# Comprehensive Approach in Crisis Management: A Literature Review

Isabel Ferreira Nunes

*PhD in Political Science and post doc in International Relations; currently is Head of the Centre for Studies and Research and Director of the National Defence Course at the National Defence Institute. Also holds the position of national delegate at the European Security and Defense College and was deputy director of the National Defence Institute. Her main fields of research are theories of International Relations, foreign policy analysis, European foreign, security and defence policy and small states.*

**Abstract**

The article consists of a literature review on comprehensive approach guided by five dimensions from a conceptual focus to the application of comprehensive approach. This includes an examination of concepts, security challenges, impact, EU international level of ambition and implementation by Member States. With this purpose, the study aims at first, to examine the conceptual boundaries of comprehensive approach by considering in literature how researchers select particular effects of comprehensiveness to define the concept. Second, to analyze the security challenges inherent to comprehensive approach. Third, to examine how comprehensive approach is part of the EU transformative project needed to tackle crisis comprehensively. Fourth, to assess how the definition of level of ambition determines a more comprehensive role for the EU. Fifth, reviews the literature on the implementation processes of comprehensive approach from the perspective of national agencies and agents of selected EU Member States.

***Resumo***

***Abordagem Abrangente na Gestão de Crises: Uma Revisão de Literatura***

*Este artigo consiste numa revisão da literatura sobre abordagem abrangente orientada por cinco dimensões compreendendo desde as questões conceptuais às práticas de abordagem abrangente incluindo: conceitos, desafios à segurança, impacto deste método de intervenção, nível de ambição e modalidades de implementação. Com este propósito, o presente estudo visa os seguintes objetivos. Em primeiro lugar examina os seus limites conceptuais na literatura, ponderando como é que são analisados vários efeitos particulares de abordagem abrangente. Em segundo, analisa os desafios da segurança internacional em contextos de abordagem abrangente. Em terceiro, debate em que medida a abordagem abrangente é parte integrante do papel transformativo da UE, no quadro da gestão de crises. Em quarto, avalia como é que a definição de um dado nível de ambição por parte da UE pode determinar um papel internacional e mais abrangente por parte da União. Por último, revê a literatura e aborda como é que as agências e agentes nacionais de um grupo de Estados-membros da União se adaptam aos requisitos da abordagem abrangente e a implementam.*

**Introduction**

Comprehensive approach presents analytical challenges that pertain from conceptual and empirical perspectives, due to the lack of analytical consensus and distinct institutional and processual adaptation of actors, which may further or hamper its practical implementation. Additionally, comprehensive approach generates a high degree of expectation regarding problem solving, when its goal is focused on problem addressing, which leaves it susceptible to criticism. Its successful implementation is not a simple task, given comprehensiveness involves very diverse perceptions, interests, instruments and policies. Various situations affect comprehensive approach. First, the presence of limited political will or selective political solidarity to engage in situations of crisis management and conflict resolution, as well as the narrow effort made by regional local actors to assume the responsibilities that come with ownership, do impact on an efficient comprehensiveness. Second, the systemic effects of current threats and risks, affect differently actors in the international system[1] and their willingness and capacity to allocate the required resources necessary to prevent, mitigate, manage and contain instability. Third, a growing number of state and non-state actors, that intervene in crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization, add complexity to comprehensiveness given they held different goals, institutional cultures, resources and distinct security practices. Despite the fact that a wide variety of stakeholders present in complex crisis situations may contribute to enhance representativeness of interests and increase the number of the resources available, it may also pose challenges to internal coordination and external cooperation. Finally, the presence of systemic threats and risks in current international affairs, also calls for a broader approach to crisis prevention, management and resolution, which comprehensive approach and action may help to achieve.

The present study has five aims[2]. First, to examine the conceptual boundaries of comprehensive approach in literature. Second, to analyze the security challenges that may affect comprehensive approach. Third to examine how comprehensive approach is part of the EU transformative role needed to tackle crisis comprehensively. Fourth to assess how the definition of level of ambition may determine a more comprehensive role for the EU. Fifth, addresses how two distinct categories of Member States adapt to implementation of comprehensive approach.

1 In the context of this research by actors, one refers to the stakeholders such as the European Union, international and national institutions, civilian (comprehending personnel from various sectors and fields of expertise), police and military personnel that have a role in implementing comprehensive approach in crisis management and conflict resolution.

2 Issues related to assessment and planning of comprehensive approach actions at the operational level will not be dealt with in the context of this study.

**Conceptualizations of Comprehensive Approach**

Conceptualization results in an attempt to organize a given part of reality, by identifying the nature and scope of a specific phenomenon. Comprehensive approach is used by many in different ways, in terms of the 'priorities, means and end-states' (Goor and Major, 2012, p. 2) identified. Its conceptual boundaries are as complex as its empirical practice. In the framework of this study, comprehensive approach pertains to how state and non-state actors coordinate and cooperate in order to prevent, manage and solve the root causes and the consequences of instability and insecurity, by finding ways to work in an integrated manner[3], combining instruments leading to sustainability of security, stability, reconstruction and development[4]. This interpretation draws attention to the multidimensional nature of the concept of comprehensive approach and its practice. Our understanding of comprehensive approach regards the implementation of sustainable approaches before, during and after crisis occur and it is related with preventive and reactive practices and methods of internal coordination, within state and non-state actors and external cooperation with external partners. Comprehensive approach is as much as a product of exogenous complex factors, related to the contemporary nature of threats and risks, as a process of internal and external adaptation to challenges by governmental agencies and security organizations. As Pirozzi (2013, p. 7) sustains, comprehensive approach "can be considered as the policy response to the evolution of the concept of security beyond the conventional, state-centric and militarizes terms of the bipolar era". Whether we consider it from the analytical or empirical point of view, comprehensive approach occurs beyond the traditional boundaries of the security dilemma among state actors, striving for military strategic advantage and favourable to the use of force. Additionally, comprehensive approach can be perceived as an inclusive process of

3 In the United Kingdom and in a comprehensive approach context , the expression 'integrated' "refers to people from different institutions (with particular reference to civilian and military institutions) working together at several levels to achieve common aims and it concerns a situation where no one in one government department has a monopoly over responses to the challenges of conflict and stabilisation contexts" (International Security Information Service, 2014, ft.1, p. 4).

4 The notion of 'comprehensive action' is originally sourced in the United Nations (UN) model, design to improve coordination among UN departments' instruments under the designation of 'Integrated Missions'. It is part of UN planning of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. It blends the security dimension with those of development, human rights, gender and humanitarian aid, in transitional phases from conflict to sustainable peace. In this context, the UN adopts what is designated as Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) in order to facilitate the implementation of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. IMPP is seen as a "dynamic continuous process allowing for activities and objectives to be revised, as the mission's understanding of its operational environment grows and as that environment itself changes" (United Nations, 2008, p. 56).

cooperation by systematizing "processes and mechanisms, promoting continuous interaction and exchange between often segregated policy communities" (Merket, 2016, p. 22) from the security environments.

In 2014, the EU Council Conclusions (2014a, § 2) acknowledge comprehensive approach both as "a working method and a set of concrete measures and processes to improve how the EU, based on a common strategic vision and drawing on its broad array of existing tools and instruments, could collectively develop, embed and deliver more coherent policies, implement more efficient working practices and achieve better results". In 2016, the High Representative at the occasion of the European Council held on the 28th and 29th of June presented the new *EU Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy* (High Representative, 2016), stressing the evidence that "the meaning and scope of comprehensive approach will be expanded underlining the need for the EU to act before, during and after crisis and conflicts unfold"[5].

From an academic perspective, comprehensive approach offers a new analytical dimension regarding the EU external action and crisis management, offering new ground for research by providing a view on "new concepts and policies for a more coordinated approach to crisis management" (Gross, 2008, p. 9). At the empirical level, it provides a field of observation of new forms of securitization, calling attention to the benefits of preventing and reacting to insecurity, with the help of broader security options throughout the whole cycle of crisis and conflicts, at diverse levels and with the contribution of different policy dimensions. The current complexity and volatility of the international security landscape, in the domain of crisis and conflicts poses additional difficulties when one seeks to draw very precise and

5 The document offers two, among many other, aspects of interest to this study. The first pertains to the title given to the new EU global strategy, by stressing the aspects of *'shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe'* and only in the subtitle referring to 'A *Global Strategy* for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy' (italics added by the author). The second, the fact the expression 'comprehensive approach', widely used in the Joint Communique presented by the Commission/HR in 2013 (see High Representative/European Commission, 2013). On the European Council Conclusions of 2014 on the EU's comprehensive approach see (Council of the European Union, 2014) and on the Action Plan on the implementation of comprehensive approach presented in 2015 by the European Commission see (European Commission, 2015a). Comprehensive approach is often replaced, throughout the 2016 document, by the expression of 'integrated approach' commonly used by Member States such as the France, The Netherlands and Denmark in their national policy documents (see further ahead in this article on the section of 'EU Member States Implementation of Comprehensive Approach: A Review'). It is important to recall that both the European Council that closed the Dutch EU Presidency and the presentation of the High Representative document to the Council were disturbed by the result of Britain's referendum. Only the close team that worked with the High Representative may explain whether that influenced the final text issued by the HR, but it is pertinent to raise the question.

all-inclusive definitions of the interactions required to stabilize crises and conflicts, mitigate future root causes of instability and create conditions for sustainable security, peace and development. The growing complexity of international crisis, due to the contemporary nature of security, leads to the fact comprehensive approach is on demand and is a widely used method of external action, although requiring better coordination and wider cooperation.

Literature on comprehensive approach often reflects a unidimensional approach, which probably results more from the difficulty to capture all the features that characterizes current security governance[6]. The complexity of security environments and the growing level of interdependence among security actors, lead researchers to look for 'specific aspects of comprehensiveness' (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 224) by selecting particular effects of comprehensiveness. Literature on comprehensive approach reflects to some extent this unidimensional approach, which probably results from the complexity of implementing it and from the diversity of actors involved, leading researchers to narrow down their object of study and privilege a single dimension.

Literature on comprehensive approach regards three traditional levels of analysis. The first looks into 'whole-of-government approaches' related to the interaction between the traditional field of foreign policy, with those of justice, police, development aid, disaster relief and humanitarian action at the international level. A second body of literature concerns 'intra-agency' within institutions, regarding horizontal coordination with respect to processes of comprehensiveness, namely those related with how institutions enable comprehensive approach and how comprehensive approach may lead to institutional reform. A third group of contributes values 'interagency' pertaining to cooperation processes of comprehensiveness between institutions, notably governmental departments (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 9; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 224; Friis and Jarmyr, 2008, p. 4).

In this study, the literature review conducted on comprehensive approach allows to identify four possible levels of research: security governance; institutionalization and institutional change; cooperation-coordination and enhanced civil-military relations.

***Security Governance***

The first dimension of comprehensive action comprises network governance approaches, as dealt with in literature about security governance, contributing to

6 To Smith (2013, p. 33) "new forms of security governance result from learning processes originated in how well new procedures and new institutional roles help solving security problems" and "new procedures and institutional roles result from adaptation processes, which translate into new responsibilities (conceptions of place in the world), rules (institutional rules and organizational structures) and resources (material and non-material assets)" (Idem, pp. 36-37).

understand how actors coordinate and cooperate within and between organizations, irrespective of traditional power and government centred relations. In this case, comprehensive security governance, as Krahmann (2003, p. 11) observes "denotes the structures and processes which enable access of public and private actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence of a central (sole) political authority"[7]. This body of literature focuses on how changes in the security environment lead to a shift from state centric actorness in international problem solving, to a situation where both governmental and non-governmental actors take a role, being that many of the actors that take part in decision-making are located above the state level. Security governance consists of a system of regulation of security "relations at the regional or international level set aside governments" (Kirchener, 2006, p. 949) established by "political actors other than governments" (Webber *et al*., 2004, p. 5). Within a security regime, decision-making is 'horizontally dispersed' (Krahmann, 2003, p. 13) (as in comprehensive coordination) in the absence of an 'overarching governmental authority' (Webber *et al.*, 2004, p. 5) and policy implementation is decentralised, self-enforced, being actor's 'compliance of a voluntary nature' (Krahmann, 2003, p. 13; Nunes, 2011, pp. 60-63)[8]. In the EU comprehensive action, one can identify distinct forms of comprehensive governance pertaining to different forms of strategic action. This occurs among the EU main decision-making bodies at various levels of governance, both in its intergovernmental level with respect to crisis management (Common Foreign and Security Policy – CFSP – and Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP) and its supranational dimensions regarding the domains of development aid, civil protection, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Woollard (2013) introduces a distinction between a broad and narrow understanding of comprehensive action[9]. The first, regards the integrated "EU approach towards a third country or towards another region or group of coun-

7 Text in brackets added by the author.

8 In a EU context, although Member States retain a great number of competences and financial and material resources to implement security and defense policies, the EU through CSDP comprises common institutions and processes that 'guide and restrain... (common) action' (Keohane, 2002, p. 15) and facilitate common action that otherwise could not be put into practice, leading to comprehensive approach.

