

Culture's Backlash on Decision Making

René Moelker

Professor associado de Sociologia na Royal Netherlands Military Academy.

Trabalha em Sociologia Militar, concentrando-se na sociologia de famílias militares, tecnologia militar, sociologia militar de Norbert Elias, educação militar e o conflito da Chechnya.

Resumo

A questão colocada neste artigo é a de saber se as lições aprendidas em Srebrenica (Unprofor) conduziram a alteração de cultura nas relações civis-militares. Foi estudado o processo de tomada de decisão para demonstrar alteração de cultura. Foi o processo de tomada de decisão ao tempo da Unprofor que fez prova de um choque entre as culturas militares e civis. Depois de um inquérito parlamentar sobre Srebrenica, procedimentos de tomada de decisão considerando desenvolvimentos foram aperfeiçoados através da utilização de um conjunto de critérios chamados "Toetsingskader". Os parlamentares usam estes critérios para questionar o governo sobre muitos assuntos importantes relativos a desenvolvimento. A aplicação dos critérios ao desenvolvimento na Etiópia e Eritreia foi bastante pacífica dado tratar-se de uma situação "clássica" de manutenção da paz de primeira geração. Os critérios contidos no "Toetsingskader" foram submetidos a uma prova mais severa no processo de tomada de decisão respeitante à participação na Força de Estabilização do Iraque (SFIR) em 2003. Por um lado, o "Toetsingskader" provou ser novamente instrumento útil para controlo parlamentar. Provou ser um instrumento capaz de preencher o fosso entre a cultura política, militar e civil. Por outro lado mantém-se o risco de raciocínio teleológico. Os critérios podem facilmente ser usados para justificar a participação pela racionalização dos objectivos de desenvolvimento e/ou ignorando questões críticas.

Abstract

The question posed in this paper is whether the lessons learned from Srebrenica (Unprofor) have led to culture change in civil-military relations. To demonstrate culture change the decision making process was studied. It was the decision making process at the time of Unprofor that showed proof of a clash between military and civilian cultures. After a parliamentary inquiry into Srebrenica, decision-making procedures regarding deployments were improved by use of a set of criteria called the 'Toetsingskader'. Parliamentarians use these criteria to question the government about many important issues regarding deployment. Applying the criteria to the deployment in Ethiopia and Eritrea went quite smoothly, being a 'classical' first generation peacekeeping situation. The criteria in the 'Toetsingskader' were put to a more severe test in the decision-making process regarding participation in the Stabilization Force Iraq (SFIR) in 2003. On the one hand, the 'Toetsingskader' proved to be a useful tool for parliamentary control again. It proved to be a tool that is able to bridge the gap between military and civilian political culture. On the other hand there remains the risk of teleological reasoning. The criteria can easily be used to justify participation by rationalizing goals of the deployment and/or ignoring critical questions.

Disaster and decision-making

It sometimes takes a disaster to put change processes into motion and to break away from cultural restraints. Rentes Florêncio (2000) defended this thesis in 'After the Disaster'. According to this author, the Earthquake of Lisbon in 1755 was not only a huge disaster, killing thousands of people, but it is also regarded as a turning point where the remnants of mediaeval culture were superseded by modern 'enlightenment' culture. Science, brought by military engineers, and a change agent embodied in the figure of Pombal were able to rebuild the city and at the same time to constitute a new societal order. The transformation by Pombal was brought about by the use of persuasion, merchant money and by brute coercion but the point Rentes Florêncio is making, is that cultural change would never have been successful if the disaster had not taken place. One can have an evolutionary model of change, but when change agents desire to accomplish a transformation from traditional culture to modernity overnight, and then they need a disaster, a revolution, a major conflict or some other kind of 'a big bang'.

Even though Rentes Florêncio's arguments are eloquent and erudite, his theory based on French structuralism is perhaps a little rough. On the other hand, theorists like Norbert Elias (but also other classic authors) also state that change comes from conflict. By studying the network of relations (the figuration) and the tensions in these networks Elias was able to discover the genesis of institutions like the profession of the Naval Officer¹ (Moelker, 2003b). However, these change processes are often long-term civilization processes characterized by gradual change.

Dutch political decision making practice was very much influenced by the tensions between civilian and military culture and in fact would probably only have changed slowly if a large scale humanitarian disaster had not occurred. The disaster that shook up civilian and military culture and that made possible a change in decision making was the downfall of the enclave Srebrenica in 1995 and the resulting genocide that cost the lives of eight-thousand persons. Causes and circumstances regarding this tragedy are complex and so is the question whether or not this event could have been prevented. If for instance the tragedy had been called 'genocide' from the beginning on, things might have been different. Rijdsdijk (2003) claims that the international community

¹ Elias' 'Study into the Genesis of the Naval Profession' is a forgotten and 'lost' classic of military sociology. It was only recently rediscovered by researching the archives in Marbach/Germany where the legacy of Elias' works is kept on file.

would have been forced to take responsibility. And this aspect of 'interpretation' or 'semantics' is only one of the complexities in the Srebrenica case. At the risk of simplifying things the analysis in this chapter is limited to political decision making for political decision making, hampered by tensions between civilian and military cultures, was very much at the root of this evil that befell the Moslem population and the Dutch peacekeepers.

