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A ascensão da Índia na ordem mundial tem vindo a merecer cada vez maior atenção nos círculos políticos, diplomáticos, económicos e académicos, tanto nacionais como internacionais.

A influência política e diplomática de Nova Deli começa a ser notória, fruto de uma globalização que desde 1991 levou os vários governos indianos a implementarem um conjunto de reformas político-económicas e a consolidarem um processo de modernização militar capaz de combater de forma efetiva as ameaças internas e de dissuadir as ameaças externas à estabilidade e integridade territorial do país. Se tal não tivesse sido feito a Índia arriscaria a ser subalternizada internacionalmente.

Paralelamente, começou a notar-se entre os estrategistas indianos o reforço de narrativas estratégicas que – tal como as da China – enfatizam os objetivos de uma civilização tão antiga quanto resiliente, bem como um sentimento de "predestinação nacional", em linha com a afirmação de Shashi Tharoor de que "a única ideia possível da Índia é a de uma nação que seja maior do que a soma das suas partes"[1].

Concetualmente, esta ascensão tem gerado debates em torno dos desafios que países como a Índia, a China e a Rússia – a que se juntam os restantes dois membros dos BRICS (Brasil e África do Sul) – poderão trazer para a ordem internacional. Uns veem a dependência da Índia e da China face à economia e ao sistema financeiro global como razão mais do que suficiente para que defendam a preservação da sua estabilidade, secundarizando considerações de cariz mais realista associadas a perturbações resultantes das alterações na distribuição de poder. Outros perspetivam um cenário mais ambivalente, no qual estas potências não desafiarão diretamente os Estados Unidos da América, mas também não assumirão mais responsabilidades decorrentes dessa sua ascensão, levando, em última instância, a uma ordem internacional sem liderança efetiva, pautada por alinhamentos e acordos de oportunidade, na sua maioria de natureza efémera.

Considerações de caráter estrutural à parte, a realidade é que a Índia – tal como os restantes membros do grupo BRICS – enfrenta um conjunto de constrangimentos, tanto externos como internos, que podem limitar, a prazo, a continuidade do seu notável crescimento.

Externamente, a parceria estratégica entre a China e o Paquistão, a que se junta a falta de acordo quanto à delimitação da fronteira com a China, a disputa com o Paquistão sobre Caxemira, os programas de modernização nuclear e balística de Islamabad e de Pequim, as condicionantes que tem no acesso aos recursos energéticos da Ásia Central, para além das omnipresentes reticências quanto às vantagens de uma sua parceria com Washington, colocam um dilema às elites políticas e mili-

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1   Shashi Tharoor (1997). *India: Midnight to the Millenium*. New Delhi: Arcade, p. 5.

tares sobre a razoabilidade em romper ou continuar com a tradicional política externa e de defesa assente na neutralidade e no não-alinhamento, como a melhor forma de salvaguardar o interesse nacional.

Internamente, com uma classe média estimada entre os 200 e os 250 milhões de pessoas, o país é visto como um enorme mercado para os produtos europeus e norte-americanos. No entanto, apesar do impressionante crescimento económico registado entre 2002 e 2011, e em menor escala – mas assim mesmo impressionante – de 2012 a 2015, os problemas associados à boa governação dos diversos Estados da Federação, a relativa debilidade do governo central em continuar a implementar e coordenar reformas económicas estruturais ainda mais profundas, as enormes assimetrias sociais e o défice de investimento em infraestruturas, ameaçam condicionar uma maior expansão desse enorme potencial.

Tendo em atenção este enquadramento, o Instituto da Defesa Nacional, integrado no ciclo de seminários 'Os BRICS e a Ordem Internacional', numa parceria com a embaixada da Índia em Portugal, organizou a 24 de novembro de 2015, o seminário internacional '*India's Foreign Policy and Strategic Culture*', que contou com conferencistas indianos e portugueses. Das respetivas comunicações, bem como dos contributos de dois investigadores do Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), de Nova Deli, resultou este número da revista *Nação e Defesa*.

No artigo de abertura, Amalendu Misra argumenta que existe uma cuidada e cultivada visão estratégica que pauta uma postura expansionista benigna da Índia. Esta visão assenta numa moldura política teórica autóctone que remonta a mais de dois mil anos e que resistiu ao passar do tempo, constituindo a base das relações internacionais contemporâneas da Índia.

Diana Soller questiona por que razão está a Índia a assumir alguns riscos em termos de segurança para fragilizar a ordem internacional liberal norte-americana. A autora argumenta que a primeira justificação baseia-se no histórico de relações tensas entre Washington e Nova Deli e na ausência de reciprocidade – um valor fundamental da cultura estratégica indiana – o qual condiciona uma maior compreensão entre ambos. A segunda justificação prende-se com o facto de estarmos perante países com uma história e identidade distintas, o que resulta em visões diferentes sobre a ordem internacional, fazendo prever o surgimento de alguns problemas resultantes da ascensão da Índia na ordem internacional. Assim, conclui que a política externa da Índia, no que concerne aos Estados Unidos, associada a uma visão multipolar do sistema internacional está a criar um dilema de segurança que Nova Deli tem ignorado, mas que mais tarde ou mais cedo terá de dirimir: o de as suas ações políticas estarem a fortalecer a posição da China, a maior ameaça à sua segurança.

Jabob Jabin analisa a Iniciativa chinesa '*One Belt, One Road*' e as preocupações que ela gera na Índia. Descreve a resposta indiana bem como as suas debilidades, antes

de examinar os casos do Paquistão e do Oceano Índico no contexto da Iniciativa e o respetivo impacto nas relações Indo-Chinesas.

Aravind Yeleri argumenta que o crescimento económico da Índia favorece a China e que quanto mais as políticas económicas de Nova Deli forem progressivamente liberalizadas e se tornarem ainda mais recetivas ao investimento externo, maiores serão os benefícios para Pequim. Neste contexto, o autor crê que a desaceleração do crescimento chinês e a sua política de internacionalização podem muito bem ser explicadas pelas emergentes simetrias económicas da Ásia.

Constantino Xavier analisa o desenvolvimento das relações bilaterais luso-indianas e argumenta que as políticas externas de ambos os países convergem agora nas regiões de expressão e influência portuguesa. Para explorar o potencial deste cruzamento de interesses, são apresentadas várias recomendações e iniciativas concretas nas áreas do diálogo político, económico, estratégico e cultural.

Por fim, Francisco Galamas centra-se nas dinâmicas nucleares trilaterais entre a Índia, a China e o Paquistão e os riscos que estas acarretam para a estabilidade regional, advindos daquilo que descreve como um ciclo de "ação-reação".

Na secção extra-dossiê, Ana da Silva Jorge faz uma caracterização da situação dos militares femininos nas Forças Armadas de vários países, antes e durante a primeira década do século XXI. Na sua análise é dada especial atenção às militares portuguesas. Adicionalmente, apresenta diversos casos onde a presença dos militares femininos foi considerada essencial para a eficiência e eficácia das missões e operações de paz, bem como as razões para a necessidade de inclusão de uma perspetiva de género nas organizações militares.

<div style="text-align: right">Vítor Rodrigues Viana</div>

India

Rajamandala Theory and India's International Relations[*]

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Abstract

In contemporary international relations India is regarded as one of the major powers. India's emergence as a key global actor is based on its international political posturing, growing economic strength, dynamic cultural influence and a potent military machine. Gifted by these assets India postulates itself as a natural global leader. However, India's power projection is not based simply on these inheritances. There is a carefully cultivated strategic vision that drives this expansionist posture. If that is so, how were to identify this vision? What are the key components of this strategy? It is argued that there is a specific theoretical framework borrowed from a two-millennium old indigenous policy framework which has stood the test of time, forming the bedrock of contemporary Indian international relations.

Resumo
A Teoria de *Rajamandala* e as Relações Internacionais da Índia

Nas relações internacionais contemporâneas a Índia é vista como uma das maiores potências. A ascensão da Índia como um ator-chave no panorama global assenta na sua postura política internacional, no seu crescente poder económico, numa influência cultural dinâmica e numa máquina militar potente. Com base nestes recursos o país vê-se a si próprio como um líder natural à escala global, existindo uma cuidada e cultivada visão estratégica que pauta esta postura expansionista. Sendo este o caso, como se pode identificar esta visão? Quais são os componentes-chave desta estratégia?
Argumenta-se que existe uma moldura política teórica autóctone e específica que remonta a mais de dois mil anos, a qual resistiu ao passar do tempo, constituindo a base das relações internacionais contemporâneas da Índia.

In contemporary international relations, India is regarded as one of the major powers. India's emergence as a key global actor is based on its international political posturing, growing economic strength, dynamic cultural influence and a potent military machine. Gifted by these assets India postulates itself as a natural global leader. However, India's power projection is not based simply on these inheritances. There is a carefully cultivated strategic vision that drives this expansionist posture. If that is so, how were to identify this vision? What are the key components of this strategy?

