

# Optimization of Civil-military Synergies in the Field of Crisis Management\*

Marco Paulino Serronha

*Brigadier General, Portuguese Army. Deputy Commander of the Kosovo Force (KFOR)*

## Resumo

### Optimização das Sinergias Civis-Militares na Gestão de Crises

Uma eficaz gestão de crises não é possível só com a utilização de soluções puramente militares e os deficientes resultados nalgumas operações exigem a todos os principais intervenientes uma eficiente e eficaz combinação de recursos militares. No entanto diversas organizações e países têm abordado esta cooperação de diferentes maneiras, não existindo um conceito unificado sobre a melhor forma de empregar de forma sinérgica recursos e capacidades civis e militares. A prática tem demonstrado diversas dificuldades na implementação desta cooperação, originadas por diversos motivos. É fundamental haver um entendimento comum sobre a utilização dos diversos recursos civis e militares, que as diversas organizações e nações têm ao seu dispor, para se atingir o sucesso na resposta a crises, neste novo ambiente estratégico. E esse entendimento poderá passar por uma percepção comum sobre como resolver os problemas assim como por novos conceitos, doutrinas e procedimentos, a serem aplicados pelos diversos actores envolvidos na gestão de crises.

## Abstract

*It is recognized, conflicts cannot be overcome only by military capabilities. Setbacks in some operations put pressure on stakeholders to come up with common views on how to better combine civil and military capabilities. Different concepts and approaches to civil-military cooperation have emerged among international organizations and nations. There are some important obstacles and difficulties to develop a common understanding to coordinate and implement policies to cope with challenges of crisis response operations in the new strategic environment. Sharing of information between military and civilian actors is one of the fundamentals to have common situational awareness. This includes a good knowledge of military and civilian capabilities available to achieve common objectives. And the way forward is new concepts, organizations, procedures and training.*

---

\* Artigo elaborado com base na intervenção feita pelo autor na Conferência Internacional Athena 2011, realizada em Tessalónica na Grécia, em 5 de Junho de 2011, cujo tema geral foi a Gestão de Crises.



## **Introduction**

The changing nature of crisis management in terms of tasks means to address them, and actors involved has forced security actors to reconsider responses. Current and future operations call for an effective and synchronized planning and deployment of military and civilian capabilities at the onset of operations (ideally in the planning phase). The traditional sequence of military intervention in crisis management followed by a civilian presence to reconstruction is no longer valid. Availability of required capabilities and coordination of actions are the key words for success. Security, development, rule of law and good governance has to evolve in a coordinated manner to achieve success in crisis management operations.

This paper will address the optimal use of the civil-military synergy in the field of crisis management in four parts. The first one is a small introduction to the subject, the second is an overview of the reality in the cooperation between civilian and military organizations, the third some views on how to precede in a pragmatic approach and it concludes with some final remarks. It will focus on NATO's developments in comprehensive approach and civil-military cooperation.

## **Some Concepts (What are we Talking About?)**

When we talk about coordination and synergy it is important, in our view, that language and terminology are precise so that all involved understand fully what is expected. In that sense it is important to address concepts and definitions about Synergy, Comprehensive Approach and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).

The term synergy comes from the Greek word *syn-ergos*, (*συνεργός*), meaning "working together" (Wikipedia). Synergy could be defined as a combined or cooperative action of two or more agents, either groups or parts that together increase each other's effectiveness. Synergy could also be defined as two or more elements functioning together to produce a result not independently obtainable. So, to have synergy, the key words are cooperation (will), coordination of actions (work) and common purpose (end state).

Comprehensive Approach could be defined as the synergy of all actors and actions of the international community through the coordination and de-conflicting of political, development, and security capabilities to face today's challenges (Weezel, p.62). This is a conceptual framework to describe civil military interaction. NATO uses the term to stress the need for the international community to improve cooperation and coordination of crisis management tools, assets and resources.

The Comprehensive Approach could also be defined as the cross-governmental generation and application of security, government and development services, expertise, and structures/resources over time and distance. This should incorporate partnerships with host nations, allied governments, and institution partners (Lindley-French, Cornish and Rathmell, 2010, 2).

CIMIC is defined in NATO's Allied Joint Publication 9 as "The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies" (NATO, 2003, 1).

Confusion should be avoided when refereeing the Comprehensive Approach and CIMIC. There is some relationship between both concepts but they are not the same. Where the Comprehensive Approach is a civilian political process, CIMIC is a military organization that facilitates cooperation between the military and civilians, especially at the tactical level.