9 This divide between the intergovernamental and supranational decision-making is also identified by Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen (2011, pp. 231-232) as responsible for introducing a logic that may affect interaction and cooperation, being considered as one of two situations. It may create tensions between structural and operational elements of security or it may cause tensions between the internal and external dimensions of security.

tries" (Idem, p. 1). In this case, integrated means general acceptance by "all relevant EU institutions and policies, 'tools' and activities to implement these objectives" (Idem, ibidem). In a EU context broad comprehensive action is operationalized through thematic or regional strategies and narrow comprehensive approach applies to the action plans that result from them. A narrow expression may also consubstantiate an interpretation of comprehensive approach drawing on the possibility of civil-military integration within military and civilian CSDP actors (Idem, ibidem). Limiting comprehensive approach to crisis management, thus restraining it to the area of competences of the EEAS, contradicts the nature and scope of the concept itself, which in our understanding regards all relevant actors, that take part with different policies and instruments, in different stages of external action in order to prevent, manage and solve security problems, being security regarded in a broad sense.

Other views on security governance convey a perspective which value the conditions of institutional 'inclusiveness and horizontal coherence' (Schroeder, 2011, p. 50). Schroeder observes that, inclusiveness occurs when inter-organizational coordination comprehends all "relevant actors in devising coordinated answers to a complex security challenge" regardless institutional affiliation. Horizontal coherence takes place when actors share horizontal coordination provisions, working "towards enhancing the overall effectiveness and efficiency of a specific cross-cutting goal" (Idem, ibidem). The same author argues that security governance allows to evaluate comprehensiveness strength in four parameters: "durability (stability of interactions over time), intensity (frequency of interactions), level (formal and informal coordination venues) and membership of inter-organizational coordination (number, profession and policy arena of involved actors)" (Idem, pp. 50-51). Studies with a more applied outlook highlight the importance of comprehensiveness to the internal domain played by the horizontal dimension (adequate level of internal security in complex environments involving law-enforcement, border management, judicial cooperation, civil protection, political, economic, financial, social and private sectors); and the vertical dimension of security, comprising international cooperation, EU security policies, regional cooperation between Member States and Member States' own policies at those levels (FOCUS, 2011, p. 7).

***Institutionalization and Institutional Adaption***

On what concerns institutional adaptation, perspectives in literature consider the process of institutionalization of comprehensive approach in three different ways. Some look at institutional adaption from the point of view of external efficiency and impact of the EU, as a way to enhance external coherence and comprehensiveness of the Union's policies. Others view institutional adaptation, for instance the

review of the EEAS[10], as a consequence that enables a more effective comprehensive approach. A third group of authors take a closer look into how new capabilities and other resources may enhance the visibility of the Union as an external actor, thus enabling better comprehensiveness.

The dimension that assesses efficiency and impact understands comprehensive approach as the result of integrated action, caused by processes of institutional adaptation among 'centralized institutions', vital to the implementation of comprehensive approach. This regards the levels of 'strategic and operational planning' (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 228) where different political actors, such as the High Representative, the President of the European Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee, EU Military Staff and the Commission (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 17) play a role in the decision-making structure. None of these EU bodies has centralized or overarching authority across all the EU policies, strategies and instruments. European security governance is shaped, conducted and limited by constitutive norms, centered on willing compliance (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 42, Protocol 10), on the respect for Members States preferences, for their constitutional constraints and for the security and defense commitments agreed in the framework of other international organizations (Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 28 and 42).

As observed by Gebhard and Norheim-Martisen (2011, p. 231) "Europe shares an external portfolio mainly constituted by its external trade policy, development cooperation and regional cooperation, as well as of loose intergovernmental coordination within the European Political Cooperation". This means that from an early stage, the EU benefited from a unique experience as an international actor, whose external action is characterized as having a comprehensive nature due to the scope of actors, policies and instruments involved. Although the European Community originally appeared as a regulatory, economic and social actor, soon it evolved into a normative, security and defense player, which led to a structural adaptation of the European Union on "how these new components of external action could be reconciled with the structural instruments the Community, already had at its disposal"

10 The European External Action Service (EEAS) was established by the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007, which entered into force in 2009. The EEAS was meant to strengthen the European Union on the global stage and to 'ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between those areas and its other policies' (Council Decision, 2010/427/EU).. The EEAS was officially launched on January 1st 2011 and since then its structure was revised in October 2014 in order to improve the crisis management services and the Foreign Policy Instruments Service. A draft review was presented in July 2015 in order to "streamline planning and decision making procedures related to CSDP missions and operations (…) in cooperation with Member States (…) guided by the November 2013 Council conclusions on CSDP and the December 2013 European Council Conclusions" (Council of the European Union, 2013,§ 3).

(Idem, ibidem). The political divide that characterized the implementation of two different paths within Europe, one of intergovernmental nature, regarding the management of political affairs and another of supranational orientation, concerning economic and social matters, is consequential over the development of comprehensive approach by connecting the domains of foreign policy to those of trade, crisis management, development assistance and humanitarian aid.

The literature on institutional change regards institutional adaptation in a twofold manner: as a source and a consequence of implementation of comprehensive approach. As a source of comprehensiveness, the constitution of the EEAS helps streamlining and improving the decision making process, seeking to guarantee the consistency of the Union's external action and generate better coordination between EU actors and cooperation among all relevant external partners. The EEAS can be understood as what the literature (Lehmann, 2011, p. 27) refers to as a 'complex adaptive system', which process of organization responds to external crisis with further 'centralization of decision-making authority' thus concentrating power and 'more control' in tackling crisis 'between actors or between actors and their environment' (Idem, pp. 30-32). This view of a complex adaptive system regards the process of adaptation of actors and decision-making processes when crises occur, causing disruption of the status quo of a given system as 'existed before the crisis occurred' (Idem, p. 29). It generates a centralization of power and resources on national executives (in the case of the EEAS on EU actors) and a 'reduction of actors involved' (Idem, p. 32) (in the EEAS case, materialized in a review and simplification of its structure) in order to better manage crisis and restore control and stability.

Consequently, the discrete reviews of the EEAS[11] since 2011, reflect a slow process of institutional adaptation of the EU's external service towards comprehensiveness, in order to attain more effective policies and improve the global impact of the EU presence. This was materialized by the High Representative, with the agreement of the President of the European Commission, on the constitution of a Commissioner's Group on External Action aimed at "creating a more structural underpinning for the comprehensive approach with the aim of further enhancing strategic coherence" (High Representative/European Commission, 2013; High Representative

11 Since 2011, the EEAS has gone various institutional adaptations in 2014 and 2015 leading to a simplified structure with the creation of three Deputy Secretary Generals, responsible for Economic and Global Issues, Political Affairs and CSDP and Crisis Response, to whom the Managing Directors of the EEAS geographical and thematic desks answer to.
In the future, an assessment of the competences of the High Representative may be desirable, due to the too broad scope of responsibilities as High Representative responsible for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defense Policy, as Vice President of the Commission, Foreign Minister of the Member States under the EU rotating Presidency and Head of the European Defense Agency (Lisbon Treaty, 2007, Article 18.4).

2015). Additionally the new Crisis Response System, within the EEAS, reflects the need for better internal coordination. The latest revision of the crisis management procedures meets this demand with the creation of a *Crisis Management Board*, connecting the horizontal aspects of EEAS crisis response functions, in liaison with Commission and Council General Secretariat, the chairman of EU Military Committee, the Chair of the Political and Security Committee, the geographical managing directorates and the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy and the *Crisis Platform* created to facilitate information share and provide political and strategic guidance for further action and planning. This last body meets on an *ad hoc* basis and is activated in response to a crisis. It includes the EEAS, the European Commission and Council Secretariat.

Comprehensive approach emerges as a central concept to the EEAS review process "which makes the EU distinctively able to tackle all aspects of a foreign policy issue" (EEAS, 2013, p. 3). The revision of the EEAS corresponds to a process of adaptation through institutional change, where the practice of comprehensive action requires the institutionalization of comprehensive approach within the EEAS, as a whole. Two categories of challenges have been shaping the developments of EU comprehensive approach. On the one hand, exogenous challenges pertaining to the proliferation of non-state actors with long lasting destabilizing effects, leading to new crises in wider geographies following the 'Arab Springs' movement. On the other, endogenous problems, such as the financial crisis in the Eurozone and closer interdependence between internal-external security threats led to an increased need for better 'coordination and effectiveness in crisis response', to 'network and pool resources more efficiently' (Ashton, 2014, p. 12) and ultimately to a 'common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy' (Mogherini, 2015, p. 3). Earlier, this concern with commonality, comprehensiveness and consistency led the former High Representative Ashton to focus the EEAS review proposal on "crisis prevention, mobilizing different strengths, capacities and working in partnership (as) the key principles underpinning policy in dealing with conflicts and crisis" (Ashton, 2014, p. 14). To the former High Representative, comprehensive approach is a process of "bringing together all of the different policies or instruments for a common purpose, which is to endeavor to tackle issues and problems before they evolve into a crisis (…) in order to be effective we need to join forces and pool resources – those of the External Action Service, the Commission and the EU Member States, complemented by strong partnerships across the world" (Idem, ibidem). This conceptualization of comprehensive approach, as defined at the highest institutional level of the EU external representation, stresses the importance of three dimensions: (1) the preventive impact of comprehensive approach; (2) the need for complementary degrees of internal and external coordination and cooperation; (3) the coexistence of distinct policy levels operating jointly within the European decision making structure.

The third dimension of institutional adaptation present in the literature concerns how comprehensive approach may cause the development of new capabilities (Smith, 2013, pp. 36-41). Smith recognizes comprehensive approach as a cumulative process of addition of new capabilities (e.g. military and police forces) connecting defense and security domains to the existing EU civilian/foreign and economic policy tools, in order to improve the EU's effectiveness and coherence as a global actor. EU's comprehensiveness means a special focus on 'preventive action' by making use of 'EU policy tools directed towards a single target/problem' (Idem, p. 37) and results from a combination between EU policing/military capabilities and 'longstanding expertise' (Idem, p. 38). This definition, although illustrative of the empirical application of the concept, appears at odds with the concept itself, due to the fact comprehensive approach may occur before, during and after a crisis, thus requiring a condition of sustainability, aiming at not only one security target, but multiple ones, with a multidimensional scope.

To Smith (2013, p. 33) adaption to new security conditions result from learning processes originated in how successfully new procedures and new institutional roles help solving security problems. The same author observes that "comprehensive approach is not just about improving functionality; it has also much to do with the EU's conception of itself as a responsible global actor', being perceived as an 'EU trademark in international politics'" (Smith, 2013, p. 40). The set-up of new institutional roles, instruments and procedures among the EU institutions and Member States result from various adaptation processes. First from new roles that come with newly perceived responsibilities related with the conceptions of place an actor has in the world. Second, from the adoption of new rules (institutional rules and formal organizational setting). Third, from the adaptation of the resources employed in long term stability, such as the role of civil society, the development of state building capabilities and the implementation of programmes of security sector reform (SSR) in combination with foreign and economic policy tools (Smith, 2013, p. 33 and pp. 36-37) made available by the EU. In fact, Gross (2008, pp. 14-15) considers SSR not only as a key concept to improve governance in post-conflict situations, but also as one of the most frequent indicators of civilian-military cooperation, especially when in articulation with processes leading to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The geographical and thematic strategies adopted by the EU, namely those for the Horn of Africa, Sahel and Gulf of Guinea are outlined around the principle of perceived responsibilities of 'support for welfare of the people of Horn of Africa', tackle 'the root causes of the extreme poverty and towards creating the grass-root conditions for economic opportunity and human development' in the case of the Sahel region and 'helping states to strengthen their maritime capabilities, the rule of law and effective governance across the region' in the case of Gulf

of Guinea[12]. These strategies, which result from a new comprehensive approach to security are being supported in their implementation by strengthening regional cooperation with relevant actors, by enhancing capacity building and by using the financial support of programmes sourced in the EU and in relevant international and regional organizations.

