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EUROPEAN DEFENCE

DAMIEN HELLY EUROPE: CULTURES OF DEFENCE AND THE DEFENCE OF CULTURES SIMON DUKE EUROPEAN DEFENCE ARCHITECTURE: INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS DICK ZANDEE CLUSTERS: THE DRIVERS OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE ISABEL FERREIRA NUNES EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION DANIEL FIOTT EUROPEAN DEFENCE MARKETS AND INDUSTRIES: NEW INITIATIVES, NEW CHALLENGES SVEN BISCOP EU-NATO RELATIONS: A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE PATRICIA DAEHNHARDT EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND GERMAN DEFENCE COOPERATION

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NAÇÃO E DEFESA
Revista Quadrimestral

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Propriedade e Edição
Instituto da Defesa Nacional
Calçada das Necessidades, 5, 1399-017 Lisboa
Tel.: 21 392 46 00 Fax.: 21 392 46 58 E-mail: idn.publicacoes@defesa.pt www.idn.gov.pt

Composição, Impressão e Distribuição
EUROPRESS – Indústria Gráfica
Rua João Saraiva, 10-A – 1700-249 Lisboa – Portugal
Tel.: 218 494 141/43 Fax.: 218 492 061 E-mail: geral@europress.pt www.europress.pt

ISSN 0870-757X Publicação Electrónica ISSN 2183-9662
Depósito Legal 54 801/92
Tiragem 750 exemplares
Anotado na ERC Registada na Latindex – Sistema Regional de Informação em Linha para Revistas Científicas da América Latina, Caraíbas, Espanha; MIAR, RedAlyC e JSTOR.
Disponível no RCAAP – Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal

O conteúdo dos artigos é da inteira responsabilidade dos autores

Editorial 5

European Defence

Europe: Cultures of Defence and the Defence of Cultures 10
Damien Helly

European Defence Architecture: Institutional Developments 23
Simon Duke

Clusters: the Drivers of European Defence 33
Dick Zandee

European Defence Cooperation 48
Isabel Ferreira Nunes

European Defence Markets and Industries:
New Initiatives, New Challenges 76
Daniel Fiott

EU-NATO Relations: A Long-Term Perspective 85
Sven Biscop

European Defence and German Defence Cooperation 94
Patricia Daehnhardt

Extra Dossiê

Romper o Cerco: a Rússia de Putin e a Nova Guerra Fria 116
Vasco Rato

A UNASUL e a Segurança das suas Fronteiras: uma Reflexão Necessária 149
Romulo Dantas

The Partition Notebooks: a Review Essay 167
Jitendra Nath Misra

Desde abril de 1976 que o Instituto da Defesa Nacional (IDN) publica, periodicamente, a revista Nação e Defesa. Com regularidade trimestral ou quadrimestral, ao longo das últimas quatro décadas esta publicação tem procurado debater os temas que, a cada momento, marcam não só a atualidade internacional, como a agenda de segurança e defesa, ao nível interno e externo. Poucas são as publicações que têm conseguido sobreviver às transformações e dinâmicas editoriais, mantendo a regularidade e rigor impostos pelos critérios de publicação científica. A revista Nação e Defesa perdura e mantem-se como uma publicação de referência no panorama nacional, na promoção do debate, divulgação e sensibilização para as questões geopolíticas, de segurança e defesa e da estratégia nacional.

Este feito só tem sido possível graças à participação dedicada e generosa dos colaboradores do Instituto da Defesa Nacional, reputados especialistas nacionais e internacionais, que assim partilham o seu conhecimento e múltiplas experiências e que constituem uma indispensável mais-valia para a consecução dos objetivos do IDN.

A revista Nação e Defesa cumpre, em novembro de 2018, a publicação do número 150. Ao longo deste percurso, foram múltiplos os contributos que proporcionou à sociedade portuguesa, contando com o envolvimento dos mais dinâmicos sectores da comunidade do pensamento, de diferentes quadrantes ideológicos e representativos de várias correntes do Portugal contemporâneo. No quadro da missão atribuída ao Instituto da Defesa Nacional, a Nação e Defesa tem dado, indiscutivelmente, um contributo para a promoção de uma cultura estratégica de segurança e defesa em Portugal.

À semelhança dos números anteriores, a Nação e Defesa dedica a presente edição a um tema central do debate internacional: a Defesa Europeia. A atual conjuntura política externa tem sido caracterizada pela identificação de um conjunto de crises, internas e na periferia próxima da comunidade transatlântica. Desde o complexo processo negocial entre a União Europeia (UE) e o Reino Unido, comummente designado *Brexit*, à posição da atual administração norte-americana em relação à UE e NATO, passando pelos vários conflitos que rodeiam o espaço europeu – da Ucrânia à Síria, da Líbia ao Iémen –, a conjuntura regional e internacional apresenta uma multiplicidade de desafios e riscos. Em 2013, ainda a braços com a resposta à crise económica e financeira, a UE relançou o debate sobre as prioridades e opções a adotar em matéria de defesa. Como resultado, surgiram várias iniciativas de reforço da cooperação, fundadas nos princípios orientadores definidos pela Estratégia Global da União Europeia para a Política Externa e de Segurança, entre as quais se destaca a criação do Fundo Europeu para a Defesa e do mecanismo de Cooperação Estruturada Permanente (PESCO). Em 2018, em consonância com a linha de orientação acordada, o Conselho Europeu aprovou o lançamento dos primeiros projetos conjuntos, consensualizados entre os Estados Membros participantes na PESCO.

Estas iniciativas contribuem para consolidar a cooperação no domínio da defesa, no quadro da UE, de duas formas. Por um lado, porque estas iniciativas assentam na definição de objetivos estratégicos e de um roteiro de implementação comum, para a UE e Estados Membros participantes, conducentes a uma melhor articulação entre a segurança interna e internacional e potenciando uma maior integração da defesa europeia. Por outro lado, a criação do Fundo Europeu para a Defesa, visando o apoio à investigação e desenvolvimento das capacidades europeias, representa uma evolução no plano dos compromissos e do investimento. No plano dos compromissos por incentivar os Estados Membros a adotar acordos no domínio da defesa, que são política e juridicamente vinculativos. No plano dos investimentos por promover, com base na harmonização de objetivos estratégicos, as áreas da investigação e desenvolvimento em matéria de defesa, vitais para o fomento do tecido empresarial e industrial europeu.
Tendo por base estes desenvolvimentos, o presente número da revista Nação e Defesa reúne, no seu *dossier* temático dedicado à Defesa Europeia, contributos de sete autores nacionais e internacionais. Damien Helly analisa as dimensões culturais das políticas de segurança europeias, com o propósito de averiguar se a Europa se move no sentido de uma cultura de defesa europeia e qual o papel do fator cultural na sua consolidação. Simon Duke examina o processo de institucionalização da defesa europeia e a forma como as novas iniciativas de cooperação neste domínio vieram ativar disposições consagradas no Tratado de Lisboa, que visam promover e gerar o incentivo financeiro conducente a uma maior afirmação da PESC e da PCSD. Dick Zandee interpreta o desenvolvimento de modalidades de cooperação na área da defesa no plano operacional, da manutenção, da logística e da aquisição de equipamentos de sob a forma de *clusters*, concluindo que estes refletem a intenção de se desenvolver uma melhor e maior partilha cooperativa no quadro das responsabilidades da defesa transatlântica e europeia. Isabel Ferreira Nunes analisa as atuais iniciativas e requisitos da cooperação no quadro da defesa europeia e reflete sobre as suas consequências sobre as prioridades estratégicas da União, bem como sobre os incentivos financeiros e processuais que poderão vir a ter um efeito agregador sobre a defesa europeia. Daniel Fiott debate os esforços recentemente desenvolvidos de apoio à Base Industrial e Tecnológica da Defesa Europeia e reflete sobre os desafios que a UE e o mercado de defesa europeu enfrentam. Sven Biscop considera que uma divisão eficaz do trabalho estratégico pode ser equacionada em torno de três funções centrais nos domínios da segurança e defesa – o da estratégia, das operações e das capacidades – deixando antever a possibilidade de desenvolvimento de uma modalidade cooperativa futura, que alie a UE aos EUA. Finalmente, Patrícia Daehnhardt avalia a posição da Alemanha face aos desenvolvimentos da defesa europeia e os impedimentos a um maior empenhamento de Berlim, debate os progressos alcançados pela UE, Alemanha e França no âmbito do aprofunda-

mento da integração da defesa europeia e a forma como a falta de uma cultura de defesa pode afetar a cooperação naquele domínio.
Na secção extradossier, Vasco Rato analisa o surgimento de Vladimir Putin como opositor do Ocidente, procurando demonstrar que a competição geopolítica com a Rússia constitui um elemento estrutural da política internacional contemporânea. Romulo Dantas foca o seu contributo na compreensão da UNASUL, criada por doze países sul-americanos, analisando recentes esforços de integração regional, através de temas de cooperação socioeconómica, de segurança e defesa multilaterais. Jitendra Nath Misra oferece-nos uma recensão literária de três obras, com estilos literários distintos entre si, que se debruçam sobre o processo de Partição entre a Índia e o Paquistão. Partindo do início do século XX até praticamente aos nossos dias, os autores dos três livros navegam pelos processos político-sociais complexos da Partição e suas multifacetadas consequências, não elogiando nem demonizando os vários protagonistas, procurando antes, identificar possíveis pontes para um desejável diálogo.
O número 150 da revista Nação e Defesa consubstancia, assim, mais um contributo para promoção da reflexão sobre temas estruturantes para a compreensão de questões de segurança e defesa internacional. Ao colocar à disposição dos leitores uma pluralidade de perspetivas, que visam promover um debate qualificado e informado, a revista Nação e Defesa corporiza a matriz fundadora do IDN: servir como uma plataforma de encontro com a sociedade portuguesa para a promoção de uma 'cultura estratégica' e uma 'consciência nacional' de segurança e defesa.

Vítor Rodrigues Viana

European Defence

Europe: Cultures of Defence and the Defence of Cultures

Damien Helly

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Abstract

This article explores the cultural dimensions of European security policies. It looks at three main questions. The first relates to the impact of various European cultures on the emergence or not of a European culture of defence. The second, explores how cultural change in the European defence sector can impact EU's external action as a whole. Third, the article outlines actions and policy measures that would contribute both to the faster development of European cultures of defence while contributing to the defence of cultures worldwide. Investments will be required in at least two areas for defence sectors: life-long practice-oriented interdisciplinary intercultural learning for security and defence staff, and enhanced creative and artistic partnerships with cultural professionals, in Europe and beyond. Strategic creativity has become as important as creative strategies.

Resumo

Europa: Culturas de Defesa e a Defesa de Culturas

O artigo explora as dimensões culturais das políticas de segurança europeias à luz de três questões. A primeira relaciona-se com o impacto de várias culturas europeias sobre a possibilidade ou não de emergência de uma cultura de defesa europeia. A segunda explora como é que alterações culturais no setor da defesa europeia podem ter impacto sobre a ação externa da União Europeia como um todo. A terceira sugere ações e medidas políticas, que possam contribuir para um desenvolvimento mais célere de culturas de defesa europeias, ao mesmo tempo que contribuem para uma cultura de defesa mundial. Dois requisitos serão necessários: uma prática de aprendizagem interdisciplinar e intercultural para profissionais que trabalhem nos setores da segurança e defesa e o incentivo parcerias com parceiros no domínio da cultura, na Europa e para além desta.

2018
N.º 150
pp. 10-22

Introduction

Recent progress in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) seems to show the EU defence agenda is growing (at least rhetorically[1]), in tune with EU opinion polls that have regularly confirmed the appetite of EU citizens for a more 'Europeanised' approach to security and defence (European Commission, 2017a)[2]. The 2017 Reflection Paper on the future of European Defence speaks of convergence and alignment of strategic cultures through training, joint exercises and joint military interventions (European Commission, 2017b). This vision has been emphasized by French President Macron and intensely commented by security and defence experts[3].

However, in contrast with the optimistic PESCO narrative (partly designed to counterbalance the negative impact of the 'Brexit' referendum) and perhaps paradoxically, European strategic convergence and internal cohesion is in halt: European leaders' inability to deal with migration shocks reveals a crisis in EU governance. Controversial and slow responses to the financial and bank crisis have affected cohesion amongst Europeans (Janning, 2017). An EU existential crisis narrative has emerged, fed by 'eurosceptic', 'EUsceptic' and other so-called 'populist' political forces[4].

This article departs from the assumption that, beyond efforts deployed within officers education mobility initiatives (such as EMilYO inspired by ERASMUS), this perceived EU existential crisis also has cultural (other would say normative) origins and looks at its roots and implications in the security and defence sector.

Defence cooperation in Europe develops in a variety of formats inside or outside EU institutional frameworks. Internal disagreements (often linked to cultural differences not least between Germany, France and the UK) towards European futures have often slowed down defence integration.

This article explores the cultural dimensions of European security policies and seeks to answer the following question: is there a conducive environment in 2018 for the emergence of a European culture of defence, and what would be the role of culture in it?

Let's first clarify the terms used here. In the case of European policies (and in this article), culture means two things: human worldviews and habits as well as various

1 See Maulny (2017).

2 Key findings include: for almost eight in ten respondents, the term security brings to mind something positive (78%); nearly one in five considers security as negative (19%). Almost two thirds (65%) are in favour of a common foreign policy of the 28 Member States. Three quarters of respondents are in favour of a common defence and security policy among EU Member States (75%). More than half of all respondents (55%) are in favour of the creation of an EU army.

3 See Whitney (2018).

4 See Brack and Costa (eds.) (2012); Brack and Startin (2015) and Bertoncini and Koenig (2014).

artistic expressions[5]. Culture – a complementary competence of the EU[6] – is back on the EU agenda: the 2017 Goteborg declaration aims at strengthening European identity through culture and education (European Commission, 2017c). The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy refers to culture seventeen times[7] and the 2017 Council conclusions on international cultural relations encourage the cultural dimensions of external action (Council of the European Union, 2017). Initiative 4 of the European Year for Cultural also included the transformation of military heritage (European Commission, 2018).

By 'European culture of Defence', we refer here to the idea of shared sets of norms, beliefs and practices about foreign, military and security policies in Europe. In that sense, a European culture of Defence is broader than a 'European Defence culture': it involves and interacts with groups and communities that are not part of the professional security system. It is close to the notion of 'security culture' or 'strategic culture' but does not entirely overlap with them because it has a stronger societal dimension[8]. It is much broader than the notion of a European Industrial defence identity.

Defence is cultural in many ways: by interpreting, anticipating and addressing security threats, it is the expression of a group's worldview and values. The Defence sector interacts with other EU culture-related policies. In that sense, Defense has cultural dimensions. When Defence is combined with development cooperation to train, equip, build military capacities or assist in Security Sector Reform, what is often at stake is a cultural (or mentality) change.

Military diplomacy combined with external and strategic communications (audiovisual in particular) inherently carry culturally-loaded messages both in their style and content (European External Action Service, 2013; Piras, 2018). They shape and are shaped by perceptions. In other words, when Defence policies interact with a range of other policies (research and education, environment, cultural heritage, and of course cultural policies and other forms of artistic expressions), their cultural dimensions are significant and should be considered seriously.

Defence is also a cultural expression in itself, expressing what a society is experiencing, even if it is not part of the cultural sector: military architectural heritage, uniforms' and weapons styles, combat aircrafts design, military flags and logos,

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5 The EU is "committed to promoting a tolerant, pluralistic approach to international cultural relations" (European Commission, 2016).

6 "The Union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. Action by the Union shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action (...)". Article 167, Treaty of the European Union.

7 This includes the words 'culture' and 'cultural' (European Union, 2016).

8 See Howorth (2002) and Nunes (2010) among others, on debates about those concepts.

informal and official music but also films, series for or about soldiers, warriors, security or super heroes relate to important forms of creation and aesthetics in our societies.

Since World War II, defence cooperation in Europe has developed within a variety of formats, yet territorial defence has been largely dominated by NATO. Individual national defence cooperation of Member States with bilateral partners has been shaped by historical, political and economic ties as well as normative features. In parallel, the EU policy layer of European Defence has emerged in the 1990s and focused on external security interventions. It is steadily getting thicker, although still very much framed by NATO and transatlantic relations.

Foreign and security policies in Europe are very much marked by the encounter of various military and security cultures, influenced by national patterns and traditions. NATO prevalence means that US military culture dominates European defence systems. In wider cultural and societal terms, Europe and the US have also influenced each other to great extent[9]. This led Robert Cooper, the pen holder of the 2003 European security strategy to state that Europe is "a subset of the American order"[10].

The emergence of ESDP/CSDP in the 1990s had already raised the question of an EU military, defence and security culture that would be distinct from a NATO and US-dominated one. Under the leadership of Donald Trump, European and US leaderships are experiencing the widening of their differences. Acute divergences appear in several external policy areas such as trade and defence. Contradictions reveal themselves in cultural attitudes and behaviours, use of social media and positioning on Western ethical references such as truth, science, cultural diversity, humanism and justice. How will this new context of US-EU relationship affect European cultures of defence?

This article looks at three main questions. The first one relates to the impact of various European cultures on the emergence or not of a European culture of Defence. Second, it explores how cultural change in the European defence sector can impact EU's external action as a whole. Thirdly, it sketches out actions and policy measures that would contribute both to the faster development of European cultures of defence while contributing to the defence of cultures worldwide.

European Cultures of Defence: Engaging Societies

For security and defence experts, acknowledging (and categorising) political, societal and cultural differences amongst national defence systems in Europe usually

9 See Pells (1997).

10 Speech at the 2014 EUISS Annual Conference, personal note of the author. See also Wallace (2016).

comes at the end of the analysis. It is the wall against which defence integration bumps, and pauses. This is where the journey of this article actually starts: by exploring interactions between societies and Defence, beyond officers' education schemes. The literature on security and defence policy in Europe has taught us three main messages in that regard.

First, a lot of research has addressed at length the question of a European strategic culture, echoing initial attempts to foster a European security and defence culture[11]. Some descriptive analytical work has been done on the differences between national strategic and security cultures and on national visions of European defence. Edited volumes or seminars are often structured along supposed national belonging and expertise: the British scholar writes about the UK, Germans about Germany and so forth[12]. Cultural differences usually serve as independent variables explaining why there is no or limited defence convergence.

Sociological studies have also shown that various groups in a given country hold various cultures of defence. Various schools of thought and specialised networks and communities dealing with security and defence co-exist across the national boundaries of defense systems in Europe: this transnational feature of a European culture of defence (expressed among others by Irondelle's formula 'Europeanisation without the EU') is probably to be explored more deeply in the future.

Second, some attention has been paid to the process of Europeanisation within national security systems (Jacoby and Jones, 2008; Paile-Calvo, 2016). There is however still limited forward looking studies on the required change within national cultural systems vis-à-vis security and defence issues. Those questions lie at the intersection of security policy studies, cultural/anthropological studies and sociological studies on values, beliefs, socialisation and cultural expressions.

The state of the art of research on 'europeanisation' in security and defence sectors has mapped the various channels through which change happens (socialisation, download/upload, through EU regulations or not, etc.)[13].

Thirdly, recent work by Malena Britz (2016) on strategic culture explored the conditions under which strategic culture can change or evolve, for instance studying the justifications of the participation in international military operations (the case of Germany in particular is interesting). Other factors are related to internal societal dynamics (for instance the presence of Kurdish populations in Germany and its impact on Germany's interventions against Daesh and in support of Kurdish

11 See WEU Assembly document A/1816, Recommendation n°724, "Developing a security and defence culture in the ESDP", 3 June 2003; rapporteur: Mrs Katseli. Quoted by Paile-Calvo (2016).

12 See for example Santopinto and Price (eds.) (2013) and Fiott (ed.) (2015).

13 See Hoeffler and Faure (2015).

fighters). A third factor to look at, but too often neglected, is the relationship between strategic culture and political culture.

These recent findings seem particularly relevant to our discussions on a European culture of defence, as they look at a wider spectrum of stakeholders and constituencies (including for instance various cultural or – previously – migrant communities as well as public opinion writ large). They also match the need to analyse cultures of defence through the interactions between European internal societal dynamics and external security and defence actions.

In this context, investing more in the cultural connections and interactions of defence systems with European societies becomes a necessity. It is the only way to grasp, anticipate and influence the evolution of various (including transnational) European cultures of Defence. Gathering such knowledge would contribute to identify the conditions under which a certain collective vision of security and defence could or should prevail in Europe and in external action. It will help us understand how mental barriers and cultural lines can move, converge, collide or clash, and how mental shifts and cultural changes may happen in the design and implementation of EU external action.

Three examples of connections between societies and defence systems can be mentioned here and could inspire future research agendas, to feed in EU external action strategic planning.

The first connection is the most well-known example: it is related to the education of officers and soldiers. The second one concerns cultural heritage policies, including the policies of memory, historical narratives as well as tangible (architectural military sites) and intangible heritage (common myths, trauma and misunderstandings)[14]. The third one has to do with the linkages between cultural and artistic expressions (including audiovisual, digital productions and even video games) and their interaction with security and defence systems.

Defence and Culture in EU External Action: Priority to Trust-building

Developing the Defence-culture nexus nationally and in Europe will bring more coherence between domestic politics and European external action.

Domestically, it would help reconcile people's perceptions of national and European security priorities. This would provide some answers to the ongoing political volatility. On the foreign affairs side, more open, more resilient and more credible security apparatuses in the eyes of their own societies, will be better equipped to assert a well-understood European approach to collective defence and human security. The Defence-culture nexus brings answers to three main transformations in EU's external action.

14 See Bouchard (2016).

Change number one is about European societies' management of their own cultural diversification. Europe's attractiveness still seems quite powerful (despite intercultural tensions and lack of cohesion). To put it differently, European societies are facing new intercultural realities. It is the result of various dynamics: EU enlargement; freedom of circulation within the enlarged EU; globalisation of migration flows, consequences of conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa; postcolonial realities, reopening of previously closed migration routes towards Europe. In that case, external factors impact Europeans collectively even – if not evenly – and provoke change within European societies.

In addition to dealing with their own various strategic cultures, European defence sectors now also have to deal with the strategic dimensions of cultural diversity, at two levels: in the societies they are supposed to protect, and in their external action writ large (Wong, 2013). New cultural alliances will be needed by European governments as well as by European individuals, networks and corporations. Intercultural sensitivity is a new priority for the EU, internally as well as in its external action: this is implication number one.

From the above, the derived question therefore is: How can various European cultures of Defence contribute to build trust worldwide in an interculturally-aware manner? This is looked at in the third part of this article.

Cultural change number two relates to the consequences of Donald Trump's behaviour towards NATO. The so-called 'West' is entering a fragmentation phase. It is creating new opportunities and opening new spaces for European engagement in the world in politics as well as with societies at large.

The usual transatlantic love story (which was initially an American idea and an American project) is getting old. The idea of Europe as a part of the American world and the West becomes partly outdated. As Ivan Krastev (2018) recently wrote, the time when the US had European allies is over. In politics, the norms and values of "predictability and reciprocity" and on behalf of which European governments used to stand up for together with America, are not shared anymore. Old friends might not be friends any longer. This might be untrue at the level of societies where some engagement will still be required.

European governments need to defend themselves from betrayals originating from their closest ally and that have far reaching consequences beyond security and defence cooperation: on trade, political and emotional ties.

With Trump's frontal attacks against the European members of NATO and the EU, the equation and the paradigms of European security and defence policy-making have changed from the outside (one change factor identified by Europeanisation theorists). In the long run, relying on the US to keep NATO sustainable is becoming risky, and costly for each EU Member states individually. European strategic autonomy is not an option anymore, it has become an impera-

tive for Europeans as they each are losing access and credibility in the eyes of Trump's America.

If this is really a paradigm change, implications are immense. First, Europeans have to reinterpret their respective national belonging to 'the West' … or to themselves. 'The West' has to be reinterpreted culturally and politically by revisiting the trust-building terms of European relations with the US government and with the American people. Second, it means Europeans need to find and keep allies outside the 'West'. Building trust with them will be one of the first priorities for EU external action. Reinventing trust-building is therefore implication number two, and it involves cultural relations.

Change number three has to do with the strategic relevance of cultural expressions in a digital age. Phases of peace and prosperity in human history were also phases of cultural innovation and creation. Innovation also came from military and security investments. Peace has been a founding stone of European integration after unprecedented bloodsheds. In an age of artificial intelligence and environmental fragility, immaterial value will be pursued, reinforced by irrational dispositions such as beliefs, feelings and prejudices. Fake news and the manipulation of public opinions and consumers through big data are already the latest manifestations of this trend.

In an uncertain connected world, those able to generate trust and emotions will generate movements of peaceful change. Cultural expressions in their diversity are an endless source of inspiration and emulating value. Their promotion, preservation and enhancement, beyond cyber security cooperation, will become a strategic asset in an interconnected, contested and dematerialised world.

Implication number three is that European defence sectors have to invest in strategic creativity by developing peace-focused partnerships with the cultural and creative industries to protect artistic freedom and recognition. In terms of innovation, boundaries between the civilian and the military are already blurred. The same will happen between the military and the creative.

The regulation of internet or laws on robots and intelligent objects will also reflect visions of our future societies. If there is a European way of life (although it was developed with the support of the US since WWII) that is worth being defended in the future, what type of defence systems will be ready to protect the diversity of its cultural expressions?

To conclude this second part, it seems quite clear that our strategic reappraisal in 2018 points towards the need for at least three innovations in European defence policies summed up as follows: first, to build trust within and beyond the 'West'; second, enhancing intercultural approaches in external action; third, in partnership with creative and cultural professionals.

The next section delves into the concrete measures that could be adopted in that regard.

Defending Cultures: Creative Partnerships as a Strategic Agenda

The contribution of EU defence policies to trust-building are already framed by the EU Global Strategy and the strategic approach to international cultural relations and could be synthesized by the moto "European cultures of Defence to defend culture". Specific measures that would contribute to this objective revolve around 4 main themes and methods.

First, a strategic approach to the Defence and culture nexus could be developed through cross-disciplinary work between various cultural professionals and institutions (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Cultural ministries, Parliaments, development cooperation, humanitarian affairs, education, environment, health, to name but a few). It would enhance cultural awareness and connections between the security and defence sector and other organisations dealing with external cultural affairs[15].

Second, the theme of heritage and memory has already been identified as a relevant and promising one. In the short term, cooperation between museums, military sites and other cultural institutions (for instance the House of European History) on heritage and memory management (particularly with digital technologies, 3D and video games) could be further enhanced[16]. Some more collaborative work on European defence myths, heroes and mindsets (such as the Dunkirk and Saint-Malo mindsets[17]) could also be envisaged.

Thirdly, the field of education and socialisation is the most advanced and its cultural potential remains to be exploited more deeply. It is commonly assumed that increased socialisation between European officers will lead to a shared strategic culture. Yet military Erasmus and joint interventions remain confined to the closed world of the defence system. Connecting more systematically security staff exchanges with civilians and cultural education professionals would contribute to accelerate the exchange and encounter of ideas, symbols and references. This would allow defence and cultural professionals to work jointly on mental maps and on the perception of interests and threats.

Finally, the three measures above (comprehensive policy-making, the cultivation of heritage and memory, and more investment in education and socialisation) will require closer cooperation between European defence systems and societies and cultural professionals. At the end of the day, mutual understandig between security and cultural professionals will benefit European societies as a whole, perhaps making armies and security systems look cool (again?) and changing the percep-

15 This has already materialised in the past through pilot initiatives such as a TV series on police in Afghanistan (Commissar Ammanullah) or radio fiction series on piracy in Somalia.

16 See Gensburger and Lavabre (2012) and Calligaro and Foret (2012).

17 See European Commission (2017d).

tions that security professionals have of creatives. One example of this version of EU's 'comprehensive approach' could be the launch of a Defence Diplomacy Dialogue (3D) culture programme as a component of the Defence Research Preparatory Action and future European Defence Research Programme (European Defence Agency, 2017). The upcoming Horizon Europe programme could also potentially be mobilised, or a sui generis initiative on the model of STARTS (Science Technology and the Arts) programme (European Commission, 2017e).
A common culture, if there will be any, will be composed of various cultures of security and defence in, between and across Member States boundaries. There will be several models, from fusion, to co-existence and, perhaps, compositions. One can expect that the more diverse creative partnerships will be built between defence and culture, the more trust will be generated inside and outside Europe.

Conclusion

Current strategic and cultural environments in Europe are closely interacting with trends in world politics. In an uncertain Western context influenced by unpredictable US leadership, European policy-makers have started to underline the relevance of a specific culture of Defence in parallel with the stronger recognition and promotion of the role of culture (both as intercultural literacy and the flourishing of cultural expressions) in European integration and external action.
Our first conclusion is that the last decades have shown some increased cultural convergence within and between European security systems. European security and defence communities and groups have more to share politically, technologically and culturally (in interventions overseas but not only) than 20 years ago. It is nonetheless still hard to imagine today the rapid emergence of a single culture of Defence of Europe. Yet, if territorial defence turns out to be the new priority for Europeans because of a serious American withdrawal from the 'old continent', a cultural shift could happen relatively quickly.
In that case, the socialisation process encouraged by military mobility and exchanges would intensify. It can certainly be reinforced in the fields of education, research, training and the cultivation of debated memories and heritage. While variety will remain a strong feature of the European defence sector, working consciously and pragmatically towards an open, dynamic and internally diverse culture of Defence is a vision that should be discussed and planned more precisely in European capitals.
Secondly, a more culturally inspired Defence policy would contribute to mutual transformations within the various areas of EU external action. For instance, some investment in military exchanges with external partners about digital creativity (in connection with cyber security), shared memories, shared heritage or cultural products and pieces of arts (linked to defence-related issues) could help deepen

relationships with them. A more elaborated and explicit strategic approach to the Defence-culture nexus (not speaking of wider security-culture nexus) still has to be developed as part of EU external action and European public diplomacy, through and in compliment of official EU policy and communication channels. One challenge is to make EU military "look cool again"; a second one is to envisage an EU soft power strategy that would encompass a Defence component in an overall EU's image management approach.

Finally, the new EU Multi-annual Financial Framework offers new opportunities with the creation of a single instrument for external action, to be combined with the one on security with the possibility to develop synergies with cultural action. For the next seven years and beyond, the legal basis is in place to pilot and experiment fruitful combinations within an EU security and culture agenda. Ambitious socialisation and mobility initiatives will be necessary but not sufficient. Investments will be required in at least two areas for defence sectors to be in tune with the complexities of the societies and the cultures they are supposed to protect: life-long practice-oriented interdisciplinary intercultural learning for security and defence staff, and enhanced creative and artistic partnerships with cultural professionals, in Europe and beyond.

The defence sector and cultural professionals rarely speak to each other, yet their work nurtures and enables one another. More peace and security enables more culture, and more cultural expressions nurtures well-being, peaceful cooperation and secure coexistence. Technological and geopolitical transformations are putting defence and culture closer to each other: strategic creativity has become as important as creative strategies.

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European Defence Architecture: Institutional Developments

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Abstract

The articles analyses the process of institutionalization of European defence, emphasizing the civilian focus of the EU crisis management system, complemented by synergies between civilian and military instruments. This shapes current European security governance and will influence the future of defence architecture. At this level, matters of coherence and effectiveness claim institutional oversight, within the Union and regarding relations between the EU and NATO, where little architectural overlap occurs. The author acknowledges that new defence cooperation initiatives, despite the fact they have not so far altered the EU's institutional architecture, they will influence the relations within and between European institutions, with various decision making formats, for instance regarding PESCO projects. It discusses how PESCO may press for a more consistent behaviour by Member States, between political agreement for external action and participation and how European defence cooperation will have to coexist with transatlantic responsibilities of EU/NATO Member States. European defence cooperation has not added new competences to EU institutions, but the availability of new sources of funding may activate dormant provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and provide the incentive for Member States to engage more systematically in CFSP and CSDP.

Resumo

A Arquitetura de Defesa Europeia: Desenvolvimentos Institucionais

O artigo analisa o processo de institucionalização da defesa europeia enfatizando a componente civil do sistema de gestão de crises da União Europeia, complementado por sinergias geradas entre instrumentos civis e militares. Esta circunstância molda o atual sistema de governação europeu e influenciará o futuro da arquitetura de defesa europeia. A este nível, questões de coerência e eficácia requerem uma supervisão institucional, dentro da União e entre esta e a NATO, plano no qual se verifica uma limitada sobreposição institucional. O autor constata que as iniciativas recentes no domínio da defesa, pese embora não tenham até à data alterado a arquitetura institucional da UE, poderão no futuro influenciar as relações dentro e entre instituições europeias, nomeadamente através dos projetos no quadro da Cooperação Estruturada Permanente. Estes poderão gerar um comportamento mais consistente entre acordo político e participação efetiva, por parte dos Estados Membros, sem esquecer que a defesa europeia terá que coexistir com as responsabilidades dos Estados Europeus, que são também membros da NATO. A cooperação no domínio da defesa europeia não veio acrescentar novas competências às instituições europeias, mas a disponibilidade de novos recursos financeiros poderá vir a ativar disposições do Tratado de Lisboa e facultar o incentivo para um envolvimento mais sistemático no desenvolvimento da PESC e da PCSD.

† Doctor Simon Duke has passed away on the 5 September 2018. Despite the circumstances, he has enthusiastically accepted to contribute to this commemorative issue, for which the National Defence Institute expresses its deepest appreciation and extends the most sincere condolences to his family and friends.

2018
N.º 150
pp. 23-32

Approaches to Security Architecture

The idea of the European Union's (EU) security 'architecture' has been used in at least two different ways. It is, in the first instance, the collection of rules, norms and principles that shape the parameters of the EU's (and others) actions within the broad remit of security. The second, which is the focus of this contribution, refers more specifically to the procedures and institutions that shape decisions and actions within the EU and between the Union and its members.

It is important to note the relation between these two types of architecture at the outset since the former plays an instrumental role in shaping the latter. Take as an example the Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequent intervention in eastern Ukraine which violated one of the fundamental pillars of the European security architecture in the form of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the inviolability of borders. This, in turn, has shaped EU-Russia relations and has led to institutional adaptations such as the creation of the *East StratCom Task Force* in 2015 to address Russian disinformation campaigns accompanied Russia's relations with its neighbours. Another example would be the identification of various forms of cyber aggression or crime as a security challenge to the EU and its members, which led to the adoption of a policy and, more recently, the creation of an EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) in Estonia. This is still in its early stages and further institutionalisation within the EU and its members can be anticipated.

The second main terminological issue to be considered is that, in *stricto sensu*, the EU is not involved in defence unless the particular case of civil protection against manmade and natural disasters is included. It is, instead, involved in a wide range of security roles, ranging from the more familiar crisis management (civilian and military) to a wide range of pre and post-conflict stabilisation roles such as security sector reform or disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation. The point here is not to engage in unnecessarily semantic debate, but merely to note that the type of security under discussion will trigger a different set of actors and this 'architecture'. This explains why the security architecture of the EU is often referred to as a system of networked governance (Faleg, 2017, pp. 65-76). The key notion behind networked governance is that actors (institutions) interact with each other in order to produce a public purpose (security in this case), often in a hierarchical manner (Fenwick et al., 2014, p. 4).

If we apply this to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) there is a broad fit since decision-making is characterised by networked governance. There are, however, elements of the institutional architecture that are more formal and hierarchical that do not fit the model so well, as in the formal decision-making structures (like the Foreign Affairs Council, the Political and Security Committee or the role of the European Parliament when it comes to budgetary scrutiny). But, networked governance tends to come more to the fore at the implementation level

following the main political decisions. This is where the *ad hoc* architecture, whose composition may be crisis specific, will come into play (like the Crisis Platform, EU Situation Room and the Crisis Management Board). It is therefore also helpful to think in terms of parts of the architecture with formal roles and those whose roles are still important, but less formal in the sense that they are responsible for coordination of the networks involved. It is also worth noting that the *dramatis personae* may well change at different stages of the crisis cycle.

Much of the EU's security architecture is specific to the Union itself and therefore requires effort to understand. Jozef Bátora (2013, pp. 598-613) usefully reminds of the interstitial nature of the European External Action Service (EEAS), within which much of the crisis management architecture is to be found. Bátora observed that the EEAS has emerged in interstices between organizational fields which, in the case of the EEAS, has produced something that has some of the attributes of a foreign ministry as well as those of a defence ministry. Although national foreign ministries, like the Netherlands, are beginning to become more interstitial, by combining foreign policy and development, none have the architectural form of the EEAS. This serves as a simple reminder that the demands made of the EU often leads to unique architectural forms that are pragmatic but also designed to avoid replicating (or clashing with) national architecture.

The architectural metaphor is also found at the European level of security, often reflected in relations between the EU and NATO. Stéphanie Hofmann (2011, pp. 101-120) was one of the earlier scholars to start considering the impact of institutional overlap, both between organizations but also within them. The idea that institutional overlap can shape strategies and influence the development of institutions is more convincing in the CSDP context, most notably in the emergence of bodies like the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), when experience showed that crisis management operations often have closely linked civilian and military dimensions and that the overall desire for coherence and effectiveness demanded some form of institutional oversight. But, the limitations of institutional overlap have also been displayed in the case of EU-NATO relations, notwithstanding the common membership of 22 states. Beyond the formal exchanges at military and civilian levels between the EU and NATO, there are surprisingly few examples of institutions or bodies that can be directly attributable to architectural overlap. This is largely due to the dissimilarities rather than similarities between the organizations and the fact that the EU's security remit covers far more aspects of the crisis cycle than NATO.

The architecture of CSDP has evolved over almost one and a half decades, to the point where it is reasonably mature. It is also worth acknowledging that over this period the development of aspects of the architecture have been inhibited by national objections. An obvious example was the 2003 call by Belgium, France,

Germany and Luxembourg to establish an EU military command headquarters at Tervuren, near Brussels. A number of 'Atlanticist' countries, notably the United Kingdom, saw this as not only duplicating NATO assets but endangering the role of NATO as the cornerstone of European security. The U.S., still furious at French and Germany refusal to join the allied coalition in Iraq, dismissed the 'chocolate summit', in a derogatory reference to the four countries. The idea did not die and was revived in the aftermath of the June 2016 British 'Brexit' referendum. It was quietly agreed in Bratislava at a summit, minus the United Kingdom, to create a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) (this time with quiet U.S. support).

The establishment of the MPCC was seen as a "very important operational decision to strengthen European defence" by the High Representative, Federica Mogherini (Council of the EU, 2017a). The MPCC has however only assumed command of non-executive missions (such as the training missions in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia) and works under the political control and strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The MPCC was formally established in June 2017 and it complements its civilian counterpart, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) through a Joint Support Coordination Cell of civilian and military experts to share expertise and support civilian-military cooperation.

The MPCC is, so far, the only new body to emerge out of the EU Global Strategy and the resultant Implementing Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD) which was presented by the High Representative to the Council in November 2016 as part of the EU's 'new level of ambition' in security and defence. Other aspects of the plan are likely to result in the need for adaptation to existing parts of the EU's defence architecture. For instance, the trial run of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which reports in November 2018, will enable greater transparency of defence plans between the EU's members. This, in turn, will have an impact on the Capability Development Plan, and the work of the European Defence Agency.

Brave New Europe – and PESCO

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is core to the strategic future of the Union, as outlined in the *Global Strategy*: "... investment in security and defence is a matter of urgency. Full spectrum defence capabilities are necessary to respond to external crises, build our partners' capacities, and to guarantee Europe's safety" (EU Global Strategy 2016, pp. 10-11). The strategy also stated that, "an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders" (EU Global Strategy 2016, p. 9). Although it was acknowledged that NATO remains the 'primary frame-

work' for the defence of most EU members, subsequent doubts about U.S. security guarantees to its European allies, as well as substantial policy differences, have given substance to the idea of strategic autonomy. It has also put PESCO at the centre of the Union's efforts to address its well-known collective defence shortcomings and thus credibility on the international stage.

PESCO is covered in more detail in another contribution (Nunes, 2018, pp. 48-75). From an institutional standpoint it does not change the institutional architecture as such, but it will nevertheless influence relations within and between institutions involved. Twenty-five EU members have entered into PESCO under which legal commitments have been made to "join forces on a regular basis, to do things together, spend together, invest together, buy together, act together" (Mogherini, 2017). This has resulted in 17 initial projects. The management of the overall process and the projects has necessitated a number of institutional adaptations.

The Council-level (at 25) meet in a 'PESCO format' and is responsible for the overall policy direction and decision-making pertaining to PESCO, while the projects are managed by the contributing Member States. PESCO issues will be addressed at the joint Foreign Affairs Council/Defence meeting, usually held twice per annum. Voting rights are however confined to those participating in PESCO (that is, all except Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom). The 'PESCO format' (i.e. all EU members are present but voting rights accorded only to PESCO participants) is carried through the Council preparatory bodies (the PSC, the Politico-Military Working Group, the EU Military Committee). Importantly, however, the scope of cooperation for any given project is agreed upon by the Member States themselves, but with a common set of governance rules. Provision is also made for the suspension of a member state who no longer fulfils the criteria by qualified majority vote (this also applies to the decision to admit a new member state into PESCO, but otherwise unanimity applies).

The Council and the Member States participating in the projects are supported by a PESCO Secretariat, consisting of representatives from the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the EEAS (the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate and the Military Staff). Based upon the assumption that the collective capabilities of the EU members constitute a single set of forces, it is unclear whether the existing PESCO projects will result in a lead-nation approach or whether the capabilities will in effect be co-owned. Even if the former, PESCO holds the potential for common command, logistics, maintenance and training facilities. These could also be offered by PESCO contributors as a common facility. The aim is not to create the mythological 'European army' but to create "a coherent full spectrum force package, which could accelerate the provision of forces" (Council, 2018).

The EDA has a core oversight and implementation role to play in PESCO. Comparisons have usefully been drawn between the design of CSDP and that of the

Eurozone and, more recently, with that of the emerging European Defence Union and that of Economic and Monetary Union. In this context the EDA plays a comparative role to the European Central Bank. The EDA assists the High Representative in the assessment of PESCO commitments, with the Agency responsible for the capability development aspects. If the EDA is the preferred joint capability facilitator, the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d'Armement (OCCAR) is seen as the preferred collaborative programme managing organisation (Council 2017b, Annex II, p. 18). The EDA, OCCAR and the European Air Transport Command (EATC), signed a Letter of Intent on 25 January 2018, building on a July 2012 administrative agreement, to cooperate more closely and avoid duplication of effort (EDA-OCCAR, 2012). The precise modalities of how EDA-OCCAR cooperation will work will become apparent, but the expertise of the latter in the coordination and management of complex programmes at the advanced stage could complement the Agency. It remains to be seen how, in this and other cases, 'Brexit' will complicate relations with the UK as a founder member of OCCAR but outside the EDA and thus access to EDF funding from March 2019 onwards, unless an agreement can be made.

PESCO is closely related to CARD, mentioned above, and to the European Defence Fund (EDF), established in June 2017. The fund is designed to promote cooperation and cost savings among EU Member States through co-financing with the EU budget of the joint development of defence equipment and technology. The research and development strands of the budget, alongside the Member States' contributions, could represent an investment in defence research and capability development of €5.5 billion after 2020 (European Commission, 2017a). The extreme costs of developing major defence platforms on a purely national basis, even for the largest EU members, has underlined the economic rationale behind joint development and ownership of the type pioneered by the seven-nation European Air Transport Command (EATC) at Eindhoven. Any such future multinational platforms will call for similar EATC type decision-making, advisory and budget structures alongside common training. This will also call for close coordination with the key EU bodies.

The Winter Package and the Broader Implications for Defence Architecture

The initiatives discussed above formed part of a 'Winter package' of initiatives presented to the Council in late 2016. It is too soon to state with any certainty what the precise impact on the EU's defence architecture will be, but four potential implications are discernible.

First, CSDP has been beset by the problem of EU members who vote in favour of a CSDP mission or operation, and thus give their political assent, but then decline to actually participate. This is merely a reflection of the fact that the EU remains heavily reliant upon its members for its ability to act in civilian and military crisis

management. It is also worth noting that the intended deployment of military force requires a unanimous decision, thus making it all the more difficult for a country that has no intention of participating to decline to support the political decision. The logic of PESCO challenges this practice since the co-development of platforms and systems will tend to imply that decisions on capabilities will be made in groups, although legally it leaves national sovereignty untouched.

