

# Climate Change and EU Security Policy: an Unmet Challenge\*

Richard Youngs

*Investigador associado do Democracy and Rule of Law Program do Carnegie Centre. Perito em política externa da União Europeia e professor de Relações Internacionais na Universidade de Warwick, tendo ocupado a função de diretor do think tank FRIDE, sediado em Madrid.*

## Resumo

### **Alterações Climáticas e a Política de Segurança da UE: um Desafio não Alcançado**

A Cimeira europeia de Dezembro 2013 deu à União Europeia um mandato para uma nova estratégia de segurança. As alterações climáticas têm desempenhado um papel cada vez mais importante nos debates sobre segurança europeia. A União tem sido uma das organizações a melhor identificar as alterações climáticas como um “multiplicador de ameaça” e a desenvolver todo um conjunto de iniciativas políticas, destinadas a relacionar fatores aliados às alterações climáticas com as políticas externas e de segurança.

A UE tem pressionado para um ambicioso acordo internacional sobre clima até 2015 pelo que importa considerar a relação entre duas agendas: a da política externa e da segurança. O autor examina problemas resultantes da fragmentação de responsabilidades entre vários atores institucionais europeus aos quais falta um enfoque sobre questões climáticas. O artigo explora ainda a relação entre alterações climáticas e políticas de emigração da UE; a relação entre clima, segurança energética e política de defesa e a dimensão geoeconómica das respostas políticas da União. Conclui com uma reflexão sobre se o fenómeno das alterações climáticas terá um efeito positivo sobre a cooperação europeia, em particular no domínio da gestão de crises com origem climática ou se ao invés incentivará os Estados a uma postura de isolamento.

## Abstract

The EU defense summit, in December 2013, gave the Union a mandate to draw up a new security strategy. Climate change plays an increasingly prominent part on debates on the European security. The EU was one of the first organizations to identify climate change as a “threat multiplier” and to gather a considerable collection of policy initiatives, designed to mainstream climate related factors within its foreign and security policies.

The EU is also pushing for an ambitious post-2015 international climate accord. Against this background, it is an important moment to consider the link between two policy tracks – the security and climate change agendas. The author examines problems that result from fragmented responsibilities, among different European institutional players, which lack a specific focus on climate change. Further, the article explores the link between climate change and EU migration policies, the connection between the impact of climate change, energy security and defence policy, and the geo-economic dimension of EU policy responses. It concludes with a reflection on whether climate change will impact positively on European cooperation, in particular in the framework of climate crisis, or conversely will prone states to self-reliance.

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The European Union (EU) is committed to upgrading its security policy and better identifying the long-term challenges to its strategic interests. The December 2013 EU defense summit gave the Union's diplomatic body (the external action service, EAS) a mandate to draw up a new security strategy. Climate change plays an increasingly prominent part in these European security debates. The EU was one of the first organizations to identify climate change as a 'threat multiplier'. It has gradually put in place an impressive collection of policy initiatives designed to mainstream climate related factors within its foreign and security policies.

In addition to these developments in security policy, changes are afoot in the EU's climate and energy policies. On 22 January the European Commission published its proposed energy policy guidelines up to 2030. These focused attention on a single, binding 40 per cent target for carbon emission reductions. The EU is also pushing for an ambitious post-2015 international climate accord. Against this background, it is an important moment at which to consider the link between these two policy tracks – the security and the climate change agendas.

Much has been written on the way in which climate change is likely to aggravate geo-strategic threats. While analysts disagree on how serious such effects will be, there is a growing consensus that so-called 'climate security' needs to be taken more seriously. Many predict a worrying cluster of climate-induced effects: increased conflict and state fragility; mass migrations; tense competition and struggles for scarce resources; a trend toward nervous self-help introspection and even militarization on the part of major powers; a closing down of the international trading system; and more complex risk management in strategic planning. Many believe that climate change is set to become a more serious security challenge than any other issue.

This paper examines the EU's record in designing better climate security policies. It asks what substance lies behind the EU's rhetoric and plethora of policy documents on this issue. It argues that the EU has made much progress in beginning to address the broader security ramifications of climate change, but that the Union needs to do more to develop an effective set of policy instruments that matches the magnitude of the likely threats ahead.