***Coordination and Cooperation***

On the fourth dimension of the literature review conducted, one identifies that the adaptation processes that have comprehensive approach as a goal, pose analytical and empirical challenges to internal/external coordination within the EEAS, pertaining to the need and will to have a higher degree of influence concentrated at the High Representative level – as compared to other EU actors like the European Commission and Council – with consequences over the competences balance among EU actors and the incentives to generate political will by Member States[13]. As Duke (2014, p. 30) points out, coordination not only requires a better definition of the role and mission of the EEAS, but also willingness of Member States to incorporate decisions at the EU level, in the face of limited consensus, which may hamper the EEAS ability 'to shape external actions' and effectively implement comprehensive approach and action. The latest EEAS review proposal relates effectiveness in the implementation of comprehensive approach, with improvements in coordination and impact on future institutionalization of cooperation. This applies to distinct EU actors namely the EU delegations and the EU Special Representatives and external partners, whether one refers to third countries or other international organizations (EEAS, 2013, p. 5).

The processes of internal coordination and external cooperation leading to comprehensive action are suggested in literature through two interpretations. On the one hand, that of authors focused on the coordination challenges posed by the increasing internal-external nexus in security relations (Eriksson and Rhinard, 2009)[14] and that examine the challenges leading to better engagement and policy

12 See Council of the European Union 2014/ 7671; Council of the European Union 2011/ 16858; European Union External Action Service, 2011.

13 The Review document was careful on the preservation of the Commission's competences in the current architecture; its role was even reinforced with the addition within the EEAS of the Commission's service of the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) responsible for the implementation of specific budgets such as the Instrument for Stability and Foreign Policy regulatory instruments. On the draft version of the future EEAS structure (dated 24 July 2015) the FPI is preserved and positioned on the upper part of the EEAS structure, together with the EU Military Committee.

14 The report issued by the HR ahead of the June 2015 European Council also stressed the importance of developing synergies between the area of Freedom/Security/Justice affairs and CSDP,

coordination among actors. On the other, authors that perceive the political divides or competences 'boundary disputes' (Blockmans and Nbauer, 2013; Major and Mölling, 2013; Merket, 2013) as a major source of disengagement from better coordination practices. At the EU level, these disputes between decision-making levels and policy actors are particularly evident in the case of foreign policy, development aid and humanitarian action.

In the context of literature concerned with coordination and cooperation, the EU comprehensive approach results from the presence of several conditions (FOCUS, p. 7). First, at the internal level, the EU comprehensive approach results from a will to improve the Union's strategic approach to the EU external action.[15] Second, a growing involvement in crisis management leads to develop partnerships and consequently to more frequent cooperative practices between the EU and different institutions and actors. Third, the construction of a 'shared strategic vision' and better cooperation between civil-military actors and EU institutions are essential conditions for comprehensive approach to happen. This view emphasizes the value of a European common approach to crisis and the role of coordination among EU institutions, complementarity of EU policies (CSDP, development assistance and humanitarian aid) and cooperation with external actors. Tardy's (2015, p. 32 and pp. 36-37) contribution to the understanding of comprehensive approach leads to reexamine the debate about EU actorness and further reflects on the possibility of an objective impact assessment of the EU external action which Gebhard and Norheim-Martisen (2011, p. 226) refer to as "EU's (specific) qualities and performance as a comprehensive security actor"[16].

At the conceptual level, comprehensive approach refers to harmonization of principles and better outline of integrated and complementary action in complex crisis. At the practice level, it highlights the complexity of engaging various sectoral approaches in crisis management, it combines different organizational cultures and involves the use of distinct instruments from individual actors at different stages, throughout the crisis cycle. As Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen (2011) observe, at the EU level, this poses a challenge due to its 'complex multilevel structures', which involve a "large number of institutional actors and policies that need to be coordinated across bureaucratic, organizational and functional boundaries" (Gebhard

notably in the framework of the European Union Internal Security Strategy adopted in 2014 and The European Agenda on Security agreed in May 2015 (High Representative, 2015, pp. 5-6).

15 Regarding the notion of strategic approach, we share Biscop (2015, p. 8) perspective that the EU strategic approach is place beyond the simple act of 'reacting to things'; is 'not about everything'; it is not a 'compilation' or 'replacement' of Member States' foreign policies, but rather a complement to it and it should regard the EU best comparative advantage when compared to other security organizations (Nunes, 2010, p. 64).

16 Brackets added by the author.

and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011, p. 222). Consequentially, the EU is 'virtually meant to act comprehensively' (Idem, ibidem) appealing to its founding myths as a civilian, normative and ethical power in the domain of security[17]. Comprehensive approach may be considered as an incremental process of coordination. It gets more effective, as organizations improve their own internal practices of coordination; as actors are willing to attain or strengthen the habit to cooperate with others and Member States perceive that their preferences and interests resonate among the international organizations they integrate.

Comprehensive approach holds a set of defining principles that inform the definitional boundaries of the internal-external relation[18]. It implies 'collective ownership and responsibility' (Civil Society, 2013, p. 2), meaning that no single actor 'can claim' full property of the instruments and processes involved in comprehensive approach, but also that ownership presupposes consensual agreement on actors and actions to be pursued. Also due to the diverse universe of actors, comprehensive approach suggests 'obligation of transparency' (Idem), which requires better practices of 'information sharing', internal 'coordination' and external cooperation among likeminded actors and organizations. Action is, according to the same source, context oriented not 'instrument driven', a principle of action which is difficult to trace in complex crisis, where actors and interests representatives are multiple, thus enabling the prevalence of different preferences. Finally, it claims observation of 'principles underpinning the different instruments', actors and actions, as well as identification and evaluation of the advantages in the application of different instruments such as those in the field of foreign policy, military, police, humanitarian and development according to local requirements and needs.

The scope of the concept of comprehensive approach must also be explained in the framework of the full span of crisis and conflict cycles. Some authors (Gebhard, 2013, p. 2) consider this kind of "functional holism across the conflict cycle more of an idealist aspiration than an attainable goal". As Goor and Major (2012, p. 1) note, comprehensive approach is about 'sustainable conflict transformation' aiming at preventing, managing, solving or stabilizing crisis and conflicts, developing sustainable institutions, governmental structures, democratically elected or with transitional representative functions, as well as encouraging social and economic development of societies and communities. At this level, comprehensive approach

17 See Nunes (2011).

18 See *Civil Society Dialogue Network Meeting* (2013). The Civil Society Dialogue Network is a mechanism design to promote dialogue between civil society and European policy-makers on matters related to peace and conflict. It is co-financed by the European Union through the Instrument for Stability and by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, in co-operation with the European Commission and the European External Action Service.

regards a mode of intervention jointly, side by side or in sequence in terms of actors and policy instruments (Binder *et al.*, 1971; Pirozzi, 2013, pp. 11-13).
Currently, there is no full explanatory theory of crisis, for which it is difficult to attempt to produce a general approach to comprehensive approach from the point of view of actors' sequential intervention in crisis prevention, management and conflict resolution. State and non-state actors have different institutional cultures, competences and resources, which may shape the collaborative manner and the impact of the means employed in one stage of crisis, as compared to another. Not all actors have or make available a full array of instruments, whether by reasons of mandate, organizational and institutional designed or interest. However, this may determine how international organizations or state actors may work effectively jointly, side by side or in a sequential manner. Thus, the type of action underpinning the concept of comprehensive approach may be affected by the institutional design of the international organizations involved and by Member States own security and institutional culture. The manner in which actors get involved in comprehensive approach, through cooperation and coordination, are also important as a definitional feature of it, as Drent (2011, pp. 8-9) and Hauck and Rocca (2014, p. 28) observed. This is a characteristic particularly noticeable in the humanitarian assistance field, level at which civil-military cooperation may occur during and after the crisis period has occurred. Comprehensive approach refers to the actions "undertaken in a coordinated and collaborative manner by national and multinational civilian government agencies, military forces, international and intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, as well as (by) the private sector in order to achieve greater harmonization in the planning, management, and evaluation of coalition interventions in complex contingencies and emergencies" (Multinational Experiment 5, 2009, p. 2). Effective coordination and cooperation may also function as a benchmark to assess positive impact among security providers and donors.

***Civil-Military Coordination***

The fifth and last dimension of comprehensive approach identified in literature, and also the most traditional of all, regards civil-military coordination (CMCO) and concerns the intervention of distinct communities of experts in a simultaneous or sequential manner in crisis management and post conflict stabilization, that is when civilian missions (e.g. police mission) are combined or succeed a military operation. As observed by Gross (2008, p. 11), CMCO refers to a new 'culture of coordination' and a 'prerequisite for the elaboration of an effective crisis response' blending 'continued co-operation', 'shared political objectives', 'well defined tasks for EU actors' and 'synchronization of activities in theatre'. This approach resembles what may be branded as a strategic approach to cooperation, not in the sense

of an approach adopted to meet opposing wills, but rather a far-reaching perspective meant to safeguard common objectives through task division and synchronized or sequential action. Improvements on better civil-military cooperation[19] increased after 2002, at a time when the EU was looking for both an internal strategic consensus, surrounding the drafting of the European Security Strategy and better cooperation in terms of external relations with strategic partnerships with other security organizations, namely NATO[20] and UN[21]. In both cases, institutional adaptation and institutionalization of cooperation occurred, facilitating a more comprehensive approach to civilian-military affairs. These initiatives led to the formalization of closer contact at the highest echelons of the EU and NATO structure, namely between the EU High Representative and NATO and the UN respective Secretary-Generals; between the EU Political and Security Committee and NATO North Atlantic Council and UN Deputy Secretary-General; between EU-NATO Military Committees and International Staffs; between the EU Council Secretariat and the Commission services and the UN Secretariat and also in capabilities development through the NATO-EU Capability Group. The EU and NATO, since then, have been developing closer cooperation in crisis management, capability development (e.g. combat on terrorism, maritime, piracy, cyber-security and organized crime) and political consultations[22] reflecting the notion that a growing fragmentation of external threats pressed for the formalization of comprehensive modalities of cooperation.

19 The development of comprehensive approach dates back to crisis management in the context of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in central Europe with the crisis in Central Europe, namely in Bosnia. The EU civil-military involvement in Bosnia at a time when a military EU-led operation broadly (EUFOR Althea between December 2004-November 2014 ) coexisted for a period of time with a civilian police mission (EUPM between January 2003 to June 2012)

20 The agreement on better EU-NATO cooperation was celebrated under the comprehensive framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, concluded in March 2003, preceded by the conclusions of NATO's Washington Summit (1999), the European Council in Nice (December 2000) and the EU-NATO Joint Declaration (December 2002). This agreement would enable the EU access to NATO planning, command options and the use of NATO capabilities. See also European Commission 2003/526 final and European Commission 2001/231 final.

21 In June 2002 the EU-UN Declaration on co-operation in conflict prevention and crisis management, underlined the commitment of the EU to contribute to the United Nations efforts in conflict prevention and crisis management and the Swedish Presidency of 2001 took forward the mandate to identify 'areas and modalities for co-operation with the UN in crisis management' namely in the context of civilian and military aspects of crisis management in the Western Balkans, Middle East, Great Lakes, Horn of Africa and West Africa.

22 A closer civil-military cooperation implied a process of institutional adaptation at the political-strategic echelons of both organizations, among groups of experts EU and NATO Military Committees, between the European Defense Agency and NATO's Allied Command Transformation and between NATO and EU's Situation Centres, among others arrangements.