While engaging with the above sets of questions I argue that there is a specific theoretical framework that forms the bedrock of contemporary Indian relations. Indian external strategy, I wish to argue, borrows from a two-millennium old indigenous policy framework that has stood the test of time. The theory in question, was developed and examined by several ancient Indian strategic theorists (notably Shukra, Manu, and Kamandaka). However, the credit goes to Vishnu Gupta or Kautilya (350 BC-275 BC) for perfecting it and providing a coherent framework that could be used as a policy by any given sovereign or state seeking to gain global supremacy. This idea, the doctrine of the sphere of sovereign influence or *Rajamandala*[1] theory introduced in Kautilya's most celebrated work the *Arthashastra* is the most fundamental in terms of providing a viable strategic imperative to the state's external power projection.

This essay is built around four interconnected themes. First, it introduces *Rajamandala* theory. Second, it examines the explanation of international relations within the ambits of this theory. Third, it brings into discussion the dimension of expansionism and how India has positioned itself in recent years in the global arena. Fourth and last, it postulates the tensions in current Indian strategic thinking and the broader ramifications *Rajamandala* theory. In sum, this essay is a critical reflection on the theoretical and policy linkages between Kautilya's *Rajamandala* theory and the nature of contemporary Indian international relations.

Rajamandala Theory

While the *Rajamandala* theory is generally attributed Kautilya he was one of several thinkers who engaged with this idea in ancient India and perfected it as an integral instrument of statecraft. The *Arthashastra* (the treatise/discourse on means to order) one of the earliest examples in the world of a manual devoted to the strategy of power was a collective effort by several thinkers over a length of time, perhaps stretching over centuries (Roy, 2013: 75).

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1   This premise is also popularly known as *Mandala* theory. However, I would use the term *Rajamandala* throughout this essay, owing to the rather expansive definition that *Rajamandala* provides over the somewhat constricting dimension of *Mandala*.

Kautilya's interpretation of the nature and character of international society has remained timeless. The *Arthashastra* was written in times when the subcontinent was divided into a number of small and mutually hostile states. Therefore, it was necessary for a king to not only protect his state but also deal with hostile kings and expand his territory (Gupta, 2014).

There are several aspects to Kautilya's magnum opus the *Arthashastra*. The purpose of this study is to examine the strategy of inter-state relations. While so doing, it debates *Rajamandala* theory or *Mandala* theory that is often regarded Kautilya's core thesis dealing with the state-centred strategic vision. While staying true to this theory this essay asks if one could draw parallels between contemporary Indian strategic thinking and the core directions enumerated by Kautilya in his *Rajamandala* theory.

While commonly understood as a foreign policy outline, in its true manifestation *Rajamandala* theory is an expression of a state's "internal" and "external" sovereignty. It postulates that a state's sovereignty is in fact two dimensional. While the primary expression of that sovereignty is almost always easily identifiable (*i.e.* the sovereignty of the state over its natural political frontiers and the subjects living within it), the external dimension of this sovereignty is much more difficult to pin down.

Thus it receives its true meaning through a given state's ability to establish its credence outside its legally recognised boundaries. Therefore, according to the *Rajamandala* theory, a state can only be truly sovereign state when it "can exercise its internal authority unobstructed by, and independently of other states" (Sarkar, 1919: 400). It is this power in relation to other state that is paramount in understanding the full remits of *Rajamandala* theory and consequently the strategic depth of a state.

In Kautilya's conception, every sovereign state, polity or ruler is surrounded by many similar sovereign entities. In this galaxy of states there would always be one sovereign who would be a natural adversary to this king or ruler. He further reminds his audience that of this galaxy of states there would be vassals, allies, neutral and hostile sovereigns. However, the sovereign must pay the utmost emphasis to the natural enemy or state and do his utmost to defeat it.

Besides there are two inter-related facets to Kautilya's *Arthashastra*. While its core advice to the sovereign was the preservation of the state, it also expected the ruler to engage in expansionism that involved conquest of new territories under the control of other rulers or sovereigns. It was, in essence, a theory of world conquest.

Kautilya was "an expansionist who provided a discourse on strategic culture to the sovereign that not only seeks the preservation of the state but also amply pushes forward a framework that seeks to conquer territories of others" (Karad, 2015: 324). For the sovereign, "*Rajamandala* theory is the plan, the blueprint of the expedition with the intention of world conquest" (Karad, 2015: 327). In Abul Fazl's interpretation of Kautilya's *Rajamandala* "the sovereign whose territory adjoined to his, although he might be friendly in appearance, yet ought not to be trusted; he was

always be prepared to oppose any sudden attack from that quarter. A king who attempted to give trouble to another king without reasonable cause was an artificial enemy of that king" (Alami, 1993: 495).

The World According to *Rajamandala*

Arguably, *Rajamandala* theory "is at the core of Kautilya's conceptualisation of state affairs, which is the theory of omnipotence" (Karad, 2015: 322). It is based on the geopolitical and geostrategic assumption that "your neighbour is your natural enemy and the neighbour's neighbour is your friend". This was the basic thought behind Kautilya's *Rajamandala* theory. In view of many critics, "it is '[t]he Kautilyan concept of power (*mandala*), centring around the would-be conqueror (*vijigishu*) who uses six fold policy (*sadgunya*) to assume the position of a universal ruler (*chakravartin*) which is of supreme importance if one were to make sense of the *Mandala* theory" (Sarkar, 1919; Gautam, 2013: 21).

If one were to give it a visual representation, Kautilya's theory of the international system, from the perspective of a sovereign it could be represented by a series of concentric circles. In this conception, if the sovereign resides at the centre of this circle, hostile states are those that border the ruler's state, forming a circle around it. In turn, states that surround this set of hostile states form another circle around the circle of hostile states. This second circle of states can be considered the natural allies of the ruler's state against the hostile states that lie between them. Consequently, the sovereign wishing power and domination always try to put his state at the centre (*nabhi*) of the Circle and simultaneously make the friendly powers the spokes of the wheel (*nemi*).

Picture 1 – Visual Representation of Inter-state Relations according to *Rajamandala* Theory

Source: Singh (2011: 11)

Therefore, according to the above framework, "the king who is situated anywhere immediately on the circumference of the conqueror's territory is termed the enemy. The king who is likewise situated close to the enemy, but separated from the conqueror only by the enemy, is termed the friend (of the conqueror)" (*The Arthasastra*, 1992).

Speaking of enemies, and allies, Kautilya is well known for outlining and applying the '*Rajamandala* Theory of Foreign Policy'. The basic argument in his theory is that any neighbouring state should be considered as a potential enemy, and dealt with cautiously. This is because, Kautilya argues, all states act in their own self-interest, be it through waging war or negotiating peace. According to the *Mandala* theory, regional states are grouped in a circle and are numbered. Kautilya suggests that any states located on the other side of an enemy state can be considered an ally. The most obvious reason for this categorization seems to be the concept of 'sandwiching the enemy'. In more contemporary terms Kautilya's *Rajamandala* Theory can best be described by the principle stating the enemy of my enemy is my friend (Boesche, 2002).

Kautilya observed that every state is surrounded by many states, and there cannot be friendly states all around. In other words, the external frontiers of a given state can be divided into friendly and enemy territories. However, the important question that arises in this context is how does one recognize/label the tag of hostile enemy or genuine friendly frontier or territory. Kautilya's identity marker in this context was deceptively simply. In the *Arthashastra*, he proposed, that a sovereign's enemy's enemy could be accorded the status of a friend. And an enemy's friend should be treated as an enemy.

One of the key aspects of the *Rajamandala* theory with regard to the conduct of business with the enemy state has to do with the continuance of a hostile offensive defence position. Having identified the enemy (state) Kautilya suggested, the sovereign should conduct his/her hostility as an open undertaking. Since Kautilya's theorisation of inter-state external relations explains, "how the political world works actually, than that it ought to be" (Karad, 2015: 322), it has a strong resonance in the strategic vision of New Delhi. As one observer put it, "since its independence, India's international behaviour has unfolded in line with this theoretical logic. For starters, India has failed to set up good relations with neighbouring countries in the region. It has long been engaged in a rivalry with Pakistan, and it is also far from friendly with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Antagonism with its neighbouring countries remains a main element of India's foreign policy" (Xinmin, 2014: 147).

While this may be true, one could also testify to the fact that bar its archrival Pakistan, from time to time, India has tried to build bridges with its other immediate neighbours. How was then one to explain New Delhi's overtures in the context of good neighbourly borderland policy? Again, while somewhat friendly, this

relationship has always been a tense affair. New Delhi simply has not succeeded in ridding the relationships of mutual distrust, tension, unilateral interference, occasional hostility, and thawing of bonhomie.

These far from friendly relations can be explained within Kautilya's conception of the *Rajamandala*. For, "the idea of the *Rajamandala* holds that relations between two contingent states will generally be tense, a fact that was definitely true of many regions, such as Europe, until fairly recently (this does not preclude the possibility of a neighbour being friendly or a vassal). This idea may explain the perception among India's smaller South Asian neighbours that India is an overbearing and dominating neighbour" (Pillalamarri, 2015: 17).