To this end, the paper suggests what the EU could and should be doing to respond to and prepare for climate-induced geopolitical instability. It argues that good climate security requires several components. European militaries must build on their incipient engagement with climate change to prepare for its broader geopolitical consequences: the securitization of climate change should not entail a narrow militarization. The EU must introduce more climate-specificity into its conflict prevent initiatives. It must do more to ensure that the read-over from its internal energy policies is consistent with its external geostrategic aims. And it needs a much clearer and systematic approach to the geo-economics of climate change.

Notwithstanding the undoubted progress made, there is a risk that short-term crises are crowding climate security from the EU's highest foreign policy priorities. While this may be understandable, the Union must remember that climate security is set to become one of the defining strategic issues in future years and must be kept at the forefront of security strategy upgrades.

### **New Commitments**

Climate change has begun to have an impact on the general definition of European security policy. Energy security is no longer conceived purely in terms of relations with key oil and gas producers.

In 2008 the then foreign policy high representative, Javier Solana, published a joint paper with the European Commission on 'Climate change and international security'. This recognised climate change as a 'threat multiplier' that needed to be placed at the heart of EU security policy. It warned that the risks were not just humanitarian but political and strategic, affecting the EU's own interests (Council of the European Union, 2008).

In the 2008 revision of the European Security Strategy, climate change was identified as a core strategic and not merely environmental challenge (European Union, 2008). In July 2011 the EU agreed new council conclusions on 'climate diplomacy' (Council Secretariat, 2011). This promised identifiable action on the security strand of EU policy. In September 2011, the Commission proposed a more strategic approach to its international energy policies. The new strategy reinforced the commitment to linking climate change policies to the EU's core security policies (European Commission, 2011a). In July 2012 the External Action Service released a new strategy document on the Arctic. In this, the EU committed to strengthening its security role in the Arctic region (External Action Service, 2012: 11).

The EU's Green Diplomacy Network (GDN) was upgraded by the EAS in 2012, to help mainstream foreign policy questions within climate change deliberations. Regular training for officials has been introduced on the security impacts of climate change and a plethora of studies has been commissioned.

European governments have agreed to ring-fence 20 per cent of the 2014-2019 EU budget for climate questions across all policy areas; this will include external relations resources being deployed far more meaningfully for the geopolitical dimensions of climate change (Council Secretariat, 2013: 6).

At the end of June 2013 the foreign affairs council adopted conclusions on climate diplomacy and security, together with a new External Action Service reflection paper. These commit ministers to an annual review of progress made in injecting foreign and security policy parameters into climate change strategies. The reflection paper claims that the EU is now much more 'joined-up' in having its mainstream diplomacy dovetail with climate objectives (Council of the Euro-

pean Union, 2013; External Action Service, 2013). Another ministerial in July 2013 focused on water challenges, with the aim of enhancing EU engagement in the Mekong, Nile and other worsening water-related tensions (Council of the European Union, 2013a).

The EU has increasingly prioritized climate security in its dialogues with the US, China, Brazil and South Africa, and at a regional level with Central Asia and the Maghreb. European leaders made a link between climate change and the November 2013 typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. The EU has pressed a new UN discussion on climate security in 2014.

The German foreign ministry has placed 'climate and security' as a priority 'new area of activity.' (Auswärtiges Amt, n.d.). The German minister of state called for 'climate security to be a core topic around which broader international alliances are constructed (Pieper, 2012: 20). The Auswärtiges Amt began increasing its climate change capacity from 2010. Funds for additional posts and a series of practical regional initiatives have been forthcoming.

The UK's 2008 national security strategy posited a link between climate change and security and claimed that: 'Climate change is potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, and therefore to national security.' (HM Government, 2008: 18; 27). In 2010 William Hague suggested that: 'Climate change is perhaps the twenty-first century's biggest foreign policy challenge.' (Hague, 2010). At the end of 2011 the UK government committed itself to producing a more political set of climate risk assessments. It pointed to the government's attempt to assess how climate change threatened not only direct physical effects but would bring 'new interests into the geopolitical calculations of states, for which current global governance structures were not designed' (Government Office for Science, 2011: 9; 40).

Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain have all introduced similar climate security strategies and sponsored a range of dialogue and seminars on this issue.

The French government published an extensive climate strategy in 2011 that also broadened out the geostrategic focus of climate action (Gouvernement de la France, 2011). European governments are united in seeking to embed a climate security remit in the United Nations Security Council, against opposition from most developing states.

### **Lacking Specificity**

This plethora of commitments, at member state and EU level, represents genuine and significant progress. Climate security is now firmly on the EU agenda. However, practical follow-through has been relatively limited, in many cases.

While statements, studies and conferences have been plentiful, their impact on actual European policies remains less than far-reaching. The EU has begun to tackle

select elements of climate security, such as preparing for climate-related humanitarian relief operations. But has yet to put in place a full-spectrum climate foreign policy.

If anything, the rate of policy innovation has slowed, as since 2011 the EU has been preoccupied with other pressing priorities; many climate security strategies were introduced in the years up to 2010-2011 only for their follow-up momentum to falter. The EU has found itself confronted with so many more immediately urgent challenges – from the economic crisis to the Arab spring – that in practice the issue of climate security has slipped down its list of priorities.

Critics lament that the profound changes that will occur to global political geography are nowhere near being integrated into strategic planning (Pascal, 2009). High Representative Catherine Ashton has not given a single speech dedicated specifically to the issue. Commitments are still phrased mainly in terms of ‘developing a narrative, ‘awareness-raising’ and ‘engaging’ with business, civil society, other powers and international organisations – that is, they are largely about the EU’s own institutional preparedness and couched less in terms of commitments to tangible policy output (Council of the European Union, 2013: 5).

Responsibilities for foreign and security policy, energy security and climate change are split in confusing fashion amongst a large number of institutional players. None of these departments are tasked unequivocally with leading on the geopolitical impact of climate change (European Parliament, 2013: 83). The same is true at the national level too: environment ministries may have adopted the discourse of ‘geopolitical impact’ but they have fought hard to keep the security community at arms-length (Mabey, 2010: 6).

Notwithstanding a small number of more developed ‘climate dialogues’, there is little evidence that climate security has become a significant factor conditioning the shape of EU global alliances and strategies for effective multilateralism. Critics charge the UK and other European states with failing to adjust their international alliances in accordance with how climate change is likely to rebalance global power (Depledge, 2012: 82).

Many policy-makers claim that the EU’s best contribution to global climate security comes from its own internal commitments. EU member states have made progress towards the well-known set of targets on emissions reductions, renewables and energy efficiency (the so-called ‘20/20/20 by 2020’ commitments). Some critics argue that emissions reductions are mainly a result of the recession, not structural change; a recession that has also eaten into research spending on renewables. Nevertheless, the EU is still in relative terms a strong performer in terms of all these indicators. Policy-makers make a read-over from this to the foreign policy aspects of climate and energy policy. They are fond of exhorting that changing light bulbs and funding loft insulation are the

best contributions to climate-sensitive foreign policy. And external policy takes the form of the EU seeking to export its internal energy regulations to other countries.

The EU's mainstream climate change policies – emissions targets, renewable development – do have an impact on climate security at a global level. But the EU tends rather uncritically to presume that the extension of its own rules and templates axiomatically constitutes a security policy beyond its borders. This is an unduly simplistic assumption, which also exaggerates the strength of core, internal EU climate change commitments.

In some senses, the expansion outwards of the EU's highly regulatory approach constrains – more than it empowers – the geo-political dimensions of climate security policy. Security deliberation tends to get crowded out by a mindset of regulatory export. Senior members of the EP's foreign affairs committee have admonished the Commission's 'introverted' focus on replicating internal market rules and consequent blindness to the international geopolitical dimensions of climate and energy (European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012).

Moreover, much policy-making effort remains focused on quite traditional parameters of energy security. Indeed, in some ways the focus now attached to the 'switch to gas' has begun to cut across climate security policies. It is true that environmental concerns are holding back shale development in Europe far more than they have done in the United States. Yet, the advent of non-conventional sources of oil and gas has once more tipped energy security debates back to a focus on access to hydrocarbons. In short, despite much rhetoric to the contrary, in practice European governments still conceive energy-related security as being overwhelmingly about guaranteeing oil and, increasingly, unconventional gas supplies far more than it is a question of pre-empting climate-induced instability.