### **The Reality Check**

NATO's experiences in missions and operations, most notably Kosovo and Afghanistan, have demonstrated that in the framework of military operations, relationships between military forces, civilian authorities, populations, organizations and agencies are complex. It is recognized that peace, security, development and stability are more interconnected than ever placing a premium on close cooperation and coordination amongst international organizations playing respective roles in crisis prevention and management. As military action alone is insufficient to prevent or resolve crises/conflicts, success in current and future operations will require enhanced interaction amongst NATO and non-NATO actors at all levels, before and during NATO engagements.

The concerted application of the instruments of power to resolve a crisis or conflict is not a new concept. It has been used by sovereign states since ancient times. Modern crises have been characterized by the increase in actors involved. The interaction between the major actors to achieve an effective resolution to a crisis or conflict is a challenge but is essential to reach a satisfactory outcome. NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach has received increased impetus following the Bucharest Summit in 2008 and the subsequent publication of a NATO Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and of the Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan addressing the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. In the Lisbon Summit the Heads of State and Government tasked the North Atlantic Council to update the NATO Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and its list of tasks. In that document,

approved by the nations, the NATO Secretary General's Proposal on a Way Ahead on Comprehensive Approach (NATO/PASP, 2011, 14) states that:

"4. From an Alliance perspective, there are essentially three aspects to underpin a Comprehensive Approach:

4.1 improving the coherent application of the Alliance's own crisis management instruments, including its military and political planning procedures;

4.2 improving the Alliance's practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the United Nations and other relevant international organizations, NGOs and local actors in the planning and conduct of operations; and

4.3 enhancing NATO's ability to bring military support to stabilization operations and reconstruction efforts in all phases of a conflict. This aspect will aim at focusing on the operational implications of this endeavour, taking fully into account relevant work undertaken by the NATO Military Authorities."

Another side of crisis management is that some times when dealing with responsive operations to a particular crisis situation (or in some war operations) the delineation of the problem (and the possible solutions) is considered a "wicked problem", due to its complexity. This concept of a wicked problem<sup>2</sup>, that it is not going to be expanded here, says that problem solvers cannot agree in the identification of the problem or its solution, differently from complex problems where they can agree on what the problem is but not in the possible solutions (Kramer, 2011, 82). This situation complicates cooperation and interaction of different stakeholders' engagement in crisis management operations. Nevertheless, in saying that wicked problems are difficult and with no clear solutions does not mean that they cannot be solved. They need a different analytical approach and a strong, collaborative engagement of stakeholders. They are the big strategic challenge to international organizations and nations in present and future crisis management.

### *The Problems*

The cooperation amongst different stakeholders has experienced several dilemmas and has important challenges ahead. The organizations also have, in our view, strong incentives to cooperate.

---

2 The terminology was originally proposed by H. W. J. Rittel and M. M. Webber, both urban planners at the University of California, Berkeley, USA in 1973.1 In a landmark article, the authors observed that there is a whole realm of social planning problems that cannot be successfully treated with traditional linear, analytical approaches. They called these issues wicked problems and contrasted them with 'tame' problems.

Some of the dilemmas of cooperation could be identified as follows:

- The primary dilemma in cooperation is the issue of how to forge a fuller civil military partnership without compromising civilian control of security policy or undermining military effectiveness. This is an old issue in civil-military relations theories and discussions. From a more purist approach that defends a clear separation of both functions to a more pragmatic approach that argues the military can perform constabulary missions in “hybrid defense” in close relationship with civil structures, several different positions could be discussed (Driver, 2011, 13-17). Competition has been a standing item in cooperation between military and civil organizations, both at international and national levels.
- There is also a dilemma concerning cooperation between international actors. UN, EU and NATO do not share the same interests. In fact, they are often rivals in crisis management. Whereas the comprehensive approach concept is designed to facilitate coordination and links between international organizations it seems that all discussions taking place on this concept are blurred naturally as everyone gain influence to increase his legitimacy or visibility, at the others expenses.
- Other dilemma is neutrality and independence linked to humanitarian workers and judges, for example. Humanitarian workers want assistance to be neutral and autonomous to the population, and the judges want to remain independent wherever they are sent. The development, security and governance objectives are not always easy to reconcile in the minds of military, humanitarian actors, judges or politicians.
- A fourth dilemma is empowerment of the local actors, as international actors are still present in crisis management even more so with the comprehensive approach which handles all dimensions of a situation in an integrated manner. A number of crises, as Afghanistan or Somalia, demonstrate it is difficult to hand over to local actors because of corruption, drug use, illiteracy, etc.