On his swearing in ceremony the 14th Prime Minister of India, Mr. Narendra Modi, invited all the heads of states of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to his swearing-in ceremony. Nothing wrong with that gesture. But examined within the above theory one could interpret it as an emperor's coronation invitation where the vassals were made obliged to come and pay their allegiance and respect. That all was not well with this bonhomie was soon apparent. Within months after this gathering, New Delhi's relationship with some of these very states metamorphosed into open criticism and hostility. Note, for instance, the landlocked republic of Nepal's recent plight. New Delhi brought the country's economy and life to a standstill for over four months (November 2015-February 2016) by orchestrating an internal dissent amongst a section of the country's populace. This led to the citizenry of some of those states openly condemning India as a big power bully.

In view of one critic, "India has always been on a high-alert and kept a very defensive attitude against interactive ties between any non-regional countries, especially big powers, and other countries in the subcontinent" (Xinmin, 2014: 159). This has been evidenced in case of Chinese economic and military incursions in Sri Lanka in the past. In recent years it has also been very critical of China-Pakistan economic corridor that connects northwest China with Pakistan's Arabian Sea coast. In view of some observers, this "strategic partnership between Pakistan and China has upset India and consequently it has openly voiced its opposition to the project" (Bhutta, 2015: 3). According to one Chinese scholar, such moves "may not be a purely historical coincidence. The strong magic power of India's *Mandala* geo-strategic thought and its strategic intention of seeking regional hegemony in South Asia are quite apparent" (Xinmin, 2014: 159).

If that were so, one could also identify New Delhi's representation of the immediate neighbour as *ari* or enemy and the one beyond the territory of the immediate neighbour as *mitra* or friend. Within the workings of this schema Afghanistan bordering Pakistan has been a traditional ally of New Delhi. So is India's relationship with Mongolia that sits just outside *ari* imagery (*i.e.* the immediate neighbour China). To

some observers, through its strategic partnership with Mongolia, "India is signal-ling something vital to the Chinese that the country can reach out to its backyard for apparent strategic considerations" (Chaturvedi, 2015: 2).

In recent years, we have witnessed New Delhi cultivating *mitras* (friends) as a bul-wark against the *aris* (enemies). What New Delhi has been engaged with and is fast unveiling is the introduction and consolidation of several strategic corridors that allows it to counter its *ies* (immediate enemy). A case in point is the opening up of a strategic corridor with the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

India and the United Arab Emirates have started a new strategic partnership after a landmark visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Abu Dhabi in August, 2015, which includes unprecedented cooperation on counter terrorism, especially signifi-cant given that the UAE has traditionally been a close ally of Pakistan (NDTV, 2016).

Similarly, in 2015 India and Vietnam signed a joint vision statement for five years, which while it aims at "enhancing their bilateral defence cooperation" (The Times of India, 2015) is in reality a defence pact whole primary objective is to undermine China's hegemony in the South China Sea.

Power Consolidation-Expansion

According to the *Rajamandala* theory, the sovereign who has established his leader-ship or the state that finds itself firmly at the centre of a constellation of states occu-pies the site towards which other sovereigns or states gravitate. Put simply, "the theory of a circle of states entails that every ruler within an international system will find his (or her) state at the centre of its own circle of states. This ruler is described as a *vijigishu*, or would-be conqueror, whose power ought to gradually radiate into ever more distant circles" (Pillalamarri, 2015: 17). But what should the sovereign do to maintain that centrality?

One of the attendant features of *Rajamandala* as a strategic doctrine is to push an expansionist agenda for the sovereign. In its crudest form this expansionism may signify physical expansion through conquest of new territories, subjugation of nations and people outside the state's borders. For *The Arthashastra* "preaches the ideal of conquest meaning the ruler or the sovereign should be desirous of *digvijaya* (the conquest of all known territories on its borders)" (Roy, 2013: 77). In this frame-work *vijigishu / vijigeesoo* (ideal ruler or sovereign) should be an aspirant to conquer and conquest.

The expansionist ideal, of course, is not a given. Kautilya makes it very explicit under what circumstance a state or a sovereign can embark on that path. First if a state is a in a state of downward slide, if its sovereignty is under threat, it is a in a state of decline and there are serious questions surrounding its future stability, the ruler or the sovereign should make every effort at defending its sovereignty by

making alliances, solving internal problems and so on. On the other hand, if the state is set on a course of steady economic growth, with a contended citizenry, and no serious threat to its frontiers and most crucial of it is being led by an able and visionary leadership then it is in a natural position to embark on a path of conquest of the neighbouring states (Kautilya, 1992; Boesche, 2003: 4).

The *raison d'etre* of an effective sovereign or a sovereign state is to establish himself / itself as the *nabhi* (or centre of gravity) of a system – in this case the international system (*The Arthashastra*, 1992). Or, as one of the earliest modern scholars put it, the sovereign "should become the lord of a mandala. It is part of his (the sovereign's) duty to try to have a full sphere around him just as the moon is encircled by a complete orb" (Sarkar, 1919: 402).

Yet, interestingly, the conquest or expansionist objective encompassed a hard power expansionism referring to territorial gains by the sovereign or *vijigishu* desirous or aspirant to world conquest. The theory provided a framework for the sovereign to go beyond the mere conquest of physical territories and become a true world conqueror (*i.e. chakravartin* through soft power projection). Kautilya did not see this conquest as something unjust. A sovereign who carried out his duties, ruled according to law, meted out only just punishment, applied the law equally to his son and his enemy, and protected his subjects not only went to heaven but had conquered the earth up to its four ends.

In Kautilya's conception there can be three distinct sets of expansion by a given sovereign. They are *dharmavijaya* (conquest for the sake of glory); *lobhavijaya* (overthrow of the adversary for economic gains); and *asuravijaya* (the base expansion which results in annihilating your enemy and appropriating their women). The ideal expansion or conquest, according to Kautilya, is for the sake of glory (*dharmavijaya*). For the sovereign who wishes to remain the centre gravity can only remain so through *dharmavijaya*.

So, how does contemporary India feature in this system?

First, India has never been an expansionist state. While the physical or territorial expansionism has never been an avowed state policy, one cannot say the same so far as New Delhi's perpetual attempts at seeking to expand its area of influence.

In this context, one could argue that there has always been a clearly defined pattern to India's ideologically driven expansionism in the post-independence period. Faced by two aggressive superpowers (United States and Soviet Union) who were engaged in a relentless campaign to ever widen their sphere of influence during the Cold War years, India chose the safer alternative of reaching out to the hesitant and unsure group of nations through its policy of nonalignment. While a global ideal, shared by many non-western post-colonial states, India nonetheless was the natural leader in this forum. Through the nonalignment movement better known

through its acronym NAM, New Delhi forever sought to consolidate its position as the *primus inter pares*.

In recent years, New Delhi would appear to claim a global leadership role not only in hard power context but in soft power posturing as well. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's suggestion that India is a natural global leader in the areas of economy, environment and manpower are cases in point (Time, 2015). With that aim in mind New Delhi has focused on establishing a secure network of friends and allies in far afield. The India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) that pledged African nations US$ 600 million seeks to establish a specific strategic depth in Africa.

India's emphasis on 'blue economy' that brings Africa and India through the common sea frontier of the Indian Ocean is likely to score that soft power expansionist dividend. Also symbolic in this equation is mission statement of IAFS through its lion representation logo – which while gives an equal share to Africa nonetheless makes no secret of India's strategic ambitions "proud, courageous, bold and on the prowl, ready to take on the future and seize every opportunity" (The Business Standard, 2015).

This vision of soft power expansionism is further consolidated by a carefully cultivated diplomacy that has sought to translate specific Indian cultural practices (such as Yoga) into universal global values. India's soft power and expansionist ambition go hand-in-hand. And, it is no longer a secret. In the words of India's top diplomat, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, the "UN's decision to commemorate the International Day of Yoga underlines the appreciation for India and its growing soft power" (NDTV, 2015).[2]

Advantage Alliance

In view of some critics, Kautilya's *Matsya Nyaya* "entails struggle for power as the *sine qua non* of the 'internal' as well as the 'external sovereignty in the international arena" (Upadhyaya, 2009: 73). While Kautilya is clear about the nature of international system, in the *Arthashastra* he nonetheless suggest the sovereign to make peace with *ari* (or enemy) in order to secure the required time to enhance one's own power or establish a balance of power. While useful measures, they should, however, be temporary. These strategies should be abandoned as and when the sovereign is confident of his power and that of the state he rules. This striving towards enhancing one's power deficiency is solely aimed at consolidating the sovereign's strength in comparison to the enemy.

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2   Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced the idea in his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2014. This proposal was co-sponsored by 177 countries, out of 193 member states. This move created a new record for the highest number of co-sponsoring nations for a General Assembly Resolution.

In his seminal essay on Indian strategic culture, military historian and theorist George Tanham suggested, "India's self-conception, its geography, and military strength are of supreme importance in shaping the strategic culture" (Tanham, 1992: 129). Some quarter-of-a-century on while all of those parameters still determine India's strategic depth, a new rubric (*i.e.* economy) has come into play. Apart from being a great military power India has also clocked in an impressive economic growth rate in recent years (surpassing its arch-rival China in 2015). This development provides critical impetus to the shaping of New Delhi's own imagination of itself in the global stage and subsequently its strategic behaviour.