In June 2015, the EU-UN common priorities expressed at the 70th United Nations General Assembly (September 2015-2016) underlined a cross sectoral, cross-policy approach stressing the commitment towards effective multilateralism; common participation in peace and security reviews; comprehensive review on non-proliferation and disarmament; cooperation regarding counter terrorism; climate change; humanitarian rights and international law; protection of humanitarian space; gender issues and open, free and secure cyberspace[23]. The partnership EU-UN is still considered a good case of cooperative success, when compared with the cooperative relation developed between the EU and NATO. Despite the institutionalization of cooperative relations between the EU and NATO, this is less visible for internal and external reasons, which impair joint comprehensive approach for two reasons. From the internal point of view, due to the position of some Alliance members that held this cooperative process hostage of their own national interests[24]. From the external point of view, due to the fact local actors have often been using competition between organizations and disagreements among Member States in order to maximize benefits (Michel, 2013, p. 263). This was particular evident during AMISOM, where NATO and the EU where engage separately, rather than jointly, in the support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) aiming at ending violence and improve the humanitarian conditions in the field.

To sum up comprehensive approach is both a concept and a practice that pertains to adaptation of international actors to the changing international environment. It deals with causes and consequences of crisis and conflicts and seeks a durable rehabilitation of local actors, decision-making structures and administrations vital to the security and development of states and communities, in complex security environments. Comprehensive approach encompasses different actors and levels of action comprising civilian and military actors, state-centric and non-state centric actors, governmental and non-governmental actors working at various stages, for instance that of security, development and humanitarian action or those of justice, social and economic levels, both in hierarchical and non-hierarchical structures.

**Challenges Inherent to Comprehensive Approach**

The implementation of comprehensive approach faces institutional and procedural challenges conditioned by the diversity of political, strategical, societal and humanitarian players[25]. If the international security of post-Cold War offers an exogenous

23 Available at http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_16584_en.htm.

24 The position of Turkey regarding the EU and Cyprus and of Greece towards Macedonia has led to a less effective EU-NATO cooperation as desired.

25 In the EU structure, three levels of decision making intervene in crisis management. There is a first level of intergovernmental nature, pertaining to CSDP and Common Foreign Security Policy instruments. A second one of supranational nature, with respect to the European Com-

challenge to the implementation of comprehensive approach, because international risks and threats are more complex and fragmented, the internal process of Europeanisation of CSDP appears to press for the development of new methodologies and instruments of comprehensive approach that followed institutional adaptation within CSDP. The European level emerges as the best 'framework for the elaboration of security policy' (Webber *et al.*, 2004, p. 14) complemented with thematic and geographical strategies. If the first (European level of decision-making), enables internal coordination essential to comprehensive approach. The second (thematic and geographical strategies), provides the topical and geographical focus that guide policies and helps defining the scenarios for European comprehensive action. The internal procedural diversity of the Union raises practical questions related to the implementation of CSDP and comprehensive approach due to the fact the nature and structure of European security offers to Member States a choice to participate on the basis of informal 'loose cooperation' (Howorth, 2007). This facilitates a more flexible process of institutionalization, coordination and cooperation within the EU, which encourages comprehensive thinking and action. Various authors perceive European security as a relational system characterized by collaborative practice described as complex multilateral and multinational coordination; high level of institutionalized cooperation (Smith, 2004; Bono, 2004) and coalescent Europeanization of Member States' security policies (Radaelli, 2006; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Tonra, 2013). As Joenniemi (2007, p. 140) observes, in Europe "cooperative engagement works as a normative goal" improving the habit of shared policy practices among Member States. Some authors perceive the lack of a specific juridical and regulative dimension of this cooperation as a highly effective setting for the comprehensive implementation of European security and defence (Pape, 2005; Mattern, 2005). To others, it is a challenge at the origin of severe setbacks in European policy formulation, capabilities generation and international actorness (Hyde-Price, 2004 and 2008; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005) that may affect European comprehensive approach and action.

Another challenge facing the implementation of comprehensive approach regards the need to avoid Member States decision makers and respective bureaucracies to influence the contents of the mandate to launch missions and operations in order to preserve national interests, sometimes at odds with the attainment of a common approach to security challenges. Comprehensive approach is not deprived from

mission's role in external cooperation, humanitarian aid and development. A third level, regards specific intra-European competences that result from the EEAS responsibilities in crisis management; from the coordination practices between the EEAS and the Commission's Foreign Policy Instruments integrated in it, and from the attempts to facilitate closer relations between the EEAS services at the political and strategic level and the EU Special Representatives and EU delegations.

self-help approach to cooperation among security and defense organizations and it may even offer the opportunity for agencies to strive for their corporate interests, which in itself may be a challenge to effective implementation of comprehensiveness. It may be affected by rivalry, competition and duplication within EU institutions, between Member States interests and other actors, which adds complex challenges to the background against which comprehensive approach is operationalized and implemented. This has been increasingly difficult to contain given the complexity of the situations in which a comprehensive approach methodology is recommended. The EU mandates and thematic and regional strategies, which frame a comprehensive approach perspective, should be broader in scope, but also inclusive and flexible. This would facilitate consensus, encourage political will and generate the necessary resources in theatre, thus facilitating adaptation to unpredictable developments, occurrences and contingencies in theatre. Comprehensive approach is about making better use of a wide spectrum of resources and combined instruments and practices that produce a complex network of interactions, which pose challenges to the national interest of Member States, to their security cultures and practices in complex crisis.

Additionally, the working methods within the EU may constitute a challenge to comprehensive approach. Right after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, the agreement on EU procedures to generate capabilities, shows evidence of a propensity to build up capabilities, before outlining the goals, the strategies and the scenarios where they could be employed (Nunes, 2016 and 2010; Bono, 2004; Bailes, 2008). In recent years, this tendency seems to be gradually replaced by the introduction of better-structured approaches to coordination and cooperation, through the agreement on action plans, enhanced partnerships and 'more for more' developmental programs, which characterize current EU regional and thematic strategies and partnerships.

Procedures of coordination and cooperation in European comprehensive approach lead actors to work jointly, side by side or in sequence and to overcome the difficulties of implementation of adequate sequential action is a challenge to sustainable crisis response. The EEAS and the European Commission are structured to safeguard subsequent phases of long-term stabilization, in particular through the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the Commissions' agencies for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), as well as Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) programs. All these are valuable assets that may help successful transition across different stages of crisis and conflicts among distinct actors[26]. The accomplishment of sustainable responses to cri-

26 To our knowledge, insufficient research has been developed on whether or not the impact of comprehensive approach is greater when there are well established formal cooperation relations between the actors, for instance if the crisis occurs in regional contexts where the Euro-

sis, by states and organizations, do not depend exclusively on their capacity to generate the required resources, but from their ability to generate political will, reach consensus and be prepared to intervene in a comprehensive manner before, during and long after crisis occurred. In this context, the prior existence of formal relations among actors may help to implement comprehensive approach, facilitating the use of practices leading to better coordination, in consecutive stages of engagement by one or various actors in theatre.

The success of comprehensive approach depends on the ability of the actors involved to guarantee a good degree of transition from prevention to development. First by creating the conditions for stabilization during transitional phases of crisis management or during and following conflict resolution. Second, by strengthening institutions and local actors in order to mitigate, in a structured manner, the sources of insecurity and violence. Third, by committing local authorities and other relevant local actors to take ownership of the institutions, administrations, instruments and processes leading to security, stability and development. Fourth, by ensuring an efficient transition among EU instruments from CSDP missions and operations, to Commission programs and projects, working in parallel with Member States' bilateral and multilateral initiatives, in the context of other international organizations, present in theatre (Pirozzi, 2013, p. 17). Diversity of actors and multiplicity of resources may improve comprehensiveness, complementarity, representativeness and legitimacy of comprehensive approach practices. By offering diverse cooperative options, it may better meet the variety of security demands in theater, but it also may run the risk of inefficiency due to the divisions posed by different interests, institutional and collaborative practices in place.

The presence of various actors in theatre may affect comprehensiveness. The EU has to struggle with the tensions caused by the systemic influence projected by hegemon states at the international level[27], by the regional impact of other organizations missions and operations in theatre[28] and by the effects of Member States and local actors' clashing interests and preferences[29] at a given time, with considerable

pean Neighbourhood Policy applies or if conversely, such formal relations do not necessarily determine the success of comprehensive approach initiatives.

27 As Koschut (2014, p. 355) notes in the end of the Cold War, the introduction of an 'out of area' security practice by NATO, beyond the traditional area of application of the Washington Treaty further impediments, disagreements and lack of coordination among transatlantic allies, that have different perceptions of risk and threat, distinct constitutional arrangements and various types views on force projection. These type of tensions generated among allied security communities may add another constrain to the effectiveness of comprehensive approach.

28 See Drent *et al*. (2015).

29 For further reading on the effects of global versus national and local spaces impact over security conceptions and practices, see Aris and Wenger (2014).

impact on threat perceptions. Although the experiences in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria called the attention to the utility of a comprehensive approach, in prevention, post crisis and post conflict recovery, leading to the creation of provincial reconstructions teams in the case of Afghanistan[30], comprehensive approach is not yet designed to help fighting sources of insurgency, violent radicalization and terrorism. Nevertheless, improvements are visible with respect to increasing resilience of states and societies with the introduction of the EU 'Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa' (2011), the 'Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel' (2011), the 'EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea' (2014) and the establishment of action plans, such as the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020, together with the setup of EU Trust Funds, an important financial instrument that may contribute to improve sustainable comprehensiveness. So far, three large EU Trust Funds have been created: the 'EU Bêkou Trust Fund for Central African Republic' (July 2014), the 'EU Regional Trust Fund for Syria' (2014) and the 'EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa' (2015) with the aim to improve the EU and its Member States capacity to 'deliver more flexible, comprehensive and effective joint support in response to emergencies' (Hauck *et al*., 2015)[31]. These aid instruments may help improving funds allocation and monitorization and facilitate engagement of third parties, partner countries and other international and regional organizations in the funds management, as an integrant part of comprehensive approach.

To the presence of different interests and to the complexity of regional crisis environments, one must add the challenge posed by local 'relevant' players and regional actors in regional crisis, as well as the role local cultural, social or even religious actors and practices may play in comprehensive approach[32]. Still in the domain of the challenges facing comprehensive approach, ownership matters to a successful process of stabilization, reconstruction and development. The EU official discourse has been dedicating a growing interest to capacity building of local actors in order to ensure security by their own means. This implies the development of efforts to empower local ownership of political and judicial institutions, good governance, rule of law, boarder management, public health management and social and economic development.

The challenges facing the implementation of comprehensive approach are not a European idiosyncrasy, but rather a commonality to most international actors com-

30 For a view that corroborates this one see Hauck and Rocca (2014, p. 18).

31 For a detailed analysis on the EU Trust Funds see Hauck *et al*. (2015).These funds are instruments of external aid, guided to countries, regions and globally to help solving emergency situations or post-conflict crises.

32 See Tardy (2014).

mitted to it. Among the current major challenges one may identify, first the complexity of assuring successful transition across the various phases of crisis management and conflict resolution, from prevention to development. Second, to effectively commit ownership to the processes of local capacity building. Third, to complement simultaneously or in sequence, all the EU instruments from CSDP, to development aid and humanitarian relief. Fourth, to accomplish an adequate balance between diverse actors, with distinct collaborative practices present in theatre. Fifth, to guarantee the impartiality of representativeness and safeguard of interests in regional crisis, which would add legitimacy to comprehensive approach and action. Sixth, to assure that comprehensive approach brings together sustainable solutions by gathering instruments oriented to long-term action, as those of foreign policy and financial, development and humanitarian aid.

**Comprehensive Approach as Part of the EU Transformative Role**

The definition of a given international level of ambition comprises a definitional approach, which affects both how actors identify and select what is relevant and prioritary. The EU security follows a holistic approach that combines the dimensions of security with those of foreign policy, external relations, development, humanitarian aid and military action, where needed and possible, with those of preventive action, capacity building and rehabilitation of fragile states and societies. At the EU level, considering that the CSDP is neither an organization nor a defense structure, one must keep in mind that, as an intergovernmental policy it gathers Member States with different strategic cultures and preferences that conduct foreign, security and defense policy unilaterally and bilaterally, with the help of coalitions of the willing or in the framework of global and regional security organizations. Additionally, the EU and CSDP are not the only platforms through which Member States can project their common preferences and interests at the global and regional level, but just one of several. This means that, an EU's comprehensive approach is and will be less affected by the so called 'clear' definition of level of ambition[33] or by the presence of a traditional 'strategic concept', but rather by Member States' perception of power and influence and how comprehensive approach will contribute to it. As Gebhard and Martissen (2011, p. 222) observe, security is as "much a matter of physical safety, political freedom and economic stability as of environment balance or sustainable development". The contemporary strategic environment has changed the nature of strategic culture and the way traditional

33 The Union's international goals and 'level of ambition' have already been stated in the European Security Strategy (2003) and The Report on the Implementation (2008), which identify the threats and means to mitigate them and with the support of several policy, thematic and regional strategy documents.

concepts of influence, power, force projection (e.g. use of military force and territorial conquest) and influence are perceived, being gradually replace by alternative dimensions of influence projection and impact. At this level the EU can, through comprehensive approach, develop its competitive advantage among other security actors. The experiences of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria have proven repeatedly, that not all security problems require military solutions[34] and that the impact of military power does not necessarily generate more stable and secured relations.

