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet. Not in order to be liberated from terror and pity, not in order to purge oneself of a dangerous affect by its vehement discharge — which is how Aristotle understood tragedy — but in order to celebrate oneself the eternal joy of becoming, beyond all terror and pity — that tragic joy included even joy in destruction. And with that I again touch on my earliest point of departure: The Birth of Tragedy was my first revaluation of all values. And on that point I again stand on the earth out of which my intention, my ability grows — I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus — I, the teacher of the eternal recurrence.” ibid.

18 WP, 616.

19 Z, II, 2.

20 In his speech On Self-Overcoming, Zarathustra says that: “The unwise, to be sure, the people — they are like a river on which a skiff floats; valuations are seated in the skiff, solemn and cloaked. Your will and your values you set upon the river of becoming; what the people believe to be good and evil reveals to me an ancient will to power. It was you, you wisest ones, who placed such guests into the skiff and gave them pomp and proud names — you and your dominating will! Now the river carries your skiff along: it has to carry it. It matters little whether the breaking wave foams and angrily opposes the keel! The river is not your danger and the end of your good and evil, you wisest ones; but this will itself, the will to power — the unexhausted begetting will of life.” Z, II, 12.

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placing of the creative will in relation to becoming paves the way for the essential criteria he uses to categorise individuals in accordance with their wills. In his understanding, will can only be defined in accordance with its strong or weak nature. Nietzsche’s logic of will, therefore, not only divides the will into two but also categorises the individuals who will these wills.

Accordingly, Nietzsche classifies individuals as either the creative man and or the small man. The small man has the weak will, since he does not want to change his values of good and evil in accordance with the becoming’s Dionysian world. Rather, the small man wills ‘the truth’ through his valuation, and he wants to substantialise his values for everyone. Although his values are carried by the river of becoming, he resists change, and the small man finds substance in the beingness of his values rather than in the values’ becoming. Hence, his static values deny life as Dionysian play, since he negates the possibility of their re-creation and re-destruction. His weak will not only necessitates the preservation of his values but also halts the creations of the strong will. The small man achieves the hindrance of the realisation of the strong will by enforcing the truth of rightness and wrongness for every will. Values then gain their solid existence, in Nietzsche’s words ‘stones’, and they judge not only good and evil but also life itself. Nietzsche refers to individuals who have weak wills as small men, since their will makes the world small to them. They diminish the value of Dionysian play in seeking to find the causality among its quantum forces. According to Nietzsche, as underlined before in the second part, when their causality fails to attune them with the flow of life, their values ultimately pave the way of nothingness, unsettlement, inertia and exhaustion in their encounters with life. As Nietzsche calls these consequences the symptoms of nihilism, he thus sees the resolution of this ‘sickness’ in his conceptualisation of ‘beyond good and evil.’

As Nietzsche refers to the Dionysian world as his own ‘beyond good and evil’, he takes the substance of Dionysian play to implant in his notion of creative will. In the suggestion of beyond good and evil, Nietzsche identifies the creativity of will in

21 *BGE*, 21.
22 *WP*, 552.
24 *WP*, 12.
accordance with its acclimatisation with the change of the things. For Nietzsche, the creative will lies in the self's personal intention to attune with Dionysian play of becoming. He regards the creative person as the superior man who sees the necessity of change in the world and consequently adapts his values. Nietzsche evaluates the superiority of man from the standpoint of his will, since he thinks that to adjust oneself to the flux of life demands a strong will. In line with his concept of ‘will to power’, the creative person who has a strong will asserts a high command on himself for the creative enforcement of the revaluation, and accordingly he obeys the destructive consequences of his will more as the change of his existing values. From this perspective, the creative person actualises the valuation of things on his own, and makes the revaluation as a part of his self. The creative person does not see his valuations as the truth of the entirety of existence. On this point, with the idea of ‘the creative will’ Nietzsche does not underscore the temporality or the relativity of values in themselves; rather, Nietzsche’s creative person attains the unity of his selfhood through the necessity of their changes. By his creative will the creative person definitively generates his entire world in which his ‘reason, image, will and love’ are realised. Nevertheless, the realisation of the vital components of this world does not suggest the arrival of values into their ultimate forms or substances in Nietzsche’s philosophy. For Nietzsche, neither the self nor its creative will completes its unity in the course of time like his promoted nature of becoming. Rather, like the Dionysian world with its play, the self finds unity in its becoming by overcoming itself with the aid of its revaluation of values.