The downfall of Srebrenica had many consequences. In this chapter only the changes in political decision-making culture are considered for the focus is not on Srebrenica as such but on cultural dimensions of civil-military relations in democratic societies. Therefore not only decision-making regarding Srebrenica will be dealt with. Much attention will be given to after-Srebrenica decision-making, meaning in particular a discussion of the cases Ethiopia-Eritrea and Iraq. The chapter ventures into the question whether the lessons learned from Srebrenica have been applied to these cases and whether these lessons have led to culture change in civil-military relations. The questions to be answered in subsequent sections are:

- What are the tensions between civilian and military culture that might possibly influence decision-making?
- How did decision-making regarding the 'safe' – area Srebrenica result into the bad ending of this Peace Support Operation?
- How did compromising between civilian and military culture result into improved decision-making practices? The case of Ethiopia-Eritrea will illustrate how the lessons learned from Srebrenica have been put into practice.
- How did politicians and the military proceed their decision-making practices in the most recent of times: the case of Iraq?

Conclusions will be drawn in the last section.

Tensions in civilian and military culture

Dutch culture in general is not very much militaristic. The Netherlands armed forces were at the peak of their power in the seventeenth century when the Netherlands Navy gained maritime supremacy and the land forces could withstand the Spaniards and the French. Partly because of the divergence between the civilian political culture and the

military culture, the glory days of the Dutch Republic did not last long. The most important power elite was the merchant class and thus the armed forces served mainly to protect merchant interests. Merchant values became more dominant than military traditions. Centralism was weak during the period of the republic (17th - 18th century). Governance in the Republic is often characterized as particularism. In this political system power is shared by many stakeholders meaning that they will have to negotiate to reach at consensus based policy decisions.

Perhaps this historical background is responsible for one of the most profound cultural traits of the Dutch; they try to reach consensus by consultation, meetings, negotiation, talking, talking, talking. As an economic system from the seventies to present day, this culture has become famous by the names 'Polder-model' or 'Rhineland-model'. These cultural traits are also responsible for tensions between Dutch and German soldiers in the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps. When the Dutch military collaborate with German soldiers as they do in the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps, the Germans observe that the Dutch do not attend meetings to make decisions. They attend meetings for brainstorming purposes. To the astonishment of the Germans decisions might very well be reversed at the next meeting (Moelker and Soeters, 2003c). Germans also observe characteristics that are common to general civilian Dutch culture, i.e. the Dutch are informal, behave in an egalitarian way, are often laid back and tend to come to solutions by improvising. Normally the collaboration of the Dutch with the Germans is satisfactorily. Soldiers from the two nations can work together smoothly and both nations share views on professionalism. There is one exception to this smooth collaboration and this exception relates to those situations where the Dutch are in a minority position. The Dutch seem to have trouble accepting a non-equal - subordinate - role in a working relationship (Soeters and Moelker, 2003).

Dutch politicians and the military share the same cultural values, but at the same time there are some remarkable differences that probably come with differences in the tasks of the two groups. Maybe the differences also come from socialization. Cadets are socialized in traditional military values like courage, patriotism, chivalry (Moelker, 2003b) that are not common any more in civil society. It goes without saying that the differences may lead to tensions between the two groups. The differences and tensions are compared with each other in table 1.

Table 1: Differences and tensions between political and military culture in the Netherlands regarding decision-making (adapted from Born and Metselaar, 2003b: 87).

Tensions	Civilian political culture	Military culture
1. Possible deployment armed forces in a crisis	Politicians are driven by idealism, political opportunism, political compromise; 'Gesinnungsethik' (ethic of intentions)	Reserved and even distant, motivated by feasibility and effectivity; 'Verantwortungsethik' (ethic of responsibility)
2. How much force/violence to be used	Clear restrictions as limited as possible	Preferably swift and decisive use of force, at any case the military strive for military superiority
3. Control over operations	Politicians want much control over the execution of operations because of the political implications of military action	Military prefer as much autonomy as possible in the execution of their tasks
4. Clarity of the assignment	Mostly vague and multi-interpretable goals, non specified end states because of necessary political compromising	Preference for a clear and unambiguous mandate and clearly defined goals and end states

As one can conclude from the table above the tensions between civilian and military culture are very much related to decision-making. At first sight one might think that the problems arising from these tensions could be avoided by following a divergent model of decision-making. Divergent decision-making 'is aimed at the maximization of professionalism within the military by separating political and military decision-making. The political leaders formulate the goals and some broad conditions for military operations and the military commanders carry out the military operations. The political leaders do not interfere in military operations, while the military commanders do not influence policy' (Born, 2003a: 155). But the divergent model does not provide the solution. When the differences between civilian and military culture are considered more closely, we cannot but conclude that the tensions between the two groups of stakeholders are structural in character and ask for structural solutions. Structurally the interests and values of politicians and military differ and contradict. Divergent decision-making is nothing more than a normative imperative (it describes how decision-making should be), but it does not reflect reality. In reality decision-making is intertwined. Politicians and the military mutually influence each other in their decision-making. Politicians cannot decide without the expert opinions of the military and the military cannot engage in action without considering the political consequences.

Sam Sarkesian (1981) states that 'the generally accepted idea of acceptance of the military in democratic societies as an apolitical organization, characterized by civilian control and supremacy is, in practice, mere ignorance of history and reality'.

When politicians and the military influence each other mutually then decision-making is intertwined or convergent. 'It is not realistic to make a distinction between policy and implementation or between government and administration. The reason is that during military operations, and especially peace missions, military commanders have to make many military decisions with political implications' (Born, 2003a: 156). Perhaps it is wiser to search for complementary roles of the political and military leaders than to separate politics from military affairs. A decision-making tool containing criteria for deployment may be of assistance in this search for complementarities. Before discussing this tool in section four, first a situation in which the tensions between civilian political culture and military culture led to humanitarian disaster is dealt with.