### **Climate-Induced Fragility**

An increasing area of concern is how climate change affects EU strategies in the area of conflict prevention and resolution. The stated priority has been more assiduously to address underlying governance pathologies in fragile and developing states, on the grounds that climate stresses render containment-based strategies to conflict even more clearly insufficient. Yet responses to 'climate conflict' remain underwhelming. European policy-makers agree that climate change is likely to augment the risk of civil conflict in resource-stressed societies. But it has not prompted any significant upgrade in EU conflict prevention efforts. Nor has it led to qualitatively different approaches to conflict that discernibly build from climate-related risk indicators. European governments have in practice done relatively little to integrate climate change factors into their conflict prevention policies as these operate on the ground in specific conflict theatres.

One report notes that little has been done to move forward with the aim of devising an 'environmental peacekeeping' strategy (Swiss Peace, 2011: 68). When EU leaders released a ten-year update of the EU's so-called Gothenburg conflict prevention programme in 2011 this made no mention of any climate related factors (European Council, 2011).

Some initiatives funded by the Commission-managed Instrument for Stability (IfS) have been related to climate security. These include projects in the Horn of Africa to respond to tensions caused by drought and food price increases; and in Bangladesh, building institutions to respond better to flooding (European Commission, 2012).<sup>1</sup> In 2011 a modest 1.5 million euros of the IfS total spend was allocated for 'natural resources and conflict'.<sup>2</sup> Officials insist that the post-2014 IfS is set to place more stress on climate-driven conflict. In 2013 the EU advanced with its 150 million euro Agadir Sahel programmes to strengthen resilience on climate change, directly linked to security interventions in Mali.

The EU has sought to enhance its early warning systems. The European Commission Crisis Room, Regional Crisis Response Planning Officers, the Situation Centre, a European Rapid Alert System, the External Action Service conflict unit and the EU Military Staff all have a role in early warning. However, early warning responsibilities specifically linked to climate change are still not clear or easily operational. And significantly, no climate change-related factors are incorporated into the way that potential crises are monitored. The CIA created a unit for forward-warning climate crises; nothing so systematic has been created in European states.

The focus has been on 'disaster response' much more than on 'disaster preparedness'. The EU's 'comprehensive approach' to conflict that was developed during 2013 did not have an apparent operational consequences related to climate-induced instability. The EAS has coordinated joint sessions with African states and China on joint climate challenges. However, tangible operational change is hard to detect. The British government's conflict Watchlist and Annual Horizon Scan does work with climate related indicators. UK conflict strategy lists climate triggers as one of the factors prompting effort to upgrade and fine-tune conflict prevention efforts (HM DFID: 2011). The Danish government has created a new Peace and Stabilisation Fund which will make new funds available for climate security projects (ECC Platform, n.d.). The German MFA has explored the notion of track II initiatives to reflect on the interests of the groups most affected by climate change (German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Germany now explicitly advocates 'conflict-sensitive adaptation practices', in particular linking track one and two approaches and using climate funds for governance challenges in fragile regions (German Federal Foreign Office, 2012: 17).

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1 Plus for details on programmes, the four volumes of the accompanying Staff Working Document.

2 See [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ifs/docs/c\\_2011\\_4451\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ifs/docs/c_2011_4451_en.pdf)

There is a widespread consensus among policy makers that the changes flowing from such formal initiatives are no more than embryonic. A 2012 independent assessment of the UK's conflict pool concluded that the basic policy had not changed (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2012). A similar stasis is evident elsewhere too. While Spanish ministers have made increasingly bold statements acknowledging the climate-conflict link (Ministerio de Defensa de España, 2011), the link between the defence minister and the Secretary of State for Climate Change is relatively weak. Insiders acknowledge that this means that the UME's inception has not led to any change in the broader gamut of Spanish conflict prevention policies.