25 Also In Will to Power, Nietzsche directly promotes his idea of ‘beyond good and evil’ in relation to the affirmation of life: “To revalue values—what would that mean? All the spontaneous—new, future, stronger—movements must be there; but they still appear under false names and valuations and have not yet become conscious of themselves. A courageous becoming-conscious and affirmation of what has been achieved—a liberation from the slovenly routine of old valuations that dishonour us in the best and strongest things we have achieved.” WP, 1007.

26 BGE, 21-22.

27 Z, II, 2.

28 Zarathustra underlines the constant need of creation and the destruction of the values in these words: “Whatever I may create and however I may love it – soon I must oppose it and my love, thus my will wants it. And even you, seeker of knowledge, are only a path and footstep of my will; indeed, my will to power follows also on the heels of your will to truth!” Z, II, 12.

29 In this regard, Zarathustra says in On Great Events that: “Not around the inventors of new noise does the world revolve, but around the inventors of new values; inaudibly it revolves.” Z, II, 18.
The antithetical form of change is not the same as the creative will's revaluation as the reconciliation of values.\(^{30}\) Moreover, the revaluation of values does not primarily aim toward the creation of new values. Instead, Nietzsche's metaphorical understanding of language brings forward the necessity of revaluation as the transformation of values whose meaning is continuously loaded, reloaded or unloaded by the self's creative will in its relationship with life. By this vivid distinction between individuals and their wills Nietzsche establishes a dynamic place of creativity in his idea of becoming. According to his idea of becoming, independent of the possible responses of the individuals to their becoming, individuals constantly become. Their becoming itself, too, is not comprehensible by them, rather they can only grasp their becoming in their beingness of becoming. In this sense, Nietzsche thinks that although the small man becomes, regardless of his static valuations, the small man fails to attain his own self due to the absence of his creative will.\(^{31}\) The creative will is what enables the self to embrace its beingness in its becoming. While the creative person finds the unity of his self in his response to becoming through the vigorous revaluation of its values, the small man negates his becoming in his unquestioned attachment to 'truths'. Therefore, although the small man becomes, he does not transpose the impact of becoming into his values and consequently his selfhood. In the end, the difference between the revaluation of values and their substantiation constitutes Nietzsche's notion of creativity, and in his conceptualisation of 'beyond good and evil' Nietzsche utilises this form of creativity to merge his perception of self with his understanding of becoming as the self's complete affirmation of life.\(^{32}\)

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30 In On Great Longing, Zarathustra refers to this process of revaluation through the image of vine maturation: "Oh my soul, I poured every sun upon you and every night and every silence and every longing – then you grew up for me like a grape-vine. (...) Oh my soul, super-rich and heavy you stand there now, a grapevine with swelling udders and crowded, brownish gold grapes – crowded and crushed by your happiness, waiting out of superabundance and even bashful because of your waiting. (...) – pour out your suffering in gushing tears over your fullness and over all the aching of the grapevine for the vintner and his knife!" Z, III, 14.

31 In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche explains the reason why the static values cannot correspond to the stream of becoming through his conceptualisation of the will to power: "whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily obscured or even obliterated." GM, II, 12.

32 Nietzsche clearly states in his posthumous work The Will to Power: "the revaluation of all values. No longer joy in certainty but uncertainty; no longer "cause and effect" but the continually creative; no longer

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References

*Primary texts*


*will to preservation but to power; no longer the humble expression, "everything is merely subjective," but "it is also our work!-- Let us be proud of it!" WP, 1059.*

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