Decision-making and Srebrenica

In the decision-making process prior to the downfall of Srebrenica, or more correctly the decision-making leading to the Netherlands participation in United Nation Protection Force (Unprofor), the interests of the stakeholders were very much intertwined (Hüttig et al, 1998). The analysis of the decision-making process is complex and complicated for there were many different stakeholders within the political realm. In the military realm there were also many different and opposing interests. The data presented here come from an official rapport by a multidisciplinary team of researchers (NIOD, 2002) and from a parliamentary inquiry (Bakker, 2003). To analyze the complexities and to rearrange the data the ideal type described in table 1 is used.

The first tension between civilian political culture and military culture relates to the motives behind decisions to deploy forces in crisis area. The decision to participate in peacekeeping in Bosnia was very much motivated by idealism on the side of the politicians. Public opinion in the Netherlands (and also world opinion) was very much involved and driven by the events in Bosnia in 1991 and 1992. Tidings of war, bomb attacks and sniper actions from Sarajevo made it into the newspaper headlines almost every day. In august 1992 images and news of 'concentration camps' (Omarska) influenced public opinion and politicians. A photograph of a malnourished man behind barbwire became an icon of the worsening humanitarian situation.

Politicians from the left felt it to be unacceptable that things like this happened one and a half-hour flying from Amsterdam (Bakker, 2003: 27). Lower House spokesmen of Foreign Affairs De Hoop Scheffer (the present Secretary-General of NATO) stated the 'humanitarian imperative' to be one of the most important motives for intervention. Liberals in the Netherlands also mentioned the importance of the Netherlands playing a role in the world (Bakker, 2003: 29). Regarding this point De Hoop Scheffer remarked that more countries felt like the Dutch, but the Dutch were among the most active agents in the international debate on Bosnia. When asked whether intervention served a specific Dutch interest De Hoop Scheffer confirmed to the parliamentary inquiry commission that the arguments on which the Dutch government founded its decision to deploy its military in Bosnia would be relevant even in the present day. Herewith he confirmed that violation of humanitarian and international rule of law is always of concern to the government. Prime Minister Lubbers added to the arguments the credibility of international rule of law (Bakker, 2003: 31). Regarding the feasibility of the operation some of the politicians were critical. Some of them realized that peace couldn't be enforced by the safe area approach. Some thought the safe areas to be a 'temporary humanitarian concept'. The Minister of Defense Ter Beek viewed the concept as a temporary solution born out of a situation of emergency that could serve until a definite peace arrangement would be found (Bakker, 2003: 36-37).

The military were certainly sensitive to the humanitarian arguments. They might even have felt a bit surprised for the most outspoken activists advocating military intervention were from the peace movement. Inside the military there were two main groups of stakeholders. The first was in favor of deploying the newly established Airmobile Brigade to show it off. As the army was facing downsizing and reorganization one of the new features was to be a new 'elite' of soldiers, the Airmobile Brigade. Generals Reitsma and Brinkman were eager to demonstrate that their men were up to the task while in fact reorganization, the process of postponing conscription and transforming into an all-volunteer force, acquirement of equipment, educating and training the soldiers had only just begun. The more cautious Generals Van Der Vlis (Joint Chief of Staff) and General Couzy (Army commander) represented the second group of stakeholders. They used many arguments against the mission in Bosnia. According to Couzy troops were not available in May 1993 because of the conscript system that was still in use at this time. Conscripts were not deployable in peace enforcing operations. According to Couzy the most important objection 'concerned the fact that the units that were to be deployed would have to be manned with volunteers from the conscript army, and also, the Airmobile Brigade (who would have to do the job) was not trained to operate as armored infantry' (Bakker, 2003:

49). But the generals also pointed at general problems of feasibility regarding the safe area concept. Though higher in rank this second group of cautious stakeholders, who emphasized feasibility, were not successful in influencing the decision making process. During an absence of this second group in summer 1993, members of the first group of stakeholders wrote a recommendation to the Minister of Defense suggesting the deployment of a logistical unit and a battalion of the Airmobile Brigade (Bakker, 2003: 50).

In the motives for deployment ethics play a major role. According to Max Weber (cited in NIOD, 2002: 185-186) there are two kinds of ethic at stake: 'Gesinnungsethik' and 'Verantwortungsethik'. People that act on 'Gesinnungsethik' (ethic of intentions) do not take the consequences of their decisions or actions into consideration. They act on good intentions. 'Verantwortungsethik' (ethic of responsibility) on the other hand is based on the consequences of actions, for people who act will in the end have to carry responsibility and will be asked for justification of their actions. Among the politicians 'Gesinnungsethik' had the upper hand. Ethics that are driven by good intentions and the wish to intervene in order to address humanitarian necessity were dominant, whereas among the military a large group of persons was inclined to look at the consequences of possible outcomes of decisions. This conclusion not only coincides with the cultural differences described above. It is also logical from the military profession point of view: military professionals are the most informed on the possibilities and the limitations of military intervention. One cannot escape the impression that the politicians did not want to hear the objections from the military expert point of view.

The second tension involved the question of the amount of force or violence that might be used. The UN-resolution 836 (4 June 1993) assigns United Nations Protection Force (Unprofor) to deter attacks against the safe areas, and allows Unprofor to use force in acts of self defense. The resolution stated clearly that this was to be achieved 'through the use of air power' (Bakker, 2003: 65). To reach these goals the number of soldiers were estimated at 34000 for Bosnia, but as these troops were not easily available the UN settled for 7600 personnel to 'deter by presence'. The Dutch sent a small battalion of about 400 personnel to the safe area Srebrenica (and there were even less in the enclave in 1995). Prior to deployment Dutch politicians discussed the matter of armament and for a number of reasons decided to send a lightly armed battalion equipped with armored cars and .50 machine guns. The standard .25 cannon was removed in order not to provoke the Serbs by an overly militaristic show of force. The objective was to use force only for self-protection. Other countries had sent personnel with heavier equipment without the UN objecting. UN-commander Briquemont would have been in favor of heavier armament and regretted

not being able to convince the Dutch authorities (NIOD, 2002: 1124). The argument not to provoke the Serbs must have been an interpretation of the resolution by Dutch politicians. In fact, the Dutch were applying principles of classic first generation peace keeping (where there is a treaty, where there is consent from both conflict parties and where impartiality is paired to light armament) in a situation where peace enforcement is required.