Second, PESCO may well imply that military operations, in particular, will be launched in the EU framework and not outside it. The tendency to launch operations outside the EU and NATO (as in 2011 in Libya) has been a growing tendency, encouraged in part by the U.S. preference to work with coalitions of the willing. CARD and PESCO will make this more difficult, but not impossible, due to the common assessment of challenges and strategic interests facilitated by the former and the binding nature of the latter. The links between CARD and PESCO are, however, mainly implicit rather than explicit. Nor was the connection between the EDF and PESCO explicit until the Commission established a link in June 2017 whereby all prototypes produced in the context of PESCO-related projects which are eligible for EDF funding, will have a 10% increase in contributions from the European budget (from 20% to 30%) (Mauro and Santopinto, 2017, p. 30).

Third, the impact of the winter package on relations with NATO is not entirely clear. On paper, anything that makes the common membership of the EU and NATO more capable and efficient is good for both organisations. But, it remains to be seen exactly what kind of 'strategic autonomy' the EU has in mind, especially as political differences between Washington, Brussels and the national capitals multiply. There is the risk of drift and in order to mitigate this links will have to be made at multiple levels: between the EU-NATO and the capitals as they draw up their National Implementation Plans for PESCO; between the EU and NATO's Defence Planning Process (NDDP); and at the strategic level on how the 2% NATO commitments apply to the common membership of the organisations. The High Representative has insisted that "the 2% debate on defence spending is a NATO debate and it is for the Member States or allies in NATO to define their way" (Mogherini, 2018). She is correct technically, but the 2014 NATO Wales summit also included the commitment to spend 20% of their annual defence spending on "major new equipment, including related research and development" (NATO, 2014). That is far from just a NATO matter since it has a direct bearing on PESCO. Coordination is evidently called for.

Fourth, if 'architecture' can be stretched to embrace the relevant external financial instruments, it is evident that the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) will radically reduce the current external financial instruments (EFIs). The conclusion of the mid-term reviews for the current MFF indicate a number of shortcomings with the current EFIs, including difficulties in 'joined-up approaches',

gaps in coverage (notably with the Union's ability to promote and mainstream 'values' agendas) and a lack of instruments that can react in a timely manner to new developments (European Commission, 2017b). Discussions on the reform of the MFF are underway but it is already evident that streamlining and simplification of the EFIs is gaining momentum, with the possible implication that more funding for security-related rapid response mechanisms could fall under a non-programmable rapid response envelope. Presumably, other longer-term and broader aspects of security will fall under some type of thematic instrument which follows the EU Global Strategy priorities ('resilience' will be of particular importance) or geographically oriented partner instruments.

More specifically, the European Council announced in June 2017 that the Athena mechanism, which covers some common costs of CSDP operations, will be expanded to include the common costs of the deployment and redeployment of the EU Battlegroups. At the moment the mechanism covers around 10-15% of the common costs, while the suggested revisions could increase them to around 20%. Although worthwhile, this will not alter the general picture where CSDP operations remain dependent upon Member States munificence. It is also worth noting that there are few incentives for third parties to participate since their access to PESCO, the EDF or the revised Athena mechanism is not currently foreseen but cannot be discounted in the longer-term.

Conclusions

Defence architecture is, admittedly, not always the most stimulating aspect of the EU's rapidly developing security and defence. It is, nevertheless, essential for the grounding and workings of the 'Winter package' discussed above. The emphasis will be upon adaptations to existing structures rather than the creation of new institutions or bodies. Indeed, it could be argued that the main thrust of the 'Winter package' was to imbue life into features of the Lisbon Treaty that had lain moribund for almost a decade.

In spite of the EU's new 'level of ambition' it is significant that no new powers have been attributed to any EU institution or agency, most notably the EDA, since CFSP and CSDP retain their unambiguous intergovernmental character. If we look for game changers in terms of the willingness of Member States to actually physically contribute to CSDP operations, it is most likely to lie in ability of the EDF to leverage national defence funding for the development of joint research and development and eventually common platforms. The amounts on offer may be relatively modest, especially in a defence market that is largely driven by exports, but they cannot be dismissed as trivial either. Institutions rarely solve problems, but they can certainly foster change.

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Clusters: the Drivers of European Defence

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Abstract

The article examines three trends that have characterised the development of defence clusters: firstly, the defence budget cuts up till 2015 have been a driving factor for maintaining capabilities together with other countries. Secondly, more permanent formats have been created, aiming at more structural and longer-term cooperation. Thirdly, defence cooperation has been deepened, both in operational terms but also in maintenance, logistics and for the acquisition of the same equipment. The new EU defence initiatives, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation could offer a framework for defence clusters, but it is considered that European countries will be rather selective in using those instruments in the face of existing multinational cooperation formats. The success of these cooperative initiatives depend substantially from political trust and solidarity that shape how contributions translate into defence performance. It concludes that specialised clusters are not about creating a European Army, but rather about building European armies step-by-step, needed for a better transatlantic burden-sharing and to underpin Europe's responsibility to take care of its own security and defence.

Resumo

Clusters: os Vetores Dinamizadores da Defesa Europeia

O artigo examina o desenvolvimento destas modalidades de cooperação em três vertentes. Em primeiro à luz do impacto dos cortes orçamentais no quadro da defesa europeia até 2015. Em segundo, o desenvolvimento recente de novos formatos mais permanentes, destinados a uma cooperação mais estruturante e de longa duração. Em terceiro, no enquadramento dado pelo aprofundamento da cooperação no domínio da defesa no plano operacional, mas também da manutenção, da logística e da aquisição de equipamentos de defesa. Examina ainda a forma como a Cooperação Estruturada Permanente pode oferecer uma oportunidade para o desenvolvimento de clusters de defesa, pese embora o empenho seletivo dos países europeus, atendendo à existência de outros formatos de cooperação multinacional. O sucesso destas iniciativas cooperativas depende consideravelmente da presença de confiança politica e solidariedade entre os Estados Membros, que permita a transformação de contributos em desempenhos concretos no plano da defesa. Conclui que os clusters especializados refletem a realidade, não se destinando à criação de um exército europeu, mas antes à construção de exércitos europeus de uma forma gradual, necessários a uma partilha mais eficaz da responsabilidade transatlântica e que reflita a intenção europeia de assumir a direção da sua segurança e defesa.

2018
N.º 150
pp. 33-47

Introduction

Defence is a complicated business. It involves a wide set of actors: politicians, policy makers, military staff, parliaments, research and technology institutions and industry – just to mention the most important ones. International defence cooperation is even more complex. Firstly, there are now at least three multinational organisations dealing with defence: NATO, the European Union and, for blue helmet operations, the United Nations. Their roles and tasks are different, but at the same time an overlap exists, in particular between the EU and NATO. For example, both organisations are involved in stability operations and capacity-building. For military operations at the high end of the spectrum often ad hoc coalitions of the willing are established. The most recent example is the anti-ISIS coalition under the leadership of the United States, carrying out the air campaign over Iraq and Syria. Secondly, nations cooperate quite extensively in smaller bilateral or subregional defence cooperation formats – also referred to as defence clusters. Originally, cooperation in such clusters was focused on operational matters: creating common headquarters, combining military education and training as well as bringing military units together in binational or multinational formations. In recent years, defence clusters have also become important vehicles for deepening cooperation through the integration of staff and units, through common defence planning and through the acquisition of the same equipment. The list of clusters and their activities has grown considerably.

This article is specifically dedicated to defence clusters. First, the author will look at recent developments. What is new in defence clusters; what makes them different compared to their predecessors? Next, the various types of cluster cooperation will be categorised and assessed, based on success and failure factors. Concrete examples will be listed to underscore these factors. In the following section the author will analyse how and why clusters develop in a specialised manner. The article ends with some conclusions.

Clusters: What's New?

There is nothing new in combined operations by the armed forces of various nations. In 1815 the Duke of Wellington led a coalition of forces consisting of British, Irish, Belgian, Dutch, Polish and Prussian soldiers – alongside military from Hannover, Brunswick and other entities. Both in World War I and World War II Allied Forces combined their efforts, bringing American, Canadian, British, French and the military of many other nations together under one overall command. In all those cases multinational formations were of a temporary nature. Normally, troops would return to their national territory after the fighting had ended in order to carry out their defence tasks in their home country. With the creation of NATO this century-old practice changed. Permanent structures were established for political

steering and control – the North Atlantic Council – and for commanding Allied forces: the NATO command structure. In the course of the Cold War 'multinationalisation' in education, training and exercises for NATO's core Article 5 task of territorial defence became the norm. Even permanent multinational formations were created, such as the fully integrated AWACS fleet, the ACE Mobile Force and the standing naval groups to which Member States contribute on a rotating basis. The end of the Cold War brought a new task for NATO: non-Article 5 or out-of-area crisis management operations. The armed forces of NATO (and several non-NATO) countries started to operate together in real-life missions, in the Balkans in the 1990s and in Afghanistan and Iraq today. As defence was no longer 'static' – i.e. limited to defending NATO's territory – 'deployability' over long distances became a priority. It resulted in the creation of a number of deployable forces headquarters (HQ), such as the 1st German-Netherlands Corps HQ, the Eurocorps HQ and several others – although political factors also often played a role in launching such initiatives. Real-life multinational operations in the air, at sea and on land also led to new permanent military formations. The Franco-German Brigade and the European Participating Air Forces (Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands) are early examples of post-Cold War defence clusters.

While NATO continued to adapt to the rapidly changing security environment – such as by the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and, in 2014, its spearhead the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) – European nations also started to cooperate militarily in the European Union as of the turn of the century. Firstly, in EU crisis management operations, albeit they turned out to be relatively small in scale and not in the high end of the spectrum. Secondly, EU Battlegroups – small battalion-plus sized formations for crisis management – were created as stand-by forces. Although so far they have never been deployed in real-life operations, the EU Battlegroups became important vehicles for closer operational cooperation between various groups of European countries. Outside the EU four countries (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands) established the European Air Transport Command (EATC) in 2010, the first example of the permanent transfer of command to a multinational European level. Three other nations (Italy, Luxembourg and Spain) have joined the EATC, which commands around 60 percent of all of Europe's military air transport assets. Estimated savings for the contributing nations are around 15 percent. EATC has proven that permanent integration through a multinational command structure is perfectly possible. Its business model has optimised the cost-effective use of air transport, air-to-air refueling and the aeromedical evacuation capabilities of the participating countries.

In recent years, defence clusters have further expanded, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms. New clusters have been created, e.g. the structural Franco-British security and defence cooperation under the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties. Others

have been 'upgraded' to a higher level of cooperation or used as a vehicle for integrating armed forces, such as of certain units of the German and Dutch land forces. Three factors have influenced or characterised the development of defence clusters in the last decade.

First, the defence budget cuts as a driving force: as a consequence of the economic-financial crisis European defence expenditure dropped by seven percent from 2007 to 2013[1]. In some countries the percentage was much higher. Often investment programmes had to delayed or cancelled. In many cases the planned acquisition numbers of new frigates, aircraft and armoured vehicles were corrected downwards. In others cases capabilities were completely lost. In 2010 the United Kingdom scrapped the acquisition programme of the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft. In the same year the Netherlands deactivated its last two tank battalions, while heavy artillery had already been reduced to eighteen modern self-propelled 155 mm howitzers (PH2000). Influenced by the same financial austerity, the acquisition budget for the replacement of the Dutch F16 fighter aircraft was fixed at €4.5 billion (the 2013 price level), which allowed for the procurement of 37 F35s (Joint Strike Fighters). To optimise the availability of fighter aircraft for international missions the Dutch authorities agreed with Belgium on common air policing and renegade flights over Benelux territory. As of January 2017 one of the two countries has two fighter aircraft available for air policing/renegade flights in Benelux airspace on a 24/7 basis. The period was initially four months, but was extended to eight months to coincide with the Belgian and Dutch contribution to the anti-ISIS air campaign. The common air policing/renegade agreement allows for such overseas deployment to be continued. Under the Lancaster House Treaties, France and the United Kingdom have reduced their nuclear weapons test facilities, making use of joint centres on both sides of the Channel. These are examples of maintaining capabilities through mutual dependencies.

Second, more permanent forms of cooperation: there are older examples of permanent defence cooperation formats, such as Benesam – the Belgian-Netherlands naval cooperation. It dates back to the 1950s, was given a boost in the 1990s and is characterised by integration elements[2]. In 2013 the Defence Ministers of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed a Benelux Declaration on defence cooperation. It formed the basis for more extensive cooperation in a wider struc-

1 EU Member States – minus Denmark – together spent €204 billion on defence in 2007. In 2013 the total amount had dropped to €190 billion. Nominally total European defence expenditure dropped by 7 percent. In real value (taking inflation into account) the percentage is 10 percent (EDA, 2016, 2017).

2 See the third factor that have influenced or characterised the development of defence clusters in the last decade.

ture, from the level of Defence Ministers to the military experts level and encompassing naval, air, land and supporting forces. The first concrete projects – 'reaping low hanging fruit' – were mainly in the education and training area. For example, it was agreed to keep one paratrooper school in Belgium, also used for training the Dutch military. Others, such as the Benelux air policing/renegade arrangement, took more time – in particular because national legislation had to be adapted. The Lancaster House security and defence cooperation is also permanent. It encompasses operational elements – in particular the Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force – as well as binational technology investment, armaments procurement programmes and defence industrial cooperation. Although some projects were dropped over time, there are ongoing binational development and procurement programmes such as for missiles and future air combat systems, including an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). The Scandinavian countries work structurally together in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), although this format is perhaps too large to be effective. German-Netherlands defence cooperation was brought to a permanent level by the land forces of the two countries[3], but by now has expanded to the air defence and naval areas.

Third, the deepening of defence cooperation: in line with the previous factors, countries are deepening their defence cooperation in clusters. Firstly, it applies to operational formats. In the past, integration below battalion level was considered to be something of a taboo. It simply could not work, due to different languages, organisation and culture – so the argument went. Germany and the Netherlands have broken this taboo by integrating a tank company with Dutch personnel into the German 414th Tank Battalion. By operating the same Leopard 2 tanks, by speaking German and by using the same doctrine and procedures, this binational tank battalion has proven in tests and exercises to comply fully with the required standards. The integration extends further upwards: the 414th Tank Battalion is under the command of the Netherlands 43th Mechanised Brigade, which is a subordinate unit of the 1st German Armoured Division. One could argue that such far-reaching integration is born out of necessity. Indeed, the format was designed in order to maintain knowledge and experience in operating tanks in the Dutch Army[4]. But the example also shows that there is more scope for such integration models, naturally assuming that preconditions apply as stated above. German-Dutch defence cooperation has also grown in the areas of air mobile forces, air defence and amphibious forces. There is a clear practical pay-off: both for NATO territorial defence as well as for deployed operations in countries like Afghanistan

3 Ibid.
4 See Swillens (2018).

and Mali the armed forces of the two countries operate together or rotate their units almost as if it were a purely national contribution.
Naturally, this has consequences for political decision-making: in both countries Parliaments are involved in this process. Thus, deeper operational defence cooperation can require the synchronisation of political decision-making processes. Integrating forces also opens up the potential for rationalising training and maintenance. The Dutch and Belgian Navies operate the same M-frigates and minehunters. There is only one school for training personnel to operate M-frigates (in Den Helder, the Netherlands) and one school for minehunter training (in Oostende, Belgium). The maintenance of all M-frigates takes place in the Netherlands while all minehunters are maintained in Belgium. Both countries have recently synchronised their procurement plans in order to purchase the same successor ships in the 2020s. Belgium leads the minehunter replacement programme and the Netherlands the acquisition programme for new frigates. As operating the same equipment is an absolute prerequisite for military integration, it is clear that defence technological and industrial interests have to be aligned too. This is visible in the Franco-German defence cooperation, such as the future tank/armoured vehicles programme – mirrored by defence industrial cooperation between Kraus Maffei Wegmann and Nexter – or the development of a future fighter aircraft (with Dassault and Airbus Defence being involved).
In the meantime a whole set of new defence cooperation initiatives has been launched in the EU. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is meant to monitor Member States' defence efforts and to explore the potential for common programmes, in particular in R&T and procurement. In 2017, a pilot CARD exercise was conducted. The first fully-fledged CARD report will be produced in the autumn of 2018. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched at the end of 2017. It is based on the EU Treaties and thus provides a juridical basis for defence cooperation among a group of 25 Member States. The PESCO countries have committed themselves to implementing a set of criteria (benchmarks or targets) on European defence cooperation such as spending norms and the obligation to participate in collaborative procurement programmes. Furthermore, groups of PESCO participating Member States have initiated projects with a variable composition. Some projects are operationally oriented; others focus on procurement. Finally, the European Commission is the new kid on the block with regard to defence cooperation. The Juncker Commission has embraced defence as a priority area. It has launched the European Defence Fund. It is already up and running with pilot activities for defence research and industrial cooperation. After 2020 the Commission aims to invest €13 billion in both areas in the context of the Multi-annual Financial Framework 2021-2027. Member States and defence industries can profit from the financial assistance from the EU budget, but obviously the Commission

will only grant the funds in the case of industrial development projects if these are multinational, involve a minimum of two Member States and companies located in at least three countries.

One could argue that the new EU instruments, in particular PESCO, offer a framework for defence clusters. For R&T and procurement programmes financial benefits are offered by the EDF, while CARD could be used as a tool for increasing synchronisation or even combining defence planning. The question is: are European countries inclined to transfer their binational or subregional cooperation to the EU level – which will be seen, justified or not, as losing control and increasing bureaucracy. Cooperation formats with the UK face an additional problem: Brexit makes it more difficult to cooperate on defence matters with London in the EU context. The likely outcome is a mixed bag. Some cooperation programmes might be introduced in PESCO and might attract EDF money. Others will remain outside the EU structures for political or other reasons.

Types of Clusters

Clusters exist in many formats or types. Firstly, a distinction can be made between operational clusters (military formations) and defence-equipment clusters (procurement clusters). The latter will not be extensively described and analysed in this article. However, it is important to note that collaborative procurement programmes are not only dependent on multinational military cooperation but also on technological and industrial work shares. The latter brings in a non-military element, which is driven by other interests than strictly those of the Defence Ministries and the armed forces. Past experience in multinational procurement programmes shows that national socio-economic interests – such as maintaining production lines, jobs and knowledge – have often been decisive factors of influence, leading to rising costs and delays in the programmes. The A400M transport aircraft with an estimated extra cost of €11 billion may serve as an example.

With regard to operational clusters at least five different types exist[5]:

(1) Multinational deployable headquarters: HQ formations able to plan and conduct up to corps-sized operations with a permanently integrated multinational staff. Examples are: the 1st German-Netherlands Corps (located in Münster, Germany) with the representation of twelve nations; the Eurocorps (Strasbourg, France), with five participating nations; the Multinational Corps Northeast (Szczecin, Poland) established by three framework nations (Denmark, Germany, Poland). All three HQs have been deployed to Afghanistan to lead

5 This categorisation is based on Zandee, Drent and Hendriks (2016). The success and failure factors in this article also originate from this Clingendael Report.

NATO's ISAF operation. Integrated HQs also exist below the corps level, e.g. the Multinational Division North East HQ in Elblag, Poland.

(2) Modular operational formations: permanent multinational formations with an integrated multinational staff, but participating countries maintaining the option to deploy their contribution nationally or with other partners. Examples are: the Franco-German Brigade; the Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF); the German Division Schnelle Kräfte/Dutch 11 Air Mobile Brigade; the multinational Special Forces Command of Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands.

(3) Integrated operational formations: permanently integrated formations which can only be deployed when all partners participate. In other words: participating countries are dependent on each other. Examples are: most multinational deployable headquarters; NATO's AWACS fleet; the integrated German-Netherlands tank battalion[6].

(4) Permanent transfer of command: a multinational formation to which participating countries have transferred command on a permanent basis, thus losing (partly or completely) national command authority. Examples are: European Air Transport Command (EATC, Eindhoven – the Netherlands); the strategic airlift capability (Pápa Airbase, Hungary); NATO AWACS.

(5) Role/task specialisation: countries (non-haves) being fully dependent on other countries to deliver capabilities to them. Examples are: Benesam education/training and maintenance of M-frigates (by the Netherlands) and minehunters (by Belgium); and as a form of one-sided dependency, Baltic air policing, carried out by fighter aircraft from other NATO countries on a rotating basis; the same air policing dependency exists for Albania, Macedonia and Slovenia.

As already shown by the given examples, various types of multinational operational cooperation can overlap. The Franco-German Brigade is a combination of a modular and integrated operational formation. In case the Brigade is deployed in its entirety it is then an integrated unit. But subunits can also be deployed under national command. EATC has an 'escape arrangement' for the participating countries, which have a permanently guaranteed revocability of the transfer of authority. Thus, EATC could more accurately be described as 'a conditioned permanent transfer of authority to a multinational level, without the loss of national sovereignty'. Benesam encompasses three types of cooperation: an integrated naval HQ (Admiral Benelux, Den Helder – the Netherlands) which also allows for national command chains; modularity of assets – the same ships which can operate closely

6 The Dutch could deploy their tanks outside the integrated battalion and the Germans could deploy the tank battalion without the Dutch tank company, but in both cases the full combat potential of the integrated tank battalion would not be used.

together but also separately; and role/task specialisation in education/training and maintenance.

Success and Failure Factors

What can be learned from the experience with multinational clusters? In other words, what are the success or failure factors? Although no agreed list exists, the available literature provides common ground for the following criteria:

(1) Trust, confidence and solidarity: multinational defence cooperation is per definition more difficult than 'doing it alone'. No country is like any other and no national army, navy or air force is the same as those of the partner nations. The negative fall-out of these national differences can only be overcome when partners can rely on each other, when they trust their colleagues and are confident in the delivery of their contributions and in their performance. But it should be underlined that trust, confidence and solidarity grow over time and have to be supported by practical measures and arrangements. In bilateral formats this is easier than in larger multinational formations. Nevertheless, in the Eurocorps, EATC, SAC and other formations countries 'feel equal' as key posts in those organisations rotate amongst all of them. A feeling of 'shared responsibility' (and, therefore, solidarity) is also the result of all participating states delivering capabilities, for example in combined or integrated units. In EATC the built-in guaranteed revocability of the transfer of authority and the options for the delegation of authority contribute to building trust and confidence. Trust and confidence is also the basis of Benesam, but without the practical 'win-win' for both parties, the cooperation would not have gone this far.

(2) Sovereignty and autonomy: the traditional view of the limits of multinational defence cooperation – when national sovereignty over military means is at stake – no longer holds true. Several cases, in particular EATC and Benesam, show that countries are prepared to transfer national sovereignty or, in other words, they become dependent on partner(s) for a military capability. But this does not come easily or naturally. In Benesam, post-Cold War defence cuts were a driving factor for reducing the on-shore footprint to maintain maximum capabilities at sea. The resulting mutual dependencies of Belgium and the Netherlands for training personnel and the maintenance of the M-frigates and minehunters respectively were thus acceptable. EATC participating states agreed to transfer command authority on condition that it could be revoked in the case of national need. In the case of Baltic air policing, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania simply could not afford to operate their own fighter aircraft, with the consequences that as 'have-nots' they would per definition become dependent on Allies. Deploying the integrated German-Netherlands tank battalion in a crisis management operation would still require sovereign national poli-

tical decision-making, including in Parliaments, in both countries – which could be a stumbling block. For that reason modularity, allowing for the withdrawal of a country's contribution from a multinational formation, is the preferred option as it offers more flexibility for real-life deployment.

(3) Similarity of strategic cultures: it seems that countries which do not necessarily share the same strategic culture are still able to operate together. France, an experienced interventionist, and Germany, reluctant to engage in operations at the high end of the spectrum, have deployed their common Franco-German Brigade on several occasions. Although some of these deployments – such as in the Kabul area – were certainly not in a benign environment, it is nevertheless doubtful if Germany would agree to a deployment in a real fighting scenario, such as for example the French Operation Serval in Mali in 2013. The usability of a common capability such as the Franco-German Brigade can still have its limits due to a lack of similar strategic cultures. The same can apply to other multinational formations, such as the combined German Division Schnelle Kräfte/Dutch 11 Air Mobile Brigade. Quite understandably, the United Kingdom with the JEF and France/UK with the CJEF have established formations with the participation of like-minded countries. President Macron's European Intervention Initiative should be seen in the same context.

(4) Geography and history: in general, neighbours work more easily together than distant friends, but geography and history have no absolute value as a success factor. It is true that bilateral cooperation models – Benesam, the Franco-German Brigade and the German-Netherlands land forces' integration – are proof of successful neighbouring country clusters. But in EATC or SAC several participants do not share borders. The same is true for multinational headquarters such as the Eurocorps. Apparently, if geography and history are obstructing multinational defence cooperation, this can be overcome in practice. However, for integrating combat or combat support units, geographical proximity and a long history of working together are certainly important success factors.

(5) Number of participants: mathematical logic would imply that multinational defence cooperation becomes more complicated as the number of participants grows. In reality, the picture is more nuanced. Certainly when it comes to complex and multi-functional capabilities – such as in a combat brigade or a tank battalion – bi-nationality is the preferred option. But for 'enabling' capabilities, such as air transport or air-to-air refuelling commanded by EATC, a higher number of participating nations does not create insurmountable problems. The same applies to SAC. In other words, the type of cooperation seems to be the decisive factor for the number of participants as a success factor, not the number itself.

(6) Countries and forces of similar size and quality: this factor applies in particular to bilateral defence cooperation (as in wider groups there is often a mix of several bigger and smaller countries). Benesam and the Franco-German Brigade are cooperation formats of similarly sized countries (small-small, big-big). But in naval terms Benesam is not a case of two equals: the Netherlands Navy is larger and has a wider set of capabilities than the Belgian Navy. Benesam works well, despite the uneven fleets of both countries, apparently because other factors are more important (crucial among which are the efficiency gains for both countries). The German-Netherlands land forces cooperation shows that even for deeper defence cooperation the combination of a large and a small nation can work perfectly well, but only if the larger nation treats the smaller nation as its 'equal' partner.

(7) Top-down and bottom-up: the usual statement is that defence cooperation will not work without top-down political steering. This will be even more the case when cooperation entails a loss of sovereignty. Benesam was brought to a higher level of cooperation after a ministerial agreement in the 1990s. EATC would not have started without the involvement of Ministers of Defence. But it is equally true that bottom-up support is required to make defence cooperation a success. The direct involvement of practitioners in Benesam to explore and develop deeper forms of cooperation is important for its success. Comparable combinations of top-down steering and bottom-up support can also be found in other cases; it is nothing less than bringing politics and practice together which is needed in order to be successful, not only in launching but also in sustaining defence cooperation over time.

(8) Mind-set, defence culture and organisation: clearly, these elements are closely related to the factors 'trust, confidence and solidarity' and to 'geography and history'. But even between neighbouring countries mind-sets, defence culture and organisation can demonstrate significant varieties. In Benesam, in the Franco-German Brigade and in the German-Netherlands land forces cooperation these differences have not created major problems and neither does this seem to be the case in the Eurocorps or EATC. One should not forget that such military formations develop their own mind-set, culture and organisation over time – 'esprit de corps' becomes an important factor in itself.

(9) Defence planning alignment: only the Benesam case study underscores the importance of this factor. The prolongation of the existing success – in particular the task specialisation in training and the maintenance of minehunters (Belgium) and M-frigates (the Netherlands) is completely dependent on both countries procuring the same replacement ships which has now been planned in close coordination. This is a new growth area for clusters as the cooperation progresses into forms of integration. The deepest forms of defence cooperation

– with mutual dependencies – will change the priority in defence planning from 'national first' to 'with partner(s) first'.

(10) Standardisation and interoperability: all examples show that common concepts and doctrine offer huge potential for increasing the usability of operational clusters. The same applies to education, training and exercises, even when subunits and combat support units are national formations. Once more, standardisation and interoperability can easily be realised when operating the same equipment. To a large extent, the success of the European participating Air Forces is the result of the four countries operating the same F16 fighter aircraft.

(11) Realism, clarity and the seriousness of intentions: the Eurocorps and the Franco-German Brigade have sometimes been labelled as 'symbolic' or 'window-dressing'. The realistic approach of the participating nations – tailor it to what it should do – and the clarity and seriousness of the intended cooperation have resulted in two very usable cooperation models as shown by their track record of deployments. On the other hand, raising high and unrealistic expectations should be avoided. Political announcements on establishing a European Army have turned out to be empty shells.

(12) Involvement of Parliaments: naturally, for operational deployment this factor only comes into play when a contributing country to a defence cooperation model is dependent on parliamentary approval – as is the case in Germany for crisis management operations. The Bundestag has not blocked deployments of the Franco-German Brigade, but this in itself does not prove the irrelevance of this factor. It is unlikely that the German Federal Government will bring a proposal for deployment to the Bundestag when it is known in advance that a supporting majority in Parliament will be lacking. In that sense the role of Parliament is important because of its pre-decision-making effect.

Many other lessons can be learned from existing defence cooperation models. Some success factors – like trust, the top-down/bottom-up combination, the same mind--set and realism – apply to all of them. The importance of other factors may vary, depending on the characteristics of the model. Clearly, the importance of these key factors is higher for models with mutual dependencies or role/task specialisation, such as training and maintenance in Benesam. Success factors in some cases turn out to be failure factors in others. 'The less, the better' – i.e., referring to the number of participants – is true for the most complex combat capabilities, but is certainly not a golden rule for deeper defence cooperation in enablers, as the EATC case shows. The same applies to a factor like the size of the countries or their armed forces.

Towards Specialised Clusters

The EU and NATO have grown in membership over the past decades, while at the same time the security environment has drastically changed. Europe is confronted by different security challenges to its East – a neonationalist Russia – and to its South where spill-over effects from the instability and turmoil in Africa and the Middle East are the dominant threats: migration, terrorism and transnational crime. Even in the digital age geography still matters. In Eastern Europe territorial defence against Russia's military threats is the primary concern. It is reflected in the defence policies of the Allied countries in the region and in their defence budget allocation. The Baltic States and Poland will soon live up to the NATO two percent GDP defence expenditure target. These countries invest mainly in the modernisation of their land forces. Spain and Italy belong to the lowest performers in terms of the GDP percentage allocated to defence. Their navies are given priority as they provide key capabilities to protect the maritime borders in the Mediterranean. Western and Northern European countries have less outspoken priorities and often contribute to NATO's forward presence as well as to operations in the South.

Another line of division between European countries is the willingness to participate in high-end interventions. France has intervened several times in Africa to stop advancing terrorist groups and to prevent states from collapsing. Only a handful of European partners have supported France militarily during these interventions and, if this were the case, mainly with enabling capabilities such as transport aircraft. More European partners have contributed to follow-on UN or EU missions. With the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) France is aiming to create a 'club' of countries with comparable strategic interests, with the willingness to intervene and with capabilities at the high-end of the spectrum. Clearly, E2I would not get off the ground in the EU because of the unanimity rule. Apparently, so far France also wants to keep E2I outside PESCO. The UK has created the JEF as an expeditionary oriented formation which has become a selection tool for the contributions of European partners that are willing 'to go in first'. The CJEF with France fulfils the same purpose. Germany remains a difficult case. Since the early 1990s successive governments in Berlin have succeeded in creating more political and public support for German participation in crisis management operations. Yet, this took place under various sets of caveats and restrictions on the use of force. In German society there is still limited support for participation in high-end intervention-type operations. For that reason the German political and military establishment is now rather content with the focus on NATO's Article 5 task of territorial defence. This has been the uncontested part of the German military build-up after the Second World War. The same applies today. Finally, there is a group of European countries – Austria and Ireland are outstanding examples – that are not willing or able to contribute to any high-end operation. However, they do con-

tribute to stabilisation and capacity-building missions in more benign security circumstances.
This variety among European countries in their defence policy and defence posture orientation could perhaps also be applied to cluster selection. For example, expeditionary-oriented nations, willing to contribute to high-end operations, should hook up with the military formations of France and the UK. With the JEF this is already the case. Countries whose main focus is on territorial defence and with a priority for strengthening their land forces could group around Germany (and Poland). Finally, those European nations which participate mainly in stabilisation-type missions could group around a core provided by Italy. Naturally, such 'specialised clusters' should not be developed in isolation from each other. EU and NATO overall coordination is required in order to ensure that the collective requirements are met for the type of operations they should be able to conduct. Furthermore, specialised clusters could reinforce each other: quickly deployable 'first in' capabilities will be needed for NATO's Article 5 for which the NRF and its spearhead have been designed; on the other hand, heavy territorial defence forces can also be used in crisis management operations as a back-up to stabilisation activities once the initial intervention has come to an end. One might argue that such specialisation is neither desirable – as it might split rather than unite the defence efforts of European countries – nor obtainable as it sets too high demands for defence cooperation between sovereign states. However, specialised clusters are already a reality. The JEF and the Franco-British CJEF are proof of this development. Germany is implementing the so-called Bühler Plan – mentioned after the Planning Director in the German Armed Forces Staff – which is focusing Berlin's defence planning up to 2030 on the strengthening of a three Division strong, heavy armoured core of the land forces. Other nations can contribute with their specific capabilities in what is called the German Framework Nation Concept. It is incorporated in the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Several other countries continue to underline the importance of their national contributions to stabilisation and capacity-building missions. In other words: specialised clusters already exist; framing them all in an EU and NATO context is preferable to allowing them to develop without any coordination[7].

Conclusions

European defence is not just the business of the European Union and NATO. In fact, most far-reaching defence cooperation takes place in smaller bilateral or subregional clusters. Some of them have a longer history, but many of them were created in recent times. It reflects a political trend to deepen military cooperation with good

7 See Dick Zandee (2017).

neighbours instead of distant friends, but in many cases declining defence budgets also increased the pressure to maintain capabilities through close coordination with partner countries and even by integrating capabilities. The result is a complex pattern of defence clusters across Europe. The larger operational formations also reflect national strategic cultures, defence policies and military priorities. In broad terms: France and the United Kingdom provide the core for high-end intervention capabilities, Germany (and Poland) for heavy armoured follow-on land forces and Italy for border protection and stabilisation missions. Other countries hook up with the UK-led Joint Intervention Force or with the German Framework Nation Concept as they like.

These defence clusters – initiated and developed outside the EU or NATO context – provide the real core of European defence cooperation. There is no European Army; there are in fact several European armies. Instead of pursuing the unobtainable – a common European capacity for all kinds of military operations – the obtainable should be welcomed. European countries have started to specialise – one country more than the other – which is reflected in the various operational clusters. If the EU and NATO can build a well-coordinated and consistent overall framework around these clusters, Europe might be on its way to getting the military capabilities which are needed for a better transatlantic burden-sharing as well as to underpin the responsibility to take care of its own security and defence.

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European Defence Cooperation

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Abstract

The article offers a view on the state of events and initiatives leading to recent developments in European defence cooperation from June 2016 – when the EU Global Strategy was presented – till June 2018 – when a call for the evaluation of progress of PESCO projects was endorsed by the Council. It argues that despite being presented as an inclusive and binding endeavour, European defence cooperation comprises political, technological and operational standards, which are not accessible to all Member States for reasons of national interest, technological and industrial gap and operational output. However, the developments of the past two years seem to have been having an incremental effect on defence cooperation, regarding the identification and agreement on strategic priorities and the development of financial incentives and processes that may consolidate European defence cooperation, as claimed by the EUGS.

Resumo

Cooperação Europeia no Domínio da Defesa

O artigo é uma perspetiva sobre a evolução de acontecimentos e iniciativas conducentes ao desenvolvimento da cooperação no domínio da defesa no período compreendido entre Junho de 2016, quando a Estratégia Global foi apresentada, até junho de 2018 altura em que o Conselho decidiu a avaliação do progresso dos projetos de Cooperação Estruturada Permanente. Considera que, pese embora o carácter inclusivo e vinculativo deste projeto cooperativo, o mesmo compreende requisitos políticos, tecnológicos e operacionais, não acessíveis a todos os Estados-Membros por razões de interesse nacional, atraso tecnológico e industrial ou desempenho operacional. Contudo os recentes desenvolvimentos dos últimos dois anos parecem estar a ter um efeito incremental sobre a cooperação no domínio da defesa no que respeita à identificação e acordo incremental sobre as prioridades estratégicas da União e sobre os incentivos financeiros e processuais, que poderão contribuir para consolidar a cooperação no quadro da defesa europeia, tal como referido na Estratégia Global da UE.

2018
N.º 150
pp. 48-75

"I have always believed that Europe would be built through crisis and
that it would be the sum of their solution"

Jean Monet (1978, p. 421)

During the European Council of December 2013, Member States representatives acknowledged that the changing strategic environment called for a better development of European capabilities, asserting that "defence matters" (European Council, 2013, §1) and that more attention and investment should be placed on European defence. Three years later, on the 28th of June 2016, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) presented to Member States the document "European Union Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" (EUGS), an introduction caught up by the result of the British referendum that would set the process of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Despite the setback marked by the fact the European Council did not formally endorsed the EUGS and one of the Union's strategically most capable Member State decided to leave the organization, the EU and NATO reaffirmed their willingness to improve European and transatlantic security and defense cooperation, with the approval of a Joint Declaration between the two organizations. Conversely to 2003, when the European Security Strategy was approved, in 2016 in different stages and at different paces the European Union, its Member States and its strategic partners presented a united diplomatic front, as a reaction to the external events that could have led to further fragmentation of interests, with consequences over European foreign, security and defence policy. On the 25th of June of 2018, the European Council emphasized the importance of security and defence cooperation to the strengthening of EU's "capacity to act as a security provider, its strategic autonomy, and its ability to cooperate with partners" (Council of the European Union, 2018/402), reiterating the goals and targets set earlier by the EUGS regarding the internal and international responsibilities of the Union.

This article offers a comprehensive view on the evolution of events and initiatives leading to recent developments in European defence cooperation from June 2016, when the EU Global Strategy was presented, till June 2018, when a call for the evaluation of progress of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects was endorsed by the Council. It argues that despite being presented as an inclusive and binding endeavour, European defence cooperation comprises political, technological and operational standards, which are not accessible to all Member States for reasons of national interest, technological and industrial gap and operational output. However, the developments of the past two years seem to have been having an incremental effect on defence cooperation, regarding de identification and agreement on strategic priorities and the development of incentives and rewards that

may contribute to the strategic autonomy of the European Union, as claimed by the EUGS.

The Institutional Setting of European Defence

In current international affairs and to the majority of international actors cooperation is no longer a matter of choice, but a necessity due to the transnational effects of instability and insecurity, which transformed the traditional sovereign domains of security and defense into a more interdependent policy domain, not only from each other but also with other policy domains. The combined consequences of current threats and the growing exposure of both states and international organizations to public scrutiny, turns collaborative practice into a much needed instrument that adds legitimacy to external action and increases the amount of instruments and resources available to international and regional actors. When cooperative practice involves major strategic players and long standing organizations, such as the European Union and NATO, it has better chances of dealing successfully with the uncertainties of systemic instability, strengthening institutions and operational circumstances to better deal with risks through responsibility sharing in external crisis management and conflict management[1].

When international organizations and states commit to cooperative frameworks this facilitates access to specialized knowledge, information and resources like capabilities, whether one refers to the possibility of the EU to use command, control and planning structures of NATO or NATO access to EU specific civilian proficiencies in crisis management contexts.

In order for cooperation to happen, political will must be strengthened on the base of common perceptions of risks, interests and opportunities or through a strategic imperative to react. This is not a technical detail, sometimes not even a financial one. It is a choice that shapes the opportunity for states and organizations to engage collective as international actors, in crisis response. Frequently, academics and practitioners deny the EU the status of an international actor, whether by stressing its inability to perform traditional state like competences in external action, based on sovereignty, territory and coercion or by comparing it to other security actors such as NATO, which as a defense organization is centered on the military dimension of international security[2]. Through CSDP, the EU aims at projec-

1 Despite the fact favourable institutional and operational conditions may be present, leading to better coordination and cooperation, the presence of multiple actors brings representativeness of interests, preferences (Moravcsik, 1991; 1997) and traditions of foreign policy into the security and defense equation, which conditions the degree of political commitment and operational engagement of self-interested players.

2 See also Hyde-Price (2006) and Ojanen (2006).

ting a more constitutive[3], rather than confrontational security and strategic culture. International actorness means that with the consensus of its constitutive parts that is, its Member States and external partners, the EU exercises governance in a way that projects influence and changes behavioral patterns among its constitutive parts enabling or leading to cooperative practices (Nunes, 2017, p. 45).
Cooperation is likely to work better in an interdependent security environment, where resources are scarce, too expensive to be individually owned or unevenly distributed, but fragmentation of threats has a wide spread effect over all.
As the European project evolves, the European Union tends to strengthen its executive, legislative and deliberative powers mimicking state like actors, which is likely to pose problems of consistency between policy formulation and policy implementation on European defence given it has to aggregate the preferences of 28, now 27 Member States.
With the ratification of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), the Union sought to strengthen consistency and coherence of its external policy and external representation with the establishment of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in charge of leading the Union's foreign and security policy fulfilling its executive functions at the highest level of foreign policy and security policy, a role complemented by the integration of the national diplomatic services of Member States under the European External Action Service (EEAS) seeking to develop a European diplomatic culture, a more efficient international engagement and in time a European common defence[4].
In 2003 the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) identified the challenges and risks that affected the EU and outlined the strategic objectives to safeguard Europe's security. This was followed in 2004 by the establishment of the European Defense Agency (EDA), created to help developing Europe's defence capabilities and support the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDC)[5].
In 12 July 2004, the European Council[6] with the extinction of the Western European Union and the creation of EDA, would endorse an expansion of the designated Petersberg Missions[7] (TEU, Article 43) from its initial scope, comprising crisis

3 See also Eckes (2015).
4 With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament was granted greater power to monitor the High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission's action thus reducing the established idea of democratic deficit.
5 As designated until 2007, date when the Lisbon Treaty was signed and ESDC took the designation Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
6 See Council of the European Union (2004).
7 Agreed during the ministerial summit of the Council of the Western European Union in 19 June 1992.

management, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, rescue missions and employment of combat forces in crisis management, adding to its tasks portfolio joint disarmament operations, military assistance, security sector reform, post conflict stabilization, fight against terrorism and the development of the civilian dimension of ESDP.

In 2009, Permanent Structured Cooperation did not emerged from a specific concern with the identification of traditional threats or enemies, but from the need to secure and strengthen Europe's interests in the face of external security challenges. PESCO, as confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty Declaration on PESCO, introduced a method of cooperation structured around a flexible mechanism of participation in European defence, which was meant to work as a vehicle of functional compensation, in case negative deliberation by Member States occurred regarding decisions with impact on security and defence. As Vimont (2018, p. 7) observes, flexible provisions have to "take into account the need to safeguard the solidarity principle that remains the bedrock of EU cooperation" therefore should not be used in a way that weakens the purpose of further integration of willing Member States. The relaunch of PESCO on the 11 December 2017, led the Council to adopt a decision establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation, shortly after receiving a joint notification by twenty three Member States expressing their intention to participate in joint defence cooperation[8].

With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDC) was renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with the intent to further collective action of Member States and introduced PESCO as an inclusive cooperative initiative.

From the institutional point of view, CSDP came out reinforced with the Treaty of the European Union with the introduction of five mechanisms: two of imperative nature and three of flexible order. Those of imperative nature came under the form of a Solidarity Clause (TEU Article 222) bound by the political pressures generated by the terrorist attacks in Madrid 2004 and specifically designed to encourage joint action of Member States in case a "Member State is the object or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States to respond to terrorist threat, protect democratic institutions and civilians and assist Member States in their territories in the event of a natural or man-made disaster". Further, the Treaty states that "The Council shall act in accordance with

8 Pierre Haroche (2017, p. 231) argues that European defence cooperation seeks primarily to respond and solve problems of inter-European interdependence triggered by the impact of international crises. See also Simón (2017, pp. 192-197).

Article 31(1)[9] of the Treaty on European Union, [noting] where this decision has defence implications" (TEU Article 222, §3), the Council would not exercise legislative functions. The Council would adopt a decision acting on a joint proposal by the European Commission and the High Representative and the European Parliament would be informed.

The Mutual Assistance Clause[10] according to Article 42(7) of the TEU agreed under the "Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy" states that "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter". However not all Member States are able to fulfill this commitment for political or operational circumstances to do so. As Bakker (2017, p. 2) refers, within NATO "the Mutual assistance commitment is backed by a common practice of planning, training and exercises, whereas within the EU, under Article 42(7) this is not the case. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States" for instance regarding the Scandinavian countries, notably Denmark which does not take part on the defence dimension of CSDP. The Treaty foresees that commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with responsibilities assumed under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which, for those States which are NATO allies, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the main forum for its implementation (Article 42, §2 and §7). The importance of these provisions of the Treaty pertains also to the fact it authorizes CSDP bodies to act militarily within the Union's territory.