The main challenges for cooperation amongst different types of organizations (IOs, NGOs and at national level) are (UNDP, 2009):

- Tackle Formalities: due to conflicting mandates and lack of memorandums of understanding, for instance;
- Culture, mindset, prejudices: at national level between Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, for instance. Or at international level between almost all the different IO;
- Bureaucratic rigidity: despite wiliness to cooperate, no flexibility to adjust plans and budgets;

- Create a Culture of Coordination between civilian and military sides (inside IO - NATO, EU, UN)
- Security : cooperation increases security of the actors involved;
- Funding: competing for funds is a zero-sum game;
- Priorities: organizations may share the vision, but not how to reach goals;
- Resources: in some (all?) crisis management operations more resources goes to military, less for development – a balanced approach in resources allocation is needed or a better distribution as the operation evolves;
- Leadership: the UN, or the strongest actor, or main donor country – this could be the most difficult challenge to address due to the fact that IO and NGO are not used to be under the control of others;
- Authority : more decentralized authority is needed because eases cooperation at lower levels;
- Local ownership: is a crucial factor for the exit strategies of nations and organizations involved in multinational crisis management operations.

Efforts for enhanced intergovernmental organizations cooperation are not unique for Kosovo but other areas of crisis. Moreover, these efforts are nowadays exceeding the realm of intergovernmental organizations and every day an increasing number in the academic community deal with this issue. Despite the competition we have experienced between main stakeholders (governments, IO, NGO and others) and not overcoming the challenges referred above we can see strong incentives for cooperation. This cooperation insures:

- Efficiency: because it is important joining and coordinating scarce resources;
- Consistency :‘the one hand should know what the other is doing’;
- Urgency: there is no great success in different missions around the world;
- Security: failed/ weak states are becoming origin and training ground for terrorists and other threats;
- Politics: electorates and constituencies in West are increasingly impatient for results;
- Legitimacy: more actors in the ground – moral and political legitimacy tend to increase.

Also we have to address strong counter-incentives for cooperation. Cooperation and collaboration are time consuming, requires compromises and a willingness to dilute one’s own policy agenda. In weighting incentives and counter-incentives it is clear the incentives are preferred.

We can see a strong disconnection between policy rhetoric concerning comprehensive approaches at the international level and policy realities in the field.

### **How to proceed?**

NATO Alliance, especially Allied Command Transformation (ACT), is producing a lot of good work in concepts and practical steps to improve the Comprehensive Approach increasing cooperation between military and civilian capabilities, along with IO and NGO's.

Interaction within the engagement space, the strategic environment in which the Alliance decides to engage, takes place over a wide spectrum. In accordance with ACT's Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept (FCCMIC) enhancing Alliance's ability to interact can be conducted by (ACT, 2008, 2):

- Promoting awareness of other players, based on principles of willingness and appropriate levels of mutual understanding.
- Fostering de-confliction between actors, based on principles of information sharing, respect and transparency.
- Bringing selected (and willing) actors together to co-operate on managing potential or current crisis through common analysis, shared interests and objectives.
- Achieving coherence on a case-by-case basis characterized by collaborative planning and concerted action initiated at the political-strategic level and commenced at all levels.

These four different states clearly delineate the quality of the relationship between NATO and the non-NATO actors engaged in crisis management.

Relationships between actors may take place along different points across the spectrum of interaction, and will vary dependent on the type and stage of a crisis. Ways to develop enhanced interaction amongst NATO and non-NATO actors could be as follows:

- Encourage comprehensive planning and close working-level relationships between Alliance forces and appropriate non-NATO actors prior to or at the onset of a crisis as well as during contingency planning through continued implementation of policy and doctrine.
- Find commonality of purpose within an engagement space to promote comprehensive, unified efforts as different instruments are applied to the crisis.
- Formalize civil-military interaction mechanisms at all levels with non-NATO actors and within NATO and create cooperative arrangements as appropriate facilitating the delineation of tasks and responsibilities (e.g. by establishing joint strategic planning cells and/or by improving civilian planning capacity).
- Where appropriate, link interaction mechanisms with non-NATO actors to the NATO Crisis Response System and the Operational Planning Process.