Authors that are critic about the EU's ambition to become a global actor (Hyde-Price, 2004 and 2006) and to adopt comprehensive approach (Mattelaer, 2013) as an instrument of international actorness, are often confined to traditional archetypes on 'security communities' that recognize NATO and the United States as efficient international actors and the global and military scope of their reach, as assets that give them a strategic advantage over other security actors. Constructivists, such as Buzan and Wæver (2003), Barnett and Finnemore (2004), liberal institutionalists as March and Olsen (1998) and even English School proponents, such as Dunne and Wheeler (1999) have contributed to explain the EU external behavior as a transformative project, of which comprehensive approach is an important part. These authors underlined the value of 'normative and cultural diffusion or influence', identifiable in the EU strategies for the Sahel region, Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa and Middle East, where implementation of comprehensive approach has been recently tested.

Comprehensive approach gives the EU the possibility to pursue a transformative goal, regarding fragile states and societies. However, this transformative role depends from the capacity of local relevant actors to incorporate processes of change exogenously given. Despite the fact regional organizations like the EU, African Union and NATO are being influenced by one another (Aris and Wenger, 2014, p. 290) the capacity of local-levels (relevant regional and local actors and organizations) to become embedded in a given process of change, exogenously transmitted, is often transformed through a process of 'norm reframe', adopted to the extent it may be understood, accepted and incorporated by local actors into their systems of believes and security practices. This condition of embedment in the other's system of norms and values is crucial for a successful implementation of comprehensive approach. This is more unlikely to happen in regions and countries affected by the consequences of recurrent crisis and intractable violent conflicts, in the context of

34 Biscop (2016, p. 25) observes that the military option can be used as a preventive instrument to escalation and that in 'a strategy based on pragmatic idealism, can only be an instrument of last resort' and it should become the last resort when 'vital interests and/or the Responsibility to Protect cannot otherwise be upheld' then Europe should be ready to act.

which, ill-defined or multiple interlocutors struggle for power positions, fueling violence and instability. Successful comprehensive action encompasses the *'transference to'* and '*adoption by'* of political and strategic culture norms and practices, as well as practices of internal coordination and external cooperation, which may be foreign to recipient actors[35].

Externally the new EU global approach, as presented at the European Council of June 2016, highlights the utility of comprehensive approach, how it may help improving the impact of the EU's external action and a better perception on its transformative nature. The EUGS states that 'Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships "(…) A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state" (European Union Global Strategy, 2016). Internally, if the perceptions of power and influenced, shared by decision makers and Member States representatives, are conformed with such a transformative role, as mentioned earlier, then the EU or CSDP are likely to focus on a level of ambition that stresses the normative, preventive, holistic and multilateral dimensions of European security, rather than the strategic approach of national interest, national security, military gain and unilateral action, thus strengthening the very concept of comprehensive approach.

The EU transformative role, through comprehensive approach is also shaped by the presence of Member States own security culture and practices. Friis and Jarmyr (2008, p. 10) consider that national interests may obstruct 'policies and practices at both strategic and operational levels' and so can the presence of distinct security cultures and practices among Member States, leading to disagreements on goals, means and ends and ultimately to deficient coordination and cooperation. Whenever Member States collectively define common understandings on their external level of ambition, this occurs for reasons of collective trust, consensus building, operational reliability or dependability of Member States, translated into how they select organizations, such as the UN, NATO or the EU/CSDP[36] as preferred security and strategic partners. As Lehne (2013, p. 16) observes, actors commit themselves to "influence international developments in accordance with their values and interests". These choices are guided by an assessment on which of

35 Italics added by the author.

36 It is important to note that each of these security organizations share different security and strategic cultures and employs distinct levels of use of force. Additionally, Member States, due to very practical reasons, such as scarcity of resources and elevated costs of maintaining military forces exclusively assigned to one security organization, face difficulties in keeping forces answerable and ready available to various organizations. Consequently, countries tend to assigned similar force packages, if not the same force package to different organizations and to give priority to that on which operational reliance is higher in a specific security scenario.

them better meets current security challenges, whether one refers to the EU in Georgia and the Horn of Africa, the UN and EU in Congo, NATO in Afghanistan and Libya or France in Mali. This does not mean that Member States are less committed to strengthening comprehensive approach, but simply that Member States with distinct national interests, different memberships in security organizations and diverse levels of strategic autonomy or dependency are likely to favour the organization or strategic partner[37], which is perceived or is better equipped to perform successfully on a given security challenge.

A successful transformative impact means several things to distinct international actors. In the EU case it means to hold specific civilian assets for instance: experience in rule of law, security sector reform and border control in complex crises; to share specific expertise in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; to have specific proficiencies in institutional building and civilian administration, in mentoring, advising and monitoring, in development aid and in humanitarian relief; or to be able to blend the use of long[38] and short term instruments[39] that better meet the root causes of instability, crisis and conflicts, without resort to force. These civilian niches of expertise can preventively maximize impact over recipient countries, enabling the EU to act as a unique security supplier, better fitted to implement comprehensive action.

**EU Member States Implementation of Comprehensive Approach: A Review**

The current state of research on the implementation of comprehensive approach offers various comparative perspectives[40] that outline different units and distinct levels of analysis. Hauck and Rocca (2014) and Friis and Jarmyr (2008) seem to offer the best explanatory approaches to Member States' implementation of comprehensive approach. Hauck and Rocca (2014, pp. 34-41) identify as main units of analysis major EU Member States, such as the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, The Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, and assesses 'national agencies and agents' approaches in different levels of analyses of external relations and how they shape implementation practices of comprehensive approach. These are then mapped by

37 Strategic partners tend to cooperate with organizations which political structures resemble best their own, especially on what regards decision-making structures.

38 The European Commission shares a strongly embedded culture of economic, financial and social incentives regarding development aid culture.

39 CSDP missions and operation in crisis prevention, management and response are set to meet immediate security concerns.

40 For a comparative research on selected EU Member States and international organizations, namely the EU adaptation to comprehensive approach, see Friis and Jarmyr (2008); Major and Schöndorf (2011); Hauck and Rocca (2014), Post (2015) and Merket (2016). For a specific outlook on comprehensiveness on defence matters, see Santopinto and Price (2013).

the authors against variables that may condition foreign policy formulation and implementation, such as political and strategic purpose; scope of implementation of comprehensive approach as referred in policy documents; degree of interaction among national agencies; degree of institutional formalization of cooperation; funding method and level of support to the EU comprehensive approach. The first variable, formalization of political and strategic purpose regards the roles prescribed by state actors, which characterize the values, interests, preferences, policies and strategies actors choose to pursue in their external relations, providing them a 'common narrative and a roadmap' (Gross, 2013, pp. 11-16) for foreign policy during crisis. The second variable refers to the scope of comprehensive approach, whether actors choose a system wide approach (including systemic approach that binds diplomacy, security, crisis management, humanitarian relief, development aid, rule of law, business and trade cooperation); a medium range approach (diplomacy, security/crisis management, humanitarian action and development) or a narrow approach (limited to civil-military coordination). The third variable found in literature regards the degree of interaction among national agencies, as a pre-condition for comprehensiveness. Interaction (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 34) may range from a low level characterized by simple information share, to a medium level where information is shared and some activities are coordinated and a high level of integration[41], where policy formulation and coordination occurs and is corroborated in policy documents, joint programming, implementing and monitoring. The fourth variable pertains to institutional formalization of cooperation indicating the cases where actors engage in '*ad hoc* cooperation', 'flexible arrangements' or highly formalized initiatives characterized by 'standardization and predictability' (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 34) in the context of an agreed institutional framework. These choices are themselves conditioned by functional dependency among actors at the strategic and operational levels and by perceptions on institutions organizational efficiency. This means that an actor can be perceived as efficient according to the size and power of its military capabilities used is crisis management or in function of specific proficiencies in stabilization, reconstruction, capacity building, developmental and humanitarian instruments (Nunes, 2016).

41 The UK's Stabilisation Unit offers a useful definition to 'Integrated Approach' (as promoted by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review) referring to 'people from different institutions (with particular reference to civilian and military institutions) working together at several levels to achieve common aims. An integrated approach recognises that no one Government Department has a monopoly over responses to the challenges of conflict and stabilisation context and that by making best use of the broad range of knowledge, skills and assets of Government Departments, integrated efforts should be mutually reinforcing (United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 2014).

Being comprehensive approach a joint effort among different internal and external actors, it entails different security and strategic cultures, varied interpretations on the 'rule of force' and the 'force of rules', distinct levels of political and operational trust relaying on diverse degrees of interdependence and functional dependency from a dominant power, an alliance or other multilateral security institutions. Such dependencies affect the very concept of comprehensiveness, how it is implemented and which strategic partners are more likely to guarantee successful comprehensive action. This set of conditions is closely related to institutional formalization, addressed in the study conducted by Hauck and Rocca (2014) and concerns the national and international orientation of actors. This will predispose them, in particular state actors, to implement 'comprehensive approach beyond the national institutional set-up' leading them to divide external tasks by cooperating bilaterally with other EU Member States, collectively with alliances, multilaterally with organizations and with other local actors. The fifth variable identified in literature is funding, combining the possibility to manage dedicated funds to the military, diplomatic, developmental and humanitarian dimensions in an integrated manner, allowing assessing how much pooled funding is dedicated to fragility and conflict affected states and societies through crisis management, recovery (including resilience), development and stabilization programs and projects.

Drawing on a comparative review of the work of Hauck and Rocca (2014), Friis and Jarmyr (2008), Major and Shöndorf (2011), Post (2015) and Santopinto and Price (2013) one can observe the following findings. The countries which have global foreign policy goals, that are internationally more active, strategically abler and that often issue formal policy guidelines under the form of strategic documents (United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden), that establish formal coordination and cooperation between national governments and agents, are among the ones that have been implementing comprehensive approach in a more efficient way. The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, France and Denmark are among the ones with the most developed institutional and processual settings to accommodate comprehensive approach.

The four countries, which are in the forefront of implementation of comprehensive approach, appear to share similar attitudes towards comprehensive approach. The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark and France with global foreign interests, have opted for strategic and targeted approaches to implementation of comprehensive approach with the involvement of relevant national actors, with responsibility for external action. Consequently, this suggests that guided and inclusive approaches to internal coordination and external cooperation facilitate effective implementation. Motives to engage in comprehensive approach range from 'national security reasons', growing 'power decline' (Post, 2015, p. 370) and 'operational benefits'(Idem, p. 340) in the British case, to anchor comprehensive

approach to a national strategic concept in the Danish case and to engagement in comprehensive approach for reasons of 'national economic interests' (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 39; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013, p. 1 and p. 3), as in the Dutch case. Denmark being the major donor in development programmes, practices comprehensive approach as a way to implement development aid and develop peacekeeping missions (Rosgaard, 2008). France employs comprehensive approach as an instrument to bridge its own national security and development policies.

Among these Member States, authoritative documents support comprehensive approach such as the 'National Security Strategy' (United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 2008; House of Commons Defence Committee, 2010) in the case of the UK; the 'Guideline on the Integrated Approach' and the 'International Security Strategy' in the Dutch case[42]; and the 'Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa, 2013' and the 'French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013'. These documents, inform national visions on international affairs, define foreign policy goals, streamline decision-making and cross-sectoral internal coordination and external cooperation.

In the face of current threats and risks diplomacy, development, defense, trade, health and justice policies are closely connected and institutional adaptation determines external action, whether one refers to the British and Danish 'whole of government approach' or the Dutch and French 'integrated approach' (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, pp. 35-36 and pp. 38-39); Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark *et al.*, 2013). In the four cases the national agency(ies) leading the process of formulation and implementation of comprehensive approach take the form of joint leadership, gathering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (The Netherlands, France and Denmark), plus Overseas (UK)[43], Defence (in all the cases) and ministerial development agencies, plus the Ministry of Justice in the Dutch case. In the Dutch and Danish cases non-governmental and private sectors play a significant role (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 48).