This decision to send light-armed troops was discussed in the media and it was heavily criticized by the three-star general that commanded the Netherlands army. General Couzy² stated that it was ‘madness’ to deploy military to places where they cannot defend the local people they are assigned to protect (Hüttig, Peek, Wester, 1998). Joint Chief of Staff Van der Vlis confirmed this view later during the parliamentary inquiry on Srebrenica ‘I already told you that you cannot protect the population without defending the safe area’ (Bakker, 2003: 71). Regarding the use of force tensions between civilian and military culture are difficult to bridge: civilian politicians tend to restrict the military to the minimum use of force whereas the military claim that they cannot do their job if they have no means to gain superiority. In Srebrenica air power would have been the only military tool to make a difference.

The third tension is about political control versus professional autonomy. Because of political implications and the fact that the final responsibility rests with the Minister of Defense there is a tendency towards micromanagement. When the enclave Srebrenica was under attack in 1995 and things really started to look bad the Minister of Defense (at that moment Joris Voorhoeve) was to be found at the Crisis Center of the Operational Staff in the Netherlands, the Dutch center of operational decision making. On the other hand, when analyzing the point of view of the military the tension stems from a lack of autonomy. Autonomy was low. The points related to autonomy, some of which were already discussed, can be summarized as follows:

- Srebrenica lies low and is therefore an easy target;
- Armament was adequate for protection of individual soldiers, not for warding off a brigade size, fully armed, attack;

2 In civil-military and political-military relations it is highly uncommon for a general in active service to express his views in the newspapers, but this general Couzy did so. By doing so, he may have distorted relations with his political supreme commander, the Minister of Defense Ter Beek. Ter Beek called him a ‘lastpak generaal’ ... a trouble general. Proof of a bad working relationship came from the parliamentary inquiry, but also from auto biographies of Couzy and Ter Beek. One can wonder whether Couzy could have exercised more influence if the working relationship was better. The fact remains that other objecting generals were likewise unable to influence the stakeholders in favor of deployment.

- Troop sizes were insufficient (circa a half battalion) to protect some 40.000 Muslim inhabitants and refugees;
- Supplies, munitions, troops were not replenished; in fact the soldiers were more or less hostages of the Serbian troops that controlled roads and possibilities for transportation; this situation led to physical but also psychological dependence on Serbian troops, some analysts have even suggested that this situation could have promoted a form of 'Stockholm-syndrome' (hostages develop sympathetic attitudes towards their hostage-taker);
- Fighting power depended on close air support (the use of which was dependent on political decision making by UN, NATO and more than one national government);
- Because safety was to be provided by air power, there was no exit strategy. The soldiers and the inhabitants/refugees of Srebrenica were trapped and could not get out.

Regarding the fourth tension, the clarity of the assignment, politicians accepted ambiguity just to keep the peace process on going. For this reason politicians regarded the 'safe areas' as a temporary humanitarian concept. It was not regarded a good solution, but viewed as something that was better than ethnic cleansing and violence. Un-clarity regarding the use of force, the mandate and the Rules Of Engagement have already been discussed above. The soldiers were supposed to protect the population without defending the enclave. The use of force depended on air power that was not delivered. Idealism drove the politicians into sending soldiers without clear goals, end states or mandates.

But there was no consensus within the military. General Brinkman stated to have understood from a Canadian commander that Srebrenica is 'a difficult, but not impossible assignment' (Bakker, 2003: 54). His higher ranking colleagues had more doubts regarding the assignment. Joint Chief of Staff Van der Vlis and Army commander Couzy criticized the decision making process by pointing at the lacking long term goals and end states in former Yugoslavia. At the moment of decision making Van der Vlis had no trust in a future peace treaty 'in 1993 I never believed that there would be an arrangement for peace' (Bakker, 2003: 48).

Harsh words from Couzy were directed at the ambiguity of the mandate: 'everybody talked about us coming to the aid of the refugees, but we knew that, if it would come to that in the end, we would have to leave those people, that we did not offer real protection. I think that you cannot bring soldiers into such an unclear, ambiguous situation...' Couzy

added a few examples to illustrate his point '... When there is an accident with civilian vehicles, it was forbidden that UN soldiers would bring the victims to a hospital, because then they would be involved. There would be financial claims. ... You cannot imagine bringing soldiers in situations like these' (Bakker, 2003: 49).

There were more forms of un-clarity besides the one regarding the assignment. Un-clarity regarding the duration of the mission arose because of bad coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minister of Defense Ter Beek proposed the duration of deployment to be 18 months. Protocol requires that this information is sent to the UN by Foreign Affairs. This information never reached the UN, letting the UN to believe that the Dutch committed themselves for an indefinite time (Bakker, 2003: 78).