### *Some Solutions*

The top down approach to find a solution to problems has shown to be a slow process that does not fit with the urgent needs on the ground. However, on the other side, strategic and political ambiguity at top level guidance puts greater emphasis on the individuals that lead the process at operational and tactical levels, where political room for initiative is needed. So an implementation of more practical approaches at tactical and operational levels is required. For that purpose appropriate delegation of authority (and resources) is needed on the senior military and civilian officials in theatre. Integrate small and medium projects with direct impact in security and living condition of populations are an important step for reaching operational and strategic objectives. More training opportunities in civil-military cooperation are also needed, at all levels, in all organizations to have a more efficient articulation of military and civilian capabilities.

Information sharing between military and civilian actors is a fundamental factor to have common situational awareness of the engagement space during crisis management operations. Information sharing and interoperability are also key enablers for complex operating environments. This includes a good knowledge of military and civilian capabilities available to better achieve common objectives. We need doctrines, concepts, organizational changes and new procedures; more training and education opportunities are needed to build on the required capabilities.

### *Doctrine and Concepts*

NATO should continue to work with international stakeholders in building common concepts and doctrines. Speaking the same language is mandatory to have common situational awareness and to better tackle the problems.

Allied Command Transformation is producing concepts in an attempt to provide solutions to the main problems in civil military cooperation. One good example is the reference of Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept which aims to enhance NATO's ability to interact with other stakeholders.

### *Organization and Procedures*

NATO, at Brussels headquarters, would settle the Crisis Management Fusion Centre to better cope with the needs of information sharing and situational awareness in a crisis. Another example is the Civil-military Fusion Centre designed to address the information management problems by operating a web tool that

allows information sharing and interaction between various stakeholders interested in a particular crisis, which allows a better Civil-military overview. Both centres proposals are inserted in the Concept for Information Sharing and Shared Situational Awareness between Civil and Military Actors produced also by ACT in 2008 (ACT, 2008)

At lower levels, tactical experience, experiments and exercises, as ARRC Project Tardis, have led to several lessons learned and/or proposals like the following (Lindley-French, Cornish and Rathmell, 2010):

- Command and Control in Stability and Reconstruction (or Hybrid) Operations: a model of effective and flexible command and control should be applied by NATO strategic commands able to reach out to key civilian partners.
- The need to harmonize Headquarters practices and Standards Operational Procedures: Allied Command Operations should take the lead in determining how NATO Force Structure headquarters' practices and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) should be harmonized on the basis of the experience, experiments and lessons learned. This should apply also to tactical composite HQ in missions and operations (KFOR and ISAF amongst others).
- Subject Matter Experts: NATO's Subject Matter Experts (SME) are needed both at the top level structures and within operational and tactical headquarters. NATO needs to build civilian capabilities within its structures including theatre HQs. This will require systematic access, at short-notice, to relevant expertise. These aspects are already included in the "Updated list of tasks for the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon summit decisions on the Comprehensive Approach" (NATO/PASP, 2011, 6).
- Civilian Advisory Cluster: An effective Command Group at strategic, operational and tactical levels would ideally include a Strategic Communications Advisor who would be a civilian from outside the formal structure in support of the Public Affairs Office (PAO) as part of a civilian cluster able to reach out to external expertise and influence.

#### *Training, Exercises and Education*

Training, education, experiments and exercises are good mechanisms of confidence building because they stimulate and develop mutual understanding between people and organizations. Training and exercises allow refinement of procedures through

the lessons learned mechanisms and is a good tool to improve local stakeholders' capabilities.

ACT has issued the Strategic Guidance for Comprehensive Approach Training emphasizing the need for a "top-down" approach to merge with the existing "bottom-up" approach.

Implementation of CA in training should be considered along the following steps:

- Dialogue: Establishing a permanent dialogue between civil and military actors, closely resembling the reality encountered in an operational environment.
- Interaction: Creating an environment where civil and military actors interact as they do in theatre.
- Participation: Establishing comprehensive training events that incorporate civil actors' inputs at the exercise design and planning phases.
- Integration: Conducting comprehensive training events in which each participating organization has decision-making authority during the design, planning, conduct and lessons learned process.

Joint civil-military training (at national and international levels) is identified as one of the key tools to overcome some of the organizational and human challenges to the implementation of Comprehensive Approach to crisis management. Joint training should not be seen as an end state, but it must be based on a correct evaluation of the needs for skills and knowledge.

The Multinational Experiments, a program lead by United States Joint Forces Command and with participation of other organizations, agencies and nations are also an essential tool providing opportunities to explore new concepts and capabilities for multinational and interagency operations. These capabilities include a "whole of government" comprehensive approach to harmonize civilian and military efforts on a multinational basis. Each event in this multinational experimentation program is designed to provide well-founded recommendations to senior leaders, and to deliver validated innovations to the practitioner, both civilian and military.