42 See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014). In 2013, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frans Timmermans addressed a letter to the President of the House of Representatives on 'International Security Strategy' suggesting that integrated approach would only succeed if actors engage in the deployment of integrated instruments such as 'diplomacy, development cooperation, defence, the police, the justice system and trade'. See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs DVB/VD-073/2013 and Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014.

43 In the case of the United Kingdom, the inter-policy approach adopted led to the creation of an inter-agency unit first named 'Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit' and later 'Stabilization Unit', which gathers representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Ministry and the Department for International Development Managed with a joint funding pool. Similarly, the United States settled an 'Office for the Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization' (Friis and Jarmyr, 2014, p. 4).

The UK, Denmark and The Netherlands allocate dedicated funds to the implementation of comprehensive approach (Hauck and Rocca, 2014) facilitating the aggregation and sharing of financial, human resources and expertise, thus creating a solid material support base for comprehensive action[44]. France has no shared funding, although representatives of the Ministry of Finance attend inter-ministerial meetings (Idem, p. 36) gathering Defence, Foreign Affairs and the French Development Agency.

Another set of countries, such as Germany and Sweden reveal distinct case studies. Although internationally active and committed, both countries hold reservations regarding the use of military force in external relations. In the first case, the motive to engage in comprehensive approach pertains to a manifestation of military commitment (Post, 2015, p. 370) by other means and a source of legitimacy (Idem, p. 390). In the Swedish case, it is a way to enforce norms and principles and promote 'international development cooperation' (Post, 2015, p. 371) reflecting an international ambition to export its own 'crisis management norms' (Idem, pp. 355 and p. 390), with a specific interest on prevention. Both privilege the use of preventive, civilian and soft power instruments, a trend which is gaining visibility among the EU official regional positions for fragile states and societies[45].

Formal strategic initiatives guide comprehensive approach, in the German case the Action Plan on 'Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding' (2004)[46] and 'White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr' (2016)[47]. In the Swedish case, a 'Total Defence' concept (Post, 2015, p. 324) employed to deal with 'civil-military action' guides comprehensive approach and action.

Institutional adaptation takes the form of a German Inter-Ministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention design to steer the interministerial external dimension of policies and international cooperation in support of the implementation of 'networked security'. In the Swedish case a dedicated agency, supervised by the Ministry of Defence, coordinates non-military actors and Stockholm

44 For instance, the UK common funding to the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, under the authority of the National Security Council, announced in June 2013 for former Yugoslavia, was of £1 billion combining defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence), see International Security Information Service (2014, ft.1, p. 4). In Denmark, a Fund for Peace and Stability was also established.

45 Council of the European Union (2011) 16858/11; Council of the European Union 2014/7671 and European Union External Action Service (2011).

46 The Action Plan defines crisis prevention as a cross-sectoral task at both government and civil society level and identifies the respective national structures involved. See German Federal Government, 2004 [accessed on 12nd April 2016].

47 German Ministry of Defence (2006). See also Major and Schöndorf (2011, p. 3).

has been a strong supporter of a 'European level conflict prevention approach' (Hauck and Rocca, 2013, p. 38). This preference is a structural feature of Swedish foreign policy, leading it to present an 'Action Plan Preventing Violent Conflicts', which was endorsed in 1999 by Member States (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009).

The document acknowledges the role of different actors and according to Post (2015, p. 327) led to the organization of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a way that would strengthened cross sectoral coordination in conflict prevention. Later in 2001, during the Swedish EU Presidency, the adoption of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, during the Gothenburg Council, led to a European valorization of the civilian instruments in crisis management and to the creation of the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. On what concerns the leading agencies for comprehensive approach, Germany's network security structure, present in its interministerial organization, fragmentizes decision making and does not lead to obvious institutional adaptation, being coordination conducted on an *ad hoc* basis using 'various conceptual approaches, present among relevant actors, without pre-settled mechanism for joint analysis, development and implementation' (Major and Schöndorf, 2011, p. 3) of crisis management policies. This occurs despite the fact a Federal Government Representative is responsible for connecting ministerial departments to the higher ranks of political decision-making (Idem, p. 3). In the Swedish case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides considerable input to Sweden's involvement in international conflict management, while an agency responsible for non-military actors working in conflict situations and natural disasters relief is coordinated by the Ministry of Defence (Hauck and Rocca, 2014, p. 36). In both cases, national leading agencies pursue a much less structured coordinated action, when compared with the first group of countries, showing preference for a more plural and network centric coordination among civil-military, developmental and humanitarian actors.

On strategic preferences and strategic partners, Germany and Sweden show preference for 'leading from behind' actively contributing to the domains of development and humanitarian action. While Germany has been more reluctant to engage directly in military action, it has been very active in post conflict situations, perceiving comprehensive approach as a way to compensate its less visible military commitment in international missions. To Berlin, a UN mandate is a requisite for external action and the EU is recognized as a preferred partner for civilian crisis management, post conflict reconstruction and humanitarian action, furthering European integration. Sweden focuses its preferences on those partners who can promote its policy goals regarding 'international development cooperation' (Post, 2015, p. 371). While the UN can provide the necessary legal and legitimate background to multilateral external action. The EU can make available financial instru-

ments and make use of Germany's expertise on developmental programmes and policies, as well as on humanitarian action.

On the application of financial resources regarding fragility situations, none of the two countries has shared or dedicated funding sources.

The last variable pertains to collective agency or how Member States internally translated collective will into implementation of comprehensive approach is indirectly addressed by the literature reviewed. The external level where collective agency of comprehensive approach is reproduced, is also different across the countries studied, denoting distinct worldviews and expressions of strategic preference in the way foreign, security policy and external cooperation are conducted. Strategic preference is conditioned by political and operational trust and by perceptions of common interests, common threat and shared opportunities. This results in selective commitment of states, in function of the level of institutional integration among international organizations (NATO, EU or United Nations).[48] Those with preferential relations with the United States and NATO, that are more likely to make use of force, notably in its military dimension and are already engaged in long term missions and operations, in the follow up of which comprehensive action may be applied, tend to opt for the implementation of comprehensiveness, bilaterally, with one international organization or under the format of a coalition of the willing. For those actors that privileged a strong legal base, on which to ground external action for reasons of legitimacy, legality, acceptance and representativeness, international players, such as the United Nations and the EU offer the preferential institutional platform, through or with which to implement comprehensive action.

The study conducted by Friis and Jarmyr (2008) on implementation of comprehensive approach isolates three alternative analytical categories distinct from previous studies: whole of government approach; inter-agency level of collaboration and intra-agency initiatives, testing them in terms of efficiency, consistency, ability to respond to insecurity, to set up policies and to add legitimacy to external action (Idem, p. 4). Major and Shöndorf (2011) complement these contributes by addressing how views and practices are observed among Member States (United Kingdom, France and Germany) (Idem, pp. 2-4) and how actors (inter-ministerial agencies) responsible for international coordination (Idem, pp. 4-6) adopt comprehensive approach in order to attain a more effective external cooperation with the EU, NATO or the UN. Svenja Post (2015) on the one hand, centers her research on the national institutional set up of Member States, how this affects the competences boundary divide among national actors and addresses how this applies to interac-

48 See North Atlantic Council (2006); United States State Department (2013) and High Representative and the European Commission, JOIN(2013)30 final.

tion with collective security actors. Post (2015, p. 379) considers that "approaches differ in accordance with the particular administrative-political framework and crisis management context, in which the respective institution or government operates". This author also underlines the role played by national interests and preferences and how they inform Member States positions within the EU. Post considers that the implementation of comprehensive approach by state actors relates closely to how far the development and conceptualization, adopted by international organizations, is perceived "as to be compatible with their own crisis management background and needs" (Idem, p. 372). This leads to conclude that the utility of comprehensive approach to Member States' foreign policies is evaluated through the lenses of national preferences. Consequently, individual actors are likely to pursue their own objectives, leaving comprehensive approach exposed to inter-institutional rivalries and different 'institutional weights' of national actors in the international stage. This observation is valid, both to explain the behaviour of Member States and EU institutions, such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), towards implementation of comprehensive approach. At this level, it appears that acceptance of 'a power base' and presence of a 'clear authority position', as related to other actors, are defining conditions to the implementation of comprehensive approach (Post, 2015, p. 380).

Still in the context of how comprehensive approach is reproduced in collective agency, strategic partnerships are also important instruments of external cooperation between the EU and other international actors. These foreign policy instruments correspond to a notion of international cooperation in a loosen format able to mobilize ways to address global and regional issues, where comprehensive solutions matter. In the context of EU's strategic partnerships, the domains of crisis management, capability development and political consultations are the most important dimensions of cooperation. Cooperation between the EU and the United Nations (UN)[49] is the most institutionalized and old cooperative relation and both organizations share similar goals and methods of cooperation. The UN is one of the organizations with the longest experience on comprehensive approach and action, through its integrated missions, meant to overcome the limitations of traditional peacekeeping in order to adapt to new forms of total war or intractable crises and conflicts by introducing a 'mission approached holistic or full service operations'[50]. A few aspects may limit cooperation for instance the presence of too many actors involved in the process of implementation of comprehensive approach, competition between EU bodies such as the European Commission (DEVCO) and those of the United Nations (UN Development Programme; United Nations Conference on

49 See Jorgensen and Laatikainen (2004); Tardy (2011) and Cîrlig (2015).

50 See Weir (2006); Harmer (2008) and Rubinstein *et al.* (2008).

Trade and Development and United Nations Human Settlements Programme). The UN is often considered an ineffective actor, with a low record of implementation and limited international representation of collective interest, conditioned by the veto system among the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, which may impact negatively on cooperation. The positive side of cooperation lies on the fact the UN and the EU are able to balance each other through complementary resources, made available according to similar normative frames and values. Since early 2000, both organizations formally shared analogous perspectives on global threats (United Nations, 2004). The UN strengthens legitimacy of comprehensive action through its mandate and scope of representativeness, while the EU through the Commissions' programmes and projects can place its financial weigh in implementing comprehensive approach (Gowan, 2014, p. 277).

Cooperation between the EU and NATO may further the implementation of comprehensive approach, as long as one understands that NATO and CSDP have different security identities and purposes, which does not mean that interests and actions cannot be shared[51]. The EU through CSDP is better equipped to engage in preventive action using reconciliatory strategies that connect security, development and governance. The combination of CSDP crisis management tools and the Commission's Foreign Policy Instruments enable it to take the lead on non-military emergency operations, linking actions in crisis management with those of development aid and humanitarian relief.

On the other hand, NATO as a defence organization based on strategic dependence among allies, centred on strategic supremacy of a superpower and that of strategically more capable allies, has higher strategic leverage due to the military weigh at its disposal. It is perceived as more efficient due to the size, deployability, impact of its capabilities and collective nature of its defence identity, which works as a mutually reinforcing driving force among allies. NATO's cooperative initiatives towards comprehensive approach in the domain of crisis management and conflict resolution cannot succeed without the bilateral support of allies, of the EU Member States and UN focus on stabilization, reconstruction, development and humanitarian aid. During the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO endorsed a 'Comprehensive Political Guidance' stating that while "NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, it needs to improve its practical cooperation, taking into account existing arrangements, with partners, relevant international organisations and, as appropriate, non-governmental organisations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations" (North Atlantic Council,

51 This part of the study draws on the findings presented by Nunes (2016) at the 'EU Strategic Partnerships EU-NATO Relations' at the international seminar 'The European Union Global Strategy'.

2006, §7). Better cooperation between the EU and NATO on comprehensive approach, in particular regarding civil-military dimension, requires better planning, command options and capabilities for CSDP missions, depending from those Member States strategically more able and capable. Enhanced European command options for CSDP operations, through the EU planning cell for CDSP operations within SHAPE, in close connection with the EU Military staff for military operations, are already a reality. This capability can be supported by the existing five headquarters offered by the UK, France, Italy, Greece and Germany, under the Union's implementation of a 'framework nation' concept, as foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, through which leading nations may offer particular capabilities.