For those other flexible arrangements, they allow groups of Member States to further cooperation and integration, whenever the Union as a whole does not wish or cannot pursue collectively. "Enhanced Cooperation" is one of these flexible mechanisms foreseen in the Treaty through which a formal delegation of tasks can be given to a specific group of Member States by the Council, a decision meant to improve the Union's external position, allowing a group of willing Member States to take forward a decision, declaring in its Article 327 that "Any enhanced cooperation shall respect the competences, rights and obligations of those Member States which do not participate in it. Those Member States shall not impede its implemen-

9 Article 15b (1) of the TEU states that "The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions".

10 The Mutual Assistance Clause was invoked for the first time, since the Treaty of the European Union ratification, on the 17th of November 2015 by France, in the follow up of the events related with terrorist acts in Paris occurred on the 13th of November.

tation by the participating Member States"[11]. According to Article 20 of the TEU, Member States may establish enhanced cooperation "within the framework of the Union's non-exclusive competences", with the aim to protect European interests and strengthen the integration process. The Council adopts the decision authorizing enhanced cooperation, whenever the cooperation cannot be undertaken "within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole" by at least nine Member States, providing functional flexibility to policy implementation on the base of willing Member States.

The Treaty also foresees that specific missions can be delegated by the Council to a Member State in the preservation of the interests of the Union in the context of the "Framework Nation" concept (Article 44)[12]. This provision enables a Member State to assume "specific responsibilities in an EU-led military operation or mission over which the EU exercises political control and strategic direction, after Council decision" (EEAS, 2015, §8), notably the capacity of setting headquarters, complementing the functional flexibility offered by Enhanced Cooperation and Permanent Structured Cooperation, in situations requiring a rapid response.

The last flexible mechanism regards Permanent Structured Cooperation. Despite, its inclusive essence PESCO is formally limited by eligibility criteria of normative nature, through the institutionalization of a permanent commitment and by a functional criteria[13], through the requisite of previous participation of Member States in missions and operations at the operational high end. In order to soften the idea of competition, and in line with Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, PESCO framework was introduced as compatible with the responsibilities assumed in the context of other organizations and without implications over the specific character of national security and defence policies of Member States.

11 The status of "participating Member States" is for the moment limited to EU Member States who are at least engaged in one European defence cooperation project led by the European Defence Agency. For PESCO projects the treaty set the requirement for a minimum of nine participating Member States. For third countries, cooperation is being envisaged, but in the field of research and innovation regarding defence products, access to technologies is limited to EU Member States. In the UK case, after March 2019, contracts with the British "with any manner of sensitive content will be terminated" (Directorate-General for External Policies, 2018, p. 32), which will pose a legal challenge to their participation in defense projects. See also Nunes (2017a, pp. 120-122). The United Kingdom on a position paper regarding the vision for the government on foreign, security and defence policy cooperation with the EU outlines its conditional to take part on defence initiatives, if it can "work with the EU during mandate development and detailed operational planning", see also United Kingdom Government (2017, p. 19, §72).

12 The concept of Framework Nation regards the "conceptual basis for the planning, launch and conduct of autonomous EU-led military operation/mission where there is a FN" (framework nation), see EEAS (2015, p. 5).

13 See also Koening and Walter-Franke (2017, p. 13).

The provisions on Permanent Structured Cooperation, as referred to in Article 42(6) approved in 2007 comprehend eight goals. The first regarded the improvement of defence capacities through the development of "contributions and participation in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments" (Article 1(a), Protocol 10 to the TEU). The second, to develop the capacity to supply by 2010, either at the national level or as part of a multinational force groups, combat units for missions planned and structured at a tactical level as battle groups (Idem, Article 1(b)). The third, to increase participation with support elements, including transport and logistic capable of carrying missions within a period of 5 to 30 days in response to requests from the United Nations, which could be sustained for an initial period of 30 days extended up to 120 days (Idem, ibidem) setting forward the limits underlining the development of the Headline Goal 2010. The fourth, to bring the respective defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible by harmonizing, pooling and specializing[14] their defence capabilities, encouraging defence cooperation in the field of training and logistics (Article 2(b), Protocol 10). The fifth, to take measures to improve availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces (Article 2(c), Protocol 10) that could guarantee the projection of security and defence of Europe's interest.

The large majority of these goals regarded military defence, a trend which PESCO framework in 2017 came to confirm. Despite the fact currently the number of CSDP civilian missions being higher than military operations, from the seventeen PESCO projects[15], adopted by participating Member States, eight have a military focus and nine may have dual use or more specific civilian purpose[16]. The sixth was to identify and overcome the shortfalls perceived in the context of the "Capability Development Mechanism". The seventh to take part, where appropriate in the

14 This assumes multilateral cooperation as a given fact, because Member States would become more interdependent.

15 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) first collaborative projects – Overview. Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32079/pesco-overview-of-first-collaborative-of-projects-for-press.pdf. Portugal will take part in five projects: European Secure Software Defined Radio; Military Mobility; Maritime (semi)Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures; Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform; and Strategic Command and Control System for CSDP Missions and Operations. See Council of the European Union (6393/18) Council Decision establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO. Brussels, 1 March.

16 At the time when the Treaty was ratified, the Protocol on PESCO would recall providing the Union with the operational capacity drawing on "civilian and military assets". In 2017 in a total of 16 CSDP missions, ten are civilian missions and six military operations. See EEAS (2017a).

development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency (Article 2(e), Protocol 10).
The Protocol safeguards that Member States have both the political and operational control over the capabilities to be made available in a PESCO framework and that they do not interfere with the security and defence "obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty". The tasks to be performed are to be "undertaken using the capabilities provided by the Member States in accordance with the principle of a single set of forces" (Protocol 10), ensuring the integrity of the commitments assumed in the context of other international organizations and guaranteeing that no overlap or duplication occurs. Finally, the Treaty anticipated the creation of a startup fund for the launch of peacekeeping operations of CSDP, with the aim to provide the financial autonomy and the capacity for rapid response.
While the Solidarity Clause and Mutual Assistance Clause offer the legally binding agreement among Member States that wish to express political will to collective support its peers in situation of crisis and conflict. The mechanisms of Enhanced Cooperation, Framework Nation and Permanent Structured Cooperation were perhaps perceived by the legislators as opportunities to overcome the difficulties foreseen ahead in the development of European defence cooperation, thus creating cooperative alternative and flexible mechanisms, through which some Member States could pursue flexible collective action, in those circumstances where full collective action was difficult or impossible.

"Defense Matters"

Several reasons may account for the difficulties experienced in launching defence cooperation between 2009 (when the Lisbon Treaty was ratified) and 2017 when a Council Decision on the 11th December 2018 established for the first time a Permanent Structured Cooperation[17]. These ranged from difficulty in agreeing on common objectives for CSDP, due to the presence of distinct national interests and perspectives on legality and legitimacy in external action, to different perceptions of immediate risk and threat.
These circumstances were aggravated by the events that followed the decisions to intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq and later by the consequences of the 'Arab Spring' movement, the Eurozone crisis, the revisionist turn in Russia's foreign policy with the intervention in Crimea, the multinational military actions in Libya and Mali, the escalation of the refugee crisis, the beginning of the negotiations laying out the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the UE and Trump's

17 See Council of the European Union (2017/2315). The list of participating Member States is in Official Journal of the European Union, L331/57-77, 14 December.

election. These external events[18] had a considerable influence on the decisions leading to Europe seeking a stronger regional and international role.

The long period that mediates between 2009 and 2018 has been marked by the uncertainty of the European project in general and european defence in particular, but it has also been a period of acknowledgement that an interdependent international security environment requires better cooperation.

The presentation on the 28th June 2016 by the High Representative of the EU Global Strategy, placed defence at the centre of the European agenda, an initiative that was strengthen on the 8th July 2016 by the "EU-NATO Joint Declaration" signed by the Presidents of the European Council, European Commission and the Secretary General of NATO, manifesting an united front among main political European actors and transatlantic allies in face of the divisive political context that marked the year. Further, the EU Global Strategy reviewed the military level of ambition calling for a "sectoral strategy to be agreed by the Council" and specified "the civil-military level of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities stemming from this Strategy" (EU Global Strategy, 2016) with three main objectives: to protect the European citizens leading to increase cooperation between internal and external security; to respond to external crises through more intense and efficient cooperation that fosters resilience; and to strengthen capacities of partners and with partners transforming formal political pledges into cooperative actions. The informal meeting of Defence Ministers in Bratislava paved the agreement between EU Defence Ministers on a roadmap to further European defence, an initiative that would be consolidated with High Representative Mogherini's proposal on an "Implementation Plan on Security and Defence" (High Representative, 2016/14392). The Implementation Plan on Security and Defence set out the level of ambition based on the agreement between EU Foreign and Defense Ministers on how to develop European security and defence policy, in straight consonance with the European Commission adoption of a "European Defence Action Plan" (EDAP) (European Commission, 2016/950 final) presented in November 2016. The Action Plan is structured around three areas: trigger the European Defence Fund; foster investments in the defence supply chain and strengthen the single market for defence (Idem, p. 5). The Plan also reminded the need to overcome inefficient spending and duplication and to solve problems of "lack of interoperability and technological gaps" (Idem, p. 3) essential to the set out of an effective PESCO. Being specialization, harmonization and pooling of capacities, one of the targets in PESCO the proposal to launch the "European Network of Defence-related Regions" will allow the European Commission to financially support regions with relevant indus-

18 What Barry Posen (2006, p. 173) refers as the "precipitating events".

trial and research capital, giving the incentive to the formation of "regional clusters of excellence" in support of the defence sector (Idem, p. 13)[19]. This is particularly relevant for Member States, which despite not having major industries, able to deliver high end defence related technologies and products may, with the adequate financial support, be able to develop research and capabilities necessary to the implementation of PESCO projects. As Biscop (2018) observes "any additional capacity that the European acquire thanks to PESCO, can still be deployed for operations in all possible frameworks: the EU itself, NATO and UN". On July 2016, it was agreed the EU-NATO Joint Declaration followed in June 2018 by a joint follow up declaration[20], completing a sequence of cooperative initiatives, bringing together the Council political representation and the EEAS diplomatic network, the Commission´s financial and regulative weigh and NATO's operational credentials into the European defence agenda.

The EUGS privileged Europe's strategic autonomy through effective and timely response to external conflicts and crises; development of the EU's capacities through better defence cooperation, leading to "interoperability, effectiveness, efficiency and trust" (EUGS, 2016) and protection of the Union and its citizens. In this last context, the European Defense Action Plan also aims at promoting civil/military synergies between defence matters and other Union's policies, aiming at guaranteeing strategic autonomy by ensuring the "protection and resilience of critical European civil and military space infrastructure" and to "tackle growing security challenges", especially those related to "border control", "maritime surveillance" and "maritime security" (European Commission 2016/950, p. 18)

By the end of 2016, the European Council endorsed a "Defence Package" that comprised a common threefold understanding on: the European security and defence commitments, as agreed at 27 Member States with the EUGS; the "European Defence Action Plan", which includes the European Defence Fund (EDF); and the cooperative initiatives approved in the context of EU-NATO relations that identified forty proposals organized in seven areas of cooperation including hybrid threats, operational cooperation, cyber security, defence capability industry, research, exercises and capacity building.

19 See European Network of Defence-related Regions (ENDR) aimed at bringing together regional authorities and clusters helping to develop dual-use strategies and providing access to EU funding, particularly to the benefit of small and medium size enterprises. Available at https://www.endr.eu/about-us.

20 See Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, The President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2016. EU-NATO Joint Declaration. Brussels, 8 July. Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf.

The unveiling of the European Defence Fund (European Commission 2017/295, p. 10)[21] by the European Commission in June 2017, set the agreement on the creation of a joint funding mechanism that will help the development of a "capability pillar" necessary to PESCO implementation and the enhancing of European operational ability. Investments are to be coordinated on the base of the priorities identified by Member States such as: remotely piloted aircraft systems, air to air refueling, satellite communications and cyber domain[22], which will "remain in the hands of Member States"(Idem, p. 3). The EDF is founded on two "legally distinct but complementary windows" coordinated by an overarching Coordination Board constituted by the European Commission, the High Representative, the Member States, the European Defence Agency and representatives of the industry comprising EU supranational and intergovernmental bodies and non-governmental actors. The programmes in both windows (Research and Capabilities) are open to all the potential interested participants from Member States, including enterprises. The Research Window will finance collaborative research in defence products and technologies and it may include "projects developed in the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation" in line with defence capabilities priorities as previously agreed (Idem, p. 4). The EU defence research programme will be capability driven and will privilege "critical defence technologies" (Idem, p. 7). The funding is sourced in the EU budget under the next Multiannual Financial Framework and it should be operational by January 1st 2021. The Capability Window will provide support to the "joint development and joint acquisition of key defence capabilities" (Idem, p. 5). The funding in this case will come mainly from Member States through the European Defence Industrial Development Programme, which will make part of the Capability Window that integrates the European Defence Fund for the development phase of new European defence products and technologies. According to a European Parliament briefing document[23], during the negotiations between the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament that occurred between 15th March and 22nd May 2018, an agreement[24] on the majority of the goals and means proposed by the European Commission was reached. However, from the €500 million for the period from January 1st 2019 to 31 December 2020, only €200 million will come from the EU budget and the remaining amount will be drawn from existing budget lines (European Parliament 2018, p. 12). This will be beneficial to Member States, not only in terms of an additional financial incentives to defence cooperation in terms of capabilities, but also

21 See also Council of the European Union (2016/34, p. 4).

22 See Council of the European Union (2013/217, §11).

23 See European Parliament (2018).

24 See Council of the European Union (2018).

on what regards the multiannual financial contributions to the EU overall budget, given that the EDF will not be entirely provide for by new financings, which would require an increase in budget contributions by Member States, but complemented with existent budget lines.

The European Commission's document on the European Defense Fund[25] openly points out some of the difficulties regarding joint development and acquisition of defence capacities pertaining to the requirement to synchronize national defence planning and budget cycles, as well as to consider the risk taking factor that result from the "technical and financial risks that individual Member States may not be willing or able to take" (European Commission 2017/295 final, p. 8). A more consistent and integrated European cooperation on development and acquisition of European capabilities, based on pooled financial contributions[26] and advisory, administrative and financial support by the European Commission will give the incentive to willing Member States to joint cooperative defence initiatives[27]. The advantages of this arrangement are three fold. It provides a solid startup financial base, offers better conditions for modernization of eligible industries and capability development, and facilitates access to wider markets, especially for small and medium size enterprises, offering the opportunity for jobs creation, foster scientific research and development of higher technical qualification on dual-use and defence capabilities. As Biscop (2017, p. 1) points out, bilateral cooperation among strong strategic and industrial capable Member States alone, will not be sufficient to "reach the critical mass of investors and customers needed to make a project economically viable". Further, the financial toolbox, as suggested by EDF, by helping to support niches of specialization on defence products and technologies, through the European Network of Defence-related Regions, it may encourage existent clusters and induce the development of new regional clusters where a specific category of expertise is available or relevant to defence research and production, thus contributing to the use of funding for cooperation on what the Commission designates by "smart specialization".

25 The EDF was announced by Claude Juncker in his 2016 State of the Union address. See European Commission (2016). The Fund was also opportunity to contribute to the development of the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base through research and investments on defence capabilities.

26 These contributions will be "discounted from the structural fiscal effort expected to be accomplished" by each participant Member State. See European Commission (2017/295 final, footnote 15, p. 13).

27 The European Commission will constitute a Task Force which will assist and provide project-specific input on the base of advisory support (standardization, legal compliance, planning and best practices); administrative help (meetings, secretariat support and information hub) and financial advantages (fund and assets management and debt issuance). See European Commission (2017, p. 19).

From the strategic and operational point of view, in March 2017, the Council[28] as part of the preparation for the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, a Concept Note on the operational planning and conduct capabilities for CSDP missions and operations, was agreed under the designation Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) (Council of the European Union 6881/2017). The MPCC is meant to offer a "permanent military planning and conduct capability at the military strategic level and within the EEAS" (Idem, p. 7). This new body was placed within the EU Military Staff, directed by its Director General in order to improve civilian-military synergies and implement non-executive mission (mentoring, advising and monitoring). The Director of MPCC will retain command authority by transfer of authority from the contributing Member States involved in CSDP operations.

Having created the financial base leading to enhancing defence investments with EDF and the operational command structure to conduct CSDP operations, in line with the Civilian Planning Conduct and Capability and Military Planning Conduct and Capability within EEAS, the Council of European Union endorsed the proposal of an annual review of Member States defence commitments, putting some degree of political pressure on compliance. On the 6th March 2017 the Council endorsed modalities to establish the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) (Council of the European Union 110/2017) with the aim to further defence cooperation and promote a capability development methodology that could address european defence shortfalls and improve coherent in defence spending, under the principles of transparency and political commitment. CARD has a voluntary essence (Idem, §11) in full observation of commitments in terms of defence planning of Member States in the context of responsibilities of collective defence, in the framework of other organizations, especially NATO. At the European political level, CARD is supposed to offer "an overarching assessment on capability-related issues contributing to political guidance by the Council" (Council of the European Union 110/2017, §11) based on the information regarding Member States defence spending, their defence investments and state of national defence research initiatives provided on an annual review. At the strategic and operational levels, CARD is meant to streamline Member States spending and capability development on the base of the Capability Development Plan (CDP)[29]. A "trial run" methodology

28 Council of the European Union (2017). See also Council of the European Union (2017/9178).

29 Since July 2008 the European Defence Agency has been taking the responsibility for gathering the inputs of participating Member States anticipating future capability needs together with the European Union Military Committee and EU Military Staff and the Council Secretariat, to identify opportunities to pool and collaborate, assess current and future operations, and to integrate technologies into military capabilities. See Fiott (2018).

(Council of the European Union 2017/ 9178, §22), will allow Member States to test and validate CARD's formulation, before its full implementation is to happen in the autumn 2019. In this context, the European Defence Agency was entrusted with collecting the relevant information regarding defence planning and spending, as well as the stages of implementation of the EU capability development, resulting from priorities set by the Capability Development Plan (CDP)[30]. In June 2018 a revised Capability Defence Plan was endorsed by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in line with the developments brought by the Security and Defense Implementation Plan, CARD, EDF and PESCO initiatives; with the identification of the domains of cooperation and with the evaluation by Members States, the EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff on three levels that constitute the European Capability Development Priorities. The first, regards short-term assessment on lessons learnt from recent CSDP operations and identification of capacity shortfalls. The second, pertains to mid-term analysis of planned capabilities and future European defence opportunities for cooperation. The third concerns long term trends that will connect capability development, technological trends and industrial needs (European Defense Agency, 2018).

PESCO: Willing and Binding Compliance in Defence Cooperation

The European Union being a multilevel organization operates at different policy levels, based on a policy and security paradigm led by negotiation, confidence building and cooperation, rather by the threat of confrontational use of force. This means that full formal transfer of decision making and policy implementation to the European level may not necessarily be a requisite in the field of security and defence[31]. On the contrary, by not having acquired yet that prerogative to decide and take action on behalf of Member States, but only by having achieved the competence to act commonly with their consent, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) forges the conditions for willing compliance of participants on decision making and foreign, security and defence policy implementation. As Kaunert and Leonard (2013, p. 13) assert, policy formulation and implementation of policies "take place in Brussels by national and European civil servants, even if the compe-

30 The Capability Development Plan was initially agreed in 2008. By 2011 ten prioritized actions were approved by the Steering Board of the European Defence Agency: medical support; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; counter improvised explosive devices; helicopters availability; cyber defence; logistic support; CSDP information exchange; strategic and tactical airlift management; fuel and energy and mobility assurance. See European Defence Agency (2011).

31 The transformation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDC) in 1999 into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 2009, occurred without transfer of competences from Member States to the EU institutions.

tencies continue to be the prerogative of member states". The setting up of a Permanent Structured Cooperation, as envisaged in 2009 in the Protocol 10 to the Lisbon Treaty and Articles 42(6) and 46, falls into this category of policy acting by willing compliance, based on binding commitments, without formal transfer of sovereignty competences to the EU on European defence[32]. Protocol 10 states that CSDP will be conducted on the base of "mutual political solidarity", "identification of questions of general interest" and achievement of a higher "degree of convergence of Member States' actions" and the Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with those principles.

Despite the fact PESCO may fit into a categorization of cooperation by willing compliance, its developments in 2017 in its relation with the European Defence Fund would lead to an agreement on regulation for setting up the EDF under the 2021-2027 multi-annual financial framework (European Commission, 2018, 476 final) and the settlement of governance rules for PESCO projects and plans to implement defence initiatives (the National Implementation Plans) in terms of fostering spending for defence research and industrial development, helping to streamline the actors engagement, the financial support to defence cooperation, the procedures to further security and defence cooperation through an inclusive and flexible method of cooperation.

On the other hand, on what regards CARD monitoring procedure by the European Council and the National Implementation Plans of PESCO by the European Defense Agency and European Commission may partially fall into a border line between intergovernmental decision making and implementation, and supranational ruling in financial terms. In its latest version of 2017, PESCO appears to fit into a more integrated model of defence policy, that blends willing compliance with a mandatory and legally binding approach (Council Decision, 2017/2315), in particular on the implementation phase, although still limited by operational criteria, in spite of its aggregative and inclusive nature.

In 2017, following the European Council of June, the High Representative, the Council, the Commission and the EU Member States showed a renewed interest on Permanent Structured Cooperation in a context of growing regionalization of policies and interests[33]. The fragmentation of threats and the consequences of budget constraints on capabilities, challenged the classical and conventional way of formulating and implementing defence policies, leading to different forms of defence cooperation for instance under the format of defense clusters, which can be a good base of experience to establish PESCO[34]. In September a group of 23 Member States

32 See also Fiott, Missiroli and Tardy (2017, pp. 44-46).

33 See Council of the European Union (2017).

34 On defence clusters see Drent, Zandee and Casteleijn (2014).

presented a list of commitments in line with Protocol 10 of the TEU regarding investments, capability development and operational readiness in the areas of security and defence (Notification on PESCO 2017). The political intent to participate in PESCO was initially signed by 23 Member States through a common notification presented to the Council and the High Representative on September 2017[35]. On the 7th December, Portugal and Ireland notified the Council on their intention to join the common notification and on the 8th December the Council adopted a Council Decision formally establishing for the first time a Permanent Structured Cooperation and the list of Participating Member States (Council of the European Union 2017/14866). With PESCO, despite the fact "capabilities will remain owned and operated by Member States" as a "single set of forces" (Council of the European Union 2018 /10246)[36] the Council agreement underlines that PESCO offers an inclusive arrangement of willing states to make "binding commitments and meet the criteria based on Article 42.6, 46 and Protocol 10 of the TEU" (Notification on PESCO 2017). The statement was meant to signal the Union's interest in developing European defence as an intergovernmental policy, where Member States governments have the last word in political and operational terms, although bound by political commitments and operational criteria. The underpinning message was that of preservation of integrity of sovereign governance by participating Member States, bound by elements of selective operational eligibility and legally binding compromise.

The Council Decision formalized the intent to establish PESCO; acknowledged the list the participating Member States and the projects on which Member States can take part; adopted the political process of governance for PESCO; set the supervision, reporting arrangements and financing procedures; identified the EU actors which will take part in PESCO arrangements and formalized the opportunity for participation of third States in individual projects.

A few contending aspects can be found between the political purpose and framework of PESCO and its process of implementation, especially on the voluntary and binding essence of this cooperative process. Participation in PESCO is of voluntary nature, but the commitments agreed by Member States have a "binding" emphasis, remaining decision-making on the participant Member States. In the medium and

35 According the TEU a common notification to the Council and HR is the first formal step to establish PESCO. The initial proposal was set in motion by Germany, Spain, France and Italy. The Council Decision approved on the 8th December 2018 foresees that in accordance with Article 46(3) of the TEU other states may later participate in PESCO. From the 27 Member States Denmark, due to the Treaty reserve invoked in 2007, does not take part of the defence dimension of CSDP and Malta.

36 Single set of forces it means that they can be made available to the EU, United Nations and NATO.

long term, the non-implementation of commitments may result in some type of consequence in terms of "name and shame" or even loss of access to funding, but no further explicit consequences can be drawn from the policy documents[37].

The Council Decision is clear on this matter by dissipating fears of loss of sovereignty over decisions with implications in the field of defence: "The decision of Member States to participate in PESCO is voluntary and does not in itself affect national sovereignty or the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States" (Council of the European Union 2017/14866, p. 3). This means that not only it preserves the commitments assumed in the context of other international organizations, but participation in PESCO occurs also in conformity with their national legal system: "Contributions by the participating Member States to fulfil the more binding commitments under PESCO will be made in accordance with their applicable constitutional provisions" (Idem, ibidem).

The main binding commitments regard "collaborative defence capability development projects", being the financing of these projects supported by the Union's budget (Idem, p. 3), consequently sourced and managed by the European Commission, a supranational body of the Union[38]. The administrative expenditures of the European Union institutions and those that will fall over the EEAS, regarding the implementation of the Council Decisions, will be "charged to the Union budget". The "administrative expenditures of the EDA" will be draw from the "financing rules of the EDA" in accordance with the Council Decision (2015/1835)[39]. Whereas the operational expenditures that result from projects "shall be supported primarily by the participating Member States that take part in an individual project" (Idem, Article 8 (2)), which means that costs fall where they lie. This in itself already poses a limitation to participation, due to the fact not all willing Member States, will be able to take part in PESCO projects or to achieve significant progress, as referred on the respective National Implementation Plans, but perhaps only those financially and strategically more robust are able to meet the more demanding criteria.

The Council Decision when referring to the establishment of PESCO limits it to a conditionality pertaining to the participation of Member States "whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria" (Council of the European Union, 2017/14866)

37 In the short term it is not foreseeable that commitments assumed in the context of defense related projects financing will be object of what Schimmelfennig (2017, p. 10) "collective financial liabilities" for participant Member States as it is the case in the European economic, monetary and budgetary domains.

38 See Lavallée (2011, p. 373 and p. 381).

39 As referred in the Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315. See Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/18835 defining the statute, seat and operational rule of the European Defence Agency. Official Journal of the European Union 266, 13.10.2015, p. 55

following the provisions adopted by Article 1 of Protocol 10. This in practical terms limits PESCO not only to the military dimension of CSDP, but again to those Member States which are willing, but also strategically and operationally more able and capable.

Conversely to the original PESCO version of 2007 (TEU, Protocol 10, Article 2) and in order to strengthen the binding nature of the commitments assumed by participant Member States, PESCO in 2017, despite underlining the voluntary nature (Council of the European Union 2017/14866, §4, p. 3), it also specifies the requirements attached to a list of binding commitments annexed to the Council Decision establishing PESCO (Idem, Article 3, §1 and Annex pp. 1-6). The Decision determines the mode and periodicity of compliant practice with the "more binding commitments" assumed by Member States. The mode takes the form of National Implementation Plans "in which they [Member States] are to outline how they will meet the more binding commitments, specifying how they will fulfil the more precise objectives that are to be set at each phase" (Idem, Article 3, §2). The National Implementation Plans are to be communicated to PESCO Secretariat, monitored by EDA on defense investments and capability development and by the European External Action Service (EEAS), including the EU Military Staff on what concerns operational aspects. They will produce a joint assessment to be delivered to the Political and Security Committee, which will take a PESCO format[40]. The result of the supervision and monitoring of the National Implementation Plans by these five bodies will be of common knowledge to all the participant Member States, which in case commitments are not fulfilled may generate problems of trust on the political and strategical reliability. On what concerns periodicity, the National Implementation Plans shall be submitted to revision on an annual base.

The binding principles to which Member States are to be bounded included five major commitments based on "collective benchmarks" (Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315), as identified and agreed upon in 2007. First, the commitment to increase investment expenditure on defence up to 20% of total defence spending in order to "fill strategic capability gaps", in line with the Coordinated Annual Review and to increase up to 2% in defence research and technology (Idem, p. 62). Second, line up defence apparatus by harmonizing needs, pooling capabilities and specializing means and capabilities. Specialization does not mean that Member States will quit on having the full spectrum of means and capabilities they need, but rather that they may invest on capabilities where they can deliver a better output in terms of defence research, technologies, industries or strategic ability at the political-strategic or operational level. This is not a novelty in itself, considering that some Member States have already offered in the past specialized capabilities without

40 See Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, Annex III, §4.1.

losing political or strategic autonomy[41]. In this cooperative context, the European Defense Fund may offer the financial incentive to improve capabilities, whereas CARD may keep participating Member States aligned with the necessary capability development benchmark to meet the output criteria targeted by PESCO initiative. The third commitment regards the availability of necessary capabilities in accordance with the existent treat level and required interoperability among Member States and with strategic partners. This will facilitate deployability, efficiency and operational output in different operational contexts in the protection of European interests in the near neighbourhood and in the far security border. The fourth commitment concerns working together to overcome perceived shortfalls in the framework of the "Capability Development Plan". The fifth and last commitment respects to participation of participants Member States in collaborative projects of the European Defence Agency, based on European equipment programmes that can fill shortages and help to develop the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

Despite the voluntary nature to participate in PESCO, once contributions are pledged they are binding and subject to monitorization and obligation to implement. A sanction process is foreseen, in case compliance with contributions is not met. The Council Decision (CFSP 2017/2315, Annex III), in accordance with Article 46(4) of the Lisbon Treaty, foresees the suspension of Member States who are no longer able or willing to fulfill higher criteria, in order to ensure a coherent and credible implementation of PESCO. Participation in PESCO according to the Council Decision (CFSP, 2017/2315)[42] is "voluntary", maintaining "national sovereignty untouched", being established in "full compliance with the provisions of the TEU and the protocols attached and respecting constitutional provisions of member States". Compliance will be bound by political willingness and national interest/gain of participant Member States and by solidarity with cooperative practice regarding European defence. As Coelmont (2017) observes "in the end PESCO is about 100% national sovereignty coupled with 100 % European solidarity".

On the 14th December 2017 the Council Decision establishing PESCO was published in the Official Journal of the European Union, where legislative acts are translated into guidelines and harmonized norms and rules with a view to informal adoption or formal transposition into national legal context. The Council Decisions gathers both the Notification on PESCO, addressed to the Council and the High Represen-

41 That was the case of Germany with its strategic mobility assets, The Netherlands with precision-guided munitions, Czech Republic with its special anti-chemical and nuclear warfare unit or Spain with its air-to-air refueling capacity, which can be place at the service of various multinational force configurations.

42 See also Official Journal of the European Union L.331/57, 14 December 2017, Annex I, p. 70.

tative, and the Council Decision establishing PESCO[43]. Five principles guiding PESCO (Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, Annex I) can be identified: conditional eligibility, compliance, flexibility, inclusiveness and complementarity. On conditional eligibility, this principle is based on the concept of higher strategic and military output, in close connection with the principle of inclusiveness of Member States and third countries, notably NATO or the departing United Kingdom. Compliance and flexibility are principles with a focus on European internal output, thus strengthening the Union's consistency and coherence between principles and actions in security and defence. With the principle of legal compliance, "PESCO offers a reliable and binding legal framework within the EU institutional framework" conform to the EU Treaty and the constitutional setting of each Member State (Idem). The principle of flexibility contributes to the principle of inclusiveness, empowering the European Union to reach the level of ambition as outlined in the EU Global Strategy: to protect European citizens, to increase capacities and readiness in response to crises and to promote better relations with neighbours and strategic partners[44]. On the principle of complementarity PESCO is introduced as a framework that will strengthen "defence capabilities of the EU Member States (and) will also benefit NATO" (Idem). The Council Decision stresses this benefit by adopting a very conservative tone, which characterized the initial stages of the then European Security and Defence Identity in late 90's, by recovering the expression a "European pillar within the Alliance" that helps responding to the demand for a more efficient transatlantic burden sharing, eventually to appease those Member States that will only commit to European defence, if that will not jeopardize their transatlantic interests (Biscop, 2017).

The formal establishment of PESCO led to the setting up of a governance mechanism where the Council (Idem, Article 4, §2, p. 8) provides: "strategic direction and guidance"; follows the fulfilment of commitments for the periods 2018-2020 and 2021-2025; identifies the objectives necessary to efficient accomplishment of the commitments undertaken and assesses the contributions of participating Member

43 Agreed respectively on the 13th November and 11th December were published in the Official Journal of the European Union on the 14th December 2017.

44 An element that may strengthened the requirement for a better connection between internal and external security lies on the development of a Civilian CSDP Compact, as endorsed by the European Council on 14th December 2017. A Civilian Capability Development Plan is envisaged to be agreed in June 2018, followed by a final agreement on a Civilian CSDP Compact in November 2018, reinforcing the commitment to the EU's joined up approach as presented by the EU Global Strategy. During the European Council of December 2017, the High Representative was invited to report on the Summer 2018 on the developments made on the consultation process with the Member States and European Commission on a Civilian CSDP Compact, see Council of the European Union (2017 EUCO19/17) and Taitto (2017).

States to fulfill the agreed commitments, according to the mechanism described in Article 6" (Idem, §2(d)), which are those of "unity, consistency and effectiveness of PESCO" (Article 6, §1). The Council also holds the responsibility for establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO framework.

Following the Council Decision of the 6th March 2018, establishing the list of projects to be developed under PESCO, project members will have to define objectives and timelines for each project, as well as the roles and responsibilities of each Member State. During the European Council of June 2018, it was agreed to assess the progress of the current seventeen PESCO projects and to call, in a rather surprising manner, to a "second wave of PESCO projects". Further a new Council Decision is expected to be issued in November 2018 on the "exceptional participation in PESCO projects" (Council of the European Union 2018/10246) of third countries. This pressure for an agreement on a second wave of new projects can be counterproductive considering that the initial stage of PESCO is still under way and a call to assess progress and implementation of the first seventeen projects is on. Participation in PESCO should not be regarded as a doing by decree project. It is a rather complex enterprise that touches core domains of states' sovereignty, with a likely potential to fall victim of the particularities of national interests of Member States. It is a matter that involves political will, like minded strategic outlooks, similar security and defence cultures, structural availability of funding, adequate military capabilities and also industrial and technological capacity. To cooperate in capabilities development in order to make them more deployable, interoperable, sustainable and effective involves an accurate assessment on the current international environment, a validation of Member States solidarity and a long term commitment to defence cooperation on how and with what are Member States willing and able to guarantee the security and defence of collective interests. Considering that the majority of current CSDP actions are of civilian nature, a closer cooperation between internal and external security must be taken into consideration and PESCO should be a relevant part of this equation. The strengthening of the civilian dimension of CSDP, with the agreement on a Civilian CSDP Compact (Council of the European Union 2017/19) is already awkwardly drawing from the short experience achieved with collaborative defence projects from which only a few are dual use. It will be interesting to follow how much dual use interface there will be between civilian and military Capability Development Plans and how much the EU Global Strategy call for a "EU strategic approach to resilience" (European Commission and High Representative, 2017/21 final) and rapid response will translate into EU initiatives and how crisis management will not be replaced, but rather complemented by a common defence project[45].

45 See European Political Strategy Centre (2017).

If the European Union will be able to develop civilian and military initiatives in a true joined-up approach[46], it will have to improve opportunities for European and Member-State's actors responsible for the internal dimensions of security and justice to work closely with those responsible for CSDP. The combined efforts between preventive and reactive EU policies, instruments and capabilities will be the test case for future CSDP or for a more effective international role for the European Union.

On what regards cooperation with third countries, notably with the UK, their participation on European defence initiatives, namely through PESCO, will only reinforce this initiative if their commitment is a long term compromise and not a pledge conditioned by the less favourable developments of their national policies or by the internal peculiarities of national party politics, with a negative impact on the future of the European project and political solidarity.

Conclusion

European defense cooperation comes at a time when multilateralism is relentlessly contested and international cooperation dismissed from the foreign policy agenda by a few major international players. Despite the apparent unfavourable context, recent European defence cooperation signals three singular developments. First, it marks some degree of unprecedented internal commonality of views, among EU Member States, on a policy domain that traditionally rests close to states sovereign attributes. This has been signalled in different ways with the identification of clear framing goals that will guide European defence (protect European citizens, respond to crisis, develop cooperative regional order with partners), together with the functional targets of rationalisation, synchronization, harmonization, specialization and interoperability. Commonality of views is also expressed on the processes of financial and political governance and on the definition of strategic priorities that will guide European capability development, offering an indication of a common assessment of the challenges ahead. Second, it was able to generate within the EU and among transatlantic allies (the US excluded) a collective sense of necessity to coope-

46 In 2011 in a pioneer work, the EU Political and Security Committee invited the Crisis Management Planning Directorate to draw together with the representatives of the EEAS bodies, the European Commission and the Chairman of the COSI Support Group a Road Map document aiming at identify lines of action within specific areas and the correspondent stakeholders necessary to develop ways to strengthen ties between CSDP and FSJ domains. The result was the identification of 27 lines of action in 5 specific domains (Comprehensive Situational Awareness and Intelligence Support to the EU; Exchange of Information and Mutual Support; Improving Mechanisms in the Decision-Making Process; Improving Cooperation in Planning EU External Action and Capabilities: Human Resources and Training). See Council of the European Union (2011/15562).

rate, rather than the privilege of choosing to do so, with effective cooperation initiatives already under development between the EU and NATO. Third, it happens following the introduction of the EU Global Strategy, that despite the fact it was not endorsed by the Council, it was able to mobilize the will and to set the basic framework of dialogue for future European defense cooperation.

After June 2016, an Implementation Plan on Security and Defense, a Defence Action Plan, a plan to further develop capabilities and a European Defence Fund were set off to strengthen European defence, mobilising the political will, the necessary funding and the availability of European and national public and private actors essential to this endeavour. Simultaneously, the EU-NATO joint initiative offers a singular opportunity to improve interoperability and create better synergies between both organizations. The European reiteration that defence capabilities will not be developed at the expenses of a weaker transatlantic alliance nor with heavier costs to the Member States budgets, makes the idea politically appealing, economically more viable and from the research and innovation point of view an interesting opportunity for the industrial sector.

Similarly, the investments to be made on European defence according to a set of strategic priorities, not only resonate the interests of EU Member States, but of those who are also transatlantic allies, by helping to meet the challenges of hybrid threats, in the cyber domain, on fight against terrorism and in crisis response, not only with better cooperation, but also with more integrated education, training, confidence building and capabilities development.

The EUGS departing from its "principled pragmatism" paved the way for an approach to European foreign policy based on the acknowledgment that Europe has interests, that "defense matters" and that cooperation is a necessity in foreign policy and an opportunity to enhance capabilities and develop national and European research, technologies and industries. This may be a reason why European defence cooperation can be said to be a transformative project that in the end will benefit small, medium and large Member States and defense stakeholders of various scales.

European defence cooperation is not only about strategic approach, funding and technological developments. It is also about fostering political will, trust and common support to a more rational manner of managing security and defence needs and resources, with the joint effort of European actors, Member States and that of strategic partners like NATO.

From an implementation point of view, European defence cooperation offers a blend of two sets of orders. On the one hand, an order made of constitutive norms of willing compliance, respectful of Member States constitutional orders and of their international and bilateral commitments. On the other, a regulative order based on legally binding responsibilities supervised by European bodies, on the

base of regular reviews of foreign, security and defense decisions and actions of Member States. This means not only an opportunity for more integrated decision making and shaping, more financial governance for defence, but also more internal and international responsibility for Member States on European defense. The EU with its "Defense Package" appears to be evolving to a more integrated model of defence policy that blends willing compliance with a mandatory and legally binding approaches, in particular on the implementation phases, although still limited by operational criteria, in spite of its much announced inclusive character. The test case for any defense project does not arise from circumstances of unity, but from when internal and external challenges call for decisions and actions at the high end of international politics, in crisis and conflict prevention and immediate response.

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European Defence Markets and Industries: New Initiatives, New Challenges

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Abstract

The author discusses how the excessive focus of European countries on national priorities have been leading to a number of structural problems, in the European defence market, related to international competition, military redundancies and unnecessary costs. The article reflects on the recent efforts by the EU to support the Europen Defense and Technological Industrial Base and it concludes with some thoughts on the challenges facing the EU and the European defence market. The paper is structured in three major parts. First, it provides an overview of recent initiatives on EU defence. Second, it examines the latest developments designed to turn these initiatives into action. Third, it concludes by outlining some strategic elements important in the context of future European defence, notably the required balance between the political will of Member States, the European financial incentives for defence and the potential interest of European industry on these incentives.

Resumo

O Mercado Europeu da Defesa e as Indústrias: Novas Iniciativas, Novos Desafios

O autor parte da afirmação de que, uma excessiva atenção dos países europeus sobre as suas prioridades nacionais no plano da defesa tem causado problemas estruturais no âmbito do mercado de defesa europeu relacionados com questões de concorrência, redundância de meios militares e desnecessários custos adicionais. Examinam-se os esforços recentemente desenvolvidos relativos ao apoio da Base Industrial e Tecnológica da Defesa Europeia e conclui refletindo sobre os desafios que a União Europeia e o mercado de defesa europeu enfrentam. O artigo estrutura-se em três partes. A primeira oferece uma perspetiva sobre as iniciativas recentemente desenvolvidas no domínio da defesa europeia. A segunda examina em que medida aqueles desenvolvimentos se têm traduzido em ações concretas no quadro da defesa europeia. Por último, conclui com algumas considerações estratégicas importantes no quadro do futuro da defesa europeia, nomeadamente o equilíbrio a alcançar entre a vontade dos Estados Membros, os incentivos europeus no plano da defesa e o interesse da indústria europeia em utilizar aqueles incentivos.

2018
N.º 150
pp. 76-84

Introduction

It is difficult to define the exact nature of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). In reality, there is still as yet no single defence market in Europe. This is despite the fact that successive rounds of consolidation have led to the creation of so-called 'European champions' such as Airbus and/or MBDA Missile Systems. In today's Europe, defence markets are still largely national and they are concentrated in a few countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK). A number of other countries such as Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Poland, Portugal and the Netherlands also maintain certain elements of a defence industrial base. The rule still seems to be that defence spending takes place on a purely national basis. According to the European Defence Agency (EDA), in 2015 about 82% of equipment spending and 92.2% of Research and Technology (R&T) investment occurred on a national basis (European Defence Agency, 2017). Yet major European collaborative programmes have still been possible to initiate. There is the example of the Eurofighter (Germany, Spain and the UK), the FREMM frigate (France and Italy), the NH90 helicopter (multiple countries) and the A400M transport aircraft (multiple countries).

Cooperation in bilateral and minilateral formats have produced mixed results, but none have been advanced through an European Union (EU) framework. The tendency towards national priorities has led to a number of structural problems in the European defence market related to international competition and military redundancies and costs.

Let us first consider the market aspects. In 2015, European industries achieved a €222 billion turnover representing a sector breakdown of civil aeronautics (51%), land and naval (24%), military aeronautics (22%) and space (3%). Close to 848,000 people are directly employed in the sector in Europe (ASD Europe, 2017). Although defence spending has started to rise in the EU mainly following the actions of Russia in Ukraine, the EU still experiences duplication and waste. For example, the European Parliament estimates that if EU Member States were to cooperate further in defence-industrial matters they could save up to €26 billion per year (European Parliament, 2017). The European Commission have drawn attention to the costs of duplication. In the EU there are 17 different types of main battle tanks (MBT), in the United States (US) just 1. In the EU there are 29 different types of destroyers and frigates, in the US only 4. In the EU there are 20 variants of fighter planes, but there are only 6 types in the US (European Commission, 2017a).

In addition to these costs and duplications is the EU's geopolitical outlook. It is no secret that Europe is experiencing a sustained deterioration in its security landscape. Threats on the southern and eastern neighbourhoods pose challenges such as nuclear and conventional threats (Russia), migration, terrorism (Sahel), energy insecurity and hybrid threats.

The EU also faces questions of unity. 'Brexit' is the most severe case that poses huge challenges for Europe's defence markets. One must also consider the shifting nature of the transatlantic relationship. As the *EU Global Strategy* makes clear, Europe has no real option but to strive for its own strategic autonomy in security and defence (EU Global Strategy, 2016). A major question driving policy in Brussels today is: can the EU fully rely on the security bargain that has emerged since 1945 and what more can the Union do for itself? 'Strategic autonomy', a term that has traditionally made some Member States weary, increasingly seems to drive forward EU cooperation on defence.