Bridging the cultural gap regarding decision-making: Ethiopia and Eritrea

In establishing the appropriate level of force to be used there is often a dilemma. Opting for a too high level of force could infringe on the trust local parties have in the intervening forces. A too low level of force may lead to the situation where intervening forces are not able to protect and defend themselves nor the local non-combatant population. The tensions between civilian political culture and military culture – regarding the motivation / rationale for participating in missions, the use of force, the desire for controlling the operations and the clarity of the assignment – form a gap that needs to be bridged in order to prevent ethical dilemmas connected with the choice for too much or too little force. The dilemmas must be solved before they, as was the case in Srebrenica, end in catastrophe. To solve the dilemmas and to bridge the differences between civilian-political culture and military culture decision-making process on sending troops abroad should rest on the principle of a priori approval. The implication of a priori approval is that parliament exercises a strong form of control over its military. This form of control is formalized in the Netherlands constitution article 100 (Wecke, 2000: 272). This article states that the Lower House has to be informed even before an informal offer is made to UN or any other international organization. On many points the decision-making procedure was improved. One of the main points being a risk analysis. An other point relates to guarantees for exit strategies. In the decision-making procedure military experts are consulted. Figure 1 gives the decision-making procedure as interpreted in the Army Doctrine Publication – III (ADP-III, 1999).




Figure 1: Decision making on national level (ADP-III, 1999: 132)

The main instrument for decision making used by the government (and, albeit at a later stage, by the Lower House) is the so-called '*Toetsingskader*'. This is a list of criteria which

was presented by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to the Lower House in 1995 and was improved in 2001. The 'Toetsingskader' is used to provide a better structure for the consultations between the government and parliament and to improve the quality of the decision-making. The 'Toetsingskader' acknowledges that decision-making is an intertwined and convergent process that improves quality by inputs from civilian stakeholders and civilian and military experts. It enables a priori parliamentary control. A list for use by parliamentarians in other countries is given by Born (2003c: 125). This list with criteria for sending troops on humanitarian missions abroad corresponds to the Dutch 'Toetsingskader 2001'³ which comprises the following points:

1. Rationale for participating / intervention: maintenance or advancement of international law and order;
2. Clear mandate in accordance with international law;
3. Participating countries: finding a balance between military efficiency and the desirability to involve as many possible countries into the operation;
4. Influence: The Netherlands as troop supplier must be able to influence the mandate, the enforcement of the mandate and the duration of the commitment;
5. Feasibility of the mission: what is the point of view of the warring parties towards intervention, which courses of action are open, what military capabilities are required, what are the rules of engagement, structure of command, what are possible risks;
6. Appropriateness and availability: Dutch contributions must fit into the composition, character and mission of the multinational coalition / forces;
7. The expected duration of the operation and the criteria to be met for its prolongation in case of need;
8. Budgetary implications: the decision by government comprises an indication of the costs involved.

In 2000 the Netherlands government had the opportunity to put the improved decision making process to the test⁴. The Dutch participated in a classic peace keeping operation in

3 Source: Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense to the members of the lower house (tweede kamer), 19-07-2001.

4 Of course, in 2000 the 1995 criteria for decision making were used. Though there are differences, these criteria correspond in essence to the improved criteria that were put forward in 2001.

Ethiopia-Eritrea meant to preserve a cease-fire between the two warring nations. In a particular border area, where frontiers were contested, a battalion of mainly Royal Marines were to observe this cease fire. Never before was participation in UN peacekeeping discussed so thoroughly (Wecke, 2000). In a leaflet counting twenty-two pages a very detailed justification regarding the arguments for participation was given. This letter from government to parliament stated that government had decided to positively answer the UN-Secretary-Generals request for troops and then went on explaining why. Government had not informed the Lower House in an early stage, for this would have implied that parliament would already give consent at this time and would have complicated the controlling task of parliament.

Risks were a very important topic of discussion. Risk analysis was based on information from the Military Information Services, but also from a scouting mission by military experts. Some parties in parliament especially stressed the point of security and risk. Discussions in parliament led to a compromise. A detachment of four Apache helicopters was stationed in Djibouti, 600 kilometers from the border where the Marines had their compound. This decision was later criticized for if the Marines really would have gotten in trouble, the chances that the Apaches could have come to their rescue would have been very much dependent on flying conditions in mountainous areas.

Other points from the 'Toetsingskader' were clearly considered in the letter to parliament and in the political discussion. A positive thing was that participation was based on a UN security council resolution. The multi-national character of the peace keeping mission guaranteed spread of responsibility, risks and burden sharing. Regarding the clarity of the assignment the letter to parliament states that the operational assignment was 'clear, feasible and attainable'. But the critics of the government pointed at the possible refugee problem. Refugees should be taken care of by refugee organizations and should not be part of the task of the military as a monitoring force. The availability of troops, one of the problems during Unprofor/Srebrenica, was no longer a difficulty. Training, equipment and experience of the Marines suffices for the task. Availability of Chinook helicopters and a troop ship accounted for the exit strategy. Command structures were clear; the UN is the sole organization responsible for the factual implementation and execution of the peace operation. At the same time the Dutch were in full command over their own soldiers, meaning that in the worst case they could decide on action themselves. Rules of engagement should be unambiguous and enable 'robust' action if necessary. Armament comprised mortars, armored Patria vehicles, Stinger rocket launchers, and personal weapons (Diemaco gun). Even though the mission was not an UN-chapter seven operation, the government

stated that they were claiming the right to self-protection. Even the financial aspects of the mission were dealt with in the to letter parliament.

The conclusion is that the criteria for sending soldiers on a peace-keeping mission were dealt with satisfactorily. The largest party in the opposition was against, as was the union for the military. Small religious and socialist opposition parties were against deployment as well. But the societal support and the political support from the other parties was large enough to decide in favor of sending troops. Dutch population clearly supports peace operations as these operations contribute to human rights and international rule of law.