This partnership contains some limitations that result from a prevailing notion that effective strategic partners are only possible among equals, that share a grand strategy and integrated approaches to security and defence policy at the conceptual, doctrinal and operational level and very precise strategic definitions and approaches on why, where and how to act. The cases referred earlier show that among and within Member States, this is often the case. A more contested, connected and complex world, as the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) suggests, requires strategic approaches to security partnerships, able to meet the diversity of challenges in a tailored made and flexible manner, adaptable to emergent security and defence challenges and risks, leading to better European coordination and external cooperation with the Alliance. For the moment, CSDP and development cooperation should focus on what they do best that is, to develop non-exclusively military emergency missions and operations. While NATO should focus on military dissuasive and reactive action, towards high intensity military contingencies, without meaning that Europe, in the medium term, should not be able to act at the high end of the military operational spectrum. The EUGS, given that one of the focus of the document is partnerships, could have also contributed to help reassessing functional cooperation between CSDP and NATO, underlining their complementary strategic purposes and their specific contribution to regional and international security. This is a difficult task, considering that NATO and the EU comprise states with distinct strategic cultures and outlooks, which affect the comprehensiveness of the agendas of security organizations, the very concept of strategic partnership and the choice of preferred strategic partners, whether one refers to the EU/CSDP or NATO.

A full implementation of comprehensive approach may also depend from a successful accomplishment of EU missions and operations in the higher spectrum of security and defence. With this in mind, a new way should be paved to solve the problem of access to NATO's command, control and planning capabilities by CSDP operations, under the Berlin Plus agreement. This could be done, whether by introducing an 'opt-out clause' option, for those NATO allies and European Member

States that often block the use of this mechanism, therefore abstaining without impairing access to those capabilities by the EU, as a part or a whole. On capabilities, the European Defence Agency has identified deficits, which a better and rational cooperation with NATO and the US could help overcoming, namely on what concerns strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, surveillance and reconnaissance. In the future, the possibility to develop a 'Berlin Plus Reversed' agreement through which, the development of EU civilian capabilities could be made available to other organizations in crisis management and post conflict reconstruction, would also further the EU international role in comprehensive approach.

A clearer position of the US administration on European defence would also be welcomed. This would facilitate the building of coalitions of the willing, under a NATO-EU partnership flag and the strengthening of commitment regarding Permanent Structure Cooperation among like-minded and strategically capable EU partners, without unnecessary overstretch of capabilities. A strong comprehensive transatlantic security agenda implies that information and knowledge on strategic affairs should be shared, that cooperation among those who can and will, does result in added value to prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution and that coordination and cooperation occurs among those that can offer the best and most sustainable solutions to local, regional and international security problems.

**Conclusion**

Comprehensive approach does not correspond to a new, but rather an adaptive response of state and non-state actors to international security challenges. The complexity of current challenges to international security requires better internal coordination, stronger external cooperation and more committed participation of local relevant actors.

On the concept of comprehensive approach, one may acknowledge that there is a general agreement on its broad conceptual delimitation on what it is and what it does, although the volatility of current international security and stability makes it difficult to generate an all-inclusive concept and practice. On what it is, it is generally described in academic literature and in organizations' policy documents as a process hold by different stakeholders, intended to prevent, mitigate, manage and solve crises and conflicts, at different stages of fragility of states and societies. As for what it does, it impacts within state and non-state actors' policies and organizational structures and it predisposes them to cross-sectoral administrative and managerial adaptation or reform of the external dimension of policies, for which they are responsible for. It also has consequences over the stability and future development of recipient countries of missions, operations and development projects and programmes.

Theoretically, comprehensive approach offers a challenging field of research on: institutional and organizational adaptation to the current security environment; new conceptualization of security practice; possibility to solve the security dilemmas through comprehensive approach as a transformative project; norm/practices incorporation and security governance; comprehensive approach as a cause of institutional reform and institutional reform as a consequence of implementation of comprehensive approach; comprehensive approach as a way to enhance resilience to fragility of states and societies; new securitisation of coordination, of EU bodies, policies and cooperation practices among strategic partners. At the empirical level, comprehensive approach suggests interesting outlooks on foreign policy and national interests; addresses prevention and sustainability as mitigating elements of insecurity and contributes to a better understanding of crises and conflicts cycles.
The second part of the study identified the various challenges that comprehensive approach entails and that mirror the current security environment. The first regards the successful ability to ensure transition across the various phases of crises and conflicts, from preventive action to peace and sustainable development. The second concerns ownership and the possibility to strengthened local actors and institutions, helping them to become more resilient and committed to stabilization, reconstruction and sustainable development. The third pertains to complementarity of instruments from CSDP missions and operations, to the programmes and projects of the European Commission, to bilateral and multilateral commitments of Member States in the organizations present in theatre. The fourth, results from the diversity of actors that take part in crisis and conflicts, which may make consensus more difficult to reach, legitimacy harder to attain and efficiency more complex to achieve due to the presence of various interlocutors. These are often perceived by security providers as authoritative and representative of states and communities' interests, sharing different collaborative practices or having no previous collaborative tradition. Diversity also increases competition among actors hampering a positive cooperation. The last challenge identified in the study respects to timing and sustainability of solutions to crises, considering that different policy and security instruments (e.g. foreign policy, crisis management, financial support and development aid) require different times associated to long term/short term presences and support in theatre.
On the third section of the article, the definition of a EU level of ambition that includes a more comprehensive role for the EU was addressed, examining how it affects how actors think, what is relevant and what is prioritary. Current security challenges, from security governance to energy and food sustainability, claim alternative ways to project influence and generate impact other than military power. Recent crises such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria prove that the military instrument is one among many contributing to a more secure environment. Com-

prehensive approach suggests a transformative project, which success depends from the ability of local actors to adopt changes exogenously given. Norm incorporation by local relevant actors is a transformative effect with consequences over providers/donors and its accomplishment a sign of positive impact of comprehensive approach among recipients. This condition occurs when norms are understood, accepted and incorporated by local actors into their systems of beliefs and security practices. It involves a process of norm transference and norm adoption and implementation from the security governance level to sustainable development practices. This transformative intension is also conditioned by how security cultures and practices may affect effective coordination and external cooperation with partners and local actors, when norms and procedures are incorporated leading to agreements on goals, means and ends at the strategic and operational level.

In the final section of this study, aspects of implementation at the national and collective level were chosen from academic and policy oriented literature, with the support of policy documents, in order to assess which units and levels of analysis are selected to explain the implementation of comprehensive approach. The units of analysis found in literature are all internationally active EU Member States in the security, defense, foreign policy, trade, developmental and humanitarian dimensions of external relations. All share an external behaviour anchored to global, targeted and structural foreign policies sustained in reasons of national interest, converted into formal policy guidelines. This leads to conclude that comprehensive approach is not, in most of the cases, free of self-help motives, but rather a foreign policy instrument of national interest.

The levels of analysis considered to assess implementation of comprehensive approach regard those expressed by political and strategical goals stated in political-strategical documents; on the degree of interaction among national agencies; formalization of institutional cooperation and shared financing methods. These determine the way comprehensive action is developed bilaterally, collectively or multilaterally. Comprehensive approach is adopted by the majority of actors as a way to strengthened states' position in international affairs, to safeguard economic priorities, to bind different national policies interests or to reinforce cooperation with partners that may further Member States international peacekeeping commitments and development aid programmes. The degree of interaction, as expressed in literature, ranges from close coordination among all external dimensions of public policies, to the traditional civil-military cooperation, with various levels of information exchange and joint action. Institutional formalization of cooperation in comprehensive approach varies from contingent and unilateral to collective, whenever political, strategic and operational trust facilitates cooperation among strategic partners. In most cases, literature show that the leading national agency for comprehensive approach is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the

Ministries of Defence, Trade, Justice and agencies responsible for development cooperation. Dedicated lines of financing are only present in two cases that of the United Kingdom and Denmark.

The collective expression of comprehensive approach resonates actors' preferred strategic partnerships, through which distinct strategic outlooks inform different practices of comprehensive approach. This situation affects the very understanding of comprehensiveness of security agendas, including different perceptions of threat, risk and the use of force across allies, which shape the choice of preferred strategic partner (United Nations, EU or NATO). Member States, such as the United Kingdom and France, which are strategically more capable, are likely to engage in comprehensive action with other like-minded partners (NATO), whenever it empowers the global impact of their interests. Germany as a normative power strategically focused, makes the military dimension of comprehensive action dependent from a UN mandate. To The Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden with a good record of international engagement and an extensive international cooperative practice, comprehensive action is a way to strengthen their international role and complement policy initiatives and programmes in terms of foreign, security and defence policies within NATO and the EU.

The last decade has been a formative experience on comprehensive approach to the European Union, to Member States and partners due to the transnational and cross-sectoral impact of current challenges and the means required to meet them. Better cooperation and coordination have become main conditions for successful comprehensive action. Comprehensiveness will only work effectively, if security providers and beneficiaries contribute to create states and communities that are more resilient, willing and able to contribute to their own security and development, while advancing a more efficient cooperative security with international and regional organizations, meant to enhance ownership. Similarly, the choice of external partners to further comprehensive action should follow a benchmark approach led by consistent political solidarity, targeted and efficient cooperation and long term sustainable solutions during and after crisis and conflicts occur.

**References**

Aris, S. and Wenger, A., 2014. Introduction: 'Inside-out/outsider-in': constructions and practices of security in regional organizations. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 27 (2), pp. 298-294.

Ashton, C., 2014. The role of the European External Action Service in a global network of crisis room. In: P. Pawlak and A. Ricci, eds, *Crisis rooms: towards a global network? Implementation of comprehensive approach.* Brussels: Institute of Security Studies.

Bailes, A. J. K., 2008. The EU and a 'better world': what role for the European Security and Defence Policy? *International Affairs*, 84 (1), pp. 115-130.

Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M., 2004. Rules for the World*: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Binder, L. *et al.,* 1971. *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press [online], available at http://ww2.odu.edu/al/jchen/Comparative%20Politics%20(Graduate)/Review%20Essays/Week%2010/ockie%20Beasley.pdf [accessed 11 August 2015].

Biscop, S., 2016. *Geopolitics with European Characteristics – An Essay on Pragmatic Idealism, Equality and Strategy*. Egmont Paper n.º 82. Brussels: Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations.

Biscop, S., 2015. Global and Operational: a New Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy. *IAI Working Papers* nº15, 27 July 2015.

Blockmans, S. and Nbauer, M. S., 2013. Legal Obstacles to Comprehensive EU External Security Action. *European Foreign Affairs Review* nº18 (Special Issue), pp. 7-24.

Bono, G., 2004. Introduction: the role of the EU in external crisis management. *International Peacekeeping,* 11(3), pp. 395-403.

Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T., 2000. When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change. *European Integration online Papers*, 4(15) [online], available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015a.htm [acessed 5 June 2016].

Brooks, S. G. and Wohlforth, W. C., 2005. Hard Times for Soft Balancing. *International Security*, 30(1), pp. 5-51.

Buzan, B. and Waever, O., 2003. *Regions and powers: the structure of international security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 341-372.

Civil Society Dialogue Network Meeting, 2013. *The EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Action: Gathering Civil Society Input. Meeting Report*. 30 January 2013, Brussels.

Cîrlig, C-C., 2015. *EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management*. European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 572.783, November.

Council Decision 2010/427/EU. *Establishing the organization and functioning of the European Union External Action Service*, Brussels, 26 July 2010.

Council of the European Union, 2016. *Council Conclusions*. Brussels, 28 June 2016 [online], available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/28-euco-conclusions/ [accessed 7 July 2016].

Council of the European Union, 2014. *Development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy*. Brussels, 4 December 2014.

Council of the European Union, 2014. *Council Conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach.* Brussels, 12 May 2014 [online], available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf [accessed 23 march 2015]

Council of the European Union, 2014/7671. *EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea.* Brussels, 17 March.

Council of the European Union, 2013. *Conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy*. Brussels, 19 December 2013.

Council of the European Union. 2013a. *Council Conclusions on the EEAS Review,* General Affairs Council. Brussels, 17 December.

Council of the European Union 2011/16858. *Council Conclusions on the Horn of Africa*. Brussels, 14 November.

Council of the European Union, 2011. *Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention*. Brussels, 20 June 2011.

Council of the European Union 9537/1/01 REV1/2001. *Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*. Brussels, 7 June.

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs *et al.,* 2013. *Denmark's Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict Affected Areas of the World.* Copenhagen: Udenrigsministeriet.