The EU is no stranger to shaping the European defence market, for in 2009 the European Commission developed legislation on defence procurement (directive 2009/81/EC) and intra-EU defence transfers (directive 2009/43/EC). In the past year or so, however, the EU has launched a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), a European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Since the British decision to leave the EU, the bulk of the remaining members have seized on a 'window of opportunity' to move forward on defence-industrial cooperation. Initiatives such as Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) were all adopted in the space of about a year having in previous years and decades not developed defence-industrial policy very far. This paper reflects on the recent efforts by the EU to support the EDTIB and it concludes with some thoughts on the challenges facing the EU and the European defence market. The paper is structured in three major parts: (1) an overview of recent initiatives on EU defence; (2) the latest developments designed to turn these visions into action; and (3) a conclusion that outlines some strategic elements for the EU to consider in the future.

What is the EU's Role?

Coordinated Annual Review on Defence

Despite the existence of NATO, a number of European countries have in recent months decided to advance their defence-industrial cooperation through the EU. This began on 14 November 2016 with the creation of the CARD. Initially conceived of as a 'European semester on defence' (to mirror the EU's economic policy equivalent), the CARD is designed to ensure that individual national defence plans are coordinated at the EU level. EU Member States recognised that there is a need to 'deepen defence cooperation and ensure more optimal use, including coherence, of defence spending plans' (Council of the EU, 2016). Planning for defence on a purely national basis, while maintaining some notion of sovereignty, has led to the types of duplication and costs mentioned in the introduction to this paper. Under CARD, the idea is for national defence planners to share information with fellow EU Member States on their budgetary planning cycles and future capability/

technology plans. Once this information is shared, it is thought that the CARD can help EU Member States identify common capability shortfalls, potential areas of joint capability development and future collaboration on defence research.

Therefore, if the *EU Global Strategy* called for the 'gradual synchronisation and mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability development practices', the CARD is the mechanism designed to meet these objectives (EU Global Strategy, 2016, pp. 20-21). As the 'CARD secretariat', the EDA will be expected to report to EU defence ministers on a biennial basis. However, CARD will be a voluntary – Member State-driven – mechanism. As the Council conclusions of 6 March 2017 make clear, CARD will not entail a one-size-fits-all approach to defence planning but provide 'a better overview at EU level of issues such as defence spending and national investment as well as defence research efforts' (Council of the EU, 2017). This, of course, poses some challenges for the EU as voluntary approaches to defence cooperation have underperformed in the past. For example, in 2007 the EDA Member States agreed to voluntary and collective defence benchmarks on defence spending, R&T investment and European collaboration that have not consistently been met in the past. A key question is whether a voluntary CARD can overcome past behaviour on defence cooperation on the part of the EU Member States.

European Defence Fund

A second major initiative developed by the EU since 2016 is the EDF. The Fund is designed to use the EU budget to support defence research and capability development. Although still in an early stage, there are presently two preparatory elements to the defence fund. First, for defence research to be secured as a fully-fledged 'European Defence Research Programme' (EDRP) after 2020 (when the new EU budget cycle begins), the European Commission has initiated a 'Preparatory Action on Defence Research' (PADR). For the years up to 2020, the PADR has a budgetary allocation of €90 million – the EU will cover up to 100% of the eligible costs of defence research financed under the PADR. After 2020, it is hoped that an EDRP can secure €500 million per year. The PADR has already started funding defence research programmes at the EU level. In 2017, an initial call for proposals under PADR received 24 concrete proposals involving almost 190 entities such as firms and research institutes.

With a budget of €25 million in 2017 (the overall €90 million up to 2020 is divided into yearly amounts), the EU is presently funding defence research projects on strategic technology foresight (a project led an Italian firm); maritime surveillance and interdiction (involving firms and research institutes Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom); adaptive camouflage for soldiers (involving firms from France, Germany, Lithua-

nia, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden); complex data and communication soldier systems (involving Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden); and, finally, protective soldier clothing (involving Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).

The EDF also seeks to fund capability development programmes. This part of the fund is less developed in terms of concrete funding programmes. Whereas PADR prepares the ground for an EDRP after 2020, a European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) will set the ground work for a fully-fledged capability fund post-2020 by investing €500 million into EU capability development from 2019-2020. The EDIDP is currently working its way through the EU's legislative process – the European Commission have prepared a draft Regulation on the EDIDP and the Council of the EU and the European Parliament have provided their feedback. The institutions have now met on three occasions during the first half of 2018 to discuss the final regulation. Unlike the PADR/EDRP, which are financed up to 100% of eligible costs, the EDIDP and eventual capability window will only have an eligible cost ceiling of 20% of EU funding. This means that the remaining 80% of funding for capability development should still come from the Member States. Post-2020, it is assumed that the EU will invest €1 billion per year into capability development and this should have a minimum leveraging effect of €5 billion per year when Member State contributions are combined.

There is as yet no clear definition on what capabilities the EU will support under the EDIDP. All one does know at present is the approach and objective of the European Commission and what they want to achieve vis-à-vis the EDTIB. In fact, the legal basis for the EDIDP is Article 173 of the Lisbon Treaty and it clearly states that: "The Union and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union's industry exist. For that purpose, in accordance with a system of open and competitive markets, their action shall be aimed at: speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes; encouraging an environment favourable to initiative and to the development of undertakings throughout the Union, particularly small and medium-sized undertakings; encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation between undertakings; and fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development". The overarching rationale, therefore, is clearly to improve the competitiveness of Europe's defence market.

Permanent Structured Cooperation

Another major breakthrough on EU defence-industrial policy in 2017 was the initiation of PESCO, which is an 'ambitious, binding and inclusive' framework aimed at incentivising cooperation among Member States in the field of defence capability development and operations. Accordingly, the 25 Member States that have joined

PESCO have accepted 20 commitments and are (in smaller groups of Member States) part of a first wave of 17 capability projects. The aim of PESCO is to raise defence spending in a concerted manner, develop military capabilities jointly, and make their military assets available for operations. Joining PESCO is voluntary. Activities carried out in the framework of PESCO can have either a capability or an operational dimension. Both commitments and projects will be the object of regular assessment by the High Representative for the Union's Foreign and Security Policy/ Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) with the support of the EDA and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The industry-related PESCO commitments include: regularly increasing defence budgets in real terms and increased defence investment and research expenditure; involvement in the EDF to increase joint capability projects; and to fill capability shortcomings, plus many more.

In terms of the PESCO projects, a first wave of 17 projects has been identified in 2018 and they are designed to promote cross-border cooperation between EU Member States. The projects in phase one include: a European Medical Command (9 Member States); European Secure Software Defined Radio (8); Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations (13); Military Mobility (24); EU Training Mission Competence Centre (13); European Training Certification Centre for European Armies (2); Energy Operational Function (4); Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package (5); Maritime (semi-Autonomous) Systems for Mine Countermeasures (6); Harbour and Maritime Surveillance and Protection (4); Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance (7); Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform (7); Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security (7); Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations (4); Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle/Amphibious Assault Vehicle/Light Armoured Vehicle (3); Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery – 2); and EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (5).

Compared with previous EU efforts in the defence domain, the added-value of PESCO comes from the combination of the nature of commitments that Member States will make, the accountability that the framework creates for Member States and the permanence of the framework. Taken together, these elements are supposed to shape national mindsets and practices, and in the end the form of cooperation, in a way never observed in the past. PESCO is supposed to lead to greater capability cooperation and industrial synchronisation. Although not all of the PESCO projects currently have an industrial/capability development dimension, this is the start of a process that should lead to the identification and development of new capabilities for the EU. It should also be stated that the European Defence Fund may also be instrumentalised to support capability development within PESCO. For example, the European Commission have stated that the 20% of eligible costs that they will

cover under the EDIDP/capability fund could eventually be increased to 30% for projects placed within PESCO.

Challenges on the Horizon?

The initiatives outlined above mark in many ways a quantum shift in the way the EU deals with defence-industrial issues and the EDTIB. There remain a number of questions, however, about the CARD, the EDF and PESCO. First, for PESCO there are questions about how far the Member States will adhere to the 20 binding commitments made to one another. PESCO is based on an annual review but there is no automatic sanctioning mechanism for states that do not meet their commitments, except for other Member States agreeing to exclude a Member State/s from PESCO. This is unlikely to happen when political considerations are kept in mind. Given the known challenges associated with capability development initiatives outside of the EU framework, there is a need to ensure that the EDF and PESCO do not fall prey to the same pitfalls. Clearly, EDF and PESCO capability projects should meet the objectives of CSDP and European defence more broadly, but there is a need to ensure that capability programmes are sufficiently ambitious to stimulate the buy-in of ministries of defence and industry (even if PESCO and the EDF are not designed to subsidise ongoing capability development projects). Capability development is a long-term process spanning multiple years and decades, and so success through EDF/PESCO has to be measured with this in mind. Achieving a mutually reinforcing relationship between PESCO, the EDF and CARD is still a work in progress.

Second, it will be crucial to achieve industry buy-in to the EDF. The European defence market is built on a complex defence supply chain that is comprised of a range of private, semi-private and public primes, midcaps and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). If the European Commission is ambitious about the types of defence capability projects that could be launched under the 'capability window' of the EDF, then the European defence supply chain as a whole may likely have to buy into the financial incentives on offer too. It will be critical to get primes, midcaps and SMEs on board, but the question is how to do so across borders in Europe. Member States that have a relatively small defence industry might be interested in the EDF for their SMEs, but EDF projects will require more than SMEs and midcaps if the EU is to develop truly ambitious defence capabilities. Prime firms will be needed to develop high-value systems, but the challenge here is that many of these firms still see governments as the major customers and investors in the defence sector. The challenge facing the European Commission is thus two-fold: first, how to stop the EDF being seen as a subsidy for SMEs in smaller Member States; and second, how to ensure that EDF projects do not just benefit prime firms in the larger Member States. This will be a delicate balance to achieve.

Finally, there is another challenge related to the use of the EU budget for defence capability development and support to the defence supply chain. To put it rather candidly, the EU budget is built on contributions from every EU Member State, but the 'capability window' appears to be geared to projects taken up by only a handful of willing Member States. This begs the question: can a common resource such as the EU budget be used to support the needs of a handful of EU Member States?

This could be a test of solidarity and indicate how far Member States view investments made through the EDF, with EU budget support, as a common public good for the whole of the EU. Here, one needs to keep in mind that national parliaments and ministries of defence will also have a say on how the EDF is used. This challenge may even invite some creative thinking as to how capabilities that are eventually developed under the EDF could be pooled, loaned, or utilised by the whole of the EU at some point. This is especially true in a PESCO context.

Conclusion

This paper has outlined recent efforts by the EU to support the EDTIB. The paper provided an overview of recent initiatives on EU defence and the latest developments designed to turn these visions into action. The paper has also considered some (non-exhaustive) strategic elements and questions for the EU to consider. What is clear with EDF, CARD and PESCO is that EU Member States do finally seem to understand that EU defence cooperation is a good way of ensuring the competitiveness of Europe's defence industry and capability development in the future. Yet, as signaled at the start of this paper it is unclear how – in the short term at least – EU Member States are willing to give up their national prerogatives in favour of a single European defence market. We are still at an early stage in developments, but the EDF and PESCO in particular are configured to rely heavily on the political will of Member States. Without Member States – who will ultimately develop and use military capabilities – the EDF and PESCO cannot be a success. The impact of these initiatives on the EDTIB is still unclear – the truth is it is too early to say –, but there is great promise in the efforts taken by the EU.

The EU has achieved much in putting forward the idea for an EDF, CARD and PESCO. As a policy response to the need to push European defence-industrial cooperation to the next level, the EU institutions and Member States have devised a range of innovative policy initiatives. Although financial incentives have been used in national defence procurement processes for many years, using financial incentives at the EU level is new and exciting terrain. The challenges ahead are myriad including: how will a balanced EDTIB be achieved? How will industry buy into the EDF/PESCO? How will the EDF transition from defence research to capability development? What are the capability development priorities?

Much depends on the EU Member States and whether they seize on the incentives put on the table by the European Commission. While it is up to the Member States to politically engage with the EDF, CARD and PESCO, the EU can in the meantime continue to stoke industry's interest but also listen to their specific needs. The task of thinking about what defence capabilities the EU should prioritise begins in earnest.

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EU-NATO Relations: A Long-Term Perspective

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Abstract
EU-NATO relations have long amounted to a beauty contest. In reality, the EU and NATO are very different organisations: the former is an actor, the latter is an instrument. Taking this into account, and leaving behind the often emotional and ideological debates, an effective division of labour can be designed for the three key functions of security and defence: strategy, operations, and capabilities. The result can be a European pillar of the European allies and partners of NATO – which also make up the EU – that contributes to collective defence while achieving strategic autonomy for expeditionary operations. The questions remains whether such a pillar should eventually also seek strategic autonomy in territorial defence. Eventually, a new NATO could emerge: a US-EU alliance.

Resumo
As Relações UE-NATO: Uma Perspetiva de Longo-Prazo

O artigo analisa as relações entre a UE-NATO na perspetiva do que as diferencia, considerando a primeira como um actor e a segunda como um instrumento. Partindo desta base analítica, rejeitando os debates emocionais e ideológicos, o autor considera que uma divisão eficaz do trabalho estratégico pode ser equacionada em três funções centrais nos domínios da segurança e defesa: estratégia, operações e capacidades. O resultado poderá ser o do desenvolvimento de um pilar europeu dos aliados europeus e dos parceiros NATO – que também integram a UE – que contribua para a defesa colectiva e ao mesmo tempo que assegure a autonomia estratégica na vertente expedicionária. A questão mantém-se se tal pilar deve ou não alcançar a autonomia estratégica europeia no que respeita à defesa territorial. Eventualmente uma nova NATO poderá emergir sob a forma de uma aliança entre os EUA e a União Europeia.

2018
N.º 150
pp. 85-93

Introduction

If one could start from a blank page, one would not create two separate organisations, the EU and NATO, but assemble European cooperation on all dimensions of foreign, security and defence policy under one roof. But we cannot. Europeans organize their collective territorial defence in NATO, which can also deploy expeditionary operations of any type anywhere in the world. The EU as well, through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), can deploy all types of expeditionary operations across the globe. When a crisis demands a military response, the question thus inevitably arises under which flag Europeans will act. Neither NATO nor the EU have armed forces of their own, so they must appeal to the same pool of capabilities for any operation.

A Beauty Contest

As a result, a beauty contest has arisen between both organisations, which have almost come to see deployments as a market. Both absolutely want to maintain their market share and their consequent claim to their members' military capabilities.

For example, there was great frustration in NATO headquarters in Brussels when after the November 2015 terrorist attacks, France invoked Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty rather than NATO's Article 5. This was read as a direct threat against what NATO considers to be its exclusive market: the security of our own territory. Many in NATO also felt overshadowed by the EU's maritime operations, notably against Somali piracy. When the EU launched Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean, NATO perceived a new market and quickly followed up with its own operation in the Aegean Sea, between Greece and Turkey. This operation could not have been done under the EU flag, for that would have been unacceptable to Turkey, a member of NATO but not of the EU and highly critical of the EU's defence dimension. This shows that the beauty contest is totally meaningless. Europeans cannot but assess on a case-by-case basis under which flag they can operate most effectively.

The EU for its part often feels marginalized, because when its Member States decide to launch combat operations they seldom, if ever, consider the CSDP as a framework. It goes further than that though: in fact states prefer to pass NATO by as well. The states that decide on combat operations prefer to conduct them themselves (such as the French in Mali) or through an ad hoc coalition outside the EU and NATO (such as the coalition against ISIL), so they can retain maximal control. Under the EU and NATO flag we patrol the seas, we train partner countries' forces, and we preposition forces in Eastern Europe. But if there is any chance of combat, it appears that states prefer not to use either organisation – which makes the competition between them even more absurd.

Apples and Pears

In order to put a stop to this meaningless competition, one must understand the nature of both organisations and how their tasks relate to each other. During the long years of the Cold War, NATO acquired such centrality in European foreign and defence policy, and in Europe's relations with the US, that many cannot, or do not want, to see that this centrality has long since come to an end. Topping the agenda of Europe's foreign policy no longer is the threat of invasion, but climate change, energy dependence, international trade, terrorism, the rise of China, etc.: issues on which NATO has little to contribute. On these issues, the EU mostly interacts directly with the US, outside the NATO framework.

The EU and NATO cannot be compared, in fact. The EU is a supranational organisation in which states share sovereignty. No EU Member State has abandoned any sovereignty, but on many issues Member States can only decide collectively, and by majority. This makes the EU a unique type of actor, something in between a state and an organisation. NATO on the contrary is an entirely intergovernmental organisation, where all decisions are taken by consensus, and there is no question of pooling sovereignty. In the EU this intergovernmental system applies only to foreign, security and defence policy: in these domains European integration has advanced the least and the EU too for the time being operates in an intergovernmental way. In general, however, the political centre of gravity of the EU lies in between Brussels and the national capitals, whereas in NATO it clearly is in the capitals (and in one capital in particular: Washington).

Consequently, the EU is an actor, whereas NATO is an instrument. The states remain the most important actors, of course. Each state wages a foreign policy and defines a strategy to that end. Through the EU, the EU Member States in addition also pursue a collective foreign policy, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP, into which the CSDP is integrated), for which in 2016 they have defined a collective strategy, the *Global Strategy*. If in a given case EU strategy requires military intervention, the Europeans have several options. A military operation can be conducted by the EU itself (through the CSDP), but also by NATO (which can thus be an instrument of EU strategy), by European forces under UN command, or by an ad hoc coalition of Member States (and non-members). It can even be a national operation, conducted by one Member State with the logistic and other support of fellow members.

NATO does not wage its own foreign policy and therefore does not determine European strategy: EU strategy sets the context within which NATO operates, not the other way around. The only exception is collective territorial defence under Article 5, because for now the EU does not really play a role in this field. Hence for collective defence, and for that only, NATO is the forum where Europeans and Americans together decide on strategy. For all other issues, Europeans set strategy

through the EU, and Americans have their own US strategy. Many still think the opposite holds true, however, as if NATO in all areas determines the strategy within which Europeans, including the EU, must then act.
The Ukraine crisis can easily demonstrate that this latter interpretation is faulty. NATO conducts the military response to the crisis: prepositioning forces on our eastern borders, as a message to Russia and to our own public opinion. That response takes place within the framework of an overall vision on the future of Europe's relations with Russia, in all areas, including energy for example. This vision is not crafted in NATO. Europeans decide on this collectively in the EU, starting from their interests and priorities as Russia's neighbour, while the Americans develop their own views in Washington. The combination of those European and American visions then determines the margin within which the military instrument is put to use, via NATO.
Apparently it remains difficult to accept this new reality. Many refuse to see that in today's multipolar world European and American interests and priorities are too divergent to pretend there can be a single NATO view of the world. Moreover, in US strategy China and Asia is now priority number one, no longer Europe, hence the US (rightly) expects Europeans themselves to ensure the stability of Europe's periphery. So whether they act under the NATO flag or the EU flag: it will in any case have to be European states that take the initiative to resolve crises around Europe – the US will no longer automatically do that in its stead. At a stroke, this new American position renders EU-NATO competition entirely obsolete.
In such a context, the EU must be an autonomous strategic actor. This implies that NATO operates within a strategic framework that is determined by the US on the one hand, and by the EU on the other hand. And that NATO can be the instrument of an exclusively European or even EU strategy, if in a specific contingency only Europeans want to act and use the NATO command structure to that end. On the other hand, this also implies that the EU must stop debating EU strategy as if the implementation of its military aspects is undertaken entirely through the CSDP, while the reality is that the majority of military operations take place in other frameworks.

Division of Labour

In order to optimise EU-NATO relations and, at the same time, achieve the strategic autonomy that the EU absolutely needs, one must address the three main functions of security and defence policy. Leaving all dogmas and emotions behind, rational analysis can determine how to organize them most effectively.

Strategy

First comes the strategic function. In this area things are clear-cut: the European states wage a foreign policy through the EU and to that end define a grand strategy

that integrates diplomacy, defence, trade, and aid. Only in the specific area of collective defence do the individual European states enter directly into a dialogue with the US and are the strategy and the military plans crafted in NATO. When a security problem arises in the periphery of Europe that may require a military response, i.e. in all non-Article 5 scenarios, it is through the EU as well that the Europeans states should assess the situation, in view of their values, interests and priorities as codified in the *Global Strategy*, in order to decide which action to take. In doing so, they have to take into account their overall foreign policy towards all states concerned, a foreign policy which in any case they wage through the EU.

Operations

Second, there is the operational function. There is no doubt who will have to launch future operations: increasingly, that will have to be the Europeans. Possibly with specific US support in well-defined areas (such as intelligence, special forces, and transport) as long as Europe itself does not possess all the required strategic enablers. But the condition for US support will be that the Europeans themselves take the initiative – if we don't act to resolve crises in our own backyard the US is not going to either. Under which command Europeans will then deploy cannot be defined beforehand. It can only be decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the scale of operations and which command and control structure they require, on which countries want to participate, and on which flag is politically acceptable in the country where we have to deploy and which is not. There's no harm therefore in maintaining various options: the CSDP, NATO, the UN, a temporary coalition, or a national operation by a single state.

A contentious issue is whether the EU needs its own military headquarters. True strategic autonomy implies that one possesses all the means that one needs to act, without being dependent on the means of other actors. That includes the operational headquarters required to plan and conduct military operations up to the scale of the EU's Headline Goal (50 to 60,000 troops). Today only NATO is capable of that. In addition, some individual countries have national operational headquarters that can conduct operations of some scale, and which can be made available to the EU on a case-by-case basis: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The EU as such has within its structures but a small cell of just over 30 officers: the Military Planning and Conduct Capacity (MPCC). This is to conduct only non-executive missions, such as capacity-building and training. Many EU officials have declared that in term the MPCC can grow into a real headquarters, but for now it is very far from that. Hence, when in a crisis Europeans decide to deploy troops under the EU flag they must sub-contract command and control, either to one of the five national headquarters, or to NATO.

This is what the discussion is about: how certain can one be that one of those headquarters will always be available if and when Europeans want to launch an operation? The five national headquarters are not automatically geared to conducting multinational operations. Staff officers from all Member States must be trained in all five, year after year, which is a costly affair. As regards the various NATO headquarters, the EU in principle has a guaranteed access, thanks to the 2002 Berlin Plus agreement. In practice, however, NATO decides on a case-by-case basis, hence many fear that a non-EU NATO Ally could veto the EU's access. This is not a hypothetical scenario. When in 2011 the British and the French had convinced the Americans to support the intervention in Libya, the US demanded that this would be a NATO operation. France, which had wanted to make this an EU operation, had to accept, only for Turkey then to state that it could not accept a NATO operation in that area. Washington then had to lean heavily on Ankara before NATO could finally assume command of the operation, which by then had already been going on for several days. The US itself is unlikely to refuse access to NATO command and control, for it wants Europe to assume more responsibility. But Washington will of course have a lot of influence on those operations, because American officers occupy most key posts in NATO headquarters.

There are but two possible solutions. The EU could create a fully-fledged operational headquarters. In a way that is a duplication of NATO, which is why the UK has always blocked this option, but it's not necessarily an unnecessary one. As seen above, it is useful to be able to operate under more than one flag, since one can never know the exact circumstances of any contingency beforehand. The EU could use this opportunity to construct a unique civil-military operational headquarters, integrating all dimensions of crisis management. The other option is to give the EU direct access to the NATO command structure. The Libyan air campaign, for example, was run by the NATO headquarters in Naples. If the EU has recourse to the NATO command structure according to the Berlin Plus agreement, it does not enter into communication with a headquarters like Naples, but with SHAPE, which passes on EU directives to the headquarters conducting the operation. As a result, the EU has but little control of its own operation. One could however grant the EU direct access to a headquarters like Naples, so that the headquarters is much closer to the political decision-making.

Capabilities

The third and final function is capabilities: the decision which different capabilities in army, navy and air force, in which quantities, are required. NATO has construed an elaborate mechanism, the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), which defines precise capability objectives for each Ally and closely monitors performance. The Alliance defines a level of ambition for NATO as a whole, for all Allies

including the US, for Article 5 (collective territorial defence) and non-Article 5 (expeditionary operations). That level of ambition is naturally higher than that of the EU-countries alone, which moreover includes only expeditionary operations, not territorial defence. What the NDPP cannot guarantee, however, is that the group of just the European NATO Allies (and partners) can act alone if necessary. NATO only looks at two levels: NATO as a whole and each Ally separately. One objective, for example, is for NATO as a whole to have sufficient strategic enablers, but the system is not built to ensure that those enablers are spread around the Alliance, and so they are not. Most strategic enablers are American capabilities. As a result, the sum total of the capabilities of all EU Member States that are members or partners of NATO does not suffice to allow that group of countries to mount operations by themselves, without US support. An additional cause is that no single European country can afford to acquire strategic enablers in numbers that matter. If the European Allies want strategic enablers, they will have to pool their means and acquire them collectively.

In order to achieve strategic autonomy, the EU Member States should therefore first define their own military level of ambition: which operations do the EU countries always want to be able to launch, if necessary by themselves, without any support from the non-EU NATO Allies? Which capabilities, including strategic enablers, does that then require?

That collective capability target of the EU countries could then be incorporated into the NDPP, so that NATO can elaborate a mix of capability targets at three levels instead of just two: for NATO as a whole, for the EU Member States that are members or partners of NATO as a group, and for each individual NATO Ally. The result should be that the EU Member States collectively hold a range of capabilities that allows them to contribute to collective territorial defence together with all NATO Allies, to contribute to expeditionary operations with all NATO Allies, but also to conduct certain expeditionary operations alone if necessary, in accordance with an EU-defined level of ambition.

If the EU Member States were to integrate their armed forces ever more, through EU mechanisms such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a real European pillar will emerge, which can contribute to NATO operations together with the US and other non-EU Allies, but which could also mount operations alone – under the EU flag or the NATO flag, but relying on European capabilities only. In political terms, there really already are two pillars in NATO today, even though Allies like Canada and Turkey don't like to hear it: the US and the EU, i.e. the two strategic actors within the Alliance. But the EU as such is not represented in NATO. There is a lot of consultation between the two organisations, at different levels, from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and EU High Representative Federica Mogherini to the military staff and the civilian administration. The

atmosphere between both is better than ever, though that does not necessarily mean that a lot happens in terms of concrete cooperation – then the beauty contest kicks in again. Mogherini and Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, are also invited to NATO summits of heads of state and government. Yet fundamentally the EU voice is not present in the Alliance.

As the European pillar solidifies, it would only be logical for the EU Member States to speak with one voice in NATO. Even though the EU as such is not a member of NATO, nothing prevents the EU Member States from sitting together prior to NATO meetings and agree on a common position. This has always been a red line for the United Kingdom, but after 'Brexit' they will no longer be able to block this – if the remaining Member States would want to go that way. Constituting an EU block within NATO would be but a logical consequence of the progressive development of the EU as a strategic actor.

Conclusion: Towards an EU-US Alliance?

One question has been left unanswered: should the autonomous EU level of ambition be limited to expeditionary operations? Or should Europeans ultimately also be capable of defending their own territory? Whatever the answer, Europeans do have to reinforce all of their capabilities, for collective territorial defence as well as for expeditionary operations. The reason that today we don't need to fear a direct invasion of our territory is not our own military strength but rather the military weakness of our potential opponents, especially Russia. And that we can count on the US, of course, thanks to NATO.

But will the latter always be the case? President Donald Trump has made it appear as if those who have not contributed enough, should not count on the US anymore. The US did continue to increase the budget for its military presence in Europe. And yet it may not be unwise to start planning for the defence of Europe by Europeans alone, just in case. NATO could undertake such planning, or the EU, its European pillar. Not with the aim of abandoning the Alliance, but to ensure that there is a plan B, so that Europe is not entirely dependent on who happens to reside in the White House. For in that regard there are no more certainties.

Perhaps Barry Posen's (2014) idea is the best solution in the long term, because it is the most flexible: to replace NATO with a new alliance between the US and the EU as such (and other non-EU NATO allies could of course join this new format too). In such a constellation, the EU Member States would define an autonomous level of ambition for all military tasks, including territorial defence, and build an integrated set of forces to that end, but they would maintain an alliance with the US at the same time. Our capacity to deter or defeat any attack would still be underpinned by an obligation of mutual assistance between the EU and the US, but if it comes to the worst plans would be ready to defend ourselves alone. In this scenario, the various

NATO headquarters could be transferred to the EU, while the US could maintain liaison officers (just like today there are European liaison officers in the different American headquarters). All of these headquarters would be under the strategic control and political direction of the EU. Only the strategic headquarters, SHAPE, could remain a joint EU-US headquarters, alternating between a European and American commander (whereas today the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SACEUR, always is an American). NATO would thus be Europeanised, as it were (Howorth, 2017).

In an unpredictable world this does seem like a commendable option for the future. Furthermore this probably is what it takes to really generate an autonomous mind-set in Europe. Because after the end of the Cold War NATO just carried on, Europeans never really stopped looking to the US to know what to do. That's our mistake, not theirs. In a balanced alliance, between the EU and the US, we could finally emancipate ourselves.

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European Defence and German Defence Cooperation

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Abstract
European Defence Cooperation has in the last few years emerged as one of the most dynamic areas of European integration, with EU Member States increasingly pursuing multilateral security cooperation strategies. Considering Germany's central role in European integration, expectations vis-à-vis Germany to contribute more in the realm of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy to further integrate European defence and promote increasing defence cooperation among its members has also increased. At the same time the election of Donald Trump and 'Brexit' are cause for greater concern regarding the evolution of European defence deepening. The article assesses Germany's role in European Defence Cooperation and in particular the German-French relationship which can serve as a 'defence motor' if both countries strive for more defence integration and a common strategic culture. However, the risk persists that EU defence cooperation can go into reverse gear, as in this intergovernmental policy domain fleeting political will or contingencies of national sovereignty continue to shape policy choices of EU states.

Resumo
A Defesa Europeia e a Cooperação Alemã em Matéria de Defesa

Nos últimos anos, a cooperação europeia no domínio da defesa emergiu como uma das áreas mais dinâmicas da integração europeia, com os Estados-Membros da UE a perseguirem cada vez mais estratégias multilaterais de cooperação em matéria de segurança. Tendo em conta o papel central da Alemanha na integração europeia, as expectativas em relação à Alemanha para contribuir mais no domínio da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa da UE para integrar ainda mais a defesa europeia e promover uma maior cooperação na defesa também aumentaram. Ao mesmo tempo, a eleição de Donald Trump e 'Brexit' é motivo de maior preocupação com relação à evolução do aprofundamento da defesa na Europa. O artigo avalia o papel da Alemanha na Cooperação Europeia em Defesa e, em particular, a relação franco-alemã que pode servir como um "motor de defesa" se ambos os países lutarem por mais integração de defesa e uma cultura estratégica comum. Contudo, persiste o risco de que a cooperação em matéria de defesa da UE possa entrar em processo de marcha atrás, pois, neste domínio político intergovernamental, a vontade política ou as contingências da soberania nacional continuam a moldar as escolhas políticas dos Estados da UE.

2018
N.º 150
pp. 94-114

Introduction

European Defence Cooperation has in the last few years emerged as one of the most dynamic areas of European integration, with EU Member States increasingly pursuing multilateral security cooperation strategies. Considering Germany's central role in European integration, expectations vis-à-vis Germany to contribute more in the realm of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to further integrate European defence and promote increasing defence cooperation among its members has also increased (Daehnhardt, 2018). Ever since the European Council of December 2013, a renewed impulse was given to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and enhanced defence cooperation among EU Member States. Crimea's annexation by Russia, the migration crisis in Northern Africa and the Middle East, 'Brexit', and uncertainty in the transatlantic security partnership were additional external drivers of this revitalization. In the face of an incrementally volatile external environment, and with the impending exit of the United Kingdom from the EU, the security and defense in the EU will decisively depend on Germany and France to jointly further EU defence cooperation.

However, initially Germany did not play a major role in the development of the European Security and Defense, in the late 1990s, when the embryonic role of the EU as an international security actor was defined by the bilateral relationship between France and the United Kingdom, when President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Tony Blair signed the Treaty of Saint Malo in December 1998, laying the foundations for the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). While Germany hoped that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the ESDP's sucessor, adopted with the Lisbon Treaty, in 2009, would play a more decisive role, where Germany's interests and responsibilities would be nested, it contributed little to its development, leaving the leading role to France and UK which, through bilateral cooperation, and outside the context of the CSDP, signed the Lancaster House Accords in November 2010 on cooperation in defense and security policies. In a broader context, other weaknesses of the CSDP reflected the lack of strategic convergence between the three major Europeans, and the fact that most CSDP civilian and military operations were smaller, often symbolic, missions of strategic capabilities that could not be an alternative to larger-scale NATO military operations. European Union defence integration also remained limited as there were significant operational constraints on European defence capabilities such as intelligence, reconnaissance, strategic and tactical transport, and the protection of forces; the European defense industry remained fragmented and undermined by state protectionism and was characterized by the absence of harmonization and standardized standards (Daehnhardt, 2014). EU defence suffered from duplications and excesses in military capabilities, such as personnel, installations and industrial

output. This situation was problematic as it overloaded EU member states' military budgets without corresponding operational benefits.
Until 'Brexit', then, in the area of security and defense, the Franco-German relationship was seconded by France's preference to continued bilateral relations with United Kingdom. Thus, in EU security and defense policy, the Franco-German relationship was traditionally not determinant, because of Germany's low profile commitment to defense issues and insignificant contribution to the European Union's strategic ambition to become a global actor. The Franco-British cooperation during the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, in which Germany abstained in the UN Security Council vote, reflected France's operational preference to cooperate with the UK in security and defense issue, even if outside the EU institutional framework.
Following the 'Brexit' vote and the election of US president Donald Trump, however, Germany's role in European defence cooperation has been elevated to a new position, raising the stakes for Berlin to become more actively involved and expecting Germany to play a role in security and defence policy more commensurate with its geo-economic power (Kundnani, 2011). This article addresses the question of Germany's growing role in European defence cooperation and how Berlin ensures a more effective role in an increasingly complex European and transatlantic context. The article is divided into four sections. The first section assesses the security implications of the 'Brexit' vote and the Trump election for European security and defence; the second section looks at Germany's position vis-à-vis European defence cooperation and sketches out potential impediments for an incrementally more active German role. The third section discusses progress achieved by the EU, and Germany and France in particular, regarding the recent further deepening of defence integration. The final section adresses the issue of a lack of a common strategic culture as a hindrance towards effective long-term defence cooperation.

Trump, 'Brexit' and the Implications for European Security

Much of the analysis on European defence cooperation depends on how one defines European defense. If it relates to the European Union's external security environment, then to some extent the EU has already become an important security actor, despite the somewhat smallness of its CSDP missions and operations. Particularly with regard to Northern Africa and the Middle East, it has training and police missions in Mali, Central African Republic, Niger, Somalia, Iraq and Libya, it fights piracy off the coast of Somalia, it combats terrorism in Mali, and it strives to ensure the stability of Europe's borders, particularly on its southern flank, as a result of the mass migration crossing the Mediterranean Sea.
But if the definition of European security and defence cooperation relates to the security relationships among EU Member States then the integration process of

European defence cooperation is much slower, despite important progress. For while the simultaneity of crises has rendered European defence integration more necessary, it has also made Member States more weary of defending their own national interests, which at times coincide and at others diverge from those of other Member States.

The accumulation of European crises in the last decade – the crisis of the Euro, the crisis of migration, the crisis of European populism and the nexus with illiberal democracies – and Russia's assertive security policy in Ukraine since the annexation of Crimeia and the civil war in Syria, all represent, in different forms, disruptive factors which highlight the fragility and potential fragmentation of Europe and illustrate the need for new dynamics in European security. But it is the recent changes in the foreign policies of the United States and the United Kingdom – within the inner circle of transatlantic and European alliances – which are cause for greater concern regarding the evolution of European defence deepening.

First, the unpredictability of the Trump administration's foreign policy suggest the continuation of the United States' global strategic repositioning and a more transactional approach in its alliance policy, with serious implications for European security. President Trump's demand that defence budgets of all NATO Member States allocate two percent of GDP to defense spending by 2024, while not new, suggests, in the terms Trump put it, a new conditionality, that in the event of an armed attack, the US nuclear guarantee would only apply to those states which had attained the stipulated target. Immediately, the transatlantic relationship was rendered more conditional, transactional and potentially temporary. Admittedly, in NATO's recommitment to territorial defence following Russian aggression against Ukraine, in 2014, the Obama and Trump administrations have reinforced the US presence in Eastern Europe by sending a battalion to Poland and by creating the European Deterrence Initiative where the US has increased its budget.

The two percent defence spending increase becomes even more significant, given that Trump has also changed the American position vis-à-vis European integration. It was a continuous security interest for all US post-war administrations to support European integration as a mechanism for stable relations with and in Western Europe and to keep the status quo in transatlantic relations. Breaking with this tradition, Trump is the first American president who openly critizices European integration, and its preferred multilateralist rules-based approach opts for a devaluation of the European Union in US strategy documents and supports 'Brexit' and populist and nationalist anti-EU-movements. This change suggests the reversal of the traditional American position of seeing European integration as supportive of the United States' role as 'Europe's American pacifier' as it was for over 70 years (Joffe, 1984). In particular, the US president's opposition to the European Union is

revealed mainly in Trump's criticisms of Germany's economic and security policies: Trump accuses Germany of using the EU as a vehicle to safeguard German interests (in a supposedly transactional perspective applied by the US itself), to pursue an unfair trade policy towards the US, to be a defence freerider in NATO and, finally, to open European doors to Syrian refugees (Deutsche Welle, 2017).

There is a causal link the analyst Seth Jones (2007) established between Germany and the US's security interests when he stated that "European security cooperation is inversely related to American power in Europe: the smaller the US military presence in Europe, the greater the impetus for European Union security cooperation to improve the potential security dilemma. It is also correlated with German power: the greater the power of Germany, the greater the impetus for co-operation". Thus there is not only a difficult transatlantic relationship but the dilemma of European security persists, and the role of NATO and the EU in this interaction is reduced: less US and more Germany are two factors serving as impulse for greater European defence cooperation.

Outside the purely transatlantic relationship, Donald Trump's decision, on 8 May 2018, to withdraw the United States unilaterally from the nuclear agreement signed with Iran in 2015, which lifted sanctions in exchange for suspending Tehran's nuclear program, produced additional implications for the transatlantic relationship, with the US reinstating economic sanctions, and the EU announcing that it would maintain its commitment to the agreement with Iran. In September 2018, Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced the creation of an independent financial mechanism which circumvents Trumps' warning that the US would target European companies which continued to do business with Iran (Financial Times, 2018*).* While this does not produce direct consequences for European defence cooperation, it highlights the diminishment of US security interest in Europe.

Trump's policies have significant implications for European defence, for while this growing estrangement can be a catalyst for reinforcing European defense cooperation, the disruption of the US strategic interest will at the same time foster new intra-European divisions as a consequence of a transformed transatlantic relationship. Taken together, these changes in American policy, Jolyon Howorth suggests, make 'the Europeans oscillate between the fear of abandonment and the self-defeating consequences of bandwagoning' (Howorth, 2018, p. 18).

Secondly, uncertainty as to the final outcome of the 'Brexit' negotiations – which could produce a full UK political and strategic dissociation from Europe or an institutional separation only with the continuation of a UK-EU strategic link – also raises serious doubts about the future of European defence, the cohesion of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance and the potential risk of a division between a European continental axis lead by Germany and France and a Anglo-

Saxonic axis lead by the United States and the United Kingdom (Lain and Nouwens, 2017). While the departure of the EU's strongest military power will weaken EU defence operationally, Germany and France will gain relative weight in EU defence as in a 'post-Brexit' EU both will account for almost half of the EU's combined military spending (Konig and Franke, 2017). The agreement to settle the UK's role in EU military operations could, however, provide for the UK to maintain a significant linkage through the provision of troops, equipment and institutional compromise, including the UK's participation in the Athena mechanism to co-finance the operations (Besch, 2018).

In a way not dissimilar to the changes propelled by Trump, the end of the recurrent UK veto stance on defense issues can serve as a catalyst towards increased European defence cooperation and strengthen the bilateral security and defence cooperation between Berlin and Paris. However, an incremental asymmetry in German-French defense cooperation should not be discarded, with inevitable implications on EU defence integration (Keohane, 2018; Pannier, 2018).

To the surprise of many, one possible domain where Germany has signalled that defence cooperation could be developed with France and the UK is in the realm of nuclear weapons capability (Fisher, 2017). A study published in 2017 by the German Bundestag scientific group concluded that German and European could co-finance the development of foreign nuclear weapons of France and the UK (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017). This would represent a major shift in Germany's decades long security policy.

Germany's Defence Cooperation Capacity

Despite the ongoing momentum for increased European defence integration, there are four weaknesses in the German position which have to be addressed as they may hinder a more engaged German role in the near future.

First, the desolate state of the German armed forces and capacity deficiencies act as an operational brake on deepening German-French defence cooperation, due to the lack of operational readiness of the Bundeswehr troops and because of technical shortcomings in many of Germany's Tornado aircrafts or submarines. The problem is not so much a shortage of financial resources, despite over two decades of defence budget cuts, but rather a misallocation of defense ressources, the irony of which is that the procurement budget for weapons and equipment is often not fully spent. This is mainly due to an over-bureacratized and understaffed Procurement Office and the closing of several manufacturing companies which affects the defence supply chain (Buck, 2018).

Secondly, German domestic politics may increasingly limit the grand coalition government margin of maneuvrability to engage in staedy defence cooperation. Incertainty regarding the future stability of the 'Grand Coalition' survival. Not only

the unusually long five months to form a new government after the September 2017 elections, but also recent domestic debacles, such as the Hans-Georg Maasen affair, over connections of the spy chief with the far-right (Deutsche Welle, 2018), the ousting of Volker Kauder, Merkel's long standing ally, from His role as chief of the CDU parliamentary party (New York Times, 2018) and a continuously disruptive "Alternative fur Deutschland" as the second strongest party according to polls in September 2018 (Handelsblatt, 2018b). Faced with this instability domestic politics may be an increasing brake on Berlin's capability to act decisively towards further European defence cooperation. Although the March 2018 coalition agreement emphasis the role of Germany in NATO and transatlantic relations, in defense of the EU and the Franco-German relationship, uncertainty about the domestic stability of the fourth coalition government renders Defence Minister Von der Leyen's position more difficult, also taking into consideration that the Social Democratic Party is traditionally averse to defence spending increases. Fault lines regarding Germany's transatlantic policy emerged, with the SPD's Foreign Minister Heiko Maas more critical tone, when he suggested that Europe should emerge as a counterweight to the US, while Chancellor Merkel, which finds herself in an overall weakened position, has opposed him (Maas, 2018).

Apart from party politics, the German public remains generally averse to international military interventions. A survey conducted in May 2014 by the Körber Foundation showed that the majority of Germans approved greater international responsibility, but 82% rejected stronger military engagement. Faced with a decision on the use of force, German decision makers are often faced with a difficult trade-off between international gains and domestic losses. In a more recent poll, in 2017, over 70 per cent of Germans consider the security of Germany and its allies the most important role for German involvement in international affairs, but only 32 percent support an increase in defense spending (Körber Stiftung, 2017). In contrast, decisions to intervene militarily and appear as an international crisis manager generally increase the approval rates of French presidents.

Thirdly, Germany continues reluctant to politically lead Europe. While it has actively responded, together with France, to Russia's actions in Ukraine, in 2014, through economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure, Germany's leadership to uphold the rules-based institutional order, stepping up its contribution to European security structures, preparing the European Union as a global actor in a 'post-Brexit' and post-American-led western world has somehow diminished since Angela Merkel's fourth coalition government came into office. While this has in part to do with the difficult post-September 2017 German election negotiations to form a coalition government, neither Chancellor Merkel nor Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen have engaged wholeheartedly with French President Emmanuel Macron's new initiatives to revitalize European integration in 2017, and

thus have fallen short of co-leading the implementation of new initiatives in the security and defence policy.

Fourthly and finally, the persistence of a *sui generis* German strategic culture is more of a hindrance in European defence cooperation than an enabler. The lack of German enthusiasm with assuming a full leadership role in bilateral coordination with Paris is (still) explained by the absence of a common strategic culture between Germany and France: Germany's Europeanism (or embedded multilateralism), and its culture of political and military restraint stands in opposition to France's emphasis on national sovereignty and strategic autonomy. In Germany the idea of strategic autonomy implies military interventionism which post-war Germany rejects with the exception of the use of force for humanitarian, crisis management or stabilization purposes in out of NATO areas.