### *Capability Building*

Without sufficient and effective military and civil capabilities there is no chance to have synergy in its application in the comprehensive approach to crisis management. Lack of some required military and civilian capabilities is one of the main problems for IO and nations addressing solutions to crisis management operations.

Dual use technologies are an interesting approach to seek synergy in civil-military capability development.

As said before an important aspect of the NATO's Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept, particularly for nations, is its implication for the development of capabilities<sup>3</sup>. It is expected that it will impact development of associated capabilities as follows:

- Civil-military interaction will be elevated to the status of a critical enabler for all military missions and operations wherein all doctrine must consider and anticipate the implications of interaction with non-NATO actors across all domains;
- Institutionalizing interaction will require broad policy and doctrine for NATO internal civil-military interaction that encompasses the various instruments of the Alliance such as linking NATO Civil Emergency Planning policy with that of NATO military doctrine;
- Enhanced current organizational practices to achieve an overarching alignment of tasks, responsibilities, and, where necessary, structures within NATO;
- Education and training will increasingly require the consideration of involvement of non-NATO actors relevant to the Alliance's efforts. Wherever possible non-NATO subject matter experts should participate and contribute to education and training, based on relevant and well-developed training serials;
- Materiel that enables interaction and that is interoperable with relevant non-NATO actors will need to be developed and/or procured;
- Senior level political military consultation, planning and decision making will facilitate broader interaction;
- Permanent access to a wider array of non-military expertise will be necessary;
- Enhanced information centres, possibly based on existing Alliance structures and arrangements, need to be developed as knowledge hubs in support of comprehensive civil-military interaction;
- The requirement for increased information sharing at all levels may necessitate revision of current security arrangements, data protocols and Standard Operating Procedures (ACT, 2007, 4-5).

European Union (EU) is fully engaged in capability development and it is im-

---

<sup>3</sup> Capabilities are comprised of one or more of the following components: Doctrine, Organization, Education & Training, Materiel, Leadership Development, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability.

---

portant that both organizations, NATO and EU, closely cooperate to have synergy in this area.

Since 2000, the European Union has been developing civilian capabilities for use in civilian missions, including post conflict and other environments. The EU has deployed civilian experts in a variety of capacities to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere. Given the fact that some would still prefer to see the EU remain purely a civilian power, it is important to note that the development of EU civilian capabilities should not become a substitute for development of European military capabilities. Focusing on EU civilian capabilities may be an attractive option financially and politically within Europe; European leaders must be careful to avoid misleading European citizens into the belief that these capabilities negate the need for continued investments in traditional military training and hardware.

Indeed, if the Common Security and Defense Policy is to improve the security of European states, and offer European leaders the flexibility that is its root justification, it will be crucial to not only develop civilian capabilities, but also to continue and accelerate the long-standing effort to reform European national militaries so that they can deploy to conduct missions across a new spectrum of tasks. Europe should develop the capability to offer protection to civilian-military missions without the need to rely heavily on NATO for protection – as they effectively have in both Kosovo and Afghanistan.

### **Final Remarks**

There is no miracle solution or silver bullet to have effectiveness in the Comprehensive Approach, for the time being, due to present obstacles and constraints. The lack of coherence and coordination among diverse international and local actors in the international conflict management system has resulted, inter alia, in inter-agency rivalry, working at cross purposes, competition for funding, duplication of effort and sub-optimal economies of scale. Lack of deployable and usable military and civil capabilities is a real problem that only a coordinated and integrated capability development process of the main IO and its member nations can ease. The real truth is that Crisis Management is not a priority in a nation's foreign policy. However we need to be pragmatic finding solutions at the tactical and operational levels that allow commanders and senior civilian officials to work together. Also we need a top down approach to have a better management of the processes at lower levels, creating appropriated doctrines and organizational changes, for instance. Achieving a functioning culture of cooperation is more important in relations

between IOs than implemented formal structures. Training is an important tool to enhance the culture of cooperation and is needed from the onset of an operation or even before a crisis occurs. Only addressing the root causes of a problem we can find cooperative solutions using different capabilities in synergy. Until we achieve this we must rely on the goodwill and experience of the stakeholders (military and civilians) at operational and tactical levels. This is good but in some cases could not be enough for success.