In retrospect it can only be said that the mission went rather well. The contribution that the Netherlands government wanted to make to the peace process was made. Minor detail was that the armed forces were criticized for not working together smoothly. Especially the logistical side of the operation proved to be expensive due to not using the resources of Air Force, Army and Navy in joint manner. Apart from this detail: the decision-making process had improved.

Putting the decision-making procedure to the test: Iraq

Was the decision-making procedure really tested in deciding on peacekeeping in Ethiopia and Eritrea? The mission concerned a classical first generation peace keeping operation and one can argue that the criteria of the 'Toetsingskader' were easily met because of the nature of these kinds of operations. There was a treaty, there was consent from both warring parties, armaments did not serve a peace enforcing operation but a monitoring situation, impartiality was easily accomplished. During the time of the mission there was no 'mission creep', meaning that the situation did not evolve from peace keeping to peace enforcing.

The 'Toetsingskader' was put to a much more heavier test in the case of Iraq in 2003. In Iraq there is a post-conflict situation which requires peace enforcing combined with civil-military nation-building. Consent is ambiguous. Impartiality is difficult; participating in peace enforcing operations in Iraq could easily be interpreted as taking sides with the United States, the United Kingdom and with the amorphous anti Saddam Hussein groups in Iraq. This situation is risky as is demonstrated by the very regular attacks on American and European troops. Even Non Governmental Organizations like the Red Cross and civilian UN employees are not safe from assaults and violence.

On six June 2003 government decided to send troops to participate in the Stabilization Force Iraq (SFIR). Now some 1.100 personnel are stationed in southern Iraq in the UK sector. The decision making process and the letter from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed the criteria put down in the 'Toetsingskader' almost to the letter, giving information regarding all the criteria. Even though this letter was carefully produced it provoked 159 questions from parliament that had to be answered⁵. The amount of questions probably reflects public opinion. Public opinion on the war in Iraq is divided; to the question whether the Netherlands' military should participate even when it could cost lives of Dutch soldiers the Dutch answered around 70% positive regarding Kosovo, the war against terrorism, or Afghanistan, but regarding the mission in Iraq support dropped to 43%. 46% of the Dutch public opinion is against participation if it could cost lives of soldiers⁶. The peace movement was very critical towards the decision to deploy troops in Iraq⁷.

5 <http://www.planet.nl/planet/show/id=85106/contentid=427347/sc=885cb4> (Dutch government agrees with sending troops to Iraq; accessed 4-1-2004).

6 <http://www.smk.nl/opinh.html> (see slide 4, accessed 4-1-2004).

7 <http://vredessite.nl/nieuweoorlog/2003/platform1206.html> (anti war in Iraq site by a Dutch peace movement; questions on the decision to send troops by this peace movement; accessed 4-1-2004).

Table 2: Criteria in the ‘Toetsingskader’ justifying participation in SFIR and some of the questions they provoke

Criteria	Arguments by government in favor of participation in SFIR	Some critical questions ⁸
1. Rationale for participating/ /intervention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safety, maintaining territorial integrity and stability are preconditions for humanitarian assistance and rebuilding Iraq. • Until a representative and legitimate government is installed, there is a need for a multinational stabilization force. • The UN resolution 1483 stipulates that participating countries are not occupying forces. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is not safety and stability threatened by the presence of occupying powers? Incidents prove that the war is not over yet. • Does the Dutch government know when an Iraqi government is installed? • From the perspective of the population all foreign troops are part of the American and British contingents and thus they are an occupying force.
2. Clear mandate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The juridical foundation for deployment is given by UN resolution 1482. Section 5 of this resolution calls upon participating nations to comply with the Geneva Convention. There is a difference between ‘occupying countries’ (US, UK) and ‘non-occupying’ countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the practical consequences the difference between ‘occupants’ and ‘non-occupants’?
3. Participating countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The most part of SFIR will consist of US and UK troops. Other participants are Denmark, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Czech republic, Rumania, Ukraine, Norway, Hungary. Other countries might be interested in joining. 	
4. Influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It is important that the suppliers of troops are involved in general political military policy making. In the British sector a ‘Committee of Contributors’ enables consultation between representatives of governments. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the content of this political military policy making?

⁸ Questions were derived from a critical analysis by the peace movement, see note 7.

Criteria	Arguments by government in favor of participation in SFIR	Some critical questions ⁸
5. Feasibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ethnic and religious differences could give rise to difficulties. Shiite population is active in installing government officials. Local leader come from tribes as well as from religious groupings. • Weather and terrain ask for additional medication etc to prevent health risks. • The military assignment is directed at restoring and maintaining safety and stability, enabling activities of humanitarian organizations, enabling infrastructure (water, electricity and so on), dismantling locations related to weapons of mass destruction, removing the remnants of the old Hussein regime, restoring public order, secure police stations, financial and cultural buildings / institutions. • Although the Rules of Engagement are not definite yet (and the Netherlands are supposed to use the same ROE as those of the lead nation, the UK, the government strives them to be robust, implicating possibilities for force protection. • Operations are under command of US CENTCOM. The UK is leading in the south of Iraq. The Netherlands are in 'full command' over Dutch soldiers. If necessary MoD will give directions. • Concerning risks: safety situation in the south of Iraq is characterized as stable ... but the situation could suddenly worsen. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which Shiite organization is involved? Which groups, which leaders? • According to UNEP, there is 1100 tons of depleted uranium used in munitions. Has the US informed the Dutch where concentrations of depleted uranium can be found? • Are UN inspections involved in dismantling locations related to weapons of mass destruction? • Are the Rules of Engagement the same as those of the Americans? • Are other departments involved in the 'full command' of the Netherlands over its own military? (interdepartmental collaboration was cause of earlier problems during Unprofor.) • Under which conditions could safety conditions worsen in the south of Iraq? • In Samarra, Hit, Falluja, Tikrit and Bagdat the situation is not quiet. More Americans have died after the official end of the war then during the war. Civilian UN-employees, NGO's, and military from Italy, Spain and other countries have suffered losses. In Basra (the UK sector) governance is temporarily taken over by the British.