NGOs criticise European governments and the EU collectively for failing to incorporate the underlying drivers of instability into more climate-sensitive conflict prevention policies. There is still no granular means of assessing the risk of climate-induced conflict and instability. Governments have struggled to incorporate climate-specific elements into their traditional conflict prevention programmes because they admit that more climate specialists would need to engage with the conflict agenda.

The EU has developed initiatives to improve poor communities' access to energy. Policy-makers argue that this lends a distinctive dimension to conflict prevention and one that is centred more on mutual human security concerns rather than purely traditional state interests. Climate commissioner Connie Hedegaard insists that a focus on access to energy in ODA is and must continue to be the leading edge of the EU's linking of security and climate change policy (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011). A new Commission communication in March 2013 promised to merge development and climate change issues into a single seamless anti-poverty policy (European Commission, 2013). The EU's entry point into climate security has been primarily through the mainstreaming of adaptation initiatives into holistic development aid programmes (Brito, 2012).

Some observers, however, doubt that increases in European climate financing have a strong or direct relevance to climate security. Critics say the EU's approach almost dampens the security logic through a discourse implying that the issue is little more than a need for more sustainable development. Most development agencies still resist their aid being used for anything with security overtones. Donors still need fully to incorporate 'conflict-sensitivity' into their adaptation funding. Governments conceive adaptation too narrowly as a matter of protective, physical infrastructure or renewable projects; in fact, it is a matter of improving governance to enhance resilience to climate stresses (Smith, 2009: 4, 8, 11, 22).

Critics also worry that the EU risks pursuing an approach to resource-conflict that actually renders such conflict more likely in the long-term (Citpax, 2011: 11). Commercial EU policies are still oriented more to 'extracting' energy resources for Eu-



ropean use. This reflects a fundamental and unresolved tension at the heart of European policies. Is security primarily a matter of bringing scarce energy resources into Europe? Or is it a question of ensuring that the latter are distributed, both internationally and within locally-fragile contexts, in the kind of equitable fashion that reduces the likelihood of conflict? So far, policy outcomes suggest that the EU has sought to straddle these two approaches without a clear prioritisation or acknowledgement of the trade-offs involved.

### **Migration: Denial?**

Rhetorically, European ministers repudiate the 'fortress Europe' approach to managing climate migration. The stated preference is for a more subtle approach based on cooperation with third countries aimed at 'managing' the impact of climate change on migratory flows.

In practice, European policy on climate and migration remains ambivalent. It is well-known that EU member states have gradually tightened rules on migration into Europe. The influence of climate-induced migration in explaining these policy trends has been negligible. Indeed, it is striking how absent climate concerns have been from the evolution of European migration policies. The European Parliament has criticised the EU institutions for failing to devise contingency plans for an increase in climate-driven migration (Citpax, 2011: 9).

The EU still has no mapping of what migration flows are likely from different parts of the world as a result of climate change. It lags behind the US in preparing for climate migration. US government bodies have begun running exercises focusing on the impact of displacements within other regions. European organisations have still not included migration in their climate risk mappings because of the uncertainties over its scale and nature; and this issue is still not part of inter-regional negotiations, say, between the EU and African Union (Werz, 2012).

The so-called Stockholm programme agreed in 2009 as the EU's main strategy for internal security calls for greater focus on climate change as a driver of security-relevant migratory flows. The Commission's 180 million euro 2011-2013 strategy paper that guides funds under its thematic programme for 'Cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum' explicitly commits to working more on the nexus between climate change and migration (European Commission, n. d.: 27-28).

In April 2013 the EU published a new staff working document on climate change and migration. Significantly, this was prepared by the development and cooperation agency, DevCo, rather than DG Home. In line with most recent research, it downplays the likelihood of mass flows into Europe itself resulting directly from climate stress in developing states. Rather it places most stress on movements within developing countries themselves and the problem of internally displaced peo-

ple. The focus is on development-related resilience-building. It states that the core policy aim should be to improve development opportunities to allow people to stay put in local communities as resources became scarcer. At the same time, the Commission acknowledges that more needs to be done positively to assist relocation where this would help access to resources. It admits that so far no more than a few limited projects have been funded to give substance to this more positive approach and that recipients' country strategy papers still include no mention of the climate-migration link that would serve as a basis for practical aid programming decisions (European Commission, 2013a: 22, 28-29, 34).