Even if since 2014, a security policy based on strategic thinking has gradually emerged in Germany corresponding to that of an ordering power in the international system, Berlin remains cautious and hesitant about the use of military force in international operations (Daehnhardt, 2017). In contrast, France's defense policy has never let go of its inherent Gaullism, and during the transatlantic crisis of 2002-2003 over the war in Iraq, the French idea of a '*Europe puissance*' as a counterweight to the United States prevailed in much of the French discourse. France and Germany have also pursued divergent goals regarding military integration. Even if Germany is gradually pulling away from its cautious and hesitant security policy towards a more ambitious security and defence policy, as stipulated in its 2016 White Paper, from the German perspective, an autonomous European intervention force presupposes a legally defined institutional framework in accordance with the democratic legitimacy the Bundestag expects. Ultimately, these changes in Berlin's position vis-à-vis its security policy do not implicitly mean that Germany's approach will become more like France's position. Thus while desirable there is no automatism in an increasingly German-French approach towards European defence cooperation.

German-French Responses: a German-French Defence Motor?

In addressing these shortfalls, both Berlin and Paris accept that a unified Franco-German leadership is the necessary condition for deeper defence integration (Kempin and Kunz, 2017). In all of the EU's more integrationist moments the Franco-German relationship has acted as the indispensable catalyst. In the economic and political realm, fifty-five years ago, in 1963, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French President Charles de Gaulle signed the Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation, or Élysée Treaty, which became the foundation for the German-French partnership. On the 25th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, in 1988, both countries signed the creation the German-French Defense and Security Council

(*Deutsch-Französischer Verteidigungs-und Sicherheitsrat*), a political mechanism meant to harmonize national security policies and promote defense cooperation and military integration in Europe.

Within the bilateral relationship, Germany pursued three objectives. First, the German – French bilateralism allowed for the Federal Republic of Germany to legitimize its post-war foreign policy. Secondly, it paved the way for an enlarged multilateralism in Europe, which became one of the core foreign policy principles of the Bonn Republic. Finally after unification, the bilateral relationship helped dissuade growing fears of a revival of German hegemony. For its part, France followed three objectives. First, to preserve French sovereignty in an intergovernmental Europe of sovereign nations. Secondly, to aspire to a French leading role in Europe in a Europeanized framework where Paris could exercise cooperative restraint and curb possible German ambitions. Finally, as from 1993, France conceived the European Union as a '*Europe puissance*' with autonomous defense capabilities in a multi-polar world and a Common Foreign and Security Policy shaped by French conceptions.

In the field of foreign and security policy, Germany and France have cooperated bilaterally through joint diplomatic efforts to settle the conflicts in Eastern Ukraine (e.g. Normandie format and Minsk agreement, February 2015) and Syria, even if with little practical results. But with 'Brexit' materializing, Berlin and Paris have become the indispensable leaders and the backbone of European defense, representing about 50% of EU military and industrial capabilities after 'Brexit'. Given Germany's high GDP, it is highly unlikely that Germany will meet the 2 per cent clause for defence expenditures by 2024. The proposed increase of 4 billion Euros for 2019 would increase the defence budget to 42.9 billion Euros, and would mostly be allocated to maintenance and procurement (Helwig, 2018, p. 5). Defence Minister Von der Leyen has announced a 1.5% GDP share of defence spending until 2024. For Germany this means that if it applied the 2 per cent clause it would become the EU's strongest military power, a circumstance which many provoke more resistance than approval from neighbouring countries as well as its own public opinion.

The Franco-German defence relationship is important for both countries, albeit for different reasons. For Germany, the bilateral relationship has always been at the heart of its European policy and has effectively functioned as a German-French engine to propel further integration. Although this focused mainly on issues related to the economic and monetary integration, there was also a defense component, as exemplified in the Franco-German Brigade, created in 1987. For France, deepening defence cooperation with Berlin remains a priority, given that only Germany has the financial resources to invest in state of the art weapons systems. Examples of German-French military cooperation include armaments cooperation with numerous joint procurement projects and the merger, in 2015, of Germany's Krauss-

Maffai Wegmann and France's Nexter, the two largest tank manufacturers of both countries. In addition, for France, Germany's participation in military operations outside Europe to deal with possible security threats has become important to counter France's military overstretch in Africa, as examplified in Mali, where Germany is part of a UN peacekeeping force and a EU military training mission in support of France's counter terrorism efforts in response to the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 with about 1,000 troops, and after the French government invoked the EU mutual assistance clause (Article 42 (7), TEU).

In the last two and a half years Germany and France have been active in pushing forward further defence cooperation among EU Member States. Germany's White Paper 2016 on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (German Ministry of Defense, 2016) published by the Federal Government on 13 July and the "EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy" served as the basis for furthering German-French defence cooperation. The German-French initiative on "Renewing the CSDP towards a comprehensive, realistic and credible defense in the EU" (German-French Security Initiative, 2016) through the creation of a European Security and Defence Union was jointly presented by Ursula von der Leyen and her French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian on 12 September 2016, and discussed shortly after at the informal meeting of EU Defense Ministers on 26-27 September 2016 in Bratislava. Creating a Security and Defence 'Union' elevates the EU's level of ambition considerably, if by "union a multi-national and integrated defence capacity enabling the EU to engage in high-intensity military and civil–military operations with minimal assistance from the US" is meant, that generates "the type of coordinated and integrated military capacity that currently exists within NATO – but under EU institutional mechanisms and with centralised EU military leadership" (Howorth, 2018, p. 9).

PESCO and the European Intervention Initiative

Advances in European defence cooperation were reinforced by the election of Emmanuel Macron, in May 2017, confirming him as one of the most pro-European and pro-German governments in Paris and a president decided on boosting the European defense and security policy. In June 2017, the EU instituted the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). However, given that its mandate is limited to non-executive (training and capacity-building) military operations and more robust executive military operations such as EUFOR Althea in Bosnia or EU NAVFOR MED operation Sophia off the coast of Libya are excluded from this new institutional structure, the MPCC only functions as a quasi-operational headquarters.

Also at the EU Council in June 2017 the EU created the European Defence Fund (EDF) to promote research and development of European technology and defense

products to encourage multinational European participation and bridge technology gaps, reduce duplication and acquisition of defense capabilities among EU Member States. While the European Commission steps up its role in defence matters by providing 20 per cent of the funding for research programmes, the total sum allocated by the EDF remains modest. Thus while its constitutes an incentive for Member States to collaborate in creating defence synergies, it will still be up to the national governments to decide whether such a high investment is worthwhile.

Another step towards increased defence cooperation was the creation of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), an intergovernmental mechanism, whose effectiveness is dependent on the Member States' willingness to share their national defence plans and where the European Defense Agency produces biennial reports on the progress made on how member states coordinate joint capability development plans.

But the most significant development was the implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), when 25 Member States signed the treaty and agreed on 17 joint projects. While relevant decisions regarding PESCO should be adopted in the Fall 2018, in terms of capability developments the seventeen projects thus far do not address major capability gaps.

At the EU Council of Ministers on 11 December 2017, 25 Member States joined PESCO. The implementation of PESCO – aimed at fomenting capability synergies – set off to a bad start as it rests on opposing German and French views: while Berlin emphasizes the political integrationist dimension aiming to include the highest number of Member States, Paris focuses on the operational efficiency of the defence cooperation among only the more capable member states (Biscop, 2018). Much of these divergent views are related to the difference in strategic cultures: whereas Germany pursues an inclusive multilateralist approach, France believes that the strategic autonomy it aims for can only be achieved by a smaller and more cohesive group of states, more capable of conducting the sort of military operations that such an autonomy entails, and in the geographical areas such a choice allows for (Major and Mölling, 2018).

Thus in insisting on 'strategic autonomy' France is following up on the EUGS stated goal that the EU should achieve strategic autonomy. But France's idea of strategic autonomy and security cooperation is not limited to the EU alone. On 26 September 2017 President Emmanuel Macron launched the European Intervention Initiative (EII) in his speech at the Sorbonne (Macron, 2017). The EII is meant to join European states that are militarily capable to project operational readiness to engage in operations, if necessary, outside the institutional frameworks of the EU and NATO. Major and Molling (2017) see this as a clear move "away from an EU-centered approach to a European defense approach", due to France's threat perception of Europe's southern neighborhood as the most important challenge for its national

security, its own military overstretch in the outer-Europe area and uncertainty regarding the US's and UK's future security policies.

Despite being proposed three months before the adoption of PESCO, many analysts see Macron's EII as the opposite of Germany's PESCO model as it aims to reinforce operational autonomy, through a core group of states, with the ironic side effect of involving the UK. But it is not clear that the EII will effectively work, as other states may accuse France of selfishly pursuing its own ambitions, particularly in Africa.

With its continuously critical stance regarding military interventions and legal constraints, Germany responded hesitantly but joined the French initiative, in order to avoid a German-French dissent and also because "amidst a strained transatlantic alliance, it became politically very costly for Germany to reject the French offer to join (...) [even if] a European hedging strategy is not pursued lightly" by Berlin (Helwig, 2018, p. 5). On 25 June 2018 Defence Ministers from France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark and Estonia signed a letter of intent on the EII, "promising to develop a common strategic culture, share analysis and predict problems at problematic points may require intervention and work to coordinate their forces for future operations" and pledging "to consolidate European strategic autonomy and freedom of decision and action".

Macron's initiative posed a challenge to Germany as, on the one hand, the basic idea of an 'intervention force' contradicts Germany's strategic culture and on the other, a force formation outside the PESCO framework would weaken the EU project on which Germany established its political capital. Defense Minister von der Leyen therefore called for the integration of the intervention force into PESCO – a proposal likely to find few supporters in France. Another option would be to 'link the EII and the Framework Concept of Nations (FNC), a German idea of organizing defense cooperation in Europe' (Major and Mölling, 2017). Finally, with regard to third country participation, the European Intervention Force allows for countries like Britain to participate and continue to contribute to the security and defense of Europe even after 'Brexit'.

But European defence cooperation cannot be dissociated from Europe's transatlantic security link with the United States. Germany, together with France will play a crucial role to ensure that enhancing European defence cooperation is done in a way not to antagonise the US and the UK even more than is already the case. PESCO and the European Intervention Initiative have the potential to raise suspicion with Washington and London that the EU states want to opt for strategic autonomy through a European security decoupled from NATO. Whereas PESCO is about developing joint defence capabilities and joint investments, the EII is intended to promote joint military interventions abroad.

In all these initiatives (MPCC, FED, CARD and PESCO), Germany will play a central role in the coming years. Since Germany has become one of the main voices in the CSDP, the concern for a 'Germanization' of European defense characterizes the view of other member states on Berlin initiatives: a focus on institutions rather than military operations. PESCO, CARD and the European Defense Fund are important steps towards a common European defense capability. They aim to maximize the efficiency of defense spending, improve the competitiveness of the European defense industry and adapt the different technologies. The EU is currently far from it. Fragmentation, duplication and protectionism prevail in the European defense industry (Drent and Zandee, 2018). In fact, many Member States maintain uncompetitive arms industries as government-subsidized job creation schemes, or buy off the peg from third countries such as the US. The biggest problem, however, is the low level of defense spending in Europe.

Prospects that defence cooperation between Germany and France may increase: the proposal to examine the joint production of combat aircraft takes place in the context of increased German defense spending. The German government, like all other NATO allies, has committed itself to increasing defense spending in order to reach the level of two per cent of GDP. In 2017, Germany's military spending rose by 3.5 per cent to 44.3 billion dollars, after a 4.2 per cent increase in 2016 (SIPRI, 2018). France is already close to that level; with about 1.8% of GDP in defense, while Germany spends only about 1.2%. The trend since 2016 of increased spending on German defense is likely to continue, which will allow Germany to invest more in military procurement (Buck, 2018).

The German and French Defence Ministers signed an agreement at the Berlin International Air Show, in April 2017, on high-level requirements for a next-generation fighter to be jointly developed by historical rivals, Dassault Aviation and Airbus, to replace the French Rafale and pan-European aircraft Eurofighter/Typhoon. At a German-French Ministerial Council meeting in Paris, on 13 July 2017, Germany and France sent an important signal as they unveiled their intention to develop a joint fighter jet aircraft expected to be operational in 2040 to replace the rival Eurofighter and Rafale jets. According to Reuters (2017), "Paris and Berlin also agreed to set up a cooperation framework for the next model of the Airbus Tiger attack helicopter and for tactical air-to-ground missiles. In addition, they will work together on procuring ground systems including heavy tanks and artillery and said a contract was expected to be signed before 2019 for the military 'Eurodrone' project, which also includes Italy".

While these joint capability development projects ensure bilateral defence cooperation between Germany and France, it will only promote real European defence cooperation if they will not remain exclusive bilateral endeavours and are at a more developed stage opened to other member states joining in (Koenig and Walter-

Franke, 2017, p. 13). The importance of such a project, as some commentators have noted, is that it "is seen as a key indicator for how – and if – Europeans can manage a truly large-scale project, especially given industry rivalries that lie beneath the often lofty diplomatic language" (Defense News, 2018).

As for defence spending, Germany and France currently spend roughly the same with defense – about 40 billion euros per year. Germany has a larger population and a larger GDP. To achieve the two percent spending target, for France this would mean an increase of about five billion euros per year. For Germany, this would mean an increase of about 25 billion euros per year – a great addition of resources that even Germany admits will be tricky to spend wisely. The other part of the two percent target is a 20 percent goal in acquiring important equipment as well as in research and development. France goes beyond this goal: they spend about 24% of their defense spending on equipment and related items. Germany is about 14%. As Germany's overall spending increases, the proportion that is devoted to the acquisition is also likely to increase. But France is disillusioned with the German government's inability to do more to increase the defense budget to over the current 1.2 per cent of GDP, given its large fiscal surplus and its commitment to move towards NATO's defense spending target of 2% of gross domestic product. Thus it is likely that "bilateral defense cooperation between Paris and Berlin will remain complicated and underwhelming" (Kunz, 2018, p. 2).

The Lacking Common European Strategic Culture

Although often trivialized, one of the biggest problems in the security and defense relationship between Germany and France remains the lack of a shared strategic culture. While France and the United Kingdom share the same strategic culture and a history of projection of military force outside Europe, Germany remains clinged to a strategic culture of military reluctance and hesitancy (*kultur der zuruckhaltung*) that makes Franco-German cooperation in defence more difficult. As Koenig and Walter-Franke have argued:

> "Contrasting views on the legitimate use of force also shape diverging preferences for the EU's role. With its interventionist culture, France views the EU as a multiplier in terms of legitimacy and capacity. It has long pressed for Europe's defence, as well as for the EU's strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. While not opposing the idea of a stronger European defence policy, Germany has advocated a comprehensive approach to security at national and EU level and insisted less on strategic autonomy from the United States. These differences in strategic culture are firmly rooted in their respective political systems. Under the German Constitution, the Armed Forces can only be used for defense purposes or in the context of multilateral operations. Whether the EU qualifies under the second is still subject to legal controversy. In addition, the Bundestag must approve any armed intervention by the Bundeswehr. In France, the president decides on the deployment of the armed forces. Since 2008, Bundestag

> approval is mandatory, but only if an operation is extended beyond four months from the initial decision. Between 1991 and 2016, the Bundestag voted twelve times more in military engagement than the National Assembly." (Koenig and Walter-Franke, 2017, p. 8).

German-French differences in strategic culture also act as an obstacle to Franco-German security and defense cooperation as they often raise mutual suspicion: Germans are weary of France's continuing interventionism in Africa which they see as serving the French national interest only, while the French do not understand that Berlin continues to abstain from siding with its allies when they launch airstrikes in Libya, in 2011, for humanitarian reasons or in Syria, in 2017, against a chemical weapons facility. Divergent positions vis-à-vis the arms export policies of Germany and France have led Germany's more restrictive arms export rules to countries at war to hinder the sale of jointly produced weaponry, such as the jointly produced helicopters to the Gulf states. In addition, "Paris' visions of strategic autonomy for Europe include a strong and solid industrial base of its own in armaments and high technology (…) and government ownership or government influence on the defence industry has always been a distinctive characteristic of France's security policy" (Puhl, 2018, p. 3). Thus French policy "prefers dealing with a competitive private sector, holding government influence to a low level. This always affected and still affects the status and organisation of armaments policy in both countries, which, after all, have to take the decisions on the procurement and maintenance of military equipment" (Puhl, 2018, p. 3).

Ultimately, for any Franco-German initiative to succeed with long lasting impact, each country would need to make concessions vis-à-vis the other, and for that to occur, as Jean-Marie Guéhenno (2016) has argued, France has to become more German and Germany has to become more French. President Emmanuel Macron's lament that EU needs a 'common strategic culture in Europe', as he put it in his Sorbonne speech, addresses the issue, but it is likely that Germany will not strive to change its own strategic culture to become more French, nor does Macron's concept, or his European Intervention Initiative imply that France's strategic culture would become more German. However, as Daniel Keohane (2018) has argued, EU military cooperation should be understood "more in the context of its utility for national defense policies across Europe, and less through its relationship with NATO or its role in European integration", as European military cooperation "is mainly driven by the merging of national defense policies in various different ways rather than by the efforts of European (or transatlantic) institutions".

But ultimately, Europe will only begin to be taken seriously as a security actor when it begins to develop new operational capabilities and "the ability to protect European interests with European troops, including, where appropriate, intervention" (Leonard and Röttgen, 2018). Otherwise, as Hans Kundnani argues, "whether,

given that the EU has not evolved into a full political union or becoming independent of the United States in security terms, the new doubt about the security guarantee could lead to a process of disintegration' the EU itself" (Kundnani, 2017, p. 2). Thus in the long term it seems plausible that "the end state will have to be some form of highly coordinated, multi-national, joint and tightly integrated defence capacity enabling the EU to engage in high intensity military (and civil-military) operations with minimal assistance from the US" (Howorth, 2018, pp. 7-8).

Concluding Remarks

European defence cooperation has in the last few years undergone a new dynamism, with new institutional structures set in place and with the promise for EU Member States to proceed with deepening defence integration through creating joint procurement initiatives, initiating permanent structured cooperation and agreeing to a European defense initiative. While these measures aim to respond to growing external challenges, much will depend on the member states continuous political willingness to put the projects into effective practice. This is particularly pressing with regard to the case of Germany, whose role in European defense in a post-transatlantic and 'post-Brexit' environment while becoming more visible remains constrained by a series of domestic constraints. Germany's Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen has steered the country in the direction of an increase of Germany's defense expenditures and armed forces modernisation, but the dire straits in which the Bundeswehr finds itself as well as the over-bureacratized procurement process raise doubts as to how effective Germany's role will be in the medium term (Mölling and Schutz, 2018). In addition, Germany's position vis-à-vis deepening defence integration rests on an inclusive approach which aims to politically have the largest possible number of Member States aboard, which may slow down the integration process as a whole. Ultimately, European defence cooperation will only function effectively if Germany works closely together with France, if they strive to develop a new approach towards a common strategic culture and if both are willing to propose new institutional structures to operationalise the EU's intended strategic autonomy. This could entail the pursuit of a European Security Council, a European Security Advisor and the creation of the post of a European Defence Minister, with the intent of fomenting trust-creating synergies among Member States as well as facilitate the all complex EU-NATO relationship (e.g. maritime cooperation in the Mediterrannean is essential).

Over the last five years, since the European Council in December 2013, the European Union has managed to galvanize the ambition to make the EU a credible security actor – at least at the level of efforts to create synergies for new projects and mechanisms such as PESCO, or structures such as the European Defense Fund. In the pursuit of genuine 'strategic autonomy' as envisaged by the EUGS, the EU

needs a clearly articulated strategy that ensures better coordination between the EU and NATO processes – by harmonizing, for example, the CARD and NATO planning processes to avoid duplication, by outlining objectives in the Southern and Eastern neighborhoods, and by reviewing of EU-NATO relations if the EU aims to progressively, as some suggest, take the lead in NATO (Howorth, 2018).

Whether or not 'Brexit' will lead the EU to greater defence integration and European strategic autonomy, and enable the EU to tackle more security-related challenges, for example in the Middle East, more effectively is not certain. Much will continue to depend on the Member States willingness to subordinate national interests to greater defence integration and, whether there is agreement as to the EU stabilization priorization role in its immediate neighbourhood.

European defence cooperation thus seems to be on the right track. But with the weakening of the Anglo-Saxon security link in the Western liberal order, following the UK's disengagement from the EU and the US's reduced commitment towards the European security guarantee, the reforms the EU Member States decide upon and the European Commission pursues in European defence need to be based on a long term strategy which implements strategic autonomy and consolidates a European perspective of a post-Atlantic world order. This need not be over-ambitious but be seen as defence cooperation 'as good as it gets', based on bilateral and multilateral compromises whereby most if not all Member States feel that they are pulling from the same string. This is where Germany's role as an 'embedded multilateralist', and compromise-seeking security actor could play a more decisive role in European defence cooperation.

Despite the enormous changes in Germany's exernal strategic environment, there is no viable alternative for Germany's security and defence policy than through the EU. This is not to be done at the expense of weakening NATO, as the German government recognizes but through strengthening European defence integration.

Ultimately, Germany can indicate it wishes to develop military capabilities like a fighter jet or a tank under the heading of PESCO, but at a later stage decide to do it outside the PESCO framework. In other words, while the much praised flexibility is a necessary mechanism towards greater EU defence cooperation and effective EU military capacity, it can just as well go into reverse gear, as any Member State, in this intergovernmental policy domain, can always allege fleeting political will or contingencies of national sovereignty. Germany, while arguably the most 'europeanised' of the bigger Member States, is no exception to this.

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Extra Dossiê

Romper o Cerco: a Rússia de Putin e a Nova Guerra Fria

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Resumo
Este artigo analisa o surgimento de Vladimir Putin como opositor do Ocidente. Liderada por Boris Ieltsin, a traumática transição para o pós-comunismo dos anos 1990 gerou as condições que levaram o Kremlin a desenvolver uma política externa em oposição aos aliados ocidentais. Acreditando estar "cercada" pela NATO e pela União Europeia, Moscovo assumiu uma postura crescentemente assertiva que terminaria com as intervenções militares na Geórgia e na Ucrânia. Esta assertividade russa deu origem a uma "nova guerra fria". O artigo pretende demonstrar que a competição geopolítica com a Rússia constitui um elemento estrutural da política internacional contemporânea.

Abstract
Breaking the Encirclement: Putin's Russia and the New Cold War

This article purports to trace Vladimir Putin's emergence as an uncompromising adversary of the West. Led by Boris Yeltsin, Russia's traumatic post-communist transition of the 1990s created the conditions for the Kremlin to define a foreign policy in opposition to the Western allies. Believing itself to be encircled as a result of NATO and European Union enlargement, Moscow adopted an increasingly confrontational posture, eventually leading to military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. In short, Russian assertiveness has provoked a new Cold War. The article traces this process and concludes that geopolitical competition with Russia is now a structural feature of contemporary international politics.

2018
N.º 150
pp. 116-148

Nos anos mais recentes, em resultado da manifesta degradação do relacionamento entre a Rússia e os países da comunidade euro-atlântica, um número assinalável de jornalistas e académicos abraçou a expressão "nova guerra fria" para caracterizar a conjuntura internacional[1]. Imperfeita, e porventura ocultando mais do que revela, a designação aponta, porém, a necessidade de questionar o idealismo que se generalizou após o desmoronamento da União Soviética quanto à possibilidade de se moldar um relacionamento cooperativo e duradouro com a Rússia. A caracterização "nova guerra fria" apresenta uma vantagem adicional: denota uma mudança estrutural na política internacional, marcada pela concorrência entre grandes potências, como, aliás, sublinha a nova "Estratégia de Segurança Nacional" dos Estados Unidos da América[2]. Não obstante estas considerações, outros observadores da cena internacional rejeitam a tese da viragem estrutural, considerando que Vladimir Putin não passa de um autocrata que, oportunisticamente, expande o poderio da Rússia, mesmo que através da força, em cada oportunidade que lhe é concedida[3]. Como corolário desta leitura, concluem que os problemas de relacionamento entre a Rússia e o Ocidente seriam ultrapassados se o presidente russo abandonasse o palco político.

Se esta segunda abordagem tranquiliza porque reduz a conflitualidade russo-ocidental à permanência de Putin (ou, noutra versão, de Donald Trump) na cadeira presidencial, a primeira perspetiva tem o mérito de sublinhar o carácter permanente e estrutural das tensões. Consideravelmente mais robusta como teoria explicativa do comportamento de Moscovo na cena internacional, a primeira perspetiva é, obviamente, menos cómoda. De qualquer forma, quando se abandona a convicção de que a resolução de problemas complexos passa pela retirada de cena de um personagem político, aumenta a probabilidade de se configurarem políticas externas mais realistas e, por conseguinte, mais eficazes na gestão das divergências. Eis a inegável vantagem do realismo como guia para a ação política.

Mas, se se concluir que a "questão russa" não se resume à permanência de Putin no poder, torna-se imperativo definir uma abordagem de longo prazo capaz de dar resposta aos desafios da política externa russa. Novamente "eleito" presidente da Rússia, em 18 março de 2018, com 76,7 % dos votos, Putin terá, por imperativo constitucional, de abandonar o Kremlin em 2024. É justamente este horizonte de fim de mandato que, nos próximos anos, tornará a política externa russa extremamente perigosa para o mundo euro-americano. Neste momento, o regime russo

1 Entre os melhores trabalhos sobre o tema, ver McFaul (2018), Conradi (2017), Legvold (2016 e 2014), Myers (2012), Lucas (2008) e Baker (2005).

2 O documento, publicado pela Casa Branca em dezembro de 2017, caracteriza a Rússia e a China como "potências revisionistas" (The White House, 2017, p. 25).

3 Ver Cohen (2009, especialmente o capítulo 7), Gessen (2012) e Trenin (2016).

encontra-se numa encruzilhada de difícil resolução: ou se institucionaliza ou Vladimir Putin prolonga o seu poder pessoal (Wood, 2018). Seja como for, independentemente do rumo escolhido, as rivalidades políticas e institucionais tenderão a agudizar-se à medida que o horizonte de 2024 se aproxima. Por isso, as incertezas da política interna farão com que a política externa russa seja crescentemente ameaçadora para os Estados ocidentais.

Este artigo considera que a política externa de Vladimir Putin se pauta pelo confronto com os países ocidentais, tratando-se de um caminho virtualmente impossível de inverter nos tempos mais próximos. Uma análise cuidadosa do posicionamento de Moscovo, particularmente desde o discurso proferido por Putin na Conferência de Segurança de Munique, em 10 de fevereiro de 2007, demonstra que, para os conselheiros do Kremlin, está em curso nada menos do que uma guerra de novo tipo com o mundo euro-atlântico. Para justificar o abandono da orientação pró-ocidental dos "anos Ieltsin", Moscovo argumenta que foram os países ocidentais que violaram os entendimentos estabelecidos aquando do fim da guerra fria[4]. Perante o "cerco estratégico" que resultou do incumprimento destas garantias, a Rússia, de acordo com esta narrativa, limitou-se a traçar uma política externa defensiva. Independentemente da avaliação que possamos fazer quanto a esta linha de argumentação, há uma verdade inequívoca: as ações de Moscovo ao longo dos anos mais recentes – na Moldávia, na Geórgia, na Ucrânia ou na Síria – desfizeram dúvidas quanto à postura bélica assumida pelo presidente Putin. Este artigo apresenta as razões que levaram Vladimir Putin a entrar em confronto com a União Europeia e os Estados Unidos da América.

O Ocidente, o "Outro" da Rússia

No último dia de 1999, Boris Ieltsin, numa inesperada comunicação televisiva, anunciou o abandono imediato do cargo presidencial que detinha desde 1990[5]. Seis meses antes de terminar o seu segundo e último mandato, e encerrando a luta surda pela sucessão a decorrer nos bastidores do Kremlin, Ieltsin transmitia ao país que seria substituído pelo primeiro-ministro Vladimir Putin, um *siloviki* desconhecido, empossado na chefia do governo quatro meses antes, em agosto de 1999. Justificando a sua resignação, Ieltsin, visivelmente envelhecido e fisicamente débil, pedia aos seus concidadãos "perdão por ter frustrado as esperanças daqueles que acreditaram em mim quando disse que saltaríamos do cinzento e estagnado passado totalitário para um futuro luminoso, próspero e civilizado" (Ieltsin, 1999). As palavras de contrição do arquiteto da transição para o pós-comunismo eram uma resposta à

4 Um interessante resumo desta perspetiva pode ser encontrado em Lukin (2014).
5 Sobre a vida e os anos de poder de Boris Ieltsin ver Morrison (1991), Aron (2000), Ellison (2006) e Colton (2008).

profunda desilusão da população com o fracasso da elite dirigente que desmantelara a União Soviética.

A amargura de Ieltsin consubstanciava uma inegável tragédia pessoal, mas, e seguramente mais importante, traduzia a tragédia coletiva resultante do falhanço de uma elite política claramente à deriva. Tal desorientação quanto ao futuro rumo do país residia, em larga medida, nas tremendas exigências e contradições impostas pela tripla transição iniciada com o desmoronamento da União Soviética. Essa multifacetada transição incluía a passagem de uma economia planificada para um mercado primitivo, do império soviético para a Federação Russa e a substituição de uma ideologia totalitária por um pluralismo político repleto de incerteza[6]. Atendendo à complexidade e à natureza genuinamente revolucionária das mudanças verificadas durante os "anos Ieltsin", as indefinições da elite pós-comunista no âmbito da política externa não eram particularmente surpreendentes. Verdadeiramente inesperada fora a orientação pró-ocidental que Ieltsin imprimiu à sua política externa, uma opção que colidia com grande parte da herança imperial e soviética (Larrabee, 1997). Contudo, considerando que a transição traçada por Ieltsin dependia do apoio material e político dos Estados ocidentais, era-lhe impossível delinear uma política exterior assente no confronto. Com a ascensão de Putin à presidência, e por razões múltiplas, muitos desses constrangimentos desapareceram.

Sem dúvida, a escolha de Vladimir Putin para chefiar o Estado russo refletia a fragilidade política de Boris Ieltsin. Bombástico, imprevisível, crescentemente impopular e incapaz de inverter a erosão da sua base de apoio, Ieltsin abdica da presidência em troca da imunidade criminal para si e para a sua "família", a vasta rede de colaboradores implicados em numerosos casos de corrupção (Rutland, 2013). Ao sair de cena em circunstâncias tão indecorosas, o homem que deu um contributo ímpar para desmantelar a União Soviética, e que simbolizou a ambição férrea de democratizar a Rússia, encerrou a possibilidade de se protelar a aproximação ao Ocidente que prosseguira em anos anteriores. Se é verdade que Ieltsin saía do Kremlin pessoalmente desprestigiado, era igualmente verdade que os "anos de chumbo" que antecederam a sua demissão desacreditaram os "democratas" – personagens como Yegor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov e Grigorii Yavlinsky – que se batiam pela consolidação de um modelo pluralista para o país[7]. Em suma, o afastamento de Ieltsin significava o fim do projeto democrático, pró-ocidental que, durante anos, o presidente russo, independentemente das suas limitações e contradições, encarnara. Como corolário, a orientação cooperativa seguida por

6 Sobre a complexidade da transição russa ver Ostrovsky (2015), McFaul (2001) e Remnick (1993).

7 Sobre o papel dos liberais no processo de reforma conduzido por Boris Ieltsin ver Desai (2005) e Hellman (1998). Sobre as dificuldades da transição para o mercado ver Przeworski (1991).

Ieltsin relativamente à comunidade euro-atlântica poderia ser invertida, abrindo-se a possibilidade de um regresso às linhas mestras de uma política externa de confronto em vigor antes de 1991 (Kotkin, 2016).

Hoje, como no passado, a hostilidade das elites russas em relação ao Ocidente permeia a cultura estratégica do país, sendo particularmente robusta nas instituições do *deep state*, incluindo os serviços de informação e segurança (*siloviki*), uma das principais fontes de recrutamento do pessoal político do presidente Putin[8]. Dado que, ao longo de décadas, as elites russas manifestaram um fortíssimo antagonismo relativamente à comunidade euro-atlântica, a postura hoje assumida face à União Europeia e aos Estados Unidos confunde-se com o interminável debate sobre a identidade da própria Rússia. Com efeito, e tal como no passado, o debate no seio das elites sobre o Ocidente alimenta a discussão paralela em volta da identidade e das ambições internacionais da Federação Russa.

Assente num antiocidentalismo crescentemente assertivo, o "putinismo" traduz uma visão neoimperial da Rússia enraizada na herança político-intelectual czarista (Laqueur, 2015; Applebaum, 2013). A este propósito, convém sublinhar que, ao longo de séculos, a Rússia, nas suas várias configurações territoriais e políticas, permaneceu afastada do *heartland* europeu, ou seja, manteve-se (nem sempre voluntariamente) na periferia da geopolítica continental. Essa marginalização reforçava a convicção das elites de que a Rússia era uma entidade "não-ocidental", um país essencialmente de cariz "asiático" (Bilington, 1996). Todavia, no século XVIII, convencido que a prosperidade futura do império exigia a adesão à modernidade Iluminista a decorrer no oeste europeu, Pedro "o Grande" impulsiona a "abertura de uma janela para a Europa" (d'Encausse, 2000, pp. 160-165). Esta preferência estratégica de Pedro "o Grande" fora partilhada por Catarina "a Grande", que, na sua "instrução" à comissão legislativa, descreve a Rússia como "um Estado ocidental"[9]. Para estes dois autocratas, a transformação da Rússia numa grande potência passava, forçosamente, por emular o modelo ocidental assente no "progresso" e na promoção de dinâmicas de modernização. Nunca inteiramente incontroverso, o projeto de modernização "de cima para baixo" dos autocratas enfrentou resistências consideráveis.

Para as elites modernizadoras da época, "a identidade asiática" da Rússia era sinónimo de atraso, estagnação e imobilismo. E porque uma "identidade ocidental" era equivalente à "mudança" e ao "progresso", a modernização (a bom rigor, a ocidentalização) era tida como não compaginável com a "identidade asiática" do país[10]. Se tal leitura fora hegemónica durante os reinos de Pedro "o Grande" e Catarina "a

8 Sobre o *entourage* de Putin ver Zygar (2016).
9 Ver *The Instructions of Catherine II to the Legislative Commission*, capítulo 1, ponto 6.
10 Sobre esta questão ver Sarkisyanz (1954) e van der Oye (2010).

Grande", no século XIX as elites questionam a necessidade de ultrapassar o atraso, a estagnação e o imobilismo associados à "identidade asiática" (Hartley, 2011, pp. 369-385). Anteriormente visto como um entrave ao surgimento da Rússia como grande potência, o "caráter asiático" do país, na medida em que coincidia com os valores estruturantes da autocracia czarista, passou a beneficiar de uma conotação positiva. Para todos os efeitos, a designação "asiática" tornou-se sinónimo de "estabilidade" e "hierarquia", pilares fundamentais que sustentavam a legitimidade do Estado imperial czarista. Concomitantemente, o termo "ocidental" passou a denotar forças sociais que visavam provocar mudanças perturbadoras da ordem vigente, ou seja, forças empenhadas em derrubar o *status quo* imperial. Esta viragem paradigmática será protagonizada pelo Czar Nicolau I, que, assumindo o poder através do golpe de dezembro de 1825, se opõe à importação de influências estrangeiras suscetíveis de corroerem os alicerces do império. Uma sociedade não-europeia assente na autocracia, na ortodoxia religiosa e no nacionalismo (*narodnost*), a Rússia imperial virava, assim, costas à modernidade e ao Ocidente.

O "golpe de estado" de 1917 que trouxe Vladimir Lenine e a fação bolchevique por ele chefiada ao poder colocaria, novamente, a questão da relação apropriada a estabelecer entre a Rússia e o Ocidente[11]. Se, por um lado, a revolução preconizada pelo novo regime previa a transformação socioeconómica da sociedade russa de acordo com um modelo de "modernização ocidental" acelerada, o modelo político totalitário instituído por Lenine representava uma rejeição inequívoca do liberalismo e do pluralismo ocidentais. Não seria propriamente um caso de "despotismo oriental", mas seguramente o bolchevismo no poder pouco se aproximava dos regimes ocidentais. Verificava-se, pois, uma tensão entre a aceitação da modernização ocidental e a rejeição dos valores políticos a ela subjacente. Em moldes ligeiramente diferentes, e como não poderia deixar de ser, esta mesma tensão atravessava a política externa soviética.

No célebre artigo "*The Sources of Soviet Conduct*", publicado em 1947, George F. Kennan, sublinhando essa tensão, argumentava que o comportamento externo da União Soviética resultava da confluência entre o marxismo-leninismo da elite bolchevique e a "circunstância" do país, isto é, a herança expansionista do império russo (Kennan, 1947). As linhas mestras da política externa soviética pautavam-se por um grau elevado de previsibilidade dado que espelhavam o expansionismo czarista, reforçado pelo messianismo marxista-leninista e pelo internacionalismo proletário. Por outras palavras, na perspetiva do diplomata americano, o vigor messiânico do partido de Lenine acrescentava robustez à tradição imperial russa, assim transformando a União Soviética numa potência revisionista temível. Com

11 Relativamente à experiência totalitária soviética ver Malia (1994) e Figes (1997).

efeito, Kennan defendia que era necessário travar o impulso expansionista do país através da "contenção", assim obrigando a clique comunista a reconhecer a falência da sua ideologia como instrumento interpretativo da realidade. Confrontados com uma ideologia desadequada à realidade, os dirigentes soviéticos ver-se-iam forçados a abandonar a sua visão do mundo.

Atendendo às ambiguidades históricas quanto à identidade da Rússia, não surpreende que a hostilidade das elites bolcheviques relativamente às "sociedades burguesas" refletisse o repúdio pelo Ocidente prevalecente durante a última fase do czarismo. Dito de forma diferente, à semelhança das elites imperiais mais reacionárias, os dirigentes soviéticos denunciavam a "decadência moral e espiritual" que afirmavam ser a essência das sociedades ocidentais[12]. Destinadas, segundo o materialismo histórico, a sucumbir perante a luta de classes que inexoravelmente desaguaria na construção do socialismo, as sociedades capitalistas, espiritualmente esvaziadas, produziam homens e mulheres incapazes de realizar a sua humanidade plena, e, por isso, refugiavam-se nos excessos do consumismo. Esta crítica soviética à alienação omnipresente nas sociedades ocidentais era, também, uma condenação de natureza moral e espiritual, em linha com a tradição antiocidental que marcara (e ainda hoje marca) a intelectualidade russa ao longo de séculos.

A rejeição do materialismo ocidental não se restringia aos "engenheiros das almas" do autocrata georgiano, empenhado na construção do "homem soviético". Surpreendentemente, dissidentes condenados à monstruosidade do *gulag* partilhavam esta leitura quanto ao vazio espiritual existente no mundo euro-atlântico. Talvez ninguém melhor do que Alexander Solzhenitsyn expressou essa aversão quando, num discurso proferido na Universidade de Harvard, em junho de 1978, afirmou que a vida espiritual no Ocidente era "sufocada por interesses comerciais. Esta é a verdadeira crise. A divisão do mundo é menos terrível do que a similar doença que afeta as suas principais secções"[13]. Com efeito, as divisões que separavam os rivais da guerra fria eram menos relevantes do que a crise espiritual comum aos dois países. As implicações políticas da posição de Solzhenitsyn eram cristalinas: o poder soviético não poderia ser simplesmente substituído pela democracia liberal porque uma mera alteração de regime era insuficiente para recuperar os valores e as tradições indispensáveis ao ressurgimento da Rússia.

Em maio de 1994, Solzhenitsyn abandona o seu exílio em Vermont e regressa à Rússia para ser recebido como um herói da resistência ao totalitarismo soviético (Sha-

12 Este tipo de narrativa dominou a produção artística soviética. Sobre a forma como o Ocidente era apresentado no cinema soviético ver Dobrynin (2009).

13 Este discurso intitulado "*The Exhausted West*", foi reproduzido na Harvard Magazine, de julho/agosto de 1978. Outros trabalhos de Alexander Solzhenitsyn que abordam esta mesma temática são "*The Mortal Danger*" de 1980, "*Warning to the West*" de 1976 e "*From Under the Rubble*" de 1975.

piro, 1994). Execrado pelos defensores do anterior regime, o escritor rapidamente se incompatibiliza com os democratas devido às violentíssimas críticas que tece à atuação de Boris Ieltsin (Williams, 1998). A mensagem tradicionalista de Solzhenitsyn destoava da orientação ocidental de Ieltsin, mas encontra eco junto de vários grupos oposicionistas. No seguimento imediato do desmantelamento da União Soviética, o tradicionalismo russo restringia-se a grupos extremistas tais como o reconstituído Partido Comunista de Gennadi Zyuganov e o ultranacionalista e xenófobo Partido Liberal Democrata de Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Contudo, ao longo dos dois mandatos presidenciais de Ieltsin, o tradicionalismo, nas suas várias manifestações, ganha terreno à medida que as "reformas democráticas" perdem apoio popular. A título exemplificativo, verificamos que, na primeira volta das eleições presidenciais de 1996, Ieltsin obtém 35,8% dos votos contra os 32,5% de Zyuganov. É certo que o presidente vence a segunda volta com 54,4%, mas, na medida em que invoca valores ocidentais para justificar o seu poder, o fracasso político de Ieltsin abre caminho à rejeição desses mesmos valores e à emergência do tradicionalismo como fonte alternativa de legitimidade política[14]. É justamente neste contexto que Putin herda a presidência da Rússia.

Putin jamais abraçou uma ideologia coerente, mas, particularmente desde 2007, tem dado voz a uma visão do mundo assente num indisfarçável "anti-ocidentalismo filosófico", num rígido tradicionalismo adverso aos comportamentos e costumes que, nos últimos anos, alastraram pelo mundo euro-atlântico. Putin acusa os países ocidentais de "rejeitarem as (suas) raízes, incluindo os valores cristãos que constituem a base da civilização. Negam princípios morais e todas as identidades tradicionais: nacional, cultural, religiosa e até sexual" (Putin, 2013). Defensor dos valores nacionais enraizados na nação profunda, Putin exclui o alargamento dos direitos das minorias, particularmente os direitos LGBT (lésbicas, gays, bissexuais, travestis, transexuais e transgénero). Este repúdio do pluralismo e da liberdade individual existente nas democracias ocidentais contrasta com a promoção de valores tradicionais, dos direitos coletivos e da defesa da ortodoxia cristã[15]. Não admira, pois, que esta visão ultraconservadora de Putin o tenha transformado num ídolo dos populistas europeus, que veem no autocrata russo um precioso aliado no combate pela preservação dos "genuínos" valores europeus e pelo ressurgimento da "verdadeira Europa" contra o cosmopolitismo das elites globalizadas que "abandonaram" as suas populações[16].

Mais recentemente, a linguagem política de Vladimir Putin começou a espelhar os "conceitos" empregues por Alexander Gelyevich Dugin e outros exponentes do

14 Sobre as eleições presidenciais de 1996 ver McFaul (1997).
15 Sobre este ponto ver Eltchaninof (2017, particularmente o capítulo 4).
16 Sobre este ponto ver Shekhovtsov (2017, particularmente o capítulo 1).

"euroasianismo"[17]. Não podendo ser considerada a "ideologia oficial" do regime, o "euroasianismo", cujas origens remontam aos anos que seguiram à revolução bolchevique, exerce ampla influência junto da sociedade e das elites russas. Publicado em 1920, o estudo "*Europa e Humanidade*", de Nikolai Trubetskoy, aristocrata exiliado depois da chegada dos bolcheviques ao poder, constitui uma referência basilar para Dugin e seus seguidores. Trubetskoy argumenta que noções que se pretendem universais – tais como "humanidade", "civilização" e "progresso" – são, na realidade, construções europeias (a bom rigor, alemãs) que visam "ludibriar" os eslavos a aceitarem o cosmopolitismo (Riasanovsky, 1964; Glebov, 2015). Com efeito, o ponto de partida do "euroasianismo" reside na rejeição do universalismo europeu, entendido como um instrumento de "colonização conceptual" do mundo eslavo de forma a obliterar a especificidade da sua identidade e cultura. Por esta razão, na ótica de Trubetskoy, a Europa liberal representava uma ameaça mortal não apenas à Rússia como, também, à humanidade no seu todo (Perkins, 2004, p. 296). Eis a condenação, *avant la lettre*, dos efeitos homogénicos da globalização.