## References

- ACT, 2008. *Civil-military Fusion Centre (CFC) and Civil-Military Overview (CMO): Concept Primer for Information Sharing and Shared Situational Awareness between Civil and Military Actors* [https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/EnhancedCi/Documents/FusionCent/CFCCMOConc/file/\\_WFS/CFC-CMO%20Concept%20Primer%20%28FEB08%29.pdf](https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/EnhancedCi/Documents/FusionCent/CFCCMOConc/file/_WFS/CFC-CMO%20Concept%20Primer%20%28FEB08%29.pdf), [acedido em 27 de Maio de 2011].
- ACT, 2007. *Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept V1.1* [http://www.google.pt/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Ftransnet.act.nato.int%2FWISE%2FEnhancedCi%2FDocuments%2Fcopy\\_of\\_FFCCMIC&rct=j&q=Future%20Comprehensive%20Civil-Military%20Interaction%20Concept%20&ei=vw39TbirC8TusgbktLHxDQ&usg=AFQjCNF7fp72zUeeckKqJZ6MeCVzGJJJeu&sig2=2JTChSDhsA7pDMkGdvRUfA](http://www.google.pt/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Ftransnet.act.nato.int%2FWISE%2FEnhancedCi%2FDocuments%2Fcopy_of_FFCCMIC&rct=j&q=Future%20Comprehensive%20Civil-Military%20Interaction%20Concept%20&ei=vw39TbirC8TusgbktLHxDQ&usg=AFQjCNF7fp72zUeeckKqJZ6MeCVzGJJJeu&sig2=2JTChSDhsA7pDMkGdvRUfA), [acedido em 29 de Maio de 2011].
- Driver, Darrell, 2011. "Europe Searching for Complementary Military and Civilian Roles", *per Concordiam Journal of European Defense and Security Issues*, Volume 1, Issue 4, 13-17. Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.
- Kramer, Franklin, 2011. "Irregular conflict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma - strategies of imperfection", *PRISM Journal of the Center for Complex Operations*, US National Defense University, PRISM 2, n. 3, Jun 2011, 75-100.
- Lindley-French, Cornish and Rathmell, 2010. *Operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach*, [http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16458\\_0310pp.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/16458_0310pp.pdf), [acedido em 25 de Maio de 2011].
- NATO, 2003. *AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine*, NATO edition.

NATO/PASP, 2011. *Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach*, [https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/ACTIPT/JOUIPT/20102011CH/Experiment/References/Comprehens0/file/\\_WFS/PASP%282011%290174%20ENGG%20%28Comp%20App%20Action%20Plan%29.pdf](https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/ACTIPT/JOUIPT/20102011CH/Experiment/References/Comprehens0/file/_WFS/PASP%282011%290174%20ENGG%20%28Comp%20App%20Action%20Plan%29.pdf), [acedido em 3 de Junho de 2011].

UNDP, 2009. *Intergovernmental Organizations Cooperation in providing assistance to SSG (focus in Kosovo)* [http://www.google.pt/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CBwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fse2.dcaf.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFile%2FDCAF%2F100824%2Fieventattachment\\_file%2F52C29F49-702B-499C-BDA7-6CC962F9B993%2Fen%2FUNDP%2B3SD%2BPresentation%2BArber%2BGorani%2B-%2BEnglish.pdf&rct=j&q=undp%20intergovernmental%20organizations%20cooperation%20the%20whole%20of%20govern%20focus%20kosovo&ei=x8r9Tc-fFMWVswa4ueHuDQ&usg=AFQjCNF95lumb4QJfNb-dwgEcqqusixCuQ&sig2=iu6YWduRZj1gHu-cUW6\\_AA](http://www.google.pt/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CBwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fse2.dcaf.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFile%2FDCAF%2F100824%2Fieventattachment_file%2F52C29F49-702B-499C-BDA7-6CC962F9B993%2Fen%2FUNDP%2B3SD%2BPresentation%2BArber%2BGorani%2B-%2BEnglish.pdf&rct=j&q=undp%20intergovernmental%20organizations%20cooperation%20the%20whole%20of%20govern%20focus%20kosovo&ei=x8r9Tc-fFMWVswa4ueHuDQ&usg=AFQjCNF95lumb4QJfNb-dwgEcqqusixCuQ&sig2=iu6YWduRZj1gHu-cUW6_AA), [acedido em 30 de Junho de 2011].

Weezel, Stijn Pz van, 2011. "NATO's Comprehensive Approach. CIMIC branch focuses on civilian-military cooperation", *per Concordiam Journal of European Defense and Security Issues*, Volume 1, Issue 4, 62-63. Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.