European diplomats argue that the focus needs to be on intra-regional flows not flows into Europe. They tend to argue that climate migration may be of more indirect than direct concern to Europe: displacements from one developing state to another, or from one region to another within the same state, may trigger conflict and instability that then effect Western interests. Several new cooperation programmes in consequence focus on this dimension of climate migration – although funds remain limited compared to those pumped into standard border controls.

EU member states have not supported the idea of including a new category of 'climate refugee', as many developing countries urge. Governments argue that if climate migrants were given the status of refugees this could prejudice the reception and resources given to those fleeing really acute political violence as a matter of absolute urgency. The aim is more modestly to get climate factors incorporated into international rules on internally displaced persons. DG Home has suggested a status of 'permanently forced migration' as a new category to get around the refugee problem. The April 2013 working document argues there is no need for 'refugee-type protection' specifically on climate-related grounds ((European Commission, 2013a: 18).

### **Militaries' Role**

European militaries have increasingly bought into the climate security agenda, despite it not constituting a traditional form of threat. The UK in particular has incorporated climate planning into its defence policy and introduced a more systematic coverage of climate change into its military staff colleges; it also created the post of climate and energy security envoy (HM Ministry of Defence, 2012). Spain has created a Military Emergency Unit to respond to climate disasters. Defence strategies in Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic all mention climate security, albeit in somewhat low profile and unspecific fashion.

European defence ministries are now fully engaged on the question of how climate change is likely to impose new requirements on their own operations. They are still in the process of taking the next step to envisioning how climate change could act as a powerful modifier of geopolitics and thus impinge upon the broader contours of defence policy (Brock, 2012).

EU planners have begun to assess climate factors as part of conflict management scenario-building, as well as tighter coordination with the EU's Civil Protection Mechanism (Ducrotté, 2012: 6). However, while European militaries have begun to take climate security seriously, there is little evidence of preparedness for armed interventions being carried out systematically as a central part of this agenda. Sceptics have long feared an over-militarisation of climate issues; in practice, militaries and the wider EU security establishment remain extremely circumspect.

A 2012 EP report found that the large number of EU documents that have given operational content to conflict management – including the EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level, the EU Concept for Military Command and Control, the EU Concept for Force Generation and the EU Military Rapid Response Concept – are bereft of climate-related considerations (European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, 2012a: 4, 7-8).

A number of CSDP missions have been deployed to climate-stressed areas where environmental factors are seen as contributing to instability. These include the maritime mission Atalanta off the Horn of Africa, and security training initiatives in the Sahel (especially through missions in Niger and Mali in 2012 and 2013, respectively). Many policy-makers see such deployments as a harbinger of future defence requirements. The EU has invested heavily in a Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) system that is now being rolled out, with a range of satellites and other capacities.

However, while such missions and support reflect an evolution in military thinking, they have been extremely low key and cannot be said to represent major deployments triggered primarily by climate factors. No EU military deployment has been countenanced to safeguard supplies coming into Europe, as one might expect in a hyper-realist geo-strategic scenario. Policy-makers acknowledge that progress on reconfiguring militaries for climate security threats has been slow and limited.

Several analysts have suggested that climate change's most notable impact on military configurations will be the onus it places on defending home territories against extreme weather (Jermy, 2011: 148). The EU agreed an Adaptation Strategy in April 2013 that was focused on such internal initiatives. The strategy recognises that internal adaptation measures remain at 'an early stage' in Europe. Fifteen member states have national adaptation strategies that are just beginning to engage in meaningful projects. The new strategy commits the EU to better exchange of member states' best practice; peer pressure to ensure all member states implement national strategies; and EU-wide vulnerability assessments, culminating in 'comprehensive threat and risk assessment reports' to be produced jointly by the Commission and High Representative in 2015 (European Commission, 2013b).

Progress has also been made on 'military greening'. The European defence establishment has begun to shift away from fossil fuels to more sustainable sources in an

effort to reduce energy consumption. In June 2012 the European Defence Agency launched a Military Green programme of procurement to coordinate the plethora of member state plans in this area.