Way back in 1992 Tanham suggested that "some Indians would like India to be a great power, as opposed to a voice in the world" (Tanham, 1992: 129). Finally, nearly a quarter-of-a-century since, India appears to be steadying itself on that path of seeking a great power identity pursuing a

bigger and stronger economic, cultural and soft power variety. In his recent visit to the United Kingdom, the Indian Prime Minister addressed a congregation of some 60 thousand non-resident Indians in the Wembley Sports Arena, London. In that speech he demanded that the world treat India as an equal ("we don't want favours from the world, we want equal stature" – Dowerah, 2015), sums up the direction in India's strategic depth. Following on that he repeated the theme during the course of Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) meeting in Kuala Lumpur. During his speech Modi proclaimed "we know that our time has come" (India Today, 2015). While this was in reference to the emerging role of Asia in international scene, the attempt was to put India at the heart of that Asian Century.

While this may be a legitimate aspiration, here one cannot help avoid asking the question: how far is India capable in terms of leading that Asian Century? Or can it be a dominant player in the scheme of things if there is ever an Asian Century?

Let me engage with these two interrelated questions head on. There are two key components to New Delhi's aspirations with regard to be at the forefront of this strategic vision. They are guided, in equal measures, by soft power strategy as well as the realpolitik considerations suggested along the lines of Kautilya.

In Kautilya's conception the sovereign ought to develop the ambit of his sovereignty by augmenting and exploiting its resources and power base. How is New Delhi exploiting its resources and its powerbase?

Thanks to its traditional rivalry/enmity with China and a majority of South East Asian states discomfort with the rising Chinese muscle in the region, New Delhi has a natural advantage. By using my 'enemy's enemy as my ally' New Delhi has pushed forward a new strategic vision in the South East Asian region. It has cultivated Myanmar and Vietnam as strategic partners, reiterated its stand as the defender of half-a-dozen regional powers claims over the South China Sea islands. Most important of all there are now talks of New Delhi and Washington

joint patrols in South China Sea (Miglani, 2016). These developments have given an unprecedented strategic depth to New Delhi's big power ambitions in the region.

While economic growth and material progress would appear to be a natural yearning for a state, the sovereign can use the idea of progress as part of consolidation of power and external outreach or non-territorial conquest. While India-Africa forum (discussed earlier) could be argued to aim at countering China in the external third and fourth ambit of the concentric circle in the *Rajamandala* diagram the initiatives in cultural diplomacy could be argued as strategies aimed at encasing India's interest in the outermost circles.

Similarly, Kautilya required his sovereign to be both pragmatic and prudence. Such an outlook and policy posture allowed him maximum flexibility in his foreign affairs and helped towards extending the remits of the state's sovereignty. Having ignored its sizeable diaspora community in the past, New Delhi has begun to embrace them in order to extend and boost its sphere of influence externally. In recent years, the advantage to its strategic posturing is aided by the presence of a significant Indian diaspora in countries like Singapore and Malaysia and its cultural influence in archipelagic Indonesia and mainland states of Cambodia and Laos. These physical and cultural ties have steered India's strategic ambitions into safer waters.

Yet as Yitzhak Klein put it, a nation's strategic culture "can be assessed, compared and analysed by means of a paradigm that represents them as a hierarchy of concepts on several levels: political, strategic, and operational" (Klein, 1991: 3). A country's security culture is often formed by the strategic preferences of the entire society and political elites on some policies and actions that are different from other countries (Duffield, 1999). "We witness that Indians may or may not be secular, may or may not want a Hindu nation, but they all unanimously want to get ahead, they want the country to progress and in peace – without lynching or riots" (Chaudhry, 2015). It is in this context that India's knowledge economy would appear to have a great potential to fulfil New Delhi's global ambitions.

The Restraints

"The measure of a country's strategic depth is examined not only by the importance it carries at the international level but also how it conducts itself internally. Strategically a country is only taken seriously at the international context if it is found to be equally robust in terms of addressing the issues and challenges internally. A continental sized country; India's external standing is undermined by the problems it faces internally. India's strategic ambition to be considered as a great power is thwarted by the dissent and conflict at home. India's most pressing strategic security concern is its own internal disunity" (Tanham, 2002: 24).

In spite of the great external success story, since the late 1980s the country has been fraying on the edges. There have been several full-blown separatist movements along its borders. "For the last one decade-and-half it is caught up in an internal insurgency in the form of Maoist uprising across the eastern, central and southern regions of the country" (Misra, 2002: 76). If in the external ambits contemporary Indian strategic culture is governed by the *Mandala* theory (as we discussed earlier), one could find its reflection in the internal arena as well. This is being pursued very vigorously in recent years. As a variation of that theory "the sovereign's enemy's friend is an enemy has been used very liberally to quash separatism and secession-ism especially in the context of insurgency in the Punjab, Kashmir, the greater North-Eastern region" (Misra, 2001: 51).

A great power ambition requires great power responsibility. Does India have the required strength and wherewithal to address the internal challenges? Kautilya, in his formulation, cautioned against the use of continuous force against internal dis-sent. While the Indian state has been primarily hegemonic in its treatment of the dissenters, one could nonetheless identify a policy shift in the earlier full-blown military engagement against the internal adversaries. While it has not completely abandoned the military option the new preferred method seems to be rapproche-ment. Note, for instance, the ruling nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) deci-sion to engage ex-separatists in the troubled province of Jammu and Kashmir in the provincial electoral politics.

While there has been a groundswell support for New Delhi that India be made a member of the United Nations Security Council by some of the important players in international relations such as the United States and United Kingdom at the same time they have voiced their concern about India's internal record. The issue of minority security, tolerance and ability to address dissent has featured time and again in Indian leadership's interaction with the heavyweights in the international arena (Dreher, 2015).

This would suggest, no matter how hard New Delhi positions itself in the interna-tional arena and how persistently the country presents itself as a strategic partner in ridding the world of global threats – from climate change to terrorism – it is going to land itself in the back if it does not address some of the pressing issues affecting the internal order and consequently its international image.

Even if India manages to sort out the internal problems there are other hurdles that it needs to address if it were to extend its remits of influence externally. While the *Rajamandala* theory is helpful a consistent and continuous treatment of the immedi-ate neighbour as the natural and permanent *ari* (enemy) does not necessarily provide strategic depth to the country in the long run. India's current predisposition towards initiating a strategic dialogue with the international world seem to be wholly and squarely dominated by its monochromatic vision of its arch enemy (*i.e.* Pakistan).

Whatever India does or seeks to achieve at the international level seem to be guided by its reflection on Pakistan. The constant discussion on combating terrorism at the international level has its roots in India's inability to counter Pakistani designs in Indian territory. A country's strategic vision can only be termed dynamic if it succeeds in freeing itself from the shackles of such historic obsession. This would mean New Delhi rejig some of its policy planning in relation to Islamabad.

Pragmatic Ambiguities

While Kautilya weighs heavily in contemporary Indian strategic doctrine there are several oddities in New Delhi's power posturing. These ideas or worldviews do not necessarily gel well with the realist framework of international relations that Kautilya proposed and India seems to have embraced.

If one were to concentrate on those aspects that have contributed most to the shaping of Indian strategic thinking it is the civilizational inheritance, which would seem to dominate this discourse. In view of one critic, "strategic culture is made up of a country's worldview, judgment of subject-object relations and model of behaviours based on that country's geography, history and economic and political development" (Xinmin, 2014: 151). For more than any other component it is composite identity that has had a massive bearing on that thinking and continues to do so. India has always been a multi-religious state and various regimes for over millennia have tried to put their imprint on the country's strategic vision through the leadership's own specific outlook: hence, the continuation of a specific policy posture through the ages.

If history has contributed to the shaping of Indian strategic culture again it is this inheritance which underwrites India's resolve to provide a well-articulated vision. As one contemporary critic put it, "one striking feature of Indian discourse on peace and conflict has been its eclectic *weltanschaung*, which traditionally allows a fusion of divergent and often contrary view points" (Upadhyaya, 2009: 72).

New Delhi, ever since India's independence, has perpetually claimed it to be a nation that operates at the international scene by a code of conduct enshrined in the principles of *ahimsa* (non-violence), *panchasheel* (peaceful cooperation) and most importantly non-alignment. These defining principles in Indian strategic culture are not some mere afterthoughts but carefully constructed paradigms that have their origin in specific religious ethics and a product of its historical inheritance.

Turning to *ahimsa* we find it is not a theory that was invented by New Delhi by focussing astutely on contemporary international relations but was plucked up from its history. This is a principle that has been practiced by millions of Hindus, Buddhists and Jains from time immemorial. Thus while embracing non-violence as a policy principle New Delhi has simply borrowed an old concept and used it for the betterment of its strategic interests in contemporary international relations.

In India, it is believed that the spirituality and mysticism of the Hindu religion can bestow moral and logical legality upon India's international status (Xinmin, 2014: 153).

One could posit something similar on the principle of *panchasheel* – the idea of a peaceful coexistence with your neighbours. This ideal, popularised by India's first Prime Minister Nehru has its basis in the principles followed by one of India's foremost emperors whose reign predated Alexander the Great's invasion of India. Asoka is unique in ancient Indian strategic culture in the sense that his was a truly international empire. While he extended the physical frontiers of his state, as part of military expansionism, he was equally successful in enforcing the vision of good life in territories far beyond his.