Evidentemente, a realidade alterou-se desde a década de 1920, pelo que a "ameaça europeia" foi substituída pela "ameaça atlântida" (*sic*), o termo utilizado por Dugin para designar a Europa e os Estados Unidos da América. Se, nas primeiras décadas do século XX, a Europa representava a falange do cosmopolitismo, no pós-segunda guerra mundial a liderança desse projeto seria assumida pelos Estados Unidos. Na conjuntura atual, o projeto de colonização avança através da globalização, entendida como o meio privilegiado da expansão dos valores e da cultura ocidentais, e da sua lógica de homogeneização, para os quatro cantos do mundo. É, pois, em nome da autodeterminação dos povos – e não apenas do povo russo – que Putin prossegue uma política externa que visa romper com os constrangimentos da hegemonia ocidental e, ao mesmo tempo, preservar a influência de Moscovo no "estrangeiro próximo".

Para todos os efeitos, Alexander Dugin ambiciona construir uma leitura alternativa da história russa que possa ultrapassar a conhecida dicotomia "asiático/ocidental". Entendida pelos seguidores de Dugin como uma sociedade híbrida que sintetiza elementos asiáticos e europeus, a Rússia não pode ser reduzida a uma dessas dimensões. As suas duas dimensões são, na realidade, complementares. A Rússia euroasiática é, pois, uma entidade única, uma civilização que se desenvolveu à parte e, por conseguinte, prossegue um "destino nacional" autónomo[18]. Visto assim, o século e meio de domínio Mongol (Tártaro) deixa de ser interpretado com um momento de subjugação eslava, e passa a ser entendido com uma época de vitalidade cultural

17 Sobre este conceito ver Dugin (2015, 2014). Para uma avaliação crítica do pensamento de Dugin ver Laruelle (2012).

18 O tema é abordado em Dugin (2018).

que permitiu que a Rússia desenvolvesse um destino autónomo fora do espaço europeu. Este destino próprio, a ser cumprido, exige a preservação de valores tradicionais claramente distinguíveis dos valores europeus ou dos valores asiáticos.
Existe, pois, um mundo russo (*mir russkiy*) que não coincide inteiramente com as fronteiras da Federação Russa, um Estado multinacional que abriga uma panóplia de povos, religiões, tradições e culturas. Sendo assim, torna-se possível reinterpretar a experiência soviética como uma tentativa de congregar os povos dentro de uma entidade política pós-nacional. Essa experiência concreta falhou, mas o projeto não deixava de ser válido. Na medida em que afirma existir um destino histórico comum aos povos russo e da Ásia Central, conjugado com o repúdio que faz da Europa e do Ocidente, o "euroasianismo" incute coerência à política externa de Putin. E dado que os modelos políticos ocidentais são incompatíveis com a "essência" deste espaço cultural-civilizacional, a expressão política do destino comum do espaço euroasiático, logicamente, reside na reconstituição de um novo império (naturalmente diferente dos impérios czarista e soviético) dominado por Moscovo. Eis a visão que leva Putin a confrontar o mundo euro-atlântico.
Multicultural, multiétnico, multirreligioso e construído ao longo de um milénio, o Estado russo representa, na caracterização do filósofo Konstantin Leontyev, um "Estado-civilização" assente e reforçado pelo povo russo, a língua e cultura russas, a igreja ortodoxa e as restantes religiões tradicionais do país (Eltchaninof, 2017, p. 71). Este "Estado-civilização", por sua vez, molda a política interna e externa, procurando flexibilidade de forma a conciliar a especificidade étnica e religiosa dos territórios que integram o Estado[19]. Porém, para garantir a unidade nacional num Estado sujeito às inevitáveis pressões centrífugas inerentes a uma entidade multicultural e multiétnica, torna-se absolutamente imperativo construir (no sentido andersoniano) uma identidade partilhada assente em valores comuns, no patriotismo e na solidariedade. Não é, pois, por mero acaso que Putin atribui uma importância incomensurável à "narrativa" da "Grande Guerra Patriótica", e à necessidade de combater o "regresso do fascismo" na Ucrânia. É justamente essa guerra patriótica que configura o elo de continuidade entre o czarismo e o Estado russo contemporâneo, e que legitima o idealismo que impulsionou o projeto soviético.
É esta natureza do Estado – simultaneamente, frágil e robusto – que obriga a que a Federação Russa se empenhe num processo de integração regional com a sua vizinhança. Se, em tempos, a integração for prosseguida por via imperial, tanto na sua versão czarista como na sua versão soviética, nos tempos que correm a integração terá de proceder através da União Económica Eurasiática[20]. Muitíssimo mais do que

19 Para uma discussão sobre estas questões ver Tsygankov (2016).
20 Sobre a União Euroasiática ver Blockmans, Kostanyan e Vorobiov (2012), Liik (2014) e Vymyatnina e Antonova (2014).

um projeto económico-comercial, a União Euroasiática visa manter a identidade histórica das nações numa região afugentada pela globalização e pelas exigências da concorrência entre grandes blocos. A integração eurasiática oferece, portanto, uma oportunidade para gerar um polo de poder internacional alternativo capaz de traçar o seu próprio destino. Caso contrário, o espaço pós-soviético permanecerá nas margens, na periferia da Europa e da Ásia. Trata-se, é certo, de assumir o fardo de construir um império russocêntrico de novo tipo, mas as vicissitudes da história e da geopolítica excluem outros caminhos.

A Ascensão do Autocrata

Indicado por Boris Ieltsin para a chefia do Estado, Vladimir Putin teria, no entanto, de vencer as eleições presidenciais agendadas para 26 de março de 2000, o que não era óbvio que viesse a acontecer. Já antes de se consumar a nomeação de Putin como primeiro-ministro (em agosto de 1999), os adversários de Ieltsin manobravam no sentido de inviabilizarem a designação de Putin para um cargo que lhe conferia vantagens consideráveis numa futura disputa pela cadeira presidencial. Alguns desses adversários, incluindo o presidente da câmara de Moscovo, Yuri Luzhkov, e o antigo primeiro-ministro Yevgeny Primakov, convencidos que as eleições seriam realizadas em junho de 2000, já se encontravam no terreno em campanha eleitoral quando Ieltsin anuncia a sua resignação e a antecipação das eleições. Todavia, os três meses que decorreram entre a indicação de Putin como presidente em exercício e as eleições de março permitiram que Putin se afirmasse politicamente (Wines, 2000; Hoffman, 2000). Apresentando-se aos eleitores como um defensor da "lei e da ordem", prometeu pôr fim ao clima de ilegalidade e impunidade que alastrara pelo país. Se é verdade que a intenção de fazer respeitar a "lei e a ordem" encontrava eco numa sociedade fustigada pela privação económica e a instabilidade sociopolítica, é igualmente verdade que as declarações de Vladimir Putin evidenciavam um nítido impulso autoritário que, com a passagem dos anos, se manifestou de forma cristalina.

É, sobretudo, a postura implacável de Putin relativamente à rebelião chechena que lhe permite consolidar uma imagem de "líder forte" determinado a inverter a desordem dos "anos Ieltsin"[21]. A questão chechena constituía uma ferida aberta que contribuiu para minar a presidência de Ieltsin. O conflito armado subsequentemente conhecido como a "primeira guerra da Chechénia" irrompeu a 11 de dezembro de 1994, sendo certo que as suas raízes remontam a agosto de 1990[22]. Nessa altura, derrotada a tentativa de golpe de Estado promovida pela velha guarda comunista que visava remover Mikhail Gorbachev do poder, Ieltsin, que dera uma

21 Sobre este ponto ver Politkovskaya (2001).

22 Sobre as guerras na Chechénia ver Lieven (1999) e Politkovskaya (2007).

contribuição decisiva para esmagar os golpistas, apelou aos líderes das regiões para obterem o "máximo de soberania" que conseguissem, assim esvaziando o centralismo do Estado soviético (Zverev, 1998, p. 122). Este conselho de Ieltsin será seguido com entusiamo na Chechénia por Dzhokar Dudyaev, um antigo general da Força Aérea Soviética que assume o poder após as eleições locais de outubro de 1991. Logo a 1 de novembro do mesmo ano, Dudyaev emite um decreto a declarar a soberania da república chechena, no seguimento do qual irrompe a guerra civil entre as forças de Dudyaev e os partidários de Uma Avturkhanov, um aliado de Ieltsin. No início de agosto de 1994, Avturkhanov, crescentemente marginalizado, solicita apoio militar ao presidente da Federação Russa. O apelo será acolhido a 30 de novembro, quando Boris Ieltsin assina um decreto no sentido de restaurar a "lei e a ordem" na Chechénia, assim justificando, em 11 de dezembro, a entrada de tropas federais no território rebelde.

Claramente incapaz de restabelecer a ordem na Chechénia, o contingente russo transforma-se numa das partes de uma guerra civil particularmente bárbara. Psicologicamente debilitadas e materialmente deficitárias, as forças federais afundaram-se no "Vietname da Rússia", de onde acabariam por se retirar em 1996, profundamente humilhadas pela guerrilha separatista que obriga o governo central a firmar um acordo de cessar-fogo. Mas a rebelião no norte do Cáucaso alastra para o Daguestão. Mais importante, vários ataques bombistas, alegadamente perpetrados por terroristas chechenos, ocorreram em Moscovo e Volgodonsk. No dia 4 de setembro de 1999, uma bomba vitimou mais de sessenta pessoas, o primeiro de vários atentados que totalizaram mais de trezentas mortes civis. Invocando estes ataques e a desordem generalizada vivida no Cáucaso, Putin compromete-se a destruir os grupos terroristas responsáveis pela violência[23]. Pouco depois, ordena o regresso de forças militares federais ao terreno, iniciando assim uma campanha de destruição simbolizada pelo arrasamento de Grozni, cidade rapidamente reduzida a escombros. Oficialmente, a "segunda guerra da Chechénia" tinha como objetivo repor a soberania de Moscovo em todo o território da Federação Russa, condição prévia para afirmar o país na cena mundial (Snetkov, 2015, p. 53). Na prática, a forma implacável como Putin conduz a guerra nas semanas que antecedem a eleição presidencial fez dele o mais conhecido e popular político do país. Seria a primeira de várias guerras que, certamente por mera coincidência, irrompiam antes de o eleitorado russo ser chamado às urnas.

Assumindo a presidência, em 7 de maio de 2000, Vladimir Putin opera uma transformação na *praxis* política interna, paulatinamente substituindo a transição para a

23 A posição de Putin relativamente ao conflito na Chechénia foi explicitada através de uma coluna de opinião publicada em 14 de novembro de 1999 no jornal The New York Times, intitulada "*Why We Must Act*".

economia de mercado por um modelo desenvolvimentista de Estado[24]. À medida que concentra o poder no governo central em detrimento das regiões, e que traça medidas de estabilização económica, Putin vê-se na necessidade de colocar as empresas estratégicas na alçada do Estado, processo que culmina, em outubro de 2003, com a prisão de Mikhail Khodorkovsky, CEO da empresa petrolífera Yukos[25]. Ao assumir o controlo da Yukos, a mais internacionalizada das grandes empresas russas, Putin sinaliza, de forma inequívoca, que os recursos estratégicos do país deixarão de ser geridos de acordo com critérios meramente empresariais, para passarem a ser encarados como instrumentos de vantagem geoestratégica. O racional desta perspetiva, que Putin havia defendido na sua tese de doutoramento na Universidade Estadual de São Petersburgo, ficou patente na Europa Central, em particular durante a "crise do gás" de 2005, quando Moscovo utiliza o fornecimento de energia para coagir politicamente o governo ucraniano[26].

Putin recolhe os louros de uma recuperação económica impulsionada pelo aumento vertiginoso da procura externa (e dos preços) de energia. Esse ressurgimento económico seria acompanhado por uma vaga de repressão dirigida contra a oposição política, alguns oligarcas hostis a Putin, as autoridades regionais, a autonomia das instituições da sociedade civil criadas durante os "anos Ieltsin" e as precárias liberdades democráticas que restavam. Subjacente às medidas autoritárias traçadas por Putin, residia a convicção de que as debilidades do Estado impediam a Federação Russa de desempenhar um papel relevante na cena mundial. Para inverter o estatuto subalterno da Federação Russa, em contraste nítido com a proeminência da antiga "superpotência" soviética, seria necessário neutralizar os inimigos domésticos da Rússia. À semelhança de grande parte da população, Putin considerava que a coesão do Estado fora deliberadamente minada por inimigos internos e externos, categorias nem sempre fáceis de destrinçar (Applebaum, 2013, p. 3). Por esta razão, quem contribuísse, deliberadamente ou não, para enfraquecer a Rússia seria considerado uma ameaça à segurança nacional e sujeito às consequências que o novo poder autocrático determinava.

A lógica desta abordagem conduz à limitação severa do pluralismo, particularmente através da governamentalização dos meios de comunicação social e do esvaziamento da sociedade civil (Gessen, 2017). É sabido que, após a implosão da União Soviética, deu-se uma virtual invasão do país por organizações não-governamentais (ONGs) ocidentais atraídas pela possibilidade de contribuir para o êxito da transição para o pós-comunismo. Somas significativas de dinheiro e outros recur-

24 Ver Goldman (2010) e Sutela (2012). Sobre as ligações que unem Putin aos oligarcas ver Dawisha (2014).

25 Sobre o caso Yukos ver Sakwa (2014) e Sixsmith (2010).

26 Sobre o significado político da "tese" universitária de Putin ver Balzer (2005).

sos foram atribuídas a uma panóplia de grupos ativos na construção da sociedade civil russa. Igualmente importante, as ONGs trouxeram conhecimento que, então, simplesmente não existia numa sociedade fustigada por décadas de partido único e de isolamento. Ciente de que estas organizações constituíam uma barreira à deriva autoritária do regime, Putin acusa-as de promovem interesses de potências estrangeiras (Gorbunova e Baranov, 2013). Também restringe o seu âmbito de atuação, assim reduzindo o espaço político da sociedade civil e, por acréscimo, diminuindo os focos de resistência ao putinismo.

Em abril de 2005, cinco anos após ter assumido a chefia do Estado e já seguro na cadeira presidencial, Vladimir Putin afirma publicamente que "o colapso da União Soviética fora o maior desastre geopolítico" do século XX, palavras que ainda hoje se fazem repercutir (Allen, 2005). Erroneamente interpretada como expressando saudosismo quanto ao desaparecimento do regime comunista, o lamento do presidente simplesmente revelava um indisfarçável incómodo com a perda de influência de Moscovo e a determinação de inverter a situação. À semelhança do *establishment* militar russo, Putin considerava que a estabilidade prolongada que vigorou durante a guerra fria resultava da capacidade da URSS de manter um sistema de equilíbrio de poderes. Em contraste, o presidente russo mantinha que a unipolaridade americana gerava instabilidade sistémica que teria, forçosamente, de ser confrontada por Moscovo. Ficava subentendido que o reequilíbrio do poderio internacional, e a estabilidade resultante de uma relação de forças mais equitativa, dependia das ações da Rússia, e isto obrigava-a a resistir à unipolaridade americana.

Visto a partir do prisma de Vladimir Putin, o colapso da URSS originou um período de humilhação profunda e sistemática da Rússia, exemplarmente ilustrada pelos sucessivos alargamentos da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN) (Lieven, 1995)[27]. Mas, já antes dos alargamentos a leste da Aliança Atlântica – o primeiro dos quais, englobando a Polónia, a Hungria e a República Checa, ocorre em 1999, na Cimeira de Washington –, Moscovo exprimia publicamente a sua insatisfação com o comportamento dos Estados Unidos e dos seus aliados europeus. Por exemplo, nos Balcãs, o intervencionismo ocidental nas guerras que acompanharam o desmoronamento da Jugoslávia contribuiu para a degradação da relação com Moscovo. À medida que os conflitos etnonacionais se intensificaram na Jugoslávia, Slobodan Milosevic, sonhando com a construção de uma "Grande Sérvia", emergia como o principal agressor das guerras balcânicas. Em consequência, a Sérvia passa a ser alvo de contenção dos Estados ocidentais que procuravam evitar uma conflagração regional. Neste período, e apesar da solidariedade expressa por

27 Para uma perspetiva crítica ver Ruhle (2014).

Moscovo para com Belgrado, as debilidades russas impediam o Kremlin de assumir um papel de liderança na Bósnia e, mais tarde, no Kosovo.
Quando, em finais de 1998, Milosevic lança a "limpeza étnica" dos *kosovars* albaneses e a OTAN responde com uma "intervenção humanitária" que termina com a presença de forças militares no terreno, Moscovo provoca um braço de ferro político com a Aliança Atlântica. No dia 12 de junho de 1999, o Kremlin desloca um destacamento de forças especiais para o aeroporto de Pristina. Em resposta, o chefe militar da OTAN, Wesley Clark, ordena ao comandante britânico, Michael Jackson, que bloqueie a pista do aeroporto e, assim, impeça o reforço do contingente russo. Prudentemente, Jackson recusa a ordem, afirmando que não iria ali, a pedido de Clark, provocar a terceira guerra mundial[28]. A manobra russa visava assegurar uma área autónoma de responsabilidade no âmbito da força de paz autorizada pelas Nações Unidas (KFOR) através da Resolução 1244 do Conselho de Segurança, uma exigência liminarmente recusada pela OTAN, que temia que a presença de tropas russas independentes da estrutura de comando da KFOR incentivaria os sérvios do norte do Kosovo – onde eram maioritários – a declarar a secessão dessa faixa da província.
A escalada seria contida através de uma solução diplomática e a Rússia acabaria por manter uma força militar no Kosovo. Mas o episódio demonstrou que a assertividade do Kremlin era motivada por três preocupações fundamentais. Primeira, tratava-se de apoiar a Sérvia, um aliado ortodoxo historicamente próximo da Rússia. Na sua qualidade de "Terceira Roma", cabia a Moscovo proteger os crentes que olhavam para a Rússia como último garante da segurança das populações ortodoxas. Esta "responsabilidade de proteger" de Moscovo, que espelhava a doutrina de "intervenção humanitária" invocada pela OTAN para legitimar a sua intervenção no Kosovo, era extensível às minorias russas residentes em países que emergiram da antiga União Soviética[29]. Segunda, a independência do Kosovo era um anátema para o Kremlin porque estabelecia um precedente suscetível de ser invocado por separatistas na Chechénia, no Daguestão e noutras regiões da Federação Russa. Terceira, a Rússia reclamava um papel de relevo no Kosovo em conformidade com o estatuto de grande potência por si proclamado. A avaliar pelos acontecimentos do Kosovo, tudo aparentava indicar que a reivindicação do estatuto de grande potência não seria acolhida favoravelmente pelos países ocidentais.
Assim, não surpreende que o conflito no Kosovo tivesse aumentado a tensão entre a Rússia e o Ocidente. Mas serão os alargamentos da Aliança Atlântica para os Estados do ex-Pacto de Varsóvia que agudizariam significativamente as tensões. No

28 O episódio é relatado em Mark Tran (1999).
29 Putin utilizou o "precedente do Kosovo" aquando da anexação da Crimeia. Ver Rotaru e Troncota (2007). Sobre o "estrangeiro próximo", ver Toal (2017).

seguimento da implosão do comunismo europeu, os países da Europa Central que até então se encontravam na órbita de Moscovo encetaram transições para a democracia e para a economia de mercado. Países anteriormente tutelados pelo Kremlin através do Pacto de Varsóvia e do Conselho para Assistência Económica Mútua (COMECON), optaram por integrar as principais instituições ocidentais, incluindo a União Europeia e a Aliança Atlântica. A escolha representava nada menos do que uma reconfiguração radical da carta geopolítica europeia em vigor durante a guerra fria e uma rutura com a existência de "Estados-tampão" que garantiam à União Soviética profundidade estratégica na Europa Central.

Aqui chegados, convém recordar o contexto político de 1989/1991 porque, nos tempos mais recentes, Putin tem afirmado que a postura "defensiva" da Rússia em política externa meramente responde ao cerco estratégico fomentado pelo Ocidente (Steil, 2018)[30]. Alegadamente participam neste cerco os antigos membros do Pacto de Varsóvia, as ex-repúblicas soviéticas bálticas, a Geórgia e alguns Estados da Ásia Central. Por muito que Putin e os seus aliados insistam nesta versão dos acontecimentos, a realidade dos factos históricos revela, desde logo, que foram os países de leste que tomaram a iniciativa de aderir à União Europeia e à Aliança Atlântica. Para a esmagadora maioria dos cidadãos que viveram o "socialismo real", a União Soviética em nada se assemelhava à força libertadora enaltecida na propaganda comunista. Tratava-se, somente, de uma potência estrangeira ocupante. Com o vertiginoso colapso da União Soviética, estreitou-se a já escassíssima margem de manobra detida pela Rússia para influenciar os acontecimentos no antigo bloco socialista, até porque os novos governos saídos de eleições livres definiram como prioridade a preservação da sua independência nacional face a Moscovo. Com efeito, as novas democracias de imediato definiram políticas externas e de segurança que pretendiam tornar irreversível o seu "regresso à Europa", um eufemismo para denotar a integração nas instituições ocidentais. Na perspetiva das elites pós-comunistas dos países de leste, o "regresso à Europa" significava romper em definitivo com a tutela de Moscovo e assegurar garantias de segurança credíveis quanto à sua independência[31]. As adesões à OTAN e à União Europeia (UE) permitem, pois, a inserção num quadro institucional que proporcionaria segurança nacional, estabilidade política e prosperidade socioeconómica.

Mais importante, o presidente russo insiste que o "cerco estratégico" viola os compromissos assumidos com os dirigentes soviéticos que negociaram o desfecho pacífico da guerra fria. De acordo com esta leitura, os países ocidentais em geral, e os Estados Unidos em particular, deram garantias de segurança a Mikhail Gorbachev

30 No seu mais recente anual discurso do "Estado da nação", Putin voltou a enfatizar a tese do "cerco" da Rússia. Ver Putin (2018).

31 Sobre este ponto ver Croft, Redmond, Rees e Webber (1999, pp. 22-88).

no sentido de que a OTAN não seria alargada para leste[32]. Em defesa desta interpretação dos acontecimentos, Putin, dirigindo-se aos delegados presentes na Conferência de Segurança de Munique de 2007, cita uma afirmação feita em 17 de maio de 1990 pelo secretário-geral da OTAN, Manfred Wörner: "o facto de não estarmos preparados para colocar um exército da OTAN fora de território alemão proporciona à União Soviética uma garantia de segurança firme" (Wörner, 1990). Interrogando uma assistência deixada estupefacta com a agressividade das suas palavras, Putin pergunta: "onde estão estas garantias?"[33]. Sete anos mais tarde, no dia 18 de março de 2014, num discurso proferido no Kremlin para justificar a sua agressão na Crimeia, Putin retoma esta narrativa das alegadas "garantias" incumpridas. Sem rodeios, o presidente russo afirma que os responsáveis ocidentais "mentiram-nos muitas vezes, tomaram decisões por trás das nossas costas, confrontaram-nos com factos consumados. Isto aconteceu com a expansão da NATO para leste, tal como a colocação de infraestruturas militares junto das nossas fronteiras"[34]. Rejeitando a premissa de que a segurança da Rússia sairia reforçada pela expansão da OTAN, que estabilizaria a Europa Central através da sua inclusão nas instituições ocidentais, Putin afirma que o alargamento constituía uma "provocação séria que reduz o nível de confiança mútua" e, nesse sentido, configurava um fator de instabilidade no quadro europeu[35].

É legítimo questionar se, terminada a guerra fria, não teria sido prudente conceder à Rússia uma esfera de influência na Europa Central; isto é, será que o "regresso à Europa" dos antigos membros do Pacto de Varsóvia deveria ter sido sacrificado em prol de um entendimento com Moscovo? Não teria sido preferível uma nova Ialta, mesmo que para isso se tivesse de abandonar a Europa Central ao seu destino? Se há margem para discutir a bondade dos alargamentos, a verdade dos factos é outra quanto às garantias de segurança alegadamente dadas aos líderes soviéticos. Responsáveis russos reiteradamente afirmam que o Ocidente, em 1990, violou uma "promessa" feita pelos governos da República Federal Alemã e dos Estados Unidos no sentido de manter os antigos países comunistas fora da Aliança Atlântica. Anatolii Adamishin, antigo vice-ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros soviético, declarou que, durante as conversas sobre a reunificação alemã, recebeu tais garantias (Gordon, 1997). A mesma posição foi, mais recentemente, vinculada por Sergei Lavrov, ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros de Vladimir Putin (Kramer, 2009, p. 40).

32 Sobre esta controvérsia ver Kramer (2009).

33 Ver "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy", February 10, 2007. O texto deste importantíssimo discurso de Putin pode ser consultado em http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.

34 Ver "Address by President of the Russian Federation", 18 de março de 2014. Consultado no site oficial da presidência russa em http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.

35 Ibid.

Estas acusações de incumprimento são categoricamente refutadas por responsáveis ocidentais que participaram nas negociações de 1990, salientado que a questão do alargamento da OTAN fora abordada exclusivamente no quadro das negociações sobre a reunificação alemã. Um dos mais importantes protagonistas dessas negociações, Philip Zelikow, mantém que, para além das referências contidas no Tratado "Dois mais Quatro" (*Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany*), assinado em setembro de 1990, nenhuma garantia foi dada à União Soviética em relação ao futuro alargamento da OTAN (Zelikow, 1995, p. 8). Recentemente, numa entrevista concedida em 2014, Gorbachev confirma a versão de Zelikow (Gorbatchev, 2014; Pifer, 2014). Em suma, nenhuma garantia, de qualquer natureza, parece ter sido concedida aos dirigentes soviéticos sobre o alargamento da OTAN para os países membros do Pacto de Varsóvia.

A Viragem de Munique

A política externa de Vladimir Putin entra numa nova fase após a Conferência de Segurança de Munique de 2007. Durante o encontro, o presidente russo faz um discurso censurando o comportamento internacional dos Estados Unidos e dos seus aliados, responsabilizando-os pelos "focos de tensão internacional" e pelo "uso ilegítimo" da força. Afirmando que a segurança internacional não se reduz às suas dimensões política e militar, pois engloba, *inter alia*, a estabilidade da economia mundial, a degradação ambiental e o diálogo entre civilizações, Putin concluía que a bipolaridade evidenciara "o enorme potencial estratégico das duas superpotências para assegurar a estabilidade global"[36]. Em contraste, o mundo unipolar "de um soberano, de um mestre" era deveras pernicioso na medida em que ameaçava o exercício pleno da soberania dos estados. Por isso mesmo, considera que o sistema "unipolar não é apenas inaceitável, como também é impossível", até porque as "ações unilaterais, e frequentemente ilegítimas, não resolveram nenhum problema"[37]. Na realidade, a unipolaridade apenas fomentou "novas tragédias humanas e criou novos centros de tensão", pelo que, na visão do presidente russo, a tentação unipolar dos Estados Unidos encaminhou "o mundo para um abismo de conflitos permanentes"[38]. Em suma, a unipolaridade era, inerentemente, um fator de instabilidade e, como tal, insustentável.

Em Munique, Putin aponta um conjunto de consequências nefastas que alega resultar do predomínio americano. Desde logo, a desproporcionalidade do poderio dos

36 Ver "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy", February 10, 2007. O texto do discurso de Putin pode ser consultado em http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

Estados Unidos provoca tentativas de equilíbrio de poder que "invariavelmente irão encorajar alguns países a adquirir armas de destruição massiva"[39]. Curiosamente, o presidente russo omite qualquer referência ao papel facilitador do seu país no desenvolvimento dos programas de nuclearização do Irão e da Coreia do Norte. Revelando um pensamento estratégico centrado na importância da balança de poder, Putin sugere que, para ultrapassar as dificuldades da unipolaridade, era necessário procurar "um equilíbrio razoável entre os interesses de todos os participantes no diálogo internacional", até porque era impossível travar o surgimento de novas potências económicas que, muito naturalmente, iriam converter o seu poderio material em "influência política para reforçar a multipolaridade"[40]. Perante as mutações internacionais que identificara, concluía que o bloco ocidental deveria partilhar a liderança internacional com a Rússia e outros países emergentes.

Como corolário do apelo à criação de um sistema multipolar (policêntrico), Vladimir Putin sustenta ser urgente definir novas regras quanto ao uso da força na política internacional. Repetindo uma formulação na altura em voga, declara que "o único mecanismo que poderá tomar decisões sobre o uso da força militar como último recurso é a Carta das Nações Unidas", acrescentando que, por isso, "não precisamos de substituir a ONU pela OTAN ou a UE"[41]. Feito um ano antes da invasão russa da Geórgia de agosto de 2008, este apelo à legalidade internacional e às normas da Carta das Nações Unidos demonstra uma notável incongruência entre as palavras e a *praxis*. Mas os apelos reiterados às normas internacionais eram críticos por duas razões. Primeira, porque Putin, pelo menos através da sua retórica, continuava a conceder legitimidade à ordem internacional; isto é, ainda não tinha abertamente abraçado o revisionismo. Segunda, essas normas e instituições internacionais, e a ONU em particular, eram extremamente úteis para a Rússia porque constringiam o impulso unilateral dos Estados Unidos. Acrescenta-se que os desentendimentos em volta das normas internacionais referentes ao uso da força provocaram brechas no seio da União Europeia e da Aliança Atlântica durante os meses de debate que antecederam a investida militar de 2003 contra Saddam Hussein[42].

Dir-se-á, a bom rigor, que a intervenção no Iraque liderada pelos Estados Unidos pairava sobre o discurso de Munique de Putin. Na conferência de imprensa que se seguiu ao seu primeiro encontro com Putin, em junho de 2001, George W. Bush disse ter olhado para a alma do presidente russo e ter concluído que o seu interlocutor era "confiável" (Rato, 2008a, p. 5). Três meses mais tarde, na sequência dos

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Estas questões são tratadas em Marques de Almeida e Rato (2004).

ataques da al-Qaeda de 11 de setembro de 2001, abriu-se uma janela de cooperação russo-americana no âmbito do combate ao terrorismo, um assunto que, ironicamente, permitia a Putin legitimar a sua devastação na Chechénia em nome do combate ao jihadismo. À medida que Washington prepara o derrube dos Taliban, Putin contribui com informações sobre o Afeganistão, fornece armas à Aliança do Norte e intercede junto de governos da Ásia Central cuja colaboração Bush solicitara. Todavia, com a passagem do tempo, aprofundou-se a desconfiança de Moscovo. Desde logo porque a presença de bases militares americanas na Ásia Central, utilizadas para prosseguir a guerra no Afeganistão e vistas como temporárias quando estabelecidas, passaram a ser olhadas por Moscovo como meios para consolidar o "cerco estratégico" à Rússia. Depois dos alargamentos da OTAN ao leste europeu, a Rússia temia ser cercada no seu flanco sul – no Cáucaso e na Ásia Central. Eis uma preocupação que se acentua nos meses anteriores à investida militar no Iraque, o aliado *pivot* da URSS (e, depois, da Rússia) no Médio Oriente.

A intervenção militar contra o regime baathista iraquiano proporcionara a abertura necessária para a Rússia estabelecer uma "aliança antiguerra" destinada a minar a hegemonia internacional dos Estados Unidos (Rato, 2008a). Para além da Rússia, esta aliança de oportunidade reunia a China, a França e a Alemanha, países que, por razões distintas, se opunham à "hiperpotência" e ao mundo unipolar que ganhara forma no seguimento da implosão da União Soviética. A estratégia de Putin seria bem-sucedida a vários níveis. Desde logo, obrigou a coligação liderada pelos Estados Unidos a agir militarmente sem um mandato do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. Se é verdade que um mandato das Nações Unidas jamais seria atribuído pela Rússia e a China, é igualmente verdade que os americanos, ao recorreram ao Conselho de Segurança em busca de uma segunda Resolução, levantaram dúvidas quanto à legitimidade do uso da força no Iraque. Igualmente importante, Putin explorou a oportunidade de abrir brechas no seio do campo euro-atlântico, colocando a França e a Alemanha em rota de colisão com Washington, e, recorde-se, com a esmagadora maioria dos países europeus que apoiaram Bush no Iraque. Mesmo que conjunturais, as divisões verificadas no interior da União Europeia e da Aliança Atlântica enfraquecem Washington, ao mesmo tempo que Moscovo ensaiava um passo gigantesco para regatear o seu estatuto de grande potência mundial.

A problemática da legitimidade do uso da força levantada pela intervenção no Iraque estava associada à forma como Putin concebia o papel da Rússia no "estrangeiro próximo", a designação do Kremlin para as antigas repúblicas constituintes da União Soviética. Consolidado o seu poder interno através da limitação das liberdades e da estatização dos sectores estratégicos da economia, Putin reúne condições para traçar uma política externa robusta relativamente ao "estrangeiro próximo". É certo que a determinação de recuperar a influência perdida no "estrangeiro

próximo" antecede a chegada de Putin à chefia do Estado russo, como ficou atestado pela atuação de Moscovo na Abecásia e na Transnístria nos meses que seguiram ao desmembramento da União Soviética. Desde logo, a presença de minorias russas em vários países que emergiram da URSS constituía um assunto delicado para Moscovo porque o Estado russo definia-se como protetor dos compatriotas residentes fora de fronteiras. Para continuar a defender os interesses e os direitos dos russos no "estrangeiro próximo", uma política externa capaz de amarrar estes países à órbita do Kremlin teria de ser formulada. A segurança da Rússia era, portanto, indissociável das preferências políticas dos países do "estrangeiro próximo". Nem os alargamentos da Aliança Atlântica aos Estados do ex-Pacto de Varsóvia nem a investida militar americana no Médio Oriente esgotavam as inquietações de Putin quanto ao Ocidente, cuja influência na vizinhança da Rússia era, na ótica do presidente, tão considerável quanto ameaçadora. As desconfianças adensaram-se em outubro de 2000, quando manifestações populares em Belgrado afastam do poder Slobodan Milosevic, um aliado que Moscovo apoiara ao longo da década de 1990. Putin entendeu a revolução que removeu Milosevic como um revés para os interesses do seu país na região, e mais uma afronta do Ocidente ao seu país. Se os acontecimentos de Belgrado eram deveras preocupantes, mais perturbadoras seriam as "revoluções coloridas" que assolaram várias ex-repúblicas soviéticas e conduziram ao derrube de governos próximos de Moscovo. Putin considerava terem sido promovidas pelas potências ocidentais para completar o cerco à Rússia iniciado pela OTAN e pela UE na Europa Central.

Uma destas revoluções ocorreu em novembro de 2003, na Geórgia, quando manifestações populares lideradas por jovens pró-ocidentais forçaram a saída do presidente Eduard Shevardnadze[43]. Com o intuito de influenciar o rumo dos acontecimentos, Putin enviou Igor Ivanov, o seu ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros, para negociar a transferência de poder. Ivanov insistentemente referia os acontecimentos como um "golpe", enquanto Putin, de forma insidiosa, afirmou que "durante séculos" existira uma "relação de irmandade" entre os povo russo e georgiano (Gessen, 2017, p. 238). Se é verdade que o aviso era destituído de subtileza, é igualmente verdade que seria insuficiente para salvar Shevardnadze. Apesar das relações com o deposto presidente georgiano não se terem pautado por especial proximidade, Putin considerava que o novo poder, personalizado por Mikhail Saakashvili, era a falange do Ocidente no "estrangeiro próximo" (Blagov, 2003). A desconfiança consolida-se quando, em maio de 2004, manifestações em Batumi, capital da região de Adjara, levam Aslan Abashidze, aliado de Moscovo que exerceria um poder ditatorial na região, a abandonar o país e a procurar refúgio em Moscovo (Walsh, 2004). Tratava-se de mais uma derrota de Putin, mas a Rússia

43 Sobre a revolução georgiana ver Jakopovich (2007) e Jones (2015).

continuava a impedir que o governo georgiano exercesse a sua autoridade na Abecásia e na Ossétia do Sul.

Ao mesmo tempo, e anos antes da invasão da Geórgia de 2008, Putin decide interferir no processo eleitoral a decorrer na Ucrânia. Em finais de outubro de 2004, escassos três dias antes da ida do país às urnas, o presidente russo desloca-se à capital ucraniana para participar nas celebrações do sexagésimo aniversário da libertação de Kiev pelo Exército Vermelho (Walsh, 2004). Na cerimónia, Putin toma o seu lugar ao lado do presidente ucraniano, Leonid Kuchma, e do seu sucessor designado, Viktor Yanukovych, o candidato apoiado por Moscovo. Participando nesta cerimónia, Putin sinalizava a sua preferência de candidato. Yanukovych perde as eleições, mas recusa aceitar o resultado. Em resposta, manifestantes ocupam o centro de Kiev durante semanas, apenas desmobilizando quando o Tribunal Constitucional ucraniano ordena a repetição do sufrágio. Novamente contados os boletins de voto, Viktor Yushchenko, o candidato pró-ocidental que fora alvo de um atentado por envenenamento com dioxina, emerge vitorioso. Estava consumada a "revolução laranja" que dá lugar a um governo de coligação composto por partidos e personalidades determinados a afastar Kiev da órbita de Moscovo[44]. Se é verdade que as "revoluções coloridas" na Geórgia e na Ucrânia constituíram reveses significativos para o presidente Putin, é igualmente verdade que a perda de influência em Tbilisi não era comparável com o desastre geopolítico que acabara de ocorrer nas ruas de Kiev.

Também as ex-repúblicas soviéticas do Báltico seriam alvos da destabilização russa. O caso mais notório ocorreu em finais de abril de 2007, quando a Rússia lança uma série de ciberataques contra as infraestruturas digitais da Estónia, incluindo *sites* do Estado, instituições financeiras e órgãos de comunicação social (Ashmore, 2009; Ruus, 2008). A origem da vaga de ataques residia na decisão do governo estónio de remover uma estátua de bronze alusiva ao Exército Vermelho, situada no centro de Tallinn, para uma zona periférica da cidade, decisão que Moscovo e os russos residentes na Estónia interpretam como um ato hostil (Myers, 2007). Os protestos intensificaram-se à medida que notícias falsas anunciando a destruição do monumento eram disseminadas pela imprensa russa. Para os russos, o "Monumento aos Libertadores de Tallinn", inaugurado em 1947, representava a vitória sobre o nazismo e a "libertação" da Estónia pelo Exército Vermelho. Em contrapartida, para os estónios, tratava-se de um símbolo da ocupação soviética que pôs fim à independência do país. Com alguma distância, é hoje evidente que se tratou do primeiro ataque desta natureza contra um aliado da OTAN, um escalar do confronto com a Aliança recorrendo à guerra híbrida que Moscovo tem vindo a aperfeiçoar nos últi-

44 Sobre a "revolução laranja" ucraniana, ver Aslund e McFaul (2006), Wilson (2006) e Plokhy (2015, especialmente capítulos 24-27).

mos anos, estabelecendo um *modus operandi* que seria repetido aquando das invasões da Geórgia e da Ucrânia.

Apesar de não ter sido a única provocação feita por Moscovo aos países bálticos, o ciberataque à Estónia foi seguramente a mais séria desde os alargamentos da OTAN. Contudo, a gravidade dos ciberataques passa para segundo plano quando, em agosto de 2008, tropas russas invadem a República da Geórgia[45]. Antes, preparando o caminho para a investida militar, Putin acusa o governo de Tbilisi de "provocações", uma denúncia inusitada quando se considera que separatistas pró-russos efetivamente ocupavam a Abecázia e a Ossétia do Sul (Rato, 2008b, p. 9). Quando o governo georgiano sinaliza a intenção de exercer a sua soberania na Ossétia do Sul, Moscovo acusa Tbilisi de provocar o confronto. Com efeito, durante os meses que antecederam a invasão, Saakashvili desdobrou-se em avisos públicos sobre as intenções agressivas do Kremlin. Por exemplo, quatro meses antes do início das hostilidades, os georgianos acusam Putin de mobilizar as suas forças, incluindo o reforço do contingente destacado na Abecázia, para fins ofensivos. Apesar das declarações russas em sentido contrário, tornou-se evidente que o uso da força na Ossétia do Sul fora planeado com antecedência, isto é, não configurava uma resposta improvisada às alegadas "provocações georgianas".

Ao lançar a guerra da Geórgia, Putin (nomeado primeiro-ministro pelo presidente Dmitri Medvedev) pretende, desde logo, quebrar politicamente um país determinado a evitar a tutela de Moscovo, o motivo que leva Tbilisi a procurar integrar a UE e a OTAN. Com o apoio dos Estados Unidos e da Polónia, Saakashvili esperava que a Cimeira de Bucareste, realizada em abril de 2008, se saldasse por um convite de adesão através de um Plano de Ação para a Adesão. Todavia, vários países europeus – incluindo o Reino Unido, a França e a Alemanha – mostram-se relutantes em aceitar a entrada da Ucrânia e da Geórgia na Aliança Atlântica num futuro próximo (Erlanger e Myers, 2008). Em consequência, a decisão sobre o eventual alargamento seria, por pressão de Moscovo, adiada até dezembro de 2008. A hesitação sinalizou a Putin que uma investida militar na Geórgia, e eventualmente na Ucrânia, não teria uma resposta robusta por parte do Ocidente.

Enquanto a Rússia transmitia um aviso inequívoco quanto às limitações da independência das antigas repúblicas soviéticas, a resposta frouxa do Ocidente aos acontecimentos na Geórgia convenceu Putin que os custos do uso da força no "estrangeiro próximo" eram aceitáveis. A incursão demonstrou que Moscovo poderia, em poucos dias, tomar a capital georgiana, ao mesmo tempo que reforçou o domínio russo na Ossétia do Sul e na Abecázia, efetivamente consumando a secessão dos dois territórios. Mais importante, conseguiu impor-se perante os aliados ocidentais que novamente se dividiram quando confrontados com a assertividade

45 Sobre as consequências imediatas da invasão, ver King (2008) e Sestanovich (2008).

de Moscovo. Se a Polónia, a Ucrânia e os países bálticos não hesitaram em manifestar apoio à Geórgia, já a Alemanha, a França e a Itália apelaram à "moderação", sugerindo que a crise residia na "irresponsabilidade" do governo de Saakashvili (Beenhold, 2008). Ao anunciar que a Geórgia não teria acesso ao Plano de Ação para a Adesão, a Aliança Atlântica reconheceu, apesar de alguma retórica em sentido contrário, que o país jamais seria acolhido como membro pleno da OTAN (Croft, 2014).

Meses antes da invasão da Geórgia, em fevereiro de 2008, um referendo sobre a entrada na Ucrânia na NATO obtivera uma resposta favorável por parte de 57,8% dos votantes. O resultado certamente gerou alarme em Moscovo, que olhava para a Ucrânia como a "Pequena Rússia". Em conversa com George W. Bush, Vladimir Putin, expressando o chauvinismo generalizado entre os seus compatriotas, afirmou que a Ucrânia "nem sequer é um Estado" (Blackwell, 2014). Poderia, certamente, ter acrescentado que nem sequer reconhecia os ucranianos como uma nação distinta. A invasão da Geórgia, o colapso da "revolução laranja" e a subsequente vitória de Viktor Yanukovych nas eleições presidências de 2010 parecia ter, em definitivo, excluído a adesão de Kiev à NATO.

Em fevereiro de 2014, o levantamento popular da praça Euromaidan obriga o presidente Yanukovych a refugiar-se na Rússia[46]. As novas autoridades em Kiev anunciaram que pretendiam seguir uma orientação pró-ocidental consubstanciada na adesão às instituições europeias. A resposta do Kremlin não se fez esperar. Nas primeiras horas do dia 27 de fevereiro de 2014, um grupo armado assaltou o Conselho Supremo da Crimeia, em Simferopol. Apelidados de "homens verdes", os soldados recolheram a bandeira ucraniana do edifício e hastearam a tricolor russa. Apesar de terem removido os distintivos das suas fardas, de forma a impossibilitar a identificação do grupo, rapidamente se tonou claro que os "homens verdes" eram forças *Spetsnaz*. A 16 de março, as novas autoridades de Simferopol declaram a independência da península. Menos de um mês depois da tomada da sede do governo da Crimeia, o parlamento russo – a Duma – aprova a anexação formal da região.

Em paralelo, em Dombas, a zona oriental da Ucrânia que partilha a fronteira com a Federação Russa, uma rebelião separatista atira a região para a guerra. Confrontada com um estado de guerra de baixa intensidade com a Rússia, Kiev, após as eleições de outubro de 2014, declara como prioritária a entrada do país na OTAN. Pouco depois, em dezembro do mesmo ano, o parlamento ucraniano abandona o estatuto de país "não-alinhado" até então seguido para evitar a hostilidade da Rússia (Vorobiov, 2015). No final do mês, o presidente Petro Poroshenko anuncia que realizará

46 Ver Wilson (2014). Para uma perspetiva mais cética relativamente aos revolucionários ver Sakwa (2015).

um referendo sobre a adesão à Aliança Atlântica. Mais tarde, em julho de 2017, Poroshenko declara que o país cumprirá os critérios necessários para obter um Plano de Ação de Adesão.