In short, European militaries are now focused on their own own energy consumption and how to run operations in climate stressed environments. European militaries are more geared toward dealing with extreme weather events than they are seized of the broader climate-engendered changes to geopolitics. Militaries still think in terms of the 'national-state interests' to be defended against climate change, not the broader impact on human security - and not the need proactively to address the root causes of individuals' rights and livelihoods.

The EU engagement is limited in areas where climate-related, cross-border tensions have surfaced – for example, in the Nile basin. While the UK government has begun to build climate risk factors into its scenario building for humanitarian response planning, the broader implications for geopolitics are acknowledged to have fallen outside the purview of military and other strategic planners (Government Office for Science, 2011: 45).

There is general agreement that European defence establishments lag behind the US military's engagement with climate change issues. Under the 2007 Global Climate Change Security Oversight Act, the US has initiated a far more systematic programme of research on the impacts of global climate change on military requirements, operations, doctrine, organisation, training, material, logistics, personnel and facilities, and the actions needed to address such impacts. The 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review talks of climate change as an 'accelerant' of instability, and in general accords the issue higher profile than most European defence documents (US Department of Defence, 2010: 85). On homeland defence the EU also lags well behind the evolution in US military planning (Paskal, 2010: 45).

There are fears that militaries have disingenuously over-reacted in an attempt to use the climate security agenda as a means of reinforcing their own claim to resources and influence within government. While such concerns are not entirely unfounded, there is insufficient evidence so far to sustain the claim that EU climate security policies have become overly militarised. In the US the military lead on climate security is much more striking than in Europe. The problem with armed forces' engagement is rather that this has been limited to relatively narrow questions of disaster response and greening military operations. European militaries have inched toward broader climate-geopolitical deliberation, but so far in a more cautious manner.

### **The Geo-Economics of Climate Change**

Climate change is also now approached as a core pillar of European economic security. In some ways, this geo-economic dimension has filtered into EU policy res-

ponses to a greater degree than have hard security aspects. However, a fundamental tension remains evident: freer markets are seen as necessary to get scarcer resources to where they are needed and to facilitate the spread of renewables; but globalisation is simultaneously seen as sustaining the economic model that lies at the very root of global warming. Emerging EU policy mixes support for open markets with government-backed commercial diplomacy. It seeks to strike a balance between interdependence and autarchy as the driving logic of security.

Much of the European Commission's rhetoric is favourable to free market policies.<sup>3</sup> The EU has pressed for a new list of 'green goods' within the WTO to be opened up for liberalized exchange. In December 2012 the EU finalised its first so-called 'Green Free Trade Agreement', with Singapore; this provides special trade rules for and lifts barriers in a range of green technologies. Including green clauses in bilateral FTAs has been seen as a means of circumventing paralysis within the WTO. The EU now aims to transfer the green trade provisions of the trade agreement with Singapore into other accords.

Some diplomats claim that the freeing up of trade in renewables is the most geo-strategically vital part of the climate security agenda. They have argued that the WTO needs to be brought into play to guard against the kind of export bans on food to which some governments have resorted since the droughts in 2009 and 2010. Free trade routes are posited as essential to a secure supply of raw materials. A core aim is to keep the integrity of supply chains in tact in states affected by climate instability. While the EU's rhetoric is that of positive-sum market interdependence, at least some European policies betray a more mercantile outlook. One leading team of experts detects signs of a more protectionist stance towards green trade (Overseas Development Institute, 2012). An autumn 2013 Citi Bank report observes a new 'energy Darwinism' as competitive support for different technologies has intensified (Citi Bank, 2013). Also in 2013, a Chatham House report noted the same trend towards resource nationalism and climate-driven protectionism in many countries.

Climate change has not convinced governments to support CAP reform – the latter clearly worsens scarcity in developing state and so feeds instability and conflict as climate impacts begin to hit. From a development point of view, officials insist that the imperative is to restrict big companies from buying up large tracts of land in poor countries to grow their own food in an effort to hoard resources as a preventive measure against climate change.