Asoka's empire, which extended from modern day Myanmar in the East to Afghanistan in the West, was notable for maintaining friendly good relations with its neighbours. His empire was not only non-violent but equally non-interventionist. This principle of respect towards your neighbours in contemporary Indian diplomacy is a direct borrowing from Asokan emphasis on recognition and respect towards one's sovereign peers or neighbours. How did contemporary India combine the ideas of Kautilya and Asoka who sat in two extremes of their ideological positions? According to one observer:

> "For much of the modern era, independent India's thinking on politics and international relations were derived not from the *Arthashastra* or similar works, but from the non-alignment and pacifism of Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, who were perhaps loosely inspired by the example of Asoka, grandson of Kautilya's king. Asoka abjured realpolitik and attempted to run his empire on the principles of morality and peace (the Mauryan Empire fell apart quickly after Asoka's death) (Pillalamari, 2015: 19).

Apart from these acknowledged borrowing there have been several other discreet intervention by religion in shaping India's contemporary strategic thought. The most glaring yet not talked about aspect of this is the role of Islam or Muslim population towards New Delhi's policy postures. A citizenry with a Hindu majority, India nonetheless, cultivated a very vibrant and productive relationship with scores of Muslim states in Middle East for nearly half-a-century (from 1947-2002).

Its heavy energy dependence on the Middle Eastern oil and gas resources necessitated New Delhi to cultivate a friendly relation with the states in the region. It could win major concessions in its dependence by playing its role in hosting the second-major Muslim population in the world. This chunk of its citizenry (belonging to the Islamic faith), in other words, were show-cased whenever it went on a 'charm offensive' *vis a vis* Islamic nations in the Middle East. Interestingly, this reference to Islam in general and its Muslim population in particular, has been as much a blessing as a restraint in terms of achieving strategic objectives.

Its proximity to the Muslim nations in the Middle East implied, New Delhi follows the former's foreign policy objectives or risk ostracism and loss of concessionary oil and gas largesse. Therefore, to placate its own Muslim lobby and to be a good reliable partner to its Middle Eastern counterparts, New Delhi did not have diplomatic relations with for almost half-a-century. Its strategic autonomy, in other words, was hamstrung by the religious components of the society and the external environment. Yet, that has not guaranteed a long-term strategic depth to New Delhi in the region. A case in point is Iran's return from international isolation.

When Teheran was under a Western economic blockade New Delhi actively pursued several high-profile trade initiatives (notably iron-for-oil agreement). India was severely criticised for doing business with a pariah regime at the time and New Delhi felt it could weather that wrath by winning over Tehran by entering into an all-weather partnership programme. Iran's return from international isolation in early 2016, however, saw Tehran unilaterally cancelling many of the earlier deals with New Delhi (the accusation here was India took unfair advantage when Iran was on its knees). To add insult to injury, in the very first week of its emergence from the blockade Iran entered into several high-profile arms, economic and trade agreements with China while completely ignoring India.

The principle of non-alignment to which New Delhi was wedded firmly is yet another point in the discussion surrounding the religious ethos and the country's external strategic policy postures. By remaining true to the principles of non-alignment, India gained massive economic and moral dividend in a Cold War dominated international relations. However, it was precisely because of its reliance on this specific principle with its roots in Hindu belief in neutrality that undermined the country from evolving into a more powerful nation.

Yet, in view of one critic, "the modern Indian concept of non-alignment itself may be a reflection of Kautilya's advice for a nation to only follow its self-interest and not get locked into permanent enmity or friendship with any other nation" (Pillalamari, 2015: 19). When confronted by hard realities and challenges at an international arena, India has dug deep into its moral reserve of its great pacifist leaders. This trait is evident, more than ever, in the "strategic speak" of the current government. India's current Prime Minister never fails to use the stock phrases like Asoka, Akbar, Buddha and Gandhi when trying to place India in the broader international context or to chart the course of its strategic initiative.

Conclusion

Kautiulya's *Arthashastra* did not deal with "a particular state in a historical time, but with the state as a concept" (Rangarajan, 1992: 542). Therefore the theoretical framework offered by Kautilya not only has a timeless appeal, but it is also primarily secular in its orientation. It is these twin aspects, which have allowed the Indian

state to appropriate parts of this treatise in its foreign policy undertakings and consequently the overall strategic vision. Recognising the contribution of *The Arthashastra* in general, and *Rajamandala* theory in particular, Shiv Shankar Menon, the 4th National Security Advisor of India (2010-2014) acknowledged, that this treatise "is a serious manual on statecraft, on how to run a state, informed by a higher purpose, clear and precise in its prescriptions, the result of practical experience of running a sate. It is not just a normative text but a realist description of the art of running a state" (Menon, 2012: 13).

Kautilya's depiction of the external world, from the viewpoint of a sovereign, as an anarchical world marked by internecine struggle for power, it is a state of affairs where various polities push their national interests, and it is a world where entities enter into diplomatic alliances either to avoid aggression or gain strategic advantage in a hostile situation are the constants that have remained timeless.

Guided by these realities New Delhi has remained close to Kautilya's prescription of statecraft. "While at one level it pursues the ambition of *chakravartin* (world conquest) through soft power export it has also been realistic by staying true to Kautilya's prescriptions on seeking peace with other sovereign entities as the true foundation of lasting internal security and stability" (Upadhyaya, 2009: 73).

Prior to the rise of Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Indian strategic thinking, was primarily *ad hoc* in nature. As George T. Tanham argued in his 2002 essay, in the past, Indians "did not address the problems seriously until a real crisis arises" (Tanham, 2002: 82). Interestingly, "after the end of the Cold War, India has begun to apply more of the *Arthashastra*'s maxims as it has grown in confidence and ability and realized the necessity of pursuing its own interests, regardless of their normative component" (Pillalamarri, 2015: 19). Under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi there has been a rethinking on future Indian strategic culture. Confident, externally oriented, self-assured in the changed circumstances the signature of this strategy seems to be both militarily robust and expansionist in the soft power context.

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When Different Democracies Collide: India and United States, Competing Visions of the International Order?

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Abstract

This article argues that commonality of regime type is not a sufficient condition for peaceful power transition. Other elements that have deserved very little attention can be much more determinant of the outcome, especially if we cross levels o analysis. This article advances a model that is going to apply to the cases of the United States (as a declining power) and India (as a rising power). The model and the empirical analysis uncover those factors, articulate them and explain why New Delhi contests important aspects of the American-led liberal order.

Resumo

Quando Duas Democracias Colidem: Índia e Estados Unidos, Visões Competitivas da Ordem Internacional?

Este artigo argumenta que a similaridade do tipo de regime não é o único fator que influência a confluência dos estados em contexto de transição de poder. Pelo contrário, existe um número de elementos pouco estudados até hoje que podem ter uma grande influência em divergências entre estados democráticos, especialmente se as avaliarmos sob o ponto de vista de diversos níveis de análise (normalmente avaliados separadamente). Para isso, o artigo desenvolve um modelo de análise que vai aplicar aos casos dos Estados Unidos e da Índia, explicando, assim, porque é que Nova Deli tem vindo a contestar aspetos fundamentais da ordem internacional norte-americana.

Introduction

In his famous book "*Diplomacy*", Henry Kissinger affirmed that there was no known country who would not achieve a higher degree of power without trying to influence the course of events in international affairs (Kissinger, 1994: 37). However, as neoclassical realists have proved since the 1990's (in this topic Fareed Zakaria is particularly relevant) the real question is not about if a state is going to try to imprint their unique mark in the system, but when, how, and in the name of what (Zakaria, 1998: 37).

We know, from classical realism and neoclassical realism that the international system is a permissive condition, *i.e.*, the system "gives states considerable latitude in defending their security interests, and the distribution of power merely set parameters for grand strategy" (Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman, 2009: 7). In other words, the international system provides constraints and opportunities for states to act in behalf of their national interest (Morgenthau, 1961: 8) which is, in part, defined not only by threat assessment but by states' own collective ideas (Legro, 2005: 13).

Therefore, the international system does not determine the quality or kind of policy choices each state is going to make. If we want to have a realistic framework that defines foreign policy making choices we should blend four elements: the structure of the international system, threat assessment (which state is my an enemy and to what degree), collective ideas (how each state self-image is going to influence the way it is exercise power), and endogenous and exogenous shocks (negative and positive) that lead the elites to reconsider their foreign policy and worldview positions towards the international order (Owen, 2010: 4).