Drent, M., 2011. The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security: A Culture of Co-ordination? *Studia Diplomatica*, LXIV(2), pp. 8-9.

Drent, M., Hendriks, R. and Zandee, D. 2015. *New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations [online], available at https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/New%20Threats_New%20EU_Nato%20Responses_Clingendael_July2015.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016].

Dunne, T. and Wheeler, N. J., 1999. *Human Rights in Global Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Duke, S., 2014. Reflections on the EEAS Review. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 19(1), pp. 23-44.

Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014. *Guidelines on the Integrated Approach*. The Hague [online], available https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2014/07/10/guidelines-provide-basis-for-integrated-approach-to-missions [accessed 12 April 2016].

Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs DVB/VD-073/2013. *International Security Strategy*. 21 June 2013.

Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs DVB/VD-073/2013. *A World to Gain a New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment*. The Hague, April 2013.

*Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa – Final Declaration* of 7 Décembre 2013 [online], available at http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/elysee-summit-for-peace-and-security-in-africa-final-declaration/ [acessed 12 April 2016].

Eriksson, J. and Rhinard, M., 2009. The Internal-External Security Nexus – Notes on an emerging Research Agenda. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 44(3), pp. 243-267.

*EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP* (European Security and Defence Policy), 16 December 2002 [online], available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm [accessed 1 February 2016]

European Commission 2015/185 final. *The European Agenda on Security*. Strasbourg, 28 April 2015.

European Commission 2015a/7913. *Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive to external conflict and crises – Action Plan*, 14 April.

European Commission/High Representative, 2013/JOIN/30 final. *The EU's comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises*. Brussels 11 December 2013.

European Commission 2003/526 final. *The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism.* Brussels 10 October 2003

European Commission 2001/231 final. *Building an Effective Partnership with the United Nations in the Fields of Development and Humanitarian Affairs*. Brussels 2 May 2001.

European Union External Action Service, 2013. *EEAS Review* [online], available at http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf [accessed 15 September 2015].

*European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World*. Brussels, 12 December 2003, [online], available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.European Union External Action Service, 2013. *EEAS Review* [online], available at http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf [accessed 15 September 2015].

European Union External Action Service, 2011. *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel.* Brussels 18 May 2011.

FOCUS, 2011. *Foresight Security Scenarios – Mapping Research to a Comprehensive Approach to Exogenous EU Roles.* Problem Space Report, FP 7-SEC-2010-1, Deliverable 3.1., September 2011.

Friis, K. and Jarmyr, P., 2008. Comprehensive Approach – Challenges and Opportunities in complex crisis management. *NUPRI Report Security Practice* nº11. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Gebhard, C., 2013. Introduction: A European Approach to Comprehensive Approach. *European Foreign Affairs Review* nº18 (Special Issue), pp. 1-6.

Gebhard, C. and Norheim-Martinsen, P. M., 2011. Making sense of EU comprehensive security towards conceptual and analytical clarity. *European Security*, 20(2), pp. 221-241.

German Federal Government, 2016. *White Paper on Germany Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* [online], available at http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/contentblob/4847754/Daten/6718445/160713weibuchEN.pdf [accessed 12 September 2016].

German Federal Government, 2004. *Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding* [online] available at http://www.ifa.de/fileadmin/pdf/zivik/2004_Aktionsplan_en.pdf [accessed 12 April 2016].

Goor, L. and Major, C., 2012. How to make the comprehensive approach work. *CRU Policy Brief*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.

Gowan, R., 2014. The UN and European Strategy. In: S. Biscop and R. G. Whitman, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of European Security.* Oxfordshire: Routledge.

Gross, E., 2013. The internal value of a global strategy project. In: K. Goldmann, J. Howorth and A. Menon, eds., *European Global Strategy in Theory and Practice: Relevance for the EU*. UI Occasional Papers nº14. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for International Affairs.

Gross, E. 2008. *EU and the Comprehensive Approach*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.

Harmer, A., 2008. Integrated Missions: A Threat to Humanitarian Security? *International Peacekeeping*, 15 (4), pp. 528-539.

Hauck, V., Knoll, A. and Cangas, A. H., 2015. EU Trust Funds – Shaping more comprehensive external action? *Briefing Note* nº81, November. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management.

Hauck, V. and Rocca, C., 2014. *Gaps between Comprehensive Approaches of the EU and EU Member States*. Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management.

High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2016. *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy,* Brussels, 28-29 June [online]. Available at https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf [accessed 30 June 2016].

High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015. *Report Ahead of the June 2015 European* Council [online]. Available at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/report-ahead_european-defence-agency.pdf [accessed 30 June 2016].

High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission JOIN/2013/30 final. *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises.* Brussels 11 December 2013.

House of Commons Defence Committee, 2010. *The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make better peace*. Seventh Report of Session 2009-2010. London: House of Commons.

Howorth, J., 2013. *European Global Strategy in a World of Power Transition.* In: K. Goldmann, J. Howorth and A. Menon, eds., *European Global Strategy in Theory and Practice: Relevance for the EU.* UI Occasional Papers nº14. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for International Affairs (online), available at http://www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/85767.pdf [accessed 28 June 2016].

Howorth, J., 2007. *The Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*. University of Michigan: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hyde-Price, A., 2008. A Tragic Actor? A Realist Perspective on Ethical Power Europe. *International Affairs*, 84(1), pp. 29-44.

Hyde-Price, A., 2006. Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), pp. 217-234.

Hyde-Price, A., 2004. European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force. *European Security*, 13(4), pp. 323-343.

International Security Information Service, 2014. *Working in European Union Common Security and Defence Policy Missions – Deployee Guide*. Stabilisation Unit, October.

Joenniemi, P., 2007. Towards a European Union of Post-Security? *Cooperation and Conflict*, 42(1), pp. 127-148.

Jorgensen, K. E. and Laatikainen, K., 2004. *The European Union and the United Nations, Conference paper presented at the Second Pan-European Conference Standing Group on EU Politics*. Bologna, 24-26 June 2004.

Keohane, R., 2002. *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*. London: Routledge.

Kirchner, E., 2006. The challenges of European Union Security Governance. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(5), pp. 947-968.

Koschut, S., 2014. Transatlantic conflict management inside-out: the impact of domestic norms on regional security practices. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 27(2), pp. 336-358.

Krahmann, E., 2003. Conceptualizing security governance. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 38(1), pp. 5-26.

Lehmann, K., 2011. Crisis foreign policy as a process of self-organization. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 24(1), pp. 27-42.

Lehne, S., 2013. The EU – actor or tool box? How Member States perceive the EU's foreign policy. In: A. Hug, ed., *Europe in the World – Can EU Foreign Policy Make an Impact?* London: Foreign Policy Centre.

Major, C. and Mölling, C., 2013. Towards an EU Peacebuilding Strategy: The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Comprehensive Approach of the EU in the Area of Civilian Crisis Management. *European Foreign Affairs Review* nº18 (Special Issue), pp. 45-62.

Major, C. and Schöndorf, E., 2011. Comprehensive Approaches to Crisis Management. *SWP Comments*, September.

March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P., 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Order. *International Organization*, 52(4), pp. 943-969.

Mattelaer, A., 2013. The Empty Promise of Comprehensive Planning in EU Crisis Management. *European Foreign Affairs Review* nº18 (Special Issue), pp. 125-146.

Mattern, J. B., 2005. Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics. *Millenium*, 33(3), pp. 583-612.

Merket, H., 2016. The EU's comprehensive approach. In: D. Zandee, ed., *The EU as a security actor in Africa.* Clingendael Monitor 2016, December 2015. The Hague: Clingendael Institute, pp. 21-30.

Merket, H., 2013. The EU and the Security Development Nexus: Bridging the Legal Divide. *European Foreign Affairs Review* nº18 (Special Issue), pp. 243-267.

Michel, L., 2013. NATO and the United States – Working with the EU to strengthen Euro--Atlantic security. In: S. Biscop and R. G. Whitman, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of European Security*. Oxfordshire: Routledge, pp. 255-269.

Mogherini, F., 2015. *Speech at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue*, 31 May.

*Multinational Experiment 5 – Key Elements of a Comprehensive Approach: A Compendium of Solutions* 2009. Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 15 November.

North Atlantic Council, 2006. *Riga Summit Declaration- Comprehensive Political Guidance*, Brussels, 29 November [online], available at http://www.nato.int/cps/on/natohq/official_texts_56425.htm?selectedLocale=en [accessed 14 April 2016].

Nunes, I. F., 2016. EU Strategic Partnerships EU-NATO Relations, communication at the international seminar *The European Union Global Strategy*, 1 February 2016. Lisbon: National Defence Institute.

Nunes, I. F., 2011. Civilian, Normative and Ethical Power Europe: Role Claims and the EU Discourses. *European Foreign Affairs Review,* 16(1), pp. 1-20.

Nunes, I. F., 2010. Security Culture, Strategic Approach and the implementation and operationalization of European Security. *Nação e Defesa* nº127, pp. 51-80.

Pirozzi, N., 2013. *The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis management,* June. Brussels: DCAF Brussels Office.

Pape, R. A., 2005. Soft Balancing against the United States. *International Security*, 30(1), pp. 7-45.

Post, S., 2015. *Toward a Whole-of-Europe Approach – Organizing the European Union's and Member States' Comprehensive Crisis Management*. Wiesbaden: Springer.

Radaelli, C., 2006. Europeanization: solution or problem?. In: M. Cini and A. Bourne, eds., *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 56-76.

*Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World – Implementation report on ESS* S407/08/2008, 11 December.

Rosgaard, E., 2008. *The Danish Comprehensive Approach, Selected Contributions from the Proceedings of the Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO).* Seminar 13-14 March 2008, Baltic Defence College (BDC), Tartu, Estonia [online], available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=97048 [acessed 25 June 2016].

Rubinstein, R. A. *et al*., 2008. Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions. *International Peacekeeping*, 15(4), pp. 540-555.

Santopinto, F. and Price, M., eds., 2013. *National Visions of EU Defence Policy*. Brussels: CEPS.

Schroeder, U. C., 2011. *The Organization of European Security Governance* – Internal and External Security in Transition. New York: Routledge.

Smith, M. E., 2013. Institutionalizing the 'Comprehensive Approach' to EU Security. *European Foreign Policy Affairs Review* nº18 (Special Issue), pp. 25-44.

Smith, M. E., 2004. Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Cooperation. *European Journal of International Relations*, 10(1), pp. 95-136.

Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009. *Preventing Violent Conflict – A Swedish Action Plan* [online], available at http://www.government.se/legal-documents/1999/01/ds-199924/ [accessed on 14 April 2016].

Tardy, T., 2015. CSDP in action – What contribution to international security. *Chaillot Papers*, May 2015. Paris: Institute of Security Studies.

Tardy, T., ed., 2014. *Fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia – Lessons learned from the Contact Group*, Report nº 20. October. Paris: Institute of Security Studies.

Tardy, T., 2011. *Coopération interinstitutionnelle: de la compatibilité entre l'ONU et l'Union européenne dans la gestion de crise.* Québec: Études Stratégiques et Diplomatiques.

Tonra, B., 2013. *Europeanisation and EU Foreign Policy: A Genealogy and Survey.* Warsaw: Communication presented at the 8th Pan European Conference on International Relations.

Treaty of Lisbon 2007/C 306/1, *Official Journal of the European Union,* 17 December.

United Kingdom Cabinet Office, 2008. *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom Security in an Interdependent World* [online], svailable at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228539/7291.pdf [accessed 12 April 2016].

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Stabilisation Unit, 2014. *Working in European Union Common Security and Defence Policy Missions*, October 2014.

United Nations, 2008. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines*. New York: United Nations Secretariat.

United Nations, 2004. *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*. Report of the Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.

United States State Department, 2013. *Conflict Prevention and Crisis Response: Responding to Emergencies Instability Overseas*. Washington: Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations [online], available at www.state.gov/j/cso [accessed 2 May 2016].

Webber, M., Croft, S., Howorth, J., Terriff, T. and Krahmann, E., 2004. The Governance of European Security. *Review of International Studies*, 30(3), pp. 3-26.

Weir, E. A., 2006. *Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative.* KAIPTC Monograph Oslo: Training for Peace.

Woollard, C., 2013. *The EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Action: Gathering Civil Society Input*, 30 January. Civil Society Dialogue Network.