The IEA complains that financial support to renewables has been unacceptably high in nine EU member states and is a sign of new green mercantilism (Platts, 2011:

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3 See <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/environment/climate-change/>

3). The Commission has pushed to keep non-EU biofuels out of Europe through regulations to do with the biodiversity of where they are grown, as concerns over the 'indirect' impact of biofuels increase. France has focused increasingly on the export of nuclear technology that other member states judge to be a security risk (Szarka, 2011: 117).

There is a new focus on governments supporting companies to gain contractual access to scarce resources. In October 2012 the Commission presented an update of EU industrial policy that promised a 'raw materials diplomacy' to secure access to vital supplies (European Commission, 2012a). The British government has launched a new 'action plan for resource security', which focuses in particular on guaranteeing access to speciality metals on the road towards low carbon (Defra-BIS, 2012). The Energy Roadmap 2050 states that decarbonisation should be a competitive boon for the EU as an 'early mover' in the global market for renewable (European Commission, 2011: 9). Government-backed commercial diplomacy has become more prominent as Europe has begun to lose ground in green technology to China and other rising powers.

The mercantile line is especially evident in the unbending EU insistence on more restrictive intellectual property rules in relation to low carbon technologies. A firm line is being maintained on IPR despite this complicating a number of free trade talks.

The frequent complaint from developing countries has been that the EU is engaged in a quick grab for large-scale renewable projects oriented towards exporting energy to European markets rather than in a genuine partnership to maximise renewables' potential for 'host' societies too. Environmental NGOs worry that European governments are pumping funds into large scale, export-oriented renewables projects that are likely merely to worsen local conflict dynamics.

This is no clear EU position yet on geo-engineering. Member state governments express concerns over 'rogue research' while also funding their own explorations into geo-engineering solutions.

Overall, critics charge that European governments seem not to recognise that the strategic need to share new technologies is more important than the profits of a small number of private companies (Mabey, 2009: 7). European governments often seem intent on protecting renewables market shares and profits to the detriment of an overarching geopolitical interest in disseminating new technologies.

### **Building on Achievements**

There is on-going debate over the best security response to climate change. Some analysts argue that this issue must propel governments towards deeper, positive-sum, liberal cooperation. More than any other issue, they insist, climate security requires outward-looking international cooperation. Other analysts suggest that

climate change will drive governments towards more isolationist foreign policies based on self-protection. Pessimists fear that 'lifeboat scenario' self-help will become the dominant logic of Western security strategies. In practice, European policies currently hover uneasily between these two logics. In their basic approach to climate security, European governments are hedging between deeper international cooperation and self-reliance.

Policy outcomes certainly do not yet appear wholesale to reflect arguments that the only way to guarantee security in a world ravaged by extensive warming is through the 'lifeboat' solution. There is little evidence that European governments are inclined towards a strongly militarised approach. The EU has inched in ad hoc fashion towards a balance between state security and human security logics in its climate geo-strategy. To date, the EU's approach to climate security is best described as a 'securitization-lite'.

Yet, a concern is evident among diplomats that climate insecurity may challenge the liberal-cooperative approach in the long-term. The EU still needs to attach greater priority to deeper international cooperation in pursuit of collective security and qualitative change in the nature of economic growth. It needs to map out more sharply defined policies on these matters as part of its mainstream, day-to-day foreign policies, in addition to current efforts within areas of ring-fenced 'climate crisis' management.

The EU still needs to make the move from 'climate security' to a full-spectrum climate foreign policy. While the self-defined security community has begun to come to terms with the implications of global warming, efforts more broadly to mainstream climate within foreign policy as a whole need to be markedly intensified.

Many remain sceptical of the climate security agenda because they conflate securitisation with militarisation; but the fact that the latter should be limited does not mean that the former is not needed. More strongly embedded international regimes will be required in all areas of security and crisis management. And the EU must still move beyond climate security being debated merely in terms of Europe having to defend itself against instability that originates 'out there' as opposed to mitigating the way its own policies often magnify global threats.

Security will not be ensured simply by spending modestly higher amounts on conflict prevention, adaptation or renewables-dissemination in developing states, however necessary and welcome such steps are. More profound adjustment is pending on the very essence of the way in which EU foreign and security policy interacts with and seeks to shape the global order. It is here that the opportunity lies for the EU to build upon advances made in the last decade to assume more far-sighted leadership on issues of global climate security.

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