Para perceber por que razão Putin fomentou as "rebeliões" na Crimeia e em Dombas, convém recordar que o presidente afirma defender os direitos dos russos que se encontram a viver fora da Federação Russa. Com efeito, as fronteiras do Estado russo (a Federação Russa) não coincidem com as fronteiras da nação. Pode, num primeiro momento, parecer que Putin se limita a defender os interesses legítimos das minorias russas que, com o colapso da URSS, se encontraram a viver nos países que emergiram da União Soviética. Todavia, a intervenção militar na Crimeia representa mais do que uma mera defesa das populações russas ou da defesa de interesses estratégicos de Moscovo no "estrangeiro próximo". Na realidade, a guerra contra a Ucrânia representa uma "linha vermelha" traçada por Vladimir Putin, isto é, configura a rejeição de uma orientação ocidental para o país. Putin, antes de aceitar tal desfecho, fomentará a guerra e o desmembramento territorial do Estado ucraniano. Esta intenção torna-se clara através de um discurso proferido no Kremlin a 18 de março de 2014 para justificar anexação da Crimeia, quando o presidente russo admitia que a OTAN às portas de Sevastopol constituía "não uma ilusória, mas uma real ameaça ao flanco sul da Rússia"[47].

Dado que a Crimeia fora administrativamente transferida para a Ucrânia por Nikita Khrushchev em 1954, defensores de Putin desvalorizam a agressão e a subsequente anexação da Crimeia[48]. A tese de que a península "foi sempre" território russo ignora que Catarina "a Grande" a conquistou aos Tártaros e a incorporou no Império Russo apenas em 1783. A importância simbólica da Crimeia reside no facto de o território ter sido essencial para o projeto de expansão imperial czarista. Considerando que a Crimeia invoca um período dourado da ascensão do Império, o regresso do território à Rússia traduz as aspirações neoimperiais da elite dirigente que rodeia Vladimir Putin. Dito de forma diferente, ao optar pela anexação, o Kremlin sinalizou a determinação de recuperar as terras que considera vitais para salvaguardar os interesses nacionais da Federação Russa, e, não menos relevante, de recuperar da humilhação sofrida às mãos do Ocidente após o desmoronamento da União Soviética. Parafraseando Donald Trump, Putin fará "*Russia great again*".

47 Ver, "Address by President of the Russian Federation", 18 de março de 2014. Consultado no site oficial da presidência russa, disponível em http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.

48 Sobre a história da Crimeia, ver Kent (2016).

Conclusão

Recorrendo a uma metáfora tão reveladora quanto cruel, Helmut Schmidt comentou que "a União Soviética era, essencialmente, o Alto Volta com mísseis" (Judt, 2005, p. 592). Por muita razão que tivesse assistido ao antigo chanceler alemão, e independentemente das restantes debilidades da União Soviética, não deixa de ser verdade que o seu poderio militar, particularmente o arsenal nuclear, lhe garantia o estatuto de superpotência mundial. Esse estatuto, e o prestígio político a ele inerente, evaporou-se com o colapso da União Soviética e os desafios subsequentes da transição para o pós-comunismo. O falhanço do projeto de ocidentalização e democratização prosseguido por Boris Ieltsin abriu caminho ao regresso a uma orientação assente na rejeição do Ocidente hoje defendida por Vladimir Putin.

Analistas que atribuem à Rússia de Vladimir Putin uma postura estratégica "defensiva" tendem a ignorar que a hostilidade de Moscovo relativamente à ordem internacional tem sido, desde que Putin assumiu o cargo presidencial, uma constante da sua política externa. Isto é, os embates entre o Ocidente e a Rússia resultam de um fator estrutural da política externa moscovita e das prioridades de segurança da Rússia: a determinação de rever as regras que estruturam a ordem internacional. Muito simplesmente, a Federação Russa é hoje uma potência revisionista comprometida com a alteração das regras fundamentais que sustentam a ordem internacional. A hostilidade de Putin em relação aos Estados Unidos e à União Europeia é a consequência inevitável de uma política externa que visa recuperar o estatuto de grande potência da Rússia e restabelecer o domínio de Moscovo no "estrangeiro próximo".

Alguns Estados europeus já se conformaram com as implicações desta nova realidade geoestratégica. Por exemplo, adotando uma linguagem tão direta quanto invulgar nos documentos oficiais da União Europeia. A "Estratégia Global da União Europeia para a Política Externa e de Segurança" declara que "a gestão da relação com a Rússia representa um desafio estratégico chave"[49]. O mesmo documento acrescenta que a "anexação ilegal da Crimeia não será reconhecida" e enfatiza que não se aceita "a desestabilização da Ucrânia ocidental"[50]. Talvez mais importante, o texto afirma que as ações da Rússia nestes palcos não são casuísticas porque a Rússia, através destas ações, "desafiou o essencial da ordem europeia"[51]. Ao caracterizar o comportamento da Rússia nestes termos, o documento refuta a eventualidade de o "desafio russo" ser de natureza conjuntural. Refuta, também, o argumento,

49 Ver "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", junho de 2016, p. 33. Uma reflexão sobre esta estratégia europeia pode ser encontrada em Viana, Gaspar e Pinto (2016).

50 "Shared Vision, Common Action", junho de 2016, p. 33.

51 Ibid.

ainda mais benigno, que Putin, dado a incapacidade de reformar o Estado e a economia do seu país, fabrica tensões externas para desviar as atenções da sua população. A nova normalidade é, pois, balizada pela procura de vantagem permanente e pela gestão das crises que invariavelmente farão parte da nova geopolítica mundial.

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A UNASUL e a Segurança das suas Fronteiras: uma Reflexão Necessária

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Resumo
Um recente esforço de integração regional para tratar de temas de cooperação socioeconómica, de segurança e defesa multilaterais e promover a construção de medidas de confiança mútua é a UNASUL, criada pelos doze países sul-americanos. As suas fronteiras nacionais caracterizam-se como zonas privilegiadas de integração, cooperação e intercâmbio cultural e comercial. Entretanto, crimes transfronteiriços na América do Sul são seus maiores desafios de segurança. Fazer frente a eles impõe valer-se de recursos militares, de segurança e de *intelligence* e modificar paradigmas tradicionais existentes. A adoção de políticas orientadas para prevenir e combater crimes transnacionais deverá considerar o equilíbrio entre liberdade e segurança, o que pressupõe dispor de mecanismos concertados de equilíbrio, cooperação e intercâmbio de informação oportuna, precisa e confiável para antecipar e reagir a condições existentes que reduzam a própria vulnerabilidade dos países sul-americanos.

Abstract
The UNASUL and the Security of its Borders: a Necessary Reflection

The UNASUL, created by the twelve South American countries, represents the most recent regional integration effort to address issues related to socioeconomic cooperation, multilateral security and defense and the promotion of mutual confidence building. South American borders are privileged zones for integration, cooperation, and cultural and commercial interchange. Transborder crimes in the region constitute the region's major security challenges, and responding to them requires new collective paradigms for the use of military and intelligence resources. Creating and implementing public policies oriented to avoiding and combating these crimes should consider the balance between liberty and security. This presupposes the adoption of concerted mechanisms of balance, cooperation and interchange of timely intelligence to react to the conditions that create vulnerability.

* Intencionalmente, o artigo não discorre sobre situações particulares de Estado-Membro da UNASUR, embora citações especificas ocorram, à guisa de exemplo ou esclarecimento. Os pontos de vista e as considerações apresentados não se constituem automaticamente posições institucionais, e sim do autor.

2018
N.º 150
pp. 149-166

"Nem cora o livro de ombrear co'o sabre... Nem cora o sabre de chama-lo irmão..."
(Castro Alves, 1870)[1]

Aspectos Históricos do Esforço para a Integração Sul-Americana

A América Latina e, particularmente, a América do Sul têm sido pouco afetadas por conflitos militares interestatais como os que têm caracterizado a Europa e outras regiões do mundo, muitas das quais ainda se deparam com crises. Embora se reconheça que a América do Sul experimentou múltiplas guerras nos primeiros 120 anos posteriores à independência da maioria dos seus países, desde então, e apesar da existência de diferenças políticas, sociais, económicas, de defesa e segurança, o último conflito que envolveu Estados da região foi a Guerra do Chaco, entre Bolívia e Paraguai, nos anos 1932 a 1935, que ocasionou a morte de cerca de 100 mil pessoas, de acordo com a Enciclopédia Britânica. Maioritariamente, os países têm solucionado as suas disputas de maneira pacífica. Entretanto, o estado de não-beligerância não significava automaticamente que havia interação cooperativa entre eles. As competições geopolíticas e desconfianças históricas contribuíam para comprometer os esforços de integração.

A integração tem sido debatida na América do Sul em diferentes níveis desde o início do século XX e, gradualmente, têm ocorrido esforços para desenvolver mais iniciativas na região, para favorecer a cooperação sul-americana.

Apesar disso, os debates sobre a segurança de fronteiras foram excluídos ou tratados à margem das discussões mais relevantes e, de maneira geral, restringidos, preponderantemente, aos âmbitos nacionais, sem esforços articulados. A constatação da existência de problemas de segurança comuns determinou que os países sul-americanos estabelecessem mecanismos para desenvolver políticas públicas conjuntas. Nesse contexto, entender a segurança, em sua acepção ampla, é aspecto-chave para o sucesso de um processo de integração regional.

A União de Nações Sul-Americanas (UNASUL)

Os países da América do Sul compartilham aspectos geográficos e históricos comuns e níveis sociais e econômicos assimétricos. A consolidação de mecanismos com o propósito de fortalecer o diálogo político entre os Estados-Membros adequa-se a uma base capaz de assegurar espaço de concertação multilateral, reforçar a integração da América do Sul, a sua condição de zona de paz, e fortalecer valores e

1 Castro Alves, poeta brasileiro (1847-1871) in *Espumas Flutuantes*, de 1870. Com adaptação literária: *o livro não se envergonha de se unir ao sabre e nem tampouco o sabre de chamá-lo de irmão*, com o entendimento de que o conhecimento e a segurança não devem se envergonhar de defender juntos os valores e os interesses da nação.

instituições democráticas representativos. Tais mecanismos favorecem o desenvolvimento socioeconómico dos seus Estados e lastreiam-se em agendas centradas na inclusão social e competitividade, no fomento de medidas de confiança nas áreas de defesa e segurança, e na ênfase nos valores democráticos. Estes, são determinantes para que a postura política fundamental para a região venha sendo a de rechaçar as práticas que comprometem o Estado de Direito, favorecendo a participação dos países sul-americanos no cenário internacional.

O mais recente esforço de integração regional para tratar temas de cooperação socioeconómica, de segurança e defesa multilaterais e promover a construção de medidas de confiança mútuas é a União de Nações Sul-Americanas (UNASUL). Criada em 17 de abril de 2007, resultou da ação consensual, e não apenas da maioria, dos doze Estados da América do Sul (Argentina, Bolívia, Brasil, Chile, Colômbia, Equador, Guiana, Paraguai, Peru, Suriname, Uruguai e Venezuela), para estabelecer plano estratégico e consolidar agenda comum para a região. De acordo com o seu Tratado Constitutivo (TCU), assinado em 23 de maio de 2008, em Brasília, a UNASUL tem como objetivo geral:

> "Construir, de maneira participativa e consensuada, um espaço de integração e união cultural, social, económica e política entre os seus povos, com ênfase no diálogo político, na educação, em políticas sociais, em energia, na infraestrutura, no financiamento e no meio ambiente, entre outros, com o objetivo de eliminar a desigualdade socioeconómica, buscar a inclusão social e a participação cidadã, fortalecer a democracia, e reduzir as assimetrias, com o fortalecimento da soberania e a independência dos Estados" (TCU, 2008, p. 9).

A resposta consensual a esses aspectos é a base que evidenciou a vontade política dos Estados sul-americanos em estabelecer um modelo de integração, com o propósito de promover a coordenação de políticas públicas e criar um foro sul-americano de diálogo democrático. De modo amplo, o aspecto central desse esforço regional é o de desenvolver uma arquitetura comum com ênfase na cooperação. Numa perspectiva de segurança regional, a UNASUL não foi concebida para atuar como aliança militar ou organização de defesa ou segurança coletiva.

Na área de segurança de fronteiras na América do Sul, o desafio imposto aos seus Estados-Membros é proporcional à sua extensão territorial (17.707.111 km²), população (em 2016, aproximadamente, 426 milhões de pessoas), assimetrias e diversidades humanas, económicas, naturais e geográficas, ao mesmo tempo semelhantes e singulares entre os Estados que formam a região. Como um exemplo da complexidade da UNASUL, a República Federativa do Brasil, com 8.514.880 km² (RESDAL, 2016), representando 48% da área da América de Sul, possui na sua faixa de fronteiras aproximadamente 10 milhões de habitantes e 17 mil quilómetros de fronteiras terrestres compartilhadas com dez países sul-americanos e 630 quilómetros com a França (Guiana Francesa), e com os quais são conformadas nove triplas fron-

teiras (Ministério da Defesa, 2017). Nessa zona de fronteiras, há 710 cidades localizadas em 122 municípios fronteiriços e, 588, não-fronteiriços. A área representa 27% do território brasileiro (Ministério da Defesa, 2016a).

Essencialmente, a UNASUL pode ser compreendida como entidade supranacional criada para impedir conflitos e/ou mitigar os seus efeitos. Como tal, busca alcançar um nível de coordenação satisfatório para que a integração ocorra com base nos princípios fundamentais de respeito pela soberania, territorialidade, autodeterminação e não-intervenção. Os seus objetivos específicos são, entre outros, "estabelecer zona de paz na América do Sul com livre circulação de seus cidadãos, consolidar uma identidade sul-americana, garantir o controle soberano de seus recursos naturais, e enfatizar a integração e a participação dos seus Estados-Membros no cenário internacional" (TCU, 2008).

A UNASUL e a Segurança das suas Fronteiras: um Esforço em Evolução

No âmbito da UNASUL, as fronteiras nas suas dimensões terrestre, aérea e marítima são extensas, maioritariamente localizadas em áreas anecúmenes (desabitadas) ou com baixa densidade demográfica, sobretudo nas suas sub-regiões Amazónia, Andes, Fueguina, Magalhães e Patagónia. Os seus Estados-Membros têm capacidades diferenciadas, o que torna mais complexas e custosas as tarefas de monitoramento humano ou técnico necessárias para a identificação antecipada de atividades ilegais que envolvem a circulação de pessoas e mercadorias.

Numa perspectiva de integração, as fronteiras assumem tanto um papel limitador para as comunicações e o fluxo de pessoas e produtos como de facilitador, para evitar maiores impedimentos à realização dessas atividades. Não obstante, fatos criminais transnacionais, que disto podem tirar partido, determinam considerar a noção de segurança de fronteiras nos níveis nacional e regional, um passo em frente em relação à ideia mais tradicional (exclusivamente nacional). Num contexto de ameaças transnacionais que pode favorecer a ocorrência de problemas vicinais ou multilaterais, a segurança das diferentes dimensões da fronteira é fator-chave e necessário para prover as condições mínimas de normalidade para a circulação de pessoas e produtos entre os países. A noção de segurança de fronteira constitui um enfoque relevante para visualizar os principais problemas que ocorrem nesse espaço, como: tráfico de drogas, armas, pessoas, minerais e mercadorias, crimes ambientais, migração ilegal, potenciais atores terroristas, entre outros. Estes, para serem enfrentados, requerem capacidade estatal de gestão de fronteiras que contemple a coordenação nacional, a cooperação internacional e o trabalho conjunto de forças-tarefas das agências governamentais envolvidas. Numa ótica de integração regional, as fronteiras passam constituir-se como uma ponte facilitadora da relação entre os países, e não barreiras que favoreçam a proteção de atores de crimes transfronteiriços da ação repressiva do Estado, como

observou o Ministro da Defesa do Brasil, Raul Jungmann (Ministério da Defesa, 2016b).

Os modos de atuação dos crimes transacionais são difusos, assimétricos e dinâmicos. Muitas vezes são imprevisíveis e valem-se de ações não-convencionais que exploram vulnerabilidades que envolvem fatores institucionais e sociais que favorecem a ocorrência dessas atividades criminais. Desta forma, as ações governamentais também devem ter em conta o estímulo a medidas coletivas de partilha de informação e de práticas de sucesso que possam reforçar a segurança comum, e não apenas desenvolvê-las nos níveis nacionais. Trata-se, assim, como condição necessária, mas não suficiente para responder ao problema, reforçar a presença do Estado e fomentar políticas socioeconómicas capazes de gerar vetores de desenvolvimento que promoverão a inclusão social, a redução da pobreza e do desemprego.

Um diagnóstico preliminar requer a descrição mínima de fatores presentes no cenário fronteiriço sul-americano, nas seguintes dimensões: (1) geográfica (extensão territorial, permeabilidade, dificuldade de locomoção e comunicação, extensa rede de vias navegáveis); (2) institucional (corrupção de agentes públicos, áreas com baixo ou ausência de controle, alfandegas ineficientes e sem integração, modelos de controle migratório anacrónico, burocráticos e pouco ágeis, níveis deficientes de profissionalização de agentes públicos civis, militares e policiais, instrumentos legais e estruturas judiciais inexistentes, insuficientes, ineficientes ou desatualizadas, carência de tecnologia e infraestruturas, presença deficiente do Estado em áreas remotas); e (3) regional (capacidades diferenciadas dos países sul-americanos, o que faz mais complexa e custosa a tarefa de monitoração humana ou técnica para a identificação antecipada de atividades ilegais, inexistência de sistema regional unificado para a reunião, análise e difusão oportuna de *intelligence*, níveis assimétricos de capacitação humana e técnica, entre outros fatores, aos níveis nacional e internacional).

A formulação de políticas públicas de segurança de fronteira não pode depender exclusivamente de um país quando se trata de ameaças que são comuns para a região. Ao contrário, para ser eficiente, a política deve considerar a participação de todos os países envolvidos. É a associação e cooperação com o vizinho que potencializa o esforço coletivo, pois nenhum Estado-Membro tem capacidade individual para garantir exclusivamente a sua própria segurança ou considerar-se senhor do próprio destino em matéria de segurança de fronteiras. É a implementação das ações práticas que reforça a adoção das medidas decorrentes e sua gestão, pois não é simplesmente o aumento quantitativo e unilateral de investimento financeiro e de agentes públicos que tornarão mais seguras as fronteiras. É necessário haver cooperação e coordenação especializadas para identificar situações que afetem a segurança e estabelecer de maneira oportuna a interpretação e a partilha correta da informação que se possa constituir como ameaça comum.

Na teoria clássica, fronteira é a demarcação geográfica que limita a área de soberania e responsabilidade jurídica e administrativa do Estado. Na área da UNASUL, os crimes transfronteiriços constituem-se como os seus maiores desafios de segurança. As fronteiras sul-americanas são zonas privilegiadas de integração e os desafios para a adoção de políticas orientadas para prevenir e enfrentar o crime organizado transfronteiriço deverão considerar o equilíbrio entre liberdade e segurança.
Às tradicionais ameaças ao Estado agregam-se outras, de natureza criminal transfronteiriça, num contexto de segurança multidimensional, entendida, de modo amplo, como a combinação dos esforços governamentais para fazer frente a problemas políticos, socioeconómicos, jurídicos, de meio ambiente e humanos e, nesse contexto, também de segurança de fronteiras. Esta requer a formulação de uma política pública específica que contemple as dimensões geográfica, institucional e regional, os fatores que as conformam, e a revisão do papel dos atores tradicionais em matéria de segurança de fronteiras, como as Forças Armadas.

A Segurança de Fronteiras e as Forças Armadas

Para os países da América do Sul, a percepção de ameaça externa como necessidade de reação a uma dimensão militar é baixa ou inexistente. A segurança de fronteiras ante ameaças transnacionais requer revisar o papel dos atores nacionais envolvidos, particularmente o das Forças Armadas, pois podem proporcionar aporte útil além das suas missões convencionais.
A criação de um espaço comum que privilegie a integração para dentro e mantenha a sua capacidade de dissuasão externa para proporcionar desenvolvimento, segurança, cooperação e entorno no qual as pessoas possam circular e o comércio prosperar, implica estabelecer ou ampliar mecanismos nacionais concertados para responder às ameaças comuns (Amorim, 2013). Entre esses, a necessidade de repensar as competências das Forças Armadas no contexto de segurança multidimensional.
Debates sobre o papel das Forças Armadas no contexto da segurança de fronteiras adquirem relevância crescente. Como consequência, questões a respeito da pertinência de desempenhar tarefas complementares às convencionais, fundamentalmente, de defesa da pátria contra agressão externa e garantia dos poderes constitucionais. Por razões históricas, culturais e legais, a concepção para sustentar a existência das Forças Armadas tem estado associada aos conceitos clássicos de Estado-Nação, de segurança nacional (em sentido estrito, de defesa, exclusivamente de natureza militar) e ao monopólio do uso legal e legítimo da força para a proteção da soberania do Estado e da sua nação em casos de ameaças externas, reais ou potenciais, imediatas ou não, resultantes de ação ou intenção de uma potência estrangeira (Lopes, 2001).
Na região da UNASUL, o conceito de segurança nacional, em sentido amplo, entendido como ações organizadas, coordenadas e interrelacionadas das organizações

do Estado para proteger os seus cidadãos, a soberania, os valores constitucionais e a integridade territorial, tem sido pouco utilizado ou, até mesmo ignorado, em razão de no passado governos autoritários o terem utilizado para legitimar ou justificar a repressão à oposição interna. Atualmente, as ameaças à segurança de fronteiras são de natureza transnacional. Mas, a resposta à sua manifestação requer o emprego de recursos exclusivos, não necessariamente disponíveis nas tradicionais estruturas de segurança pública. Neste contexto, o conceito de segurança nacional deixa de estar vinculado exclusivamente àquele de defesa, como o poder que garante o *status quo* interno e guardião do Estado. Passa a incluir, também, o da segurança pública, como conjunto de ações exercidas para preservar a ordem interna, as pessoas e o património, no país. Nesta acepção multidimensional, as medidas em favor da segurança nacional, dissociadas de uma componente ideológico-partidária, passam a envolver tanto as competências das organizações de defesa quanto as de segurança pública. A segurança de fronteiras é o ponto de interseção de ambos os conceitos.

Repensar o papel das organizações de defesa e adequar instrumentos legais, inclusive os de natureza constitucional, que têm respaldado a presença e atuação convencionais das Forças Armadas em áreas de fronteiras (para que atuem de maneira preventiva e repressiva e disponham de poder policial, respeitando a soberania e o interesse do Estado-Membro vizinho), é condição necessária para que o ator criminal não se refugie no outro lado da fronteira. Torna-se mais difícil combater o crime organizado com atuação débil do Estado nas fronteiras e sem cooperação.

Sem desconsiderar as suas tradicionais missões, a presença das Forças Armadas em áreas de fronteira, e o seu controle sobre os espaços terrestre, marítimo e aéreo, tem potencial para: (1) reduzir a incidência de crimes ao meio ambiente e transnacionais organizados; (2) intensificar a presença do Estado na área; (3) conhecer a fronteira para desenvolver estudos relativos aos seus desafios, vulnerabilidades, necessidades e potencialidades; (4) contribuir para a formulação de políticas com ênfase na segurança pública; e (5) fortalecer o apoio governamental à população local. Na região da UNASUL, a questão da segurança de fronteiras não deve ser considerada somente como uma prioridade nacional, mas também multinacional. Nesse contexto, autoridades civis e militares dos governos de Argentina, Bolívia, Brasil, Chile, Paraguai e Uruguai, participaram da Reunião Ministerial do Cone Sul sobre Segurança nas Fronteiras, ocorrida em Brasília, no dia 16 de novembro de 2016, e reconheceram que os crimes transnacionais estão no centro de muitos dos problemas de segurança e têm efeitos nocivos no desenvolvimento regional.

A Declaração de Brasília (DB/SF), que decorreu dessa reunião, propõe, entre outros objetivos, promover e consolidar a cooperação judicial, policial e de agências de *intelligence*, para aumentar e agilizar a capacidade de resposta frente às formas e manifestações da criminalidade organizada transnacional.

Quando os esforços de integração regional contemplam incrementar o controle fronteiriço, as atividades criminais transnacionais poderão ser reduzidas. A ideia de integração associada exclusivamente à promoção do desenvolvimento dos países, evidenciada por meio do aumento da circulação de pessoas e produtos, não se constitui garantia de que haja diminuição da ocorrência de ilícitos transnacionais. De fato, poderiam até mesmo aumentar, caso não contemplem também medidas de segurança que favoreçam a monitorização, detecção antecipada e repressão eficazes. Para que o processo de integração seja consequente para os países, é necessário considerar a associação dos fatores desenvolvimento e segurança. Em zonas fronteiriças, estes impõem o desafio de se dispor de coordenação interagências e de uma reconfiguração de processos de trabalho nos níveis nacional e regional.

Neste contexto, a reconfiguração das tarefas atribuídas às Forças Armadas torna-se fator crítico para o sucesso, pois estas possuem capacidades necessárias para responder ao crime transfronteiriço. Por exemplo, em casos de voos clandestinos para traficar drogas ou outros produtos, radares e meios aéreos da Força Aérea constituem-se recursos exclusivos e insubstituíveis para identificar e reprimir o crime, que se potencializam ainda mais quando uma organização interage de maneira coordenada com seus pares regionais. Sem cooperação transfronteiriça, ou caso esta seja débil, o ator criminal simplesmente cruza a fronteira ou suspende temporariamente suas atividades e fica livre da ação repressiva, o que pode tornar desgastante e inócua a atuação das Forças Armadas como observou o general Villa Boas (Brito, 2017).

A base do crime está no princípio da oportunidade, como observou o ex-secretário de Segurança Pública do Rio de Janeiro, José Mariano Beltrame (Carneiro, 2017), consequentemente, a interferência do Estado na economia criminal contribui para privar ou restringir as condições que a favorecem, o que é essencial para combatê-la. A coordenação antecipada de operações militares com países vizinhos minimiza a duplicação de esforços nacionais em segmento comum de fronteira. Numa lógica de soma de esforços, permite racionalizar o emprego de recursos humanos e materiais, estende a ação governamental combinada no espaço e tempo fronteiriços e contribui para multiplicar a área de atuação do Estado e sua duração, o que é fundamental para maximizar o seu resultado.

Em consequência, trata-se de um esforço para discutir a necessidade ou não de atualizar as competências convencionais das Forças Armadas para responder aos desafios de segurança de fronteiras, e não de propor automaticamente a modificação do seu papel constitucional em proveito de atividades de segurança multidimensional, particularmente em fronteiras, ou de querer transformá-las numa força policial. O que se propõe é refletir sobre a sua participação para prover recursos humanos, capacitação, informação, logística e equipamentos. Adicionalmente, como externalidade positiva, a presença das Forças Armadas em zonas de frontei-

ras pode também oferecer à população local ações de caráter cívico-social, saúde e serviços de infraestrutura. Trata-se de apoio subsidiário e temporalmente limitado das Forças Armadas para fazer frente a situações nas quais o Estado identifica que as estruturas usuais de resposta de segurança pública estão indisponíveis ou são inexistentes ou insuficientes para o desempenho das suas competências legais de proteger a sociedade.

A Segurança de Fronteiras Orientada pela Função *Intelligence*

A função *intelligence* é uma ferramenta necessária para a gestão do Estado. O termo *intelligence* contempla três aspectos essenciais: atividade, organização e produto. O conceito de *intelligence*, embora não esteja internacionalmente padronizado, é entendido como a informação decorrente da atividade desenvolvida por uma organização especializada, inclusive mediante emprego de meios e recursos sigilosos, não disponível publicamente, requerida, obtida, analisada e difundida com oportunidade, segurança e de maneira confiável, produzida por profissional do Estado com atribuições legais para tal, com base em doutrina e metodologia próprias de *intelligence*, para a produção de conhecimento para assessorar a formulação de decisões políticas no mais alto nível do governo. Ainda que não exclusivamente, o utilizador preferencial do conhecimento da *intelligence* é o chefe de Estado ou de Governo. Constitui-se como uma capacidade especializada para a gestão da informação. A sua missão principal é a de obter dados, processar a informação e gerar e difundir a informação privilegiada ao decisor, de forma precisa, oportuna e confiável. Não obstante, parafraseando Lowenthal (2002, p. 8) "*intelligence* é informação. Entretanto, informação não é necessariamente *intelligence* e, quando toda informação é considerada *intelligence*, nada o é".

De fato, informação é a descrição simplificada derivada da observação de fato ou situação, comunicação, relatório, rumor, imagem etc. e, isoladamente, pode ser ou não verdadeira, precisa, confirmada, pertinente ou confiável. A informação é a base para a produção da *intelligence*. Tradicionalmente, à definição de *intelligence*, na sua acepção de produto de uma atividade especializada, vinculam-se pressupostos essenciais que a caracterizam como apartidária e típica do Estado, à disposição dos seus sucessivos governos. Para tanto, são empregues fontes, métodos e técnicas sigilosas (cujos limites são fixados normativamente), necessários para produzir *intelligence* capaz de diminuir o grau de incerteza que pode estar associado ao processo decisório e à ação governamental. Porém, o processamento (ciclo de *intelligence*[2]) de

2 Não se dispõe de modelo único universalmente acordado. Ao ser denominado ciclo de *intelligence*, depreende-se não se tratar de processo estático. Usualmente, são consideradas para a produção do conhecimento de *intelligence* as seguintes fases: requerimento, planejamento, obtenção, processamento, análise, difusão e retroalimentação.

informação aberta pode também gerar *intelligence*, que não se constitui política pública, mas pode prover aportes para sua formulação. Essa é uma razão pela qual a atividade de *intelligence* não deve atuar por iniciativa própria ou no vácuo, mas, sim, responder aos requerimentos (ou necessidades) de informação que se constituem prioridades para a ação governamental, pois se tudo for considerado prioridade, também nada o será. Tais prioridades devem ser estabelecidas por autoridades governamentais de alto nível, especialmente pelo Presidente da República.

Usualmente, há quem possa considerar que a atividade de *intelligence* antecipa o futuro e é infalível. Isso nem sempre ocorre. Para Clausewitz (1984, p. 117) "muita *intelligence* é contraditória e a maioria é incorreta". Apesar de se centrar na percepção da *intelligence* nas guerras, ocasião na qual "a verdade é considerada a primeira vítima do conflito", muito desse seu entendimento permanece verdadeiro. Contraditória ou incorreta não significa que seja forjada e nem necessariamente se constitua como falha.

O profissional de *intelligence* muitas vezes dispõe de apenas um fragmento de informação para processar. A informação disponível pode ser cumulativa e a primeira recebida pode ser menos precisa do que a última. Na medida em que mais informação é obtida, sua negação ou corroboração tornam-se mais evidentes e permitem preencher lacunas de conhecimento que impõem análises mais abrangentes para determinar o significado e as tendências mais prováveis, notadamente sobre fato ou situação em áreas difusas nas quais respostas baseadas em abordagens tradicionais de defesa, segurança pública e diplomacia não são suficientes, adequadas ou viáveis.

No âmbito da UNASUL, a história de regimes autoritáros em vários dos seus países e a utilização da atividade de *intelligence* como "polícia secreta ou política" com o propósito de manutenção ilegítima do poder, comprometeu o seu sentido legítimo e apartidário. Compensar esse déficit percetivo sobre a *intelligence* pressupõe promover a cultura de *intelligence* em sistemas políticos democráticos (Swenson, 2015), como instrumento de antecipação do Estado e ao serviço da sociedade, para dissociá-lo do conceito estrito e ideológico da função *intelligence* que se associa ao da segurança nacional em sistemas políticos não-democráticos.

A aplicação da função *intelligence* no contexto da segurança de fronteiras torna-se relevante ao antecipar informações sobre atores e atividades criminais. O agente criminal monitoriza e estuda o comportamento e as debilidades dos órgãos de segurança do Estado para avançar ou recuar (Beltrame, 2017). Neste contexto, tornam-se favoráveis para esse agente a divulgação antecipada da mobilização e do deslocamento de grande quantidade de efetivos e recursos militares para a realização de operações em zonas de fronteiras, informações sobre os lugares onde ocorrerão as atividades e o período de tempo estabelecido para a sua execução.

Em razão da imprevisibilidade e continuada mutação dos ilícitos fronteiriços, potencializam-se resultados com a realização de múltiplas operações militares

combinadas, de curto prazo e pontuais, nacionais, bilaterais ou multilaterais, sem publicidade, com base na *intelligence*, fornecida por agências governamentais de *intelligence*, sobre as áreas com maior incidência de atividades criminais, os seus atores e as formas de atuação.

O combate eficaz ao crime organizado transnacional pressupõe obter, interpretar e disseminar informação sigilosa e, ao mesmo tempo, criar canais especializados entre as agências de *intelligence* dos Estados-Membros para intercambiá-la oportunamente e desenvolver trabalhos conjuntos relacionados às oportunidades e ameaças comuns.

Combater os crimes transfronteiriços com ênfase em *intelligence* supõe haver existência prévia de integração. Uma forma de lográ-lo é a construção de medidas de criação da confiança entre as estruturas de *intelligence* civil, policial, aduaneira, financeira e militar, entre outras, envolvidas na segurança de fronteiras. No Brasil, a atividade de *intelligence* executada por agência civil é denominada "*intelligence* de Estado" e a organização que a realiza é a Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN), o único órgão brasileiro cujo fim é planear e executar as atividades de *intelligence* de Estado para subsidiar o processo decisório nacional.

A essas competências são também agregadas à ABIN a condição de agência central do Sistema Brasileiro de Inteligência (SISBIN). Outras instituições que trabalham com *intelligence* (de natureza setorial) têm na atividade um meio para subsidiar as suas competências legais. Assim, contribui para eliminar as barreiras que limitam a cooperação e fomentam a adoção de medidas que promovam o estabelecimento de dispositivos legais que permitam o intercâmbio de *intelligence* e criem condições favoráveis para a adaptação cultural ao trabalho integrado. São condições necessárias, ainda que não suficientes, para os Estados-Membros da UNASUL responderem ao problema do crime transnacional.

A atividade de *intelligence* é estratégica e contribui para antecipar oportunidades e ameaças comuns. A natureza da *intelligence* é preditiva, regida por diretrizes, limites e parâmetros legais, e foca ameaças cuja evolução podem ter impacto significativo no atingimento dos objetivos nacionais, como: crime organizado, terrorismo, ameaça à segurança cibernética, entre outros. Nesse contexto, desenvolver uma rede de comunicação e monitorização técnica fronteiriça conectada a centros de integração e decisão favorece a identificação oportuna de atividades criminais para apoiar operações militares ou policiais inopinadas.

Os crimes transnacionais têm efeito nocivos sobre as sociedades sul-americanas e afetam negativamente o seu desenvolvimento sustentável. Responder a eles pressupõe fortalecer o multilateralismo e incrementar os mecanismos regionais de *intelligence* como condições essenciais para maximizar o esforço coletivo.

São esses mecanismos de cooperação, nas suas dimensões multilateral, bilateral e nacional, que favorecem: (1) a coordenação de uma visão estratégia compartilhada

de segurança de fronteiras; (2) a identificação de oportunidades para a formulação de acordos nessas dimensões e seus respectivos ajustes legais, financeiros e técnicos; e (3) a articulação da resposta interna das entidades especializadas participantes. A interoperabilidade[3] estabelecida entre essas dimensões gera ações e avanços coletivos na formulação de políticas públicas transformadoras, baseadas na obtenção, processamento e intercambio de *intelligence* sobre vulnerabilidades, óbices e desafios em zonas comuns de fronteiras, e em relação aos impactos de outras ameaças globais complexas, como o terrorismo e a segurança cibernética.

Especificamente no que se refere ao terrorismo, os ataques perpetrados pela al-Qaeda, em 11 de setembro de 2001, contra os Estados Unidos da América, impuseram à Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) desafios e complexidades adicionais à nova ordem mundial, na qual o combate global ao terrorismo e às suas redes de apoio eram os eixos centrais das políticas de segurança coletiva dos seus Estados-Membros. As respostas decorrentes deviam envolver desdobramentos e medidas de natureza judicial, militar, policial, de *intelligence* e socioeconómica, sob coordenação da ONU. As ações mais visíveis em matéria de contraterrorismo têm sido as de: (1) incrementar a cooperação; (2) fortalecer instituições; (3) capacitar agências governamentais nacionais especializadas; e (4) ampliar suas relações com os parceiros congéneres internacionais, para prevenir e responder à ameaça imprevisível, imediata e dispersa do terrorismo.

O combate ao terrorismo e aos crimes conexos impôs outras medidas específicas para reforçar a segurança das fronteiras nacionais contra a entrada ilegal de pessoas – inclusive de combatentes estrangeiros[4] – o tráfico humano e de armas, narcóticos e mercadorias, a proliferação de materiais nucleares e de destruição em massa, e a lavagem ou evasão de ativos financeiros, com o desafio adicional de manter a capacidade de os Estados em promoverem a circulação legal de pessoas e produtos.

Nesse contexto, fatores políticos, socioeconómicos, legais e culturais orientam as prioridades de ação coletiva e contribuem para mitigar condições locais que potencialmente favorecem o terrorismo. Entre os desdobramentos desses fatores, podem ser considerados, por exemplo: (1) investir em educação inclusiva e de qualidade, particularmente primária e secundária; (2) desenvolver políticas públicas multidisciplinares[5] de ação coletiva para prevenir a radicalização e o recrutamento; (3) pro-

3 Por interoperabilidade, entende-se a capacidade de sistemas, unidades ou forças para prover e receber serviços e informações de outros sistemas, unidades ou forças e utilizar esses serviços de maneira a poder operar eficientemente juntos.

4 Com base em definição do Centro Internacional de Contraterrorismo, de Haia, são indivíduos que, por variados históricos e motivações ideológicas, unem-se a conflito armado no exterior.

5 Para maximizar a sua eficiência e incluir medidas de contenção e prevenção, o desenvolvimento multidisciplinar depolíticas públicas deve considerar aportes de atores governamentais ou não, como, por exemplo: agências de *intelligence*, policiais e de defesa; ministérios de áreas

teger os cidadãos e as infraestruturas críticas (ou estratégicas); (4) deter e julgar terroristas e seus apoiantes, inclusive em etapas preparatórias de planeamento; e (5) responder à ameaças e ataques de modo a minimizar suas consequências.

Os terroristas não agem isoladamente. Estão vinculados a ideologias extremistas e comunicam por meio da internet, cuja utilização com propósitos terroristas deve ser prevenida, para que não se transforme em plataforma para propaganda, comunicação, treino, apoio, recrutamento e financiamento.

Em matéria de segurança cibernética, compreende-se a resposta do Estado para conjugar ações, governamentais ou não, civis e militares, aplicadas com a finalidade de proteger as infraestruturas de informação e comunicação públicas e privadas do país. A segurança cibernética não é uma *commodity* e não se pode simplesmente comprá-la no mercado dos países que se desenvolveram mais nesse setor. O rápido crescimento e a dependência dos governos e das sociedades em relação à tecnologia da informação ampliaram tanto oportunidades como ameaças. Estas são globais e não reconhecem fronteiras formais e pressupõem ação concertada para combatê-las. A adoção de medidas contra ameaças cibernéticas, que são coletivas, não deve ser atribuída a uma entidade única e nem devem conformar-se com nichos setoriais civis ou militares que sejam mais ou menos seguros ou exclusivos.

A interdependência para tornar mais seguro o ambiente cibernético implica estimular a ação concertada da sociedade civil, da academia e dos setores públicos e privados, que se constituem forças motrizes multidimensionais, interoperativas e interrelacionadas que proveem a procura, conhecimento, transformação e normalização, que favorecem a segurança coletiva. Potencializa esse esforço estabelecer ou reforçar estruturas nacionais de identificação e resposta a incidentes de segurança cibernética e incentivà-las a operar em rede; conectá-las à estrutura regional com competência para centralizar medidas de prevenção, alerta antecipado, resposta e melhores práticas; identificar e promover ações necessárias para desenvolver uma cultura para segurança cibernética na região da UNASUL; e estabelecer os contatos extra regionais associados.

São as vulnerabilidades proporcionadas por não se considerar esses fatores, comuns ou não, que favorecem o terrorismo e as ameaças à segurança cibernética e comprometem a ação coordenada. As áreas nas quais é possível cooperar são diversas. Por isso, a *interface* entre a academia e a atividade de *intelligence* é significativa, sobretudo pela necessidade de desenvolver modelos de cooperação que não desconsiderem o interesse nacional, mas que também enfatizem o coletivo, respeitando a autodeterminação dos Estado-Membros e priorizando trabalhos operacionais e as questões técnicas envolvidas.

sociais, educacionais, culturais e financeiras; e entidades religiosas, juvenis, de família, de mulheres, da sociedade civil, da imprensa e do setor privado.

A academia é uma instância de análise crítica, reflexão e promoção de boas práticas, as quais não são frequentes no trabalho diário das organizações públicas perante fenómenos no âmbito de suas competências. O fomento da capacitação profissional conjunta em *intelligence* pode ser efetuado por meio de cursos, seminários, *workshops*, conferências ou outras modalidades de programas acadêmicos, nos níveis básico e avançado, que contemplem tanto as especificidades do tema como técnicas prospectivas e acessórias que os sustentem. Trata-se de providenciar instrumentos para a formação de quadros da UNASUL envolvidos na segurança de fronteiras e que se valem de recursos de *intelligence* para desenvolver as suas tarefas: participando na formação e capacitação de profissionais de *intelligence*, especialistas e académicos dos Estados-Membros, preferencial, mas não exclusivamente, para colaborar na identificação de necessidades; desenhar programas curriculares; ministrar aulas; monitorar o processo ensino-aprendizagem e o seu valor agregado para a promoção de uma cultura de *intelligence* regional (Prieto e Hirane, 2015).

No âmbito do Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano (CDS) da UNASUL, a Escola Sul-Americana de Defesa (ESUDE) é a instituição que tem por missão "contribuir para a consolidação dos princípios e objetivos estabelecidos no Estatuto do CDS para a formação e capacitação, por meio da docência e pesquisa, de modo a ampliar a confiança mutua, favorecer o avanço de uma cultura de defesa comum e aperfeiçoar as condições de segurança na América do Sul" (ESUDE, 2017). Estruturar essa instituição académica, que naturalmente tem a vocação para centralizar a formação e o aperfeiçoamento profissional da UNASUL em temas de defesa e segurança regionais, favorece: a construção de redes de diálogos e confiança na América do Sul; contribui para a gerar identidade sul-americana; e promove a compreensão da natureza, funções, objetivos e atividades da UNASUL. Em matéria de capacitação em *intelligence*, também pode constituir-se como elo com as escolas de *intelligence* dos Estados-Membros para identificar prioridades necessárias para elaborar um currículo académico comum e oferecer a capacitação especializada baseada num adequado e mutualmente compreensível método de produção de conhecimento de *intelligence* e num glossário técnico regional partilhado, para o intercâmbio seguro e oportuno de *intelligence*.

Perceber as fronteiras como espaço comum de segurança impõe desenvolver mecanismos multidimensionais nas suas dimensões política, de defesa, segurança pública, *intelligence*, e jurídica, nos níveis nacional, bilateral e regional. Além disso, pressupõe abordagem baseada na vontade consensual, no princípio da responsabilidade partilhada, na identificação dos objetivos prioritários, na formulação de diretrizes, e em acordos e mecanismos de cooperação para a realização de ações coordenadas estabelecidas entre os Estados-Membros.

O debate sobre a segurança de fronteiras no âmbito da UNASUL impõe crescentes reflexões sobre a substituição da visão histórico-cultural tradicional, exclusiva ou

primordialmente centrada na individualidade territorial, por outra, de natureza coletiva, sem comprometer os princípios fundamentais dos seus Estados-Membros, das suas relações internacionais e dos direitos e deveres dos seus cidadãos.