India is an exemplary state in this matter: its most important rivalries, Pakistan and China were defined in the 1950's and the 1960's respectively. However, recent changes in policy – namely towards the United States and international order – were not determined by these enmities, but by shocks. There have been three since the 1990's: the collapse of the Soviet Union and the almost simultaneous crises of the balance of payments at the beginning of the 1990's (Ganguly and Mukherji, 2011: 23, 84) that led to a lost decade in India's foreign policy. Too centered on solving its economic problems (and in economic reforms determined by the IMF loans) New Delhi was consumed by domestic affairs.[1]

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1   However two things must be noted: the first is that the way towards a more open economy was already underway before the shocks mentioned above. Rajiv Gandhi, the tragically assassinated Prime Minister was, according to several authors, the major architect of the elites' pact between the Congress Party and the businessmen towards a wider openness to the markets, back in the mid 1980's (see for example Ganguly and Mukherji, 2011: 84; Kholi, 2012: 11). The other thing is that Gandhi's measures were accelerated and broaden by the loans (and attached guarantees) granted to India by the IMF. However, it is also true that the economic reform in India were also not as ambitious as it is usually believed, and the state is still very present in much of the states' economic affairs (Kholi, 2012: 17)

The apathy was broken by the victory of the BJP[2] and the first nuclear test performed in 1998. Two consequences arose. The international community condemned India's initiative, imposing sanctions and criticizing New Delhi openly, but it also triggered a new sort of attention over India: after all, the state was a democracy in a neighborhood of autocratic regimes, was one of the most populous countries in the world, was opening its economy to foreign markets, and now possessed nuclear power. These events prompt a last minute visit by Bill Clinton in March 2000 that created mixed feelings among the India elites. Some welcomed the President and perceived it as the American recognition that India was an important player, others saw it with mistrust: after all Clinton always emphasized the integration of China over India and the President's visit came a little too late in his tenure. The BJP considered by most analysis more pragmatic and national interest oriented was in power, and according to some authors, determined to open a new era in Indian foreign policy (Mohan, 2015: 116; Muni, 2009: 20).[3]

However, the third shock was positive, albeit also very demanding. By the mid-2000's India stop been perceived internationally as a "supplicant" state and started to be seen as a "competitor" (Smith, 2007: 6). That came with a price: New Delhi's elites had to start looking for the type of international actor they wanted their country to be, and how, as a responsible stakeholder, it would give its contribution to the world order. By this time the United Progressive Alliance (UPA1) coalition, led by the Congress Party, was back in the government.

This emergence has implications especially given the context within which it started to happen. On the one hand, India's rise has been shadowed by the rise of one of its major rivals, China (which has grown so far politically and economically faster than India), along with the rising prominence of other states like Russia and Brazil with very different political strategies, along with the United States strategic restraint (Sestanovich, 2014: 9). This scenario prompted what Robert Gilpin calls "the first phase of power transition". This first phase is characterized by a period where states already perceive that the distribution of power is shifting but it did not change enough yet to propel confrontation (either form the *status quo* powers who will tend to challenge the most prominent rival to keep it from rising or the most prominent rising power trying to challenge the *status quo* power) (Gilpin, 1981: 14). But, more importantly, and still following Gilpin, the first phase is also the moment when states, both declining and rising, start to define their allegiances and possible

2   As we will see later the BJP is a more ambitious party in terms of foreign policy and India's insertion in market economy.
3   We do not refer to the nuclearization of India as a shock (at least for New Delhi). It was an internal decision that was the consequence of a long debate that started during Indira Gandhi's tenure.

future partnerships and alliances, as well as their positions about important matters in the international system. To put it simply, in the first phase of power transition states start or intensify their domestic debates about the international strategy they want to follow and what sort of role they want to play in world affairs. This is the phase India is currently facing. Internal debates are about what role India should play in the international system, now that it is recognized by its peers as an emerging power.

So far, and according to a number of field interviews, as well as publications released in the last few years, New Delhi is inclined to follow its traditional "autonomy" strategy (Ollapally and Rajagopalan, 2012: 79), both for strategic reasons, to diversify friendships without antagonizing its possible neighboring rivals (Mohan 2015: 201), and for value based reasons, materialized in the resurgence of what could be called Neo-Nehruvianism narrative, *i.e.,* India's positions are based on some of the fundamental values and strategic culture inspired in India's founding father and adapted to the needs of the twenty first century (Soller, 2014: 19).

Therefore, on the one hand, we are witnessing a more pragmatic power driven foreign policy since the end of the 1990's, accompanied by a defensive moral based narrative that became more evident in the 2000's. The former justifies what Mohan calls Modi's "embrace to America" (Mohan, 2015: 113), and the later prescribes caution in world affairs, especially in what regards the values of the international order built mainly by the United States – that, in an overall perspective, India does not subscribe (Hurrell, 2006). This is an instance, perhaps the most important one, of how often New Delhi separates the multilateral order policies from the bilateral relations approaches (Chaudhuri, 2014: 27).

Therefore, in what concerns multilateral relations, India has been acting politically –often siding with China – against the liberal international order and the unipolar world dominated by the United States that New Delhi seems to perceive as dangerous and against its interests (Acharya, 2014: 4). New Delhi is not necessarily acting against the United States bilaterally (remember Modi's embrace) with whom it jointly works in particular policies where there is mutual understanding and/or interest such as combating terrorism, joint policies on nuclear proliferation, and more recently, in a number of joint military exercises (see MOD 2012 Report). However, since power is not only absolute but also relative and international relations are not only multilateral but also bilateral, while undermining Washington's led-liberal order, India is also helping empowering its rival, China, endangering its own security. This behavior is puzzling both strategically (why would New Delhi empower Beijing?) and in what concerns the international order (why would India endanger a liberal order that tends to defend and enhance its regime type?).

Taking this short introduction into account, this paper asks the following question: why is India taking security risks to weaken the American liberal order?

The answer might be in two connected elements identified recently by the *Oxford Handbook of India Foreign Policy*. First, there is very little or almost no theorization on the role of India in international relations (Malone, Mohan and Raghavan, 2015: 8). There are plenty of books and articles about India's foreign policy, but very little has been written on India's worldview and how it relates to the ongoing liberal order. The second reason rests in a more empirical fact: despite being a democracy since its independence, India has little taste for some of the norms and rules advanced and enhanced by a Western-value based international order.

The most common example is New Delhi's rejection of the idea of spreading democracy (Muni, 2009: 4, 18). As it was recently written by a number of influential authors among the Indian elites "we are committed to democratic practices and are convinced that robust democracies are a surer guarantee of reciprocity in our neighborhood and beyond. *Yet we do not promote democracy* or see it as an ideological concept that serves as a polarizing axes in world politics" (Khilnani *et al.*, 2014: 77) (emphasis added). Human rights protection by force and the denial of international legitimacy to states that are not democracies are just two of the ordering principles where India is in disagreement with the United States. As we shall see later, other overarching issues are at stake.

Taking this gap into account (lack of scientific production on India's role in the world) and the idea that India wants to take advantage of its image as a "non-aggressive power" (Khilnani *et al.*, 2014: 12) this paper advances the hypothesis that New Delhi is a more "introverted" democracy if compared with the more "extroverted" character of Washington's foreign policy and international order[4], which precludes a closer relationship among the two states. As such, this paper makes two arguments: the first is that there is a history of tense relations between Washington and New Delhi that is a strong constraint to a deeper understanding between the two states. It is not necessarily (or at least not only) a matter of resentment, or of what Bruce Jones calls an "impulse of rivalry" (Jones, 2014: 4); it is a matter of reciprocity, a fundamental value in the Indian strategic culture.

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4   The terms "introverted" and "extroverted" used here to classify the different character of India and the United States democracy have been adapted from the terminology recently introduced by Madalena Meyer Resende to qualify types of nationalism. "Introverted nationalism" refers to sorts of that are skeptical about supra-national institutions and their beneficial effects on state-building institutions while "extroverted nationalism" refers to those who believe that supra-national institutions are beneficial and positively transformative (see Resende, 2015: 7, 10, 86). Adapted to democracy, these terms should read as the difference between a more contained democracy that excludes a number of interventionist policies from its strategy thinking (introverted) and a democracy that has a more expansionist and interventionist policy in the name of democracy (extroverted). Along the paper, these differences will become clearer.

Even Ashley Tellis, one of the major defenders of a rapprochement between India and America affirms that "any effort to assess the future of U.S.-Indian relations must begin with an attempt to understand weather the fundamental constraints that pervaded the development of close bilateral ties in the past have disappeared irrevocably" (Tellis, 2015: 488). This is telling about an ongoing mistrust that has been fading but is yet to be completely overcome (Ollapally and Rajagopalan, 2012: 83)[5]. Conversely, Indian elites tend to see the liberal international order as harmful to their interests and values as well as for other states that, for one reason or another, have been so far completely or partially excluded from it. If the order was built by the United States and its allies – and India, despite being a democracy did not belong to it – there is a possibility that New Delhi will tend to see the order through the lenses of this non-declared but existent estrangement.

The second argument is that there are different worldviews in Washington and New Delhi, and both are rooted in the history and identity of those countries. Therefore we should expect some problems to arise in India's relationship with the international order. The abundant literature about the relationship between New Delhi and the U.S scarcely covers that fact and the reasons why this problem goes beyond the bilateral relationship and relates to the comprehensive way India sees the liberal international order through the lenses of its own identity. To prove this argument it is necessary to fill, at least partly, the theory gap Malone, Mohan, and Raghavan mentioned, and to focus in trying to understand the relationship of India with the world and, more specifically, with the norms and rules that are accepted by the international community.