Criteria	Arguments by government in favor of participation in SFIR	Some critical questions ^s
6. Appropriateness and availability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Netherlands government has units that are available and appropriate to the task of participation in SFIR. It concerns a total of 1100 soldiers. 	
7. The expected duration, premature ending and exit strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NL participation is for a period of six months. Prolongation for another six months requires a separate decision by the ministerial board of the government and renewed consultation with parliament. • Premature ending of the mission is possible when the political process is disturbed and the formation of an Iraqi government is made impossible. • 'Extraction' (meaning exit strategy) is the responsibility of the UK. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the criteria? When is the political process disturbed and the formation of a Iraqi government impossible?
8. Budgetary implications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estimation of additional costs can only be provisional. The estimation is circa 65 million euros. These additional costs will be paid from the HGIS-budget. 	

Government answered all of the 159 questions, and some six months later (six december 2003) when parliament was consulted to decide on the question of prolonging the mission for another six months government answered 185 questions. Risk management was again one of the most important topics. At the end of 2003, begin 2004, Iraq is not very stable and incidents, shooting, etceteras, appear on regular basis. Some 70 Special Forces (green berets) were added to the battalion to provide extra security.

But contributing to the rule of law is not easy. Training Iraqi police officers led to hilarious footage on Dutch television. Dutch policemen were training Iraqi future policemen and instructing them at some local post. When the Dutch instructors left the site, the Iraqi – in front of Dutch television, left their post immediately, forgetting all they had learned that day.

The critical questions pointed at possible difficulties. Some of these difficulties proved reality. On 27 December 2003 a Dutch sergeant-major supposedly shot an Iraqi man who was looting a container that had fallen from a convoy. Maybe the Dutch soldiers felt threatened by the group of 70 looters. Warning shots did not suffice to scare the looters away. The Dutch soldier was arrested and returned to the Netherlands to face criminal investigation (if the facts turn out to be true, he could be accused of murder or manslaughter). The investigation will take its time (in the mean while the soldier was released and is awaiting the investigation), but the societal and political discussion regarding this matter is already one of the major topics in the newspapers' front-pages. Members of parliament have asked the government whether the rules of engagement are sufficiently clear. The department of justice was criticized for proceeding as quickly as they did. The Prime Minister visited the troops in Iraq to ease them and to assure them that their job is valued very highly. Meanwhile these troops are demoralized: when they shoot in the line of duty they have imprisonment by their own juridical system to fear.

The shooting incident proves again that South Iraq is not stable yet, and it also proves that it is a good thing that parliamentarians are able to question the rules of engagement. Parliamentary control contributes to the improvement of these tools of peacekeeping / / peace enforcement.

Conclusion: risk of teleological reasoning

The question posed in this chapter was whether the lessons learned from Srebrenica have led to culture change in civil-military relations. Just like an earthquake Srebrenica made Dutch society shake and tremble. People felt responsible for the death of so many innocent victims. The survivors are still grieving over their relatives. Many of the soldiers involved are traumatized and still suffer from the lack of societal recognition. In April 2002 shortly after publication of the NIOD-report, government fell because of Srebrenica.

In this chapter the decision making process was studied. It was the decision making process at the time of Unprofor that showed prove of a clash between military and civilian cultures. Politicians were indeed driven by good intentions, whilst a large proportion of the military was more cautious. Government wished to limit the use of force, whereas the military preferred armament that would enable them to do 'robust' peacekeeping. Politicians wanted much control over operations. The military wanted autonomy. But conditions for

professional autonomy in Srebrenica were poor. Unclear mandates, assignments and rules of engagement might at some point be useful to continue the political dialogue, but they were devastating to the mission of the battalion in Srebrenica. The result of the ambiguity was, as one of the military put it, that their hands were tied. Disaster was the consequence.

The criteria used for deciding whether or not to deploy military in operations other than war, the 'Toetsingskader', did serve as a bridge between the civilian-political culture and the military culture. Politicians were, as a result of the lessons learned from Srebrenica and the tool for political control, able to take the point of view of the military. Parliamentarians questioned the government specifically on the points of feasibility, clarity of the mission, participating nations, and so on. Decision-making was acknowledged to be convergent for the expert opinions of the military were asked in the decision making process itself. If decision making would have remained divergent, meaning that the government decides and the military only carry out the assignment, than the gap between the two cultures could never have been bridged.

The 'Toetsingskader' is used for every deployment. In the case of the deployment in Ethiopia-Eritrea the decision making procedure contributed to an open political debate and improved parliamentary control. By and large this mission was successful. Parliamentary control is also strong in the case of Iraq. Here the 'Toetsingskader' is put to a much more severe test. The mission is much more difficult, it being a peace enforcing operation in unstable and risky surroundings. Participation is criticized more than in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Now that the mission is going on for more than half a year, it is clear that some of the criticisms have proven their point. Iraq is riskier than the government described it in its first letter to parliament. Progress concerning nation building is slow. Due to differences between the rules of engagement of the occupying countries and the non-occupying countries, these rules are not so clear as everybody thought they were.