A constatação de que, usualmente, em relação às ameaças transnacionais o fato social antecede a norma legal em matéria de gestão de informação – especialmente a sensível – favorece enfatizar a abordagem interdisciplinar para racionalizar recursos, mitigar a duplicação de esforços e maximizar os resultados, superar paradigmas regionais de cooperação, repensar as competências das estruturas de defesa e de segurança pública no contexto da segurança nacional, e atualizar as normas, constitucionais e ordinárias inerentes. Os crimes transnacionais no espaço da UNASUL constituem-se como dos maiores desafios à sua segurança coletiva. Torna-se essencial eliminar ou mitigar condições existentes que fragilizam a sua própria segurança, integrar a zona fronteiriça numa dinâmica de desenvolvimento socioeconómico regional, promover a geração de oportunidades de negócios e contemplar as capacidades de cada Estado-Membro, para transformar as constatações em políticas públicas. Entretanto, os crimes nas zonas de fronteiras não são automaticamente crimes contra a segurança nacional. Se os Estados-Membros buscam segurança, não podem ter fronteiras abertas sem dispor de mecanismos concertados de equilíbrio de um maior nível de liberdade e segurança, como condição necessária para proteger as suas sociedades.

A ênfase regional não exclui relações privilegiadas com parceiros tradicionais nem tampouco com outros, em outros continentes. A adoção e adaptação de novos conceitos e práticas virtuosas de cooperação, sem desconsiderar aqueles que tenham sido originados nos níveis nacional ou bilateral, são fatores que reforçam a identidade sul-americana e a adesão dos seus Estados-Membros ao objetivo geral da UNASUL e à sua capacidade de conceber métodos para mediar conflitos de interesse de maneira mutualmente benéfica, para prevenir a escalada de tensão.

Considerações Finais

Discutir as competências das Forças Armadas no contexto da segurança das fronteiras não pressupõe, simplesmente, alterar o seu papel constitucional em proveito de atividades de segurança pública, mas sim apresentar o argumento relativo à necessidade de ampliar ou restringir as missões da expressão militar de poder de cada Estado-Membro em relação a potenciais novos aportes em matéria de segurança de fronteiras, para que participem e garantam, no marco jurídico da UNASUL, os objetivos gerais e específicos acordados no seu Tratado Constitutivo. Por isso, não implica apenas dispor da sua capacidade nas áreas fronteiriças, mas também aproveitar a sua capilaridade e fazer uso dos seus recursos humanos e materiais exclusivos, essenciais para a dissuasão da atividade criminal transfronteiriça regional.

A natureza difusa e imprevisível do crime transnacional na região da UNASUL impõe a necessidade de cooperação interdisciplinar e interoperativa entre as estruturas especializadas dos Estados-Membros. A construção de um modelo sul-americano multidimensional de resposta a crimes em zonas limítrofes requer dispor de políticas públicas não focadas exclusivamente no nível nacional e na cooperação interestatal tradicional, mas que também incorpore a segurança de fronteiras de modo a envolver acordos entre os governos e que comtemple, nesse contexto, as dimensões concernentes à defesa, segurança pública e *intelligence*.

A *intelligence* não é uma panaceia para, isoladamente, responder ao crime transnacional. Entretanto, imperfeita ou não, favorece proporcionar conhecimento para reduzir o grau de incerteza para a ação governamental. Em decorrência, o intercâmbio de *intelligence* deve constituir-se como uma política pública compartilhada, e não apenas prática informal e discricionária, com condições que favorecem o identificar de atores, estruturas, modos de atuação e intenções criminais; a criação de centros de fusão de informação para seu processamento e redes de intercâmbio para a difusão da *intelligence* resultante; a decisão de medidas a adotar; e o planeamento das ações de segurança para neutralizar ou mitigar a ameaça.

No contexto da UNASUL, a integração da informação obtida por agências de *intelligence*, militares, de segurança pública e de outras estruturas governamentais especializadas, favorece o desenvolvimento de uma política pública abrangente capaz de elaborar uma estratégia partilhada de ação coletiva orientada pela atividade de *intelligence*. O intercâmbio de *intelligence* entre as agências governamentais envolvidas na segurança de fronteiras pressupõe o existir de um processo de conhecimento e construção de confiança e o implementar dos requisitos fundamentais para que a segurança dos seus profissionais e da informação sejam observados pelas partes.

Para fazer frente aos desafios atuais e futuros que se apresentam, as agências de *intelligence* dos Estados-Membros devem constantemente inovar e aperfeiçoar-se. Isso impõe repensar paradigmas tradicionais, adequar os instrumentos normativos e formular políticas públicas especializadas, como condições necessárias que facilitem o desenvolvimento de capacidades e competências dos seus profissionais. Neste contexto, pressupõe, de maneira articulada e acordada conjuntamente, construir um programa de capacitação continuada em *intelligence* com o objetivo de identificar os fundamentos conceituais e os valores essenciais; elaborar um glossário técnico e de procedimentos analíticos e operacionais, e enfatizar o cumprimento das medidas de segurança derivadas.

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The Partition Notebooks: a Review Essay

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Kiran Doshi, 2017. *Jinnah Often Came to Our House*. New Delhi: Tranquebar Press, Westland Publications Ltd, pp. 490, Rs. 595.

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History is a pitiless science. Under the historian's gaze, new information can turn yesterday's hero into today's villain. This is true of India's partition. It did not follow the script. India's freedom was not a fairly tale of struggle and victory. Partition was tainted with blood. A dark past makes the definitive judgment on Partition difficult. If we scruff the taint, events appear different.
Starting from the early twentieth century, these three works navigate the slippery pathways to Partition, neither eulogising nor demonising the protagonists.
The figures they write about might disappoint some, but triumphs and follies shadow all human life. Two of the authors are former diplomats, and the third is a civil servant. Practitioners are prudent, familiar with good and bad decisions. Being expert in the art of the possible, the authors calm the debate.
Doshi's work won him the Hindu Prize for Fiction 2016. Raghavan's is contemporary history, and Bhatnagar's is commentary. Doshi deals with the past (1904-1937), Raghavan with the present (1947-2008), and Bhatnagar with past and present (1906-2017). Writing on the same epoch tempts singling out the better author. But being different genres, there is reason to avoid a score sheet. A practitioner's views count, regardless of the quality of literary craft, and we should leave it at that.

History in Three Voices
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Hindu-Muslim collaboration for India's independence seemed promising. Then, it fell apart. Doshi's fictionalized political history is about twentieth century upper class Mumbai Muslims, based on lives of people he has known. His exploration of love and betrayal is suffused with backgrounders on the slow disintegration of India's unity. In the service of independence, personal lives are torn. Idealistic nationalists like Rehana stumble into loss. Paradoxically, Doshi's mainly Muslim characters, notably Sultan Kowaishi, put their bets on the material. But it is the lofty Jinnah's complex morality that takes the novel forward, even when others appear to be in the front lines. Raghavan writes about the real India-Pakistan conflict that followed Partition. The account is chronological, but the perception is subtle. Beginning with the accession of princely states, the Indus Waters Treaty, the wars of 1965 and 1971, the restoration of diplomatic relations and efforts to pick up the pieces, the crises of 1987, 1990 and 2001, and the Kargil war, Raghavan ends his book with the stalemate of the twenty first century. Bhatnagar divides his book into four sections: Partition, Prime Ministers, *Hindutva* (Hinduness) and India's Challenges – foreign affairs, the economy, defence, and science. From the founding of the Muslim League in 1906, his commentary moves past India's trials and triumphs to the low of Partition, hitting turbulence as independent India struggles with its past. Like a choice of dishes on a revolving table, Bhatnagar entices us with the sheer breadth of his work.

With faith and politics in contestation, Doshi's novel is imagined with warmth and humour. For a former diplomat, the transition to writing fiction is remarkable. Raghavan, who was India's envoy to Pakistan, and worked on the Pakistan desk in India's Foreign Ministry, provides an "Indian" (p. xi/§4) perspective that is "subjective and selective" (p. ix/§3), "animated and anecdotal" (p. x/§1). He relies upon published information and India's Foreign Ministry archives to deliver informed judgments. Even with few primary sources, the volatility of the India-Pakistan relationship hands us minor gems. Bhatnagar says little on Pakistanis he knew while in government, and many of the Indians he writes about do not come out well. His heart is in Indian science, and its heroic figures.

The authors give agreeable accounts of official India, yet not confined to what governments like to hear. Since deniability is wired into fiction, it is easier for Doshi to break free of taboos. Raghavan shows how Indians and Pakistanis draw different conclusions from the same negotiations, even the same text. He has enough of the Pakistani point of view to claim impartiality. He confesses to an Indian perspective, but observes events as a historian, with diligence and rigour. Bhatnagar assesses personalities with candour and grace.

Rewind into the early 20th century. The British colonisers sang their own paeans. It looked different to Indians. Nationalist politicians, such as Gandhi and Nehru, wrote about the colonised from prison cells. After independence, the lives of the British in India ceased to interest scholars, except imperial romanticists. Research focused on India and its problems. This process has accelerated. As a frontrunner in the world's new economic architecture, India increasingly resembles other great powers in behaviour. This makes India a subject of study for what it is, rather than what others imagine it to be. With the nation's voice growing, India-born authors have a wider audience. Like Ramachandra Guha's *India After Gandhi* or Dipankar Gupta's *The Caged Phoenix: Can India Fly?*, the authors demystify western tropes of India as a supposedly other- worldly culture. One wonders why it needs Indians to normalise India.

A Nation Goes Under the Knife

Most entry points to the creation of Pakistan have been explored. The overwhelming focus is on the west. Amritsar has a Partition Museum, but Kolkata doesn't. Better researched is the Pakistani army's genocide in East Pakistan, and the creation of Bangladesh. India's second partition in 1971 is seen more as an India-Pakistan contest than a humanitarian catastrophe. Consistent with the flow of existing enquiry, neither author comments on the partition of Bengal. This subject deserves its historians.

Hindus and Muslims in East Bengal were polarized considerably before their brethren in the west. From the 19th century, East Bengali Hindus began to abandon

their landholdings, and moved to Kolkata to join the professions. Partition atrocities in the east do not match the horrific numbers of the west, but it was an equal suffering. On August 16, 1946, Pakistan's founder, Muhammed Ali Jinnah's call for "Direct Action Day" saw the massacre of 50,000 Hindu Bengalis in Noakhali, and only Gandhi's fast prevented retaliation against Muslims in Kolkata. In the northwest, polarization was slower. Punjab's Hindus were landowners and traders. The Sikhs lived in the "canal colonies", with little appetite to relocate. The British recognised contrasting attitudes in Bengal and Punjab.

The case of the Sikhs is curious. Their main holy sites were in West Punjab. Nankana Sahib, the birthplace of Guru Nanak, has nine *Gurudwaras* (temples). Gurudwara Panja Sahib is at Hasan Abdal, and Maharaja Ranjit Singh's *samadhi* (mausoleum) is in West Punjab. Mass migration of Sikhs to the east changed the way they think about their history. Some Sikhs in Europe and the Americas want a sovereign state called Khalistan, in India's Punjab, not in Pakistan's Punjab, where their historical memory is lodged. Why the Sikhs have abandoned ownership of a past rooted in the western half of Punjab needs more research.

Doshi's novel recreates the Muslim side of this past, with conflicted characters hurtling towards Partition. Raghavan says little on events leading to Partition. It is Bhatnagar that deals with Partition in detail. Congress got its strong India, instead of the federated state Jinnah wanted, yet complained for years that India had been divided (p. 62/§3). Bhatnagar is gracious towards the feudal stalwarts who came up short at Partition. Not all feudals bowing before the nationalist juggernaut were immediately discarded. After Hyderabad's merger with India, the last Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, was appointed *Rajpramukh* (first minister), under the watch of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India's first home minister. Others left wider legacies. The last Nawab of Junagarh, Sir Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III Rasul Khanji's love of wildlife helped develop the Gir forest as a habitat for the Asiatic lion. Bhatnagar plucks the good from the mayhem.

Partition's quibbles continue to confront us, as domestic quarrels. The international response to it needs more research. Bhatnagar has a pointer. Burma's Aung San presciently said Partition "augurs ill not only for the Indian people but also for all Asia and world peace" (p. 62/§5). Others have pronounced on the international aspect, but we have limited knowledge of it.

Dreamers and Disrupters

In the accounts of the authors, most Partition actors falter. Bhatnagar says that India's last viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, was appointed "far too early in the day" (p. 54/§4) being "less than distinguished" (p. 56/§2) and given to "pomp and ceremony" (p. 47/§3). In his predecessor, Archibald Wavell's place, "I might have succeeded in keeping the country together" (p. 56/§6) Mountbatten vainly declares.

Indians fare no better. Nehru had tired of the quarrels with the Muslim League, losing the appetite for a fight. Gandhi was alone in forlorn quietude the day India got carved up. Other nationalists either followed Gandhi and Nehru, or, like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, were sidelined.
Neither author pronounces on Mountbatten's attitude towards Pakistan. But clearly, the British were scouting Hindu-Muslim fault lines for opportunities to strengthen the imperial hold. Doshi says: "The British were at last beginning to realise that they had made a terrible mistake in suppressing Mohammedans after 1857. That had let Hindus progress so much that they were actually becoming a threat to British rule. To counter that, the British had no option but to help Mohammedans become strong again" (p. 53/§4). British partiality for Muslims rankles the lawyer Pandey, who loses out on a job to Jinnah: "You know why the Britisher sponsored him and not me? Because Jinnah is a Mo'mden whereas I belong to the community of no-good agitators, being a Hindu" (p. 48/§4).
The British "found themselves bolstering the Muslim League" (p. 38/§2) Bhatnagar asserts. Wavell found Jinnah "straighter, more positive and more sincere than most of the Congress leaders" (p. 39/§7). Francis Mudie, governor of Punjab, said: "Like most practical administrators in India, I had always preferred the Muslim to the Hindu ... his charm was not put on if he liked you... he was naturally charming" (p. 41/§4). Mudie was smitten by Muslims: "There was no examination of what the Muslims were afraid of and of whether there was any way to remove their fears, other than Partition. Instead there was nothing but politics and what looked ... like attempts to trap Jinnah into some difficult position or other" (p. 41/§5). Likewise, Ian Stephens, editor of the British-owned newspaper, *The Statesman*, published an advertisement on behalf of the rulers of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, prompting Patel to advise his recall to Britain (p. 47/§4). Bhatnagar presents compelling evidence of the British tilt towards Muslims.

Not a Courtier

Why would Jinnah not have felt bolstered by such support? In Doshi's account, Jinnah is a determined disrupter. The more he refuses to concede to opponents, the more interesting he becomes. This might explain why Doshi's novel is about Jinnah, rather than Gandhi or Nehru. To understand Jinnah, we also need to put our finger on the upper class Mumbai Muslim community he came from. What were they like?
Doshi portrays Muslims with a visionary sympathy, based on ties of family, through his marriage to a Muslim. "Half my family is Muslim", he told a gathering of his former colleagues at a discussion honouring his book. The loves and quibbles of the novel's characters have a poignant intimacy. The research on the era Jinnah shaped is good. These are personal journeys, mostly of Indians, but along the way the jour-

neys become political. There is little on how individual Britons responded to the empire slipping away. The few British characters are ornamental.

To Indians, Jinnah is a villain, never mind the many false starts of the nationalist project. Doshi revisits Jinnah, human as any of us. He does not gloss over Jinnah's faults, but also salutes his integrity. Even while disagreeing with Jinnah's politics, there is an effort to understand his compulsions. The stubborn Jinnah was not "open to reason once he had made up his mind to do something" (p. 4/§2). In acts of straightforward obstinacy, he "would only smoke more if asked to smoke less" (p. 48/§1). Does self-obsessed determination finish us, as smoking caused Jinnah's tuberculosis? Is Doshi hinting at Jinnah's self- destruction?

Doshi also finds Jinnah evolving from a secular nationalist to a champion of Muslims. The early Jinnah was a Nehru clone: "The British have not given us the railways, Kowaishi. They've given themselves the railways, and they've done so because troops move faster by train than in bullock carts" (p. 45/§15). Or, consider: "Communal electorates can only make people think communally, not as citizens of one country" (p. 107/§5). Up to page 107 of the novel, Jinnah is the toast of the nationalists.

In his telling of Jinnah's resignation from the Congress party, the point where he transforms into a spokesman for Muslims, Doshi hints at his own sympathies. As Jinnah exchanges glances with Rehana, the secret admirer of his nationalism, his transformation begins. Doshi compares this to "the glance in the eyes of Julius Caesar on the stage at Stratford-on-Avon when he cried *Et tu, Brute*, and fell" (p. 248/§1). The nationalist Jinnah has come full circle.

Doshi unflinchingly locates his work within the bounds of facts, as they might have happened. He avoids hindsight. Turning painful facts into fiction softens his disagreement with Jinnah's politics. This is deliberate.

Unlike other negative accounts, Doshi's Jinnah is honourable, almost. Doshi employs fiction to unmask the vulnerable Jinnah. Consider his wife Ruttie's one final, poignant longing before her death: "I would like to be J's wife in my next life also" (p. 319/§13). Then, the pleading: "Tell him that. And tell him that I promise to be a better wife next time" (p. 319/§13). Doshi's reference to Jinnah weeping at Ruttie's grave is regarded as a fact. He brings poignancy to love.

Bhatnagar, too, courageously humanises the vain, honourable and determined Jinnah. Stanley Wolpert's assessment clarifies Bhatnagar's surrogate sympathy: "Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation- state. Muhammad Ali Jinnah did all three" (p. 191/§1). Mudie's Jinnah is upright: "His great hold on the Muslims of India was due to his reputation for absolute strength and integrity and any compromise might have been interpreted as a sign of weakness" (p. 41/§2). Drawing strength from such portraits, Bhatnagar delivers a posi-

tive assessment: "Jinnah's achievement assures him a place in world history" (p. 191/§2). This is true. Few came close to achieving what Jinnah did. In contrast, Nehru became Prime Minister "because Gandhi declared him his heir" (p. 75/§3), Bhatnagar asserts.

Like Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah, other Partition figures were conflicted. We don't know what went on in the minds of the multitudes caught on the wrong side of the religious divide. They were too poor to relocate. The prosperous had a choice. Most upper class Muslims left for Pakistan, Raghavan says. Azim Husain and Mohammad Yunus chose India. K.L. Gauba converted to Islam, yet questioned the wisdom of a Muslim state, remaining in India. Air Commodore Balwant Das and the diplomat Jamsheed Marker opted for Pakistan. Raja Tridiv Roy, the Chakma leader of the east, chose Pakistan's distant overlordship to immediate Bengali Muslim tyranny. Yet he was an outsider in Pakistan (p. 116/§3), says Raghavan.

Bhatnagar carefully tick marks the shifting loyalties of Muslim officers of the Indian Civil Service. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Pakistan's first secretary general, was from the Audit and Accounts Service. Sir Ghulam Muhammad (1951-1955), Pakistan's first finance minister and third governor general, was from the Railway Accounts branch. The two brothers Agha Hilaly and Agha Shahi, who had joined the Indian Civil Service in 1936 and 1943, opted for Pakistan. Hilaly became Pakistan's envoy in New Delhi and Shahi became the Foreign Secretary in 1973. It was esteem for Jinnah that made Hilaly choose Pakistan, Bhatnagar quotes his son Zafar Hilaly as saying (p. 45/§2). Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan, a prominent Muslim League leader, stayed on in India, but two of his sons and members of the Indian Civil Service, G.A. Madani and I.A. Khan, chose Pakistan (p. 73/§5). Bhatnagar provides a fine reading of Pakistan's leading lights.

Contested Heritage

Even after Muslims had their Pakistan, peaceful coexistence with India remains elusive. Both sides are unable to delink inter- state relations from personal pieties. Indians assert a common identity: "Oh! They are just like us." Pakistanis recoil at this. Pakistani diplomat Shahid Amin terms the Indian assertion of a common culture "a subtle argument to deny the rationale for the very creation of Pakistan"[1]. Pakistan champions an Islam beginning with the Arab conquest of Sind, neglecting its pre- Islamic heritage. Jinnah's vision of a secular state has been long-discarded in favour of Islamic majoritarianism, transforming into violent extremism. Pakistan unflinchingly holds that Muslims were right in drawing away from Hindu domination. The Pakistani author Haroon Khalid writes: "After Partition, while ancient

1 Amin, S., 2009. *Reminiscences of a Pakistani Diplomat*. Karachi: Karachi Council on Foreign Relations, p. 97.

Buddhist sites were preserved, and promoted, as part of the country's rich history, the Hindu heritage was ignored as the trauma of Partition and the quest for shaping an identity distinct from Hindu India animated the national narrative. During the wars of 1965 and 1971 with India, members of the Hindu and Sikh communities were attacked. In 1992, after the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in India, many Hindu temples in Pakistan were destroyed"[2].

Raghavan puts the number of temples destroyed at a hundred and twenty (p. 203/§2).

Similar voices have arisen in India, where the Hindu Right asserts a rejection of the Islamic contribution to India. Here, Bhatnagar's meticulous research into *Hindutva* is instructive. *Hindutva* is not recent, but developed alongside the secular nationalist movement as an alternate philosophy, he asserts. After Gandhi's assassination in 1948, *Hindutva* was in retreat, to gradually regain lost ground, culminating in the Bharatiya Janata Party's 2014 election victory. There is a fine analysis of the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS – National Volunteer Force), and leaders such as Swami Dayanand Saraswati, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Syama Prasad Mookerjee, Deendayal Upadhyaya and Madhukar Dattatraya Deoras. Bhatnagar calls Mookerjee "a remarkable figure in Indian public life in the forties and fifties and a fearless nationalist," with "lofty idealism" and "impeccable character" (p. 176/§5). Upadhyaya and he are "the two pillars on which the future of the BJP will rest" (p. 177/§3).

While the debate between the Left and the Right continues, Bhatnagar points to the need to correct the course: "The anti- RSS propaganda has been led by individuals and groups whose academic embellishments appear grand but who have actually promoted segregation. Polemics cannot be a permanent feature of thinking societies, which is why the alternative narratives of the RSS on nationalism and culture present complex dilemmas to those who regard intellectualism as a monopoly of a particular stream and are unable to countenance the demolition of monolithic debate" (p. 184/§4).

Bhatnagar is right that the Left-led nationalist project, which sidelined alternate thinking, is being challenged by the Right, with determination, discipline and faith. Understanding India requires a proper acknowledgement of an alternate philosophy that also shapes the nation's politics. Bhatnagar declines the invitation to trivialize an India that has existed in the past, and will continue into the future. Competitive right-wing politics in both countries complicates their relations.

The spiritual contest has influenced Indians and Pakistanis so much that moving forward becomes difficult. Drawing from memories of Islamic rule on the subcon-

2 Khalid, H., 2017. Katas Raj temple complex is a sad monument to Pakistan's unease with its Hindu heritage. *Scroll.in*, December 22. Available at https://scroll.in/article/862322/katas-raj-temple-complex-is-a-sad-monument-to-pakistans-unease-with-its-hindu-heritage.

tinent, Pakistan claims strategic equivalence with India. It is not persuaded about India's wider ambitions. Given the disparities in size, this frustrates Indians. The Wagah border ceremony provides Pakistan "opportunistic equivalence, however superficial and fleeting, with India"[3], asserts Minhaz Merchant. It is not just opportunistic equivalence, however. The two nations are hard- wired in a broader equivalence, because, for Pakistan, the powerful world of Islam is an equalizer. For Pakistanis it is not just cultural or military equivalence. Hindu majoritarianism in India creates the moral equivalence, completing the triad.

Pakistan has moderates too. The *Dawn* newspaper publishes accounts of Hindu festivals and Pakistan's pre-Islamic heritage. In private encounters with the author, Punjabi and Kashmiri Pakistanis have acknowledged their Hindu ancestry. In his book *The Indus Man*, Aitzaz Ahsan explores an alternate identity, away from an exclusive Islam, to one that is shaped by the river Indus. But without Islam, Pakistan would struggle to define its nationhood. As Raghavan says, an Indus identity is more an intellectual construct than a building block of a nation: "This kind of argument gives Pakistan a homogeneity it lacks. Geographical determinism has its limits"[4].

Independence and After

Brother Enemies

Thus, the past is guidance to what follows. Partition is not over. Each day, there is a psychological Partition between Indians and Pakistanis, between Hindus and Muslims in both countries, between competing ideas of state, between different versions of soft power. Politics, sport, cinema – everything comes into the equation.

Like a serene deity, Raghavan keeps his Pakistan secrets to himself. There is not one reference to a conversation he had with a Pakistani. Yet, he puts enough of Pakistani thinking in the public domain. At a discussion meeting on his book, Raghavan said that, even amid hard posturing, deal-making with Pakistan is possible. This is as far as he goes into revealing the pragmatic side of Pakistanis.

Raghavan gives a fine account of the mergers of Junagarh and Hyderabad into India, and Kashmir's contested accession. He tells us more, expertly using published sources. For example, the Pakistani author, Yaqoob Khan Bangash, reveals that Dujana, near Delhi, offered to accede to Pakistan, but was rebuffed (p. 6/§2). Pakistan recognized Kalat as a sovereign state (p. 12/§5), and All India Radio announced Kalat's offer to accede to India (p. 13/§3). Prime Minister Nehru told

3 Merchant, M., 2018. U.S. won't be able to rein in Pakistan over terror: India will have to take action. *DailyO*, January 11. Available at https://www.dailyo.in/politics/us-aid-pakistan-rogue-nation-terror-funding-afpak-jim-mattis-nato-terrorism/story/1/21663.html.

4 He said this in a conversation with the author on July 26, 2018.

the Constituent Assembly that Kalat had approached India to establish a trade agency in Delhi (p. 14/§1). Since India had no border with Kalat, while Pakistan did, these moves precipitated Pakistani action to secure Kalat's accession. If Pakistani Ahmadiyas are not considered Muslim, Gurdaspur's Muslim majority at Partition would be nullified, and Pakistan's claim to Gurdaspur would collapse (p. 22/§1), Raghavan quotes Pakistani historian Tahir Kamran as arguing.

Not So Calm Waters

Water has no boundaries, transporting victors and losers in empire-building. With the environment buckling under our feet, water has become scarce. The India-Pakistan water conflict began immediately after independence. The rivers of the Indus basin flow from India into Pakistan. Raghavan says that, in 1948, the government of India's Punjab state cut off the waters of common rivers, only to be overturned by the federal government. Curiously, India did not insist upon Pakistan paying for canal waters under the agreement of May, 1948. This decision might have introduced an unequal obligation on India, and potentially weakened its future negotiating position.

Under the auspices of the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty was concluded in 1960[5]. Like most Indian analysts, Bhatnagar calls the treaty's terms "a gifting away, to a perennially hostile Pakistan, of a lion's share of the waters", and 174 million U.S. dollars for dams to boot (p. 146/§5). Sullen Indians clamour for the treaty's review, if not its abrogation. India's grievance on misplaced generosity is matched by Pakistan's anxiety on punitive Indian action.

India asserts its right to build hydro-electric projects in Jammu and Kashmir, through which four of the five rivers in the Indus basin flow. In the 1980s, India almost withdrew from a negotiation on the Salal hydro-electric project. Raghavan hints that the negotiation was rescued at the urging of former Indian Foreign Secretary Jagat Mehta, as India was also a lower riparian to China (p. 145/§3). In 1987, India showed sensitivity to Pakistan's concerns, by suspending the Tulbul navigation project on the Jhelum river.

Over the passage of time, India's position has hardened. In retaliation against a terrorist attack at Pathankot in September, 2016, where 19 soldiers were killed, India launched a review of the Indus Waters Treaty[6]. Prime Minister Narendra

5 The treaty allows Pakistan use of 80 per cent of the waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, the three western rivers, while India has 20 per cent. India has rights to the waters of the three eastern rivers – the Beas, Sutlej and Ravi. See Khadka, N.S., 2016. Are India and Pakistan set for water wars?. *BBC.com*, December 22. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37521897.

6 Senior Indian officials told the BBC that India would step up using water from the three western rivers, which flow through Jammu and Kashmir state. See Khadka, N.S., 2016. Are India

Modi ominously said: "blood and water cannot flow at the same time"[7]. India suspended a meeting of a committee set to oversee water-sharing. In response, Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan's U.N. ambassador, cautioned that water agreements should not be "undermined through unilateral or coercive measures"[8]. Raghavan says that Pakistanis see India's hydro-electric projects in Kashmir in strategic rather than economic terms: "The military mind looks at capabilities, not intentions"[9].
Amid calls in the media for abrogating the treaty, China blocked a tributary of the Yarlung Zangbo (called the Brahmaputra in India), and, in 2017, suspended sharing of data on the Brahmaputra with India. While in theory India could ask for a review of the treaty and greater share of the three western rivers, China's actions constrain India's choices. Would not diversion of Indus waters by China also have an implication for Pakistan?

The Wars

Raghavan's accounts of the 1965 and 1971 wars do not yield new facts, but provide absorbing lessons.
Neutral observers note that it was Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, the infiltration of armed irregulars into Kashmir, which triggered the 1965 war. Most Pakistani accounts blame India. In Pakistani diplomat Iqbal Akhund's assessment, the 1965 war "was an Indian war of aggression to destroy Pakistan and victory was ours because we prevented India from taking Lahore" (p. 97/§2). This view is now discredited, even in Pakistan. Cyril Almeida writes in *Dawn*: "1965 was a bad idea taken to perfection, all three stages of it. First came Gibraltar, that silliness of sending irregulars and radicalised civilians over into India-held Kashmir to foment revolution. When revolution didn't show up, we got into the business of Grand Slam – sending regular army troops over to wrest a bit of India-held Kashmir and win that most lusted after of victories, a strategic one. Then came actual war across the border, for which we were somehow unprepared and scrambled to fight to a stalemate because the Indians were a bunch of reluctant invaders"[10].

and Pakistan set for water wars?. *BBC.Com*, December 22. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37521897.

7 Rowlatt, J., 2016. Why India's water dispute with Pakistan matters. *BBC.Com*, September 28. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-37483359.

8 PTI, 2016. Indus Water Treaty: Pakistan warns against use of water as an instrument of coercion. *The Indian Express*, November 25. Available at https://indianexpress.com/article/world/world-news/indus-water-treaty-pakistan-warns-use-of-water-as-an-instrument-of-coercion-4391122/.

9 In conversation with the author on July 26, 2018.

10 Almeida, C., 2015. Gibraltar, Grand Slam and War. *Dawn*, August 30. Available at https://www.dawn.com/news/1203708.

Curiously, despite Pakistan precipitating the 1965 war, India did not ask for the equal and simultaneous implementation of the provisions of the Tashkent Declaration of 1966. Raghavan quotes an Indian Ministry of External Affairs account: "It is clear now – a year after the Tashkent Declaration – that in signing it, Pakistan's immediate interest was to secure withdrawal of Indian forces, repatriation of prisoners of war, the resumption of overflights to and from East Pakistan and the restoration of full diplomatic relations. Since securing these principal gains, Pakistan has been tardy in taking any additional major steps towards complete normalisation of relations" (p. 100/§3).

India won the 1971 war, but did it lose the peace, as many Indians hold? Bhatnagar says that India "botched up" (p. 203/§2) the 1972 Simla Agreement. Raghavan disagrees: "Too rigid a stand by India in Simla, or the failure of the negotiations, would have raised the spectre of external intervention again" (p. 122/§2). India had dismembered a member of the UN through force, and there were "limits on how much more India would be allowed to extract from what remained of Pakistan" (p. 122/§2). Whether India took a conciliatory position at Simla under international pressure needs more research. Recall the relentless Soviet pressure on India in the lead up to Tashkent.

Neighbours and Their Truths

Raghavan's strength lies in that he presents the Pakistani point of view with copious quotes from Pakistani authors. President Ayub Khan tells Indian high commissioner Rajeshwar Dayal that Nehru looked upon him "with contempt…Mr Nehru seemed to think that the Congo was more important to India than Pakistan" (p. 70/§2). Diplomat Abdus Sattar, writing about Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at the 1972 Simla negotiations, says "she was 'petite and seemingly frail' but 'robust in mind' and though 'deceptive in her inarticulate speech' no one could 'miss the thrust of her remarks'" (p. 119/§4). At the negotiation Sattar finds D.P. Dhar "a charmer" and P.N. Haksar "without a peer in knowledge and erudition", T.N. Kaul displayed "unmistakable hostility towards Pakistan" and the India approach to the negotiations was guided by "a visceral antagonism towards Pakistan" (p. 120/§1). Amin writes that Indira Gandhi "more or less froze" and "the atmosphere suddenly became tense" (p. 135/§3) when Pakistan's newly- appointed ambassador, Fida Hussain, raised the need for a Kashmir solution in his meeting with her in 1976.

Little wonder that Indians and Pakistanis draw different conclusions from the same events. Pakistanis call Junagarh's accession to India forcible, and show it as Pakistani territory on maps, while Indians claim a plebiscite settled the accession. Pakistanis accuse India of strangulation in withholding transfer of cash balances, while Indians point out that Gandhi actually fasted for Pakistan to secure its dues. Pakistanis consider Hyderabad's accession to India an act of perfidy, while Indians

consider it pragmatic and strategically logical. Pakistanis consider the award of Muslim-majority Gurdaspur to India unjust, while Indians see it as vital for the defence of Kashmir and the Sikh holy city of Amritsar. For Indians, the 1965 war began on August 5, when Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in Jammu and Kashmir, while for Pakistan it began with the Indian attack on Lahore on September 6, commemorated as "Defence of Pakistan Day." Indians claim there was an unwritten understanding during the Simla negotiations to convert the line of control into an international border over time, while Pakistanis deny such an understanding. India gave the *Bharat Ratna* award to Badshah Khan, a respected figure of the nationalist movement, while Pakistanis see him as one who never reconciled to Partition. Indians claim that Pakistan's visiting foreign minister, Yakub Khan, delivered a war ultimatum during a visit to Delhi in January, 1990, while the Pakistanis feel Khan had not been forceful enough in projecting Pakistan's position on Kashmir. The list goes on.

Raghavan judges events in the context of the times, injecting realism into the discourse, however painful. Indians rue not expelling Pakistani forces from Kashmir in 1947, but "military advice was not in favour of this" (p. 9/§2). Pakistan's Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan expressed similar misgivings. Indians view denial of water to Pakistan as a strategic weapon, but at independence it had a "local and provincial flavor" (p. 11/§1). Rahmat Ali's idea of Muslim-majority states in India (Bang-i- Islam, Osmanistan, Haideristan, Siddiqistan, Faruqstan, Muinstan and Maplistan) through a "Pakistan National Liberation Movement" (p. 19/§1) would appear like a fantasy today, even to Pakistanis. Ali, "a potentially disruptive dreamer", who had returned to live in Pakistan in 1948 was told within months to "go back to England failing which he would be arrested" (p. 19/§1).

Just being in Pakistan also gives Raghavan advantage over other Indian scholars, who find it difficult to interrogate Pakistan's complexities and even to access Pakistani authors. For instance, there are Bengalis in Pakistan "who disagreed with the creation of Bangladesh and consciously chose not to live there after 1971" (p. 114/§1). The case of Shahbeg Singh, a Bangladesh war hero, who masterminded terrorism inside Amritsar's Golden Temple, is "poetic justice" (p. 173/§3) to Pakistanis. Armed with privileged access, Raghavan expertly judges the India-Pakistan conundrum: "neither the extent of goodwill nor the extent of hostility in each country for the other can be underestimated" (p. 303/§2).

The Complex Science of Nation-building

While Pakistan sought all kinds of equalizers with its eastern neighbour, India launched a valiant struggle against its past. Bhatnagar's searing eye spares none who fell short in this endeavour. His gaze is stubbornly discerning, even brutal. There is not an issue he does not address.

Prime Ministers in Free Fall

Bhatnagar audaciously throws himself into the front lines, sending ideologically-opposed prime ministers like Nehru and Narendra Modi into free fall. Nehru did not stand up for colleagues, “shied away from building up the armed forces” (p. 86/§2), showed “a very costly error of judgment on China” (p. 100/§8), miscalculated in rejecting U.S. moves for India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council at China’s cost (p. 90/§2), and used “tact and guile” to persuade the Chief of the Army Staff, General K.S. Thimayya, to withdraw his resignation (p. 97/§4). At the other end, the Modi-led National Democratic Alliance ruling coalition “has not yet scored a major foreign policy win…with Pakistan and, to a certain degree, China, relations are actually worse” (p. 143/§3). Indira Gandhi interfered in the functioning of the judiciary (p. 115/§5), and groomed Rajiv Gandhi as her “dynastic successor” (p. 112/§4). V.P. Singh “set the stage for unrest on a widespread scale from 1990 onward” (p. 124/§7) and the Atal Behari Vajpayee administration “took forward this train of horrifying lapses and administrative failure in December 1999 when the terrorists who had hijacked an Indian Airlines Airbus had to be released at Kandahar” (p. 125/§1). The H.D. Deve Gowda government was “colourless” (p. 133/§3), and Manmohan Singh had an “ego not quite commensurate with his attainments” (p. 141/§4). But Vajpayee and Singh’s “wasted years” (p. 142/§2) may not have been entirely that. By ordering nuclear tests in 1998, Vajpayee created a more favourable strategic environment, and Singh’s 1995 civil nuclear agreement with the U.S. consolidated India’s nuclear status.

Nor is it all gloom for the prime ministers. Nehru was “a statesman of international stature” (p. 100/§9) and “among India’s great prime ministers” (p. 101/§1). V.P. Singh’s “integrity was unquestionable” (p. 125/§5), Rajiv Gandhi’s “record in economic policy was good” (p. 124/§1), and P.V. Narasimha Rao’s legacy in “economic reforms is well- documented” (p. 129/§6). Lal Bahadur Shastri showed resolve in the 1965 war, and Indira Gandhi “played her hand brilliantly in the liberation of Bangladesh” (p. 111/§2). Other leaders are praised: Jayprakash Narayan was a “figure of great moral authority” (p. 94/§2), and the chief minister of the Punjab state, Pratap Singh Kairon had “extraordinary vision and drive” (p. 99/§4). But “the different political dynasties, with the Gandhis at the apex” (p. 220/§2), degraded the polity. “Unwillingness to acknowledge the contribution of its many leaders who were from outside the Nehru family” sapped the Congress party, Shastri almost being “wiped out from the pages of history by his own party” (p. 106/§2).

Bhatnagar lovingly writes about Indian scientists, whose autographs he sought while in school, on the strength of easy access, as his grandfather S.S. Bhatnagar was one of India’s leading scientists. Meghnad Saha “received Nehru’s consideration and respect” and “scientists working with Nehru had direct access to him,

sometimes more than members of the cabinet" (p. 91/§4). Such has been the legacy of these figures that India is a leading space power.

The Future

Raghavan's book is superb history. He refrains from pronouncing upon Pakistan after 2008, wisely, because a historian's gaze requires distance. But his mind has peeped into possible futures: "Technology is changing everything. The younger generation is being in touch in a neutral way. Things may not appear to be so, but they are better than twenty years ago. In the next twenty years things will continue to get better"[11]. Facebook, WhatsApp and the Internet have made it possible to sidestep sermons and advisories from the political class, for a more honest appraisal of the relationship. Rather than becoming delusional, Indians and Pakistanis might be better off shutting the emotion and pursuing a cool, merit- based approach. But this is difficult to do. Solving problems needs a long and hard gaze beyond social graces and hospitable demeanours, never by themselves enough to address prejudice and animosity.

The regions of Pakistan and India absorbed their colonial encounters differently, and, with independence, chose opposed futures. While the divergence in approach remains, a growing congruence in the use of religion for political purposes further complicates matters. Yet, cultures have the capacity to absorb lessons and correct the course. The greatest challenge before Pakistanis is to fashion an identity that can draw not only upon its kinetic Islam but upon other traditions as well. India can lend a hand by reasserting its vaunted syncretic culture that has absorbed so many intrusions, to create something miraculously Indian. This requires a dialogue of civilisations.

11 He said this in conversation with the author on July 26, 2018.

ERRATA

No número 149 da revista Nação e Defesa, no artigo da autoria de Jorge Silva Paulo, intitulado "Porque Não Devem os Militares Ser Polícias, em Democracia" (pp. 166-185),

na página 174, onde se lê:

> Para o mesmo autor, "o combate na guerra continuara a constituir a sua [das FA] razão de ser, pelo que deverão resistir à tentação de esquecer essa missão, em tempos de apoio difícil por parte de opiniões públicas mais recetíveis a aceitar despesas com o bem-estar social do que com a segurança, evitando encontrar fundamentos para a sua existência e missão em ações de polícia ou daquilo que passou a designar-se por 'missões de interesse público' (como se a sua missão principal não constituísse a sua missão de interesse público por excelência)." (Santos, 2014, p. 349).

Deve ler-se:

> Para Espírito-Santo (2014, p. 349), "o combate na guerra continuara a constituir a sua [das FA] razão de ser, pelo que deverão resistir a tentação de esquecer essa missão, em tempos de apoio difícil por parte de opiniões públicas mais recetíveis a aceitar despesas com o bem-estar social do que com a segurança, evitando encontrar fundamentos para a sua existência e missão em ações de polícia ou daquilo que passou a designar-se por 'missões de interesse público' (como se a sua missão principal não constituísse a sua missão de interesse público por excelência)."

Na página 177, na nota de rodapé 8, onde se lê:

> Lei de Defesa Nacional (LDN).

Deve ler-se:

> Lei de Defesa Nacional e das Forças Armadas (LDNFA).

Na mesma página, no último parágrafo, onde se lê:

> Polícia Militar

Deve ler-se:

> Polícia Marítima

Aos leitores da revista, e especialmente ao autor, apresentamos as nossas desculpas, lamentando o ocorrido.

O coordenador editorial

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Números temáticos publicados

1998	84	Inverno	Uma Nova NATO numa Nova Europa
	85	Primavera	Portugal e o Desafio Europeu
	86	Verão	O Desafio das Águas: Segurança Internacional e Desenvolvimento Duradouro
	87	Outono	O Estado em Mudança
1999	88	Inverno	Mulheres nas Forças Armadas
	89	Primavera	Portugal na NATO: 1949-1999
	90	Verão	Economia & Defesa
	91	Outono	Operações de Paz
2000	92	Inverno	Portugal e as Operações de Paz na Bósnia
	93	Primavera	Novos Rumos da Educação para a Cidadania
	94	Verão	Democracia e Forças Armadas
	95/96	Outono-Inverno	Prevenção de Conflitos e Cultura da Paz
2001	97	Primavera	Nova Ordem Jurídica Internacional
	98	Verão	Forças Armadas em Mudança
	99	Outono	Segurança para o Século XXI
	100	Inverno	De Maastricht a Nova Iorque
2002	101	Primavera	Europa e o Mediterrâneo
	102	Verão	Repensar a NATO
	103	Outono-Inverno	Novos Desafios à Segurança Europeia
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	Extra	Abril	A Revolução nos Assuntos Militares
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	108	Verão	Portugal e o Mar
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2005	110	Primavera	Teoria das Relações Internacionais
	111	Verão	Raymond Aron. Um Intelectual Comprometido
	112	Outono-Inverno	Número não Temático
2006	113	Primavera	Número não Temático
	114	Verão	Segurança na África Subsariana
	115	Outono-Inverno	Portugal na Europa Vinte Anos Depois

2007	116	Primavera	Número não Temático
	117	Verão	Número não Temático
	118	Outono-Inverno	Políticas de Segurança e Defesa dos Pequenos e Médios Estados Europeus
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	120	Verão	Número não Temático
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	123	Verão	Portugal e a Aliança Atlântica
	124	Outono-Inverno	Que Visão para a Defesa? Portugal-Europa-NATO
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	126		O Conceito Estratégico da NATO
	127		Dinâmicas da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa da União Europeia
2011	128		O Mar no Espaço da CPLP
	129		Gestão de Crises
	130		Afeganistão
2012	131		Segurança em África
	132		Segurança no Mediterrâneo
	133		Cibersegurança
2013	134		Ásia-Pacífico
	135		Conselho de Segurança da ONU
	136		Estratégia
2014	137		Reflexões sobre a Europa
	138		Brasil
	139		Portugal na Grande Guerra
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	141		Arquipélago dos Açores
	142		India
2016	143		Terrorismo Transnacional
	144		The EU Comprehensive Approach: Concepts and Practices
	145		Leituras da Grande Guerra
2017	146		Drones
	147		Brexit
	148		Grupos Islamistas Radicais
	149		Europe and Refugees

Política Editorial

Nação e Defesa é uma publicação periódica do Instituto da Defesa Nacional que se dedica à abordagem de questões no âmbito da segurança e defesa, tanto no plano nacional como internacional. Assim, *Nação e Defesa* propõe-se constituir um espaço aberto ao intercâmbio de ideias e perspetivas dos vários paradigmas e correntes teóricas relevantes para as questões de segurança e defesa, fazendo coexistir as abordagens tradicionais com as problemáticas de segurança mais recentes.

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The journal pays special attention to the Portuguese situation, being a space for reflection and debate over the broad choices that Portugal faces in terms of security and defence, as well as other international security issues with potential impact on Portuguese interests.

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