These arguments are going to be displayed in four sections. The first is a brief clarification of a number of concepts, indispensable to understand both the international order in its different dimensions, as well as India's role in the international system, especially in the upcoming power transition. The second section presents a model of analysis that will theoretically sum up the components of the problem addressed by this article. As we will see, part of the model regards the relationship between the hegemonic power and other states and the way other states perceive and relate to the international order. The model asks for an empirical analysis that will be the subject of the last two sections, one (the third part of the article) regard-

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5   According to interviews conducted by the author in New Delhi in 2014, there is still a large mistrust among the public opinion over the United States, especially during Democrat administrations. There is a general belief that the integrationist positions of the Democrats lead them to pay more attention to China than to India. The same can be said about the elites. Although there is a younger generation who is more open to the United States, elite interviews showed that the Cold War grievances are still very much present among several academics and policy makers.

ing the American liberal international order and what the United States expects of its international liberal allies, and the other (the forth section of this article) will approach India's "response". This last section looks at India's historical relationship with the United States, its worldview, and consequent evaluation of American international standards.

The paper concludes that the two elements – the bilateral relationship and the perception of the international order – are both causes of India's commitment to contribute to the enhancement of a multipolar international system. However, it will also highlight the security dilemma that India has so far ignored but sooner or later will have face: the fact that its political actions have the collateral effect of empowering China, the most important threat to India's security.

Conceptualizing International Order and Emerging States in Phase One of Power Transition

The international order is usually conceptualized as the set of norms and rules that regulate the relations among states at a giving moment in time. Usually the international organizations of the new international order are built right after deep crisis or wars. The winners negotiate mechanisms that simultaneously perpetuate their power and interest, including the creation of conditions for lasting peace (Ikenberry, 2011: 36). Most authors point out that the attempts to creating such arrangements were the Peace of Westphalia (1648), followed by the Congress of Vienna that generated the Concert of Europe (1815), the very short-lived Treaty of Versailles (signed in 1919), the institutionalized order after World War II (1942-1989), and the post-Cold War American global hegemonic order (1991-ongoing) (see Clark, 2011 and Kissinger, 2014).

In all cases but the last, the states that negotiated the order had win a war, which gave them legitimacy to start a new institutional arrangement, but also made them sit around the table and negotiate, make concessions, adapt to one another, and accommodate. The last case was different: there was a sole superpower that after some indecision opted for a Wilsonian order that it believed was good not only to extend its primacy across time, but also to the humanity in general, once liberalism, the ideology of progress represented by the United States no longer had rivals (Smith 1994: 151) and have proved to be the most conductive to prosperity and happiness. We will get back to this issue on section three. Now, suffice to say that despite the legitimacy borrowed by winning the bipolar conflict, the fact that there was no negotiation opened a new era for the definitions and contours of international order.

Furthermore, the upcoming power transition comes with three novelties. First, there is reason to believe that the United States will not lose its position as a great power (Buzan, 2004: 87). Despite the spectacular economic rise of states like China and India and the fact that Russia's assertiveness has grown recently without much

resistance from other states, Washington is still the most powerful state in a number of aspects, especially in what concerns military power (Nye, 2015: 8).

Second, what is likely to happen is the rise of a few poles of power, none of them a clear winner or loser, with very different visions of what a fair and peaceful order means and with fundamental differences of collective identities. On one hand, "hegemonic war" (Aron, 1966: 70) is much less likely as most of the states possess nuclear weapons, tending to natural deterrence (Waltz, 2009: 87-88); but on the other hand, due to the blurry hierarchy among the states and differences on their ends, order will also be more difficult to negotiate. When should negotiations start? What are the central issues to be discussed besides "hierarchy of prestige"?[6] Which states will sit around the negotiations table? Which conceptions are they willing to make?

This leads us to the third point that will also deserve further discussion along the article: the ongoing liberal international order is highly institutionalized (Ikenberry, 2011: 28). This can have one of two consequences: either accommodation, as the upcoming powers will accept the ongoing order with due accommodation and few changes; or a more difficult power transformation, if the newcomers do not accept the rules of the game and are willing to change them at a very high degree. Destroying and building new institutions is a herculean job. As theory tells us, institutions are hard to change gradually, let alone to transform (Owen, 2010: 57). Therefore, it is likely that a highly institutionalized international order will be harder to negotiate. So far, rising states have actually been using the order's institutions in two ways: to promote themselves (Brazil and India have been claiming for a seat in the United Nations Security Council) or to denounce the American-led order itself (as the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization or the last two Climate Summits in Copenhagen and Paris illustrate).

These new characteristics require more sophisticated definitions of order. Besides distribution of power, institutions and the rules of the game, there are other five elements worth evaluating, as they are to be expected to generate more tension among the superpower and the rising powers of the international system.

The first is legitimacy, *i.e.,* "the authority contract" between the hegemonic power and the states that are going to be ruled (Lake, 2009: 93). As we will see there are different sources of legitimacy according to the United States and the emergent powers.

The second concept is justice, or, in other words, "the principles of right and justice [that] are selected and agreed upon" by the parts and that are going to constitute the core of the hierarchy of states.

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6   This is an expression borrowed from Gilpin (1981: 31).

The third element is states' "worldviews". In the past, this factor was easier to overcome; both in Westphalia and Vienna, international powerful actors would stick to a minimal base of principles that would allow them diversity and pluralism in a number of matters – especially internal (Kissinger, 2014: 12)[7]. The ideological problem would only come in World War II and the end result was the division of the world in two – a Western democratic sphere and a socialist centralized one. There was no further negotiation after the beginning of the bipolar conflict. The end of the Cold War removed ideational issues from the global debate again due to the collapse of one of the competitors. However, the problem of different worldviews is likely to return again due to the differences among the contestants.

Forth is the sense of belonging. As theory tells us, when there is an international order, especially a hegemonic one, some states abide by consent and others are coerced into it (Keohane, 1984: 63; Buzan 2014: 18)[8]. States that feel they belong to the order tend to be more cooperative and less unsatisfied once they become great powers.

Finally, the international order has a dimension an author calls "normative approbation" (Clark, 2011: 104), which basically sums the previous elements. A state may strongly disagree with the principles of the order but it might not be able to change the rules of the game for a long time (being a colony the classical example). As such, the order, both during its formation period and its lifetime, has a *dynamic* nature. It incorporates every states relationship with the hegemonic power, as well as the judgment of the order's norms and rules (that are also not static). But we only tend to remember this dynamics component – that is arguably the most important aspect of the international order – when power starts to shift.

This more comprehensive definition of international order – that entails not only distribution of power, norms, rules and international institutions, but also legitimacy, justice, worldviews, belonging and approbation – is particularly important as we face the rise of what Sean Burges calls "emergent states". An emerging state is one that "does not seem to realize that [it should] be happily (and quietly) joining the liberal 'West' club constructed by the United States. The emerging state does not seem to want to be used to set the current framework of global governance rules

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7   This was the case both of the peace of Westphalia, that had the goal of allowing each state to choose the religious tendency inside their border and Vienna, where states were allowed to have completely different regimes types. In both cases the ordering principle was balance of power. In Westphalia, equal sovereignty allowed these free internal choices. In Vienna, there was a difference between great powers and other states, but internal choices were also respected as long as they did not interfere in states relations.

8   Coercion does not necessarily mean military conflict: it means that some states are not comfortable with the rules of the game but they are not strong enough to change them.

and institutions" (Burges, 2014: 286). However, it does not mean that it wants to tear it apart.

In previous power transitions, the literature used to categorize states in two groups. The *status quo* powers, the ones that wanted to maintain the ongoing order because they were satisfied with it (satisfaction might require accommodation, *i.e.*, the recognition of new great power status, but not the change of the rules of the game). The other category were the revisionist powers, the ones that seek to change the order, as it did not serve their interests and purposes (Hurrell, 2007: 3). Those states would not only be willing to change their position in the distribution of power, they would also want to redefine the social rules of the community of states (Gilpin, 1981: 11).

Today, these classifications are more blurred. For example Randall Schweller sees a finer degree of dissatisfaction, arguing that emerging states can be "spoilers, supporters or shirkers" (Schweller, 2011: 287), or, in an opposite way, Miles Kahler classifies all rising powers as "moderate reformers" (Kahler, 2013: 279). Others authors prefer to study the different roles each rising state would like to play in a changing world (see for example Burges, 2013; Narlikar, 2013). India, despite its repeated rhetoric on democracy has been displaying the will to correct injustices that, in its perspective, the American order brought to its region (but without exaggerated claims of U.S. lack of legitimacy). It believes in sovereignty as the central value of the international system and rejects intromission and intervention of the most powerful states in the system (Bajpai, 2003: 258-259) It also contests liberalism as a necessary condition for belonging to the international society (Hurrell, 2003: 2, 44), and believes, inequality is not only a result of bad internal policies, but of the Western exploitation of developing countries (Gallagher, 2013: 2) among other examples.

In sum, all these authors and their sometimes confusing definitions lead us to another problem: states that are rising might very well be something in between – not revisionist, nor *status quo*. They desire to reform the order to *fit in*, not only in the power politics sense (to be recognized as great powers), but also with what they think is their unique form of contribution to the international order (that they believe they can improve by advancing their particular ideas) helping to create setting that is more fair, just, and encompassing of the desires of other states. India and Brazil fit that model (probably Russia and China are more revisionists): they see the international order as too rigid as only liberal democracies similar to America seen to fit in (Grey, 2000: 1).Therefore they are looking to disrupt it through *soft balancing* (see Paul, 2005) without completely destroying it. They are willing to introducing their own values that better reflect their interests and "foreign policy traditions" (Crandall, 2011: 10).