Iraq demonstrates that by use of a set of criteria like the 'Toetsingskader' a risk of teleological reasoning is introduced. Teleological reasoning is explaining things by reference to some purpose or end, also described as final causality, in contrast with explanation by efficient causes only. Human conduct, insofar as it is rational, is generally explained with reference to ends pursued⁹. If the government feels positively inclined to send its military on a specific mission, there are always justifications that substantiate these inclinations.

9 www.britannica.com

Rationalizing is one of the methods used in teleological thinking. Contributing to world peace is always a good reason to participate in peace keeping and peace enforcing. Juridical foundations by UN resolution are solid reasons for participating. Another method is ignoring the facts that are bothersome to the intentions of government. It is easy to ignore the fact that the population of Iraq is torn and divided. It is easy to ignore the fact that this population might even be hostile towards foreign intervention because intervention is done for the good of the Iraqi people. Classic in risk analysis is the thought that dangers will befall on someone else. People have trouble imagining their own soldiers might be killed as well. It might happen to the Americans, or to the Italians, but not to our own soldiers.

Teleological reasoning, reasoning towards an end or goal, is a serious risk and the criteria in the 'Toetsingskader' cannot guard us against this kind of reasoning. The criteria have bridged the gap between two cultures. They have improved parliamentary control to the benefit of all concerned, but they are not perfect. If governments really are fixed on participating in a specific mission, they will always find some justification to do so. Are new disasters lying around the corner?

References

ADP-III (1999) *Army Doctrine Publication - III - Peace Operations*, Den Haag: Koninklijke Landmacht.

Bakker, B. et al. (2003) *Missie Zonder Vrede [Mission Without Peace]* Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 28 506, nrs. 2-3. Chapter two 23-91.

Born, H. (2003a) 'Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Relevance, Issues, and Research Agenda. In Caforio, G. (ed.) *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, New York: Kluwer/Plenum, 151-166.

Born, H. and M. Metselaar (2003b), 'Politiek-militaire betrekkingen.' [Political-military relations] In: Moelker, R. and J. Soeters (eds.) *Krijgsmacht en Samenleving. [Armed Forces and Society]* Boom: Amsterdam.76-116.

Born, H. (2003c) *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. Principles, Mechanisms and Practices*, Lausanne: Inter-Parliamentary Union / Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Hüttig, E, R. Peek, W. Wester, (1998) 'Srebrenica: een pijnlijke politieke vergissing' [Srebrenica: a painful political decision]. In Thijn, E. van et al. (eds.) *De sorry-democratie: recente politieke affaires en de ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid*. [The Excuse Democracy: Recent Political Affairs and the Ministerial Responsibility] Amsterdam: Van Gennep.

<http://vredeessite.nl/nieuweoorlog/2003/platform1206.html> (anti war in Iraq site by a Dutch peace movement; questions on the decision to send troops by this peacemovent; accessed 4-1-2004)

<http://www.planet.nl/planet/show/id=85106/contentid=431831/sc=32212e> (Dutch soldiers killed one Iraqi that was looting a container; accessed 4-1-2004)

<http://www.planet.nl/planet/show/id=85106/contentid=427347/sc=885cb4> (Dutch government agrees with sending troops to Iraq; accessed 4-1-2004)

http://www.defensie.nl:30280/Images/11201_tcm6-36789.pdf (Dutch government answers parliament on the matter of prolongation SFIR; accessed 4-1-2004)

<http://www.smk.nl/opinh.html> (accessed 4-1-2004)

Moelker, R. (2003a) 'The Last Knights' in Kirkels, H., W. Klinkert & R. Moelker (eds.) *ARMS 2003 Officer Education. The Road to Athens*. Breda: Royal Netherlands Military Academy, 82-100.

Moelker, R. (2003b) 'Elias, Maritime Supremacy and the Naval Profession: On Elias' unpublished Studies in the Genesis of the Naval Profession', *British Journal of Sociology*, 54 (3) 373-390.

Moelker, R. and J. Soeters (2003c) Sympathy, Stereotypes and the Contact Hypothesis. In: Hagen, vom U., P. Klein, R. Moelker & J. Soeters (eds.) *True Love. A Study in Multinationality within the 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps*. Breda & Strausberg: SOWI/Forum 25.

NIOD (2002) *Srebrenica een 'veilig' gebied. Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyses van de val van een Safe Area*. [Srebrenica, a 'Safe' Area. Reconstruction, Backgrounds, Consequences and Analysis of the Downfall of a Safe Area] Amsterdam: Boom.

Rentes Florêncio, A. (2000) *Na de ramp. De aardbeving van Lissabon (1755) en de verandering van sociale vormen*. [After the Disaster. The Earthquake of Lisbon (1755) and the Change of Social Forms] Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis.

Rijdsdijk, E. (2003) 'Srebrenica, genocide en de reterritorialisering van internationale verantwoordelijkheid' [Srebrenica, Genocide and Reterritorialisation of International Responsibility] *Vrede en Veiligheid* 32, 3, 303-320.

Sarkesian, S. (1981) *Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1981.

Soeters, J. and R. Moelker (2003) 'German-Dutch Co-operation in the Heat of Kabul'. In H. Kümmel and S. Collmer (eds.) *Soldat – Militär – Politik – Gesellschaft*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 63-76.

Wecke, L. (2000) 'Voor de Bakker? Besluitvorming inzake Vredesoperaties Getoetst' [Bakker, Decisionmaking Regarding Peace Support Operations Examined], in B. Bomert, T. van den Hoogen en R. Wessel (eds.) *Jaarboek Vrede en Veiligheid 2000*, Studiecentrum voor Vredesvraagstukken, 268-289.