They are also aware that they are "global swing states" (Fontaine and Kilman, 2013: 93), meaning that the way they (will) choose to conduct their foreign policy (through "taking new responsibilities, free-riding or obstructing") and develop their rela-

tionships with other states is going to have impact in the current liberal international order. Of course, power emphasizes dilemmas that were already underlying states' internal debates. The difference is that currently these "emerging states" start to be pressured by the community of states to make decisions that they were able to postpone when their international status was less prominent. India is one of those states.

Conceptualizing Decision Making Towards the International Order

Both realists and liberals would advise India to join the international liberal order. Among the community of liberal scholars is almost unanimous the claim that the United States would be willing to share power with their fellow democracies (Ikenberry, 2011: 6), especially with India because of its economic and latent power (*i.e.* size and population), and its geographical position (proximity with China) that would make New Delhi the ideal ally to contain Beijing. Actually it is fair to acknowledge that George W. Bush's initiative to bring India into the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2005, as well as Condoleezza Rice's official trip to India, declaring the United States willingness to support India's rise are part of those efforts carried out by the Washington in the previous administration to reinforce the relation between the two states[9] (Baru, 2014: 199; Tellis, 2015: 492).

Furthermore, in theoretical terms, there is a strong belief among American scholars and policymakers that the Democratic Peace Thesis will have an important role in the states relations in the future. According to that theory, applied to power transition, there is almost unanimity in pointing out that regime type is a smoothing factor in power transition, and will direct democratic rising states towards an approximation of one another to preserve the values of the international liberal order[10]. This has been reinforced rhetorically by New Delhi when the BJP was in power (Mohan, 2015: 15). A lead followed by Manmohan Singh (despite strong criticism along the lines of the Congress Party).

However, in practice, India seems reticent to do so, and there are two important reasons to justify New Delhi's choice, which are usually absent from the debate. First is what we call India's "collective identity" (from which regime type is just one of the characteristics). Constructivism develops its main theoretical points over the

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9   Some authors claimed that the rapprochement started right at the end of Bill Clinton's administration, when the U.S. President made an official visit to the country in March 2000, while suspending the sanctions imposed after the Indian nuclear test. However, it was right at the end of his tenure, therefore it is fair to affirm that the President that really tried to build a solid relationship with India was George W. Bush.

10   For a detailed explanation of why the Democratic Peace Thesis might not work in the case of U.S.-India relations see Soller (2014: 12-17).

assumption of states' socialization. Following Alexander Wendt's lead, most authors focus either on mutual co-constitution or on one of the vectors of the "structure-agency" interaction (*i.e.* how the structure influences the state or the state influences the structure) (Mercer, 1995: 230; Wendt, 1999: 26).

However, we believe that there is a privileged role for states' self-image in the creation of their worldviews. Self-identity, "one's conception of who one is and who one is not" (Anderson, 2010: 46), is usually disregarded, but it is critical in debates among elites specially during shocks, as they look for internal references (*i.e.* historical experiences, learning processes, traditions, values, exceptionalism, the founding fathers' views) to make decisions, including to debate a vision of how the international order should look like.

Therefore, and this is the second reason, states strongly use first level of analysis' elements (self-images emerging from internal debates and decisions) to evaluate, on the one hand, the behavior of the hegemonic state(s) (second level of analysis), and, on the other hand, the values that underlie the international order (third level of analysis) they have been subjected to. This evaluation (the dynamic part of the international order) is going to determine the degree of contestation (if any) of the international order. In sum, we can only evaluate satisfaction (and compliance with the order) or dissatisfaction (which entails some degree of revisionism) if we understand how the three levels of analysis interact. To do so, we developed the following model.

India through, its historical experiences, traditions and internal debates (Waltz, 1967: 3) developed a set of collective ideas that by interaction with exogenous factors – chiefly the configuration of regional and international distribution of power – are expressed in its national interests. These experiences also lead to an

understanding of what an international order that is fair and protective of their interests should look like.

Simultaneously those collective ideas are fundamental to evaluate both the hegemonic states' behavior and the international order that together constitute the way India is going to evaluate the international order as a whole. This detail is important inasmuch as one of the most common criticisms that come from New Delhi is the lack of reciprocity of the United States towards India and Washington's use of double standards[11] (depending on the political proximity of the state and/or their own fulfillment of the rules they themselves created). Consequently, there is an overall judgment of the international order *de facto*, (that includes a composite of the perception of the behavior of the hegemonic power and an evaluation of the values, and how they impact India's interests) against the "imagined" order that India finds both more suitable to its interests and more just for the world (according to its internal values). The more approximate the *de facto* order and the "imagined" order are, the most likely is the probability of alignment in context of power transition. The opposite is also true.

What follows is an empirical test of the proposed model. We start by looking at the American-led international order and the expectations developed by Washington concerning other democratic states. Then, we will proceed with an analysis of how India is responding to these expectations.

America's Extroverted Democracy

When it comes to classify the United States as an international power terms as democracy and liberalism come to mind. "Liberalism" is the set of "ideas [the United States] holds about how power should be used" (Legro, 2005: 3). Therefore, despite deviations related to securing vital interests, liberalism provides the ideational framework, the set of "collective ideas" that guides American order building and foreign policy[12].

In what concerns the third level of analysis, (and as a consequence of the first level), the United States created a liberal international order – sometimes referred as American-led international order – that reflects its internal values. Order is always a project with a purpose (Hurrell, 2007: 2) and in the present case, the American

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11 This was a very usual criticism heard during field interviews. Even more pro-American scholars/policy makers in India, identified this as one of the most prominent problems concerning Washington behavior (along with forceful regime change due to imperialistic interests).

12 Other authors use other terms such as "foreign policy tradition" or "political culture" to designate the same phenomenon (Crandall, 2011: 8; Ambrosius, 2012: 7). However, we consider the term "collective ideas" more accurate as it brings us back to the first level of analysis and its expansion to the other levels.

order is based on the "*idea* of a liberal solidarist society of states" (Hurrell, 2007: 5)
(emphasis added) that will in turn, through progress and time become, in its most
ambitious view a "world order of democratic states" (Ambrosius, 2002: 7).

Specifically, when Woodrow Wilson proposed a new world order, he was deliber-
ately rejecting the classical European model of balance of power, while organiza-
tion and advancing a new one inspired on American internal ideological principles
(Cooper, 1983: 270). Since Wilson's Fourteen Points, most elements of the United
States corollary were maintained, some reinforced and some added, contributing to
a certain definition of what it means to be a liberal international actor and how the
liberal international order should be organized (Mandelbaum, 2002: 34).

Woodrow Wilson's view of the world can be summed in four main principles:
national self-determination – that required sovereignty and democratic self-gov-
ernment; liberalization of the world economy; collective security; and progressive
history. These four main principles, according to Wilson and most of his followers
are universal, *i.e.*, they fit the peoples of every nation of the world independently of
their history, cultural, or religious heritage (Ambrosius, 2002: 2).

The logic was the following: an international order based on balance of power had
proved inefficient in preventing war; therefore the international system should be
reorganized according to the United States constitutional principles that enabled its
peaceful prosperity since the Civil War. Those principles were to be reflected in an
international organization – the League of Nations – that would create a framework
for peaceful exchange and favor states' path towards self-determination and
democracy (Soller, 2009: 23). That would lead to the growth of the number of
democracies and consequently the occurrence of war would decline. Wilson was a
firm believer in Kant's vision that democracies do not go to war with one another
and tend to get together in a federation for perpetual peace, due to a number of
similarities that would lead them to defend the same values against putative ene-
mies (Ikenberry, 2008: 10; Mandelbaum, 2002: 67).

These were the principles behind Wilson's plan to "make the world safe for
democracy" and the ideational foundations of what later came to know as *Pax
Americana* (Lind, 2006: 25). The logic was the following: sovereignty (and self-deter-
mination) was dependent on self-government; self-government would lead to the
natural choice of democracy as regime type, once history was moving towards uni-
versal liberalism; and the United States role was to provide the necessary structures
to facilitate this march towards progress (Ikenberry, 2008: 15).

It was implied that the League of Nations was to be based in American values due
to its "unique nature, distinct from European great powers" (Legro, 2005: 61); that,
guided by the U.S. leadership of collective security, it would became "a system
in which all nations in the world, powerful and weak, automatically would unite
to punish any aggression by any country anywhere" as the only way to restore

enduring peace in the international system after World War I (Lind, 2006: 97), while contributing to "end tyranny" when it was on the way of democratic development (Gaddis, 2008: 13). Implicit was the rejection of legitimacy of states that did not share the United States regime type.

After World War II, the United States became the "Liberal Leviathan", to use Ikenberry's (2011) famous and accurate expression. The decline of the European powers after the war brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the top of power politics and soon their rivalry began. This transition and posterior bipolar conflict had two major consequences.

First, the U.S. Western hegemony became highly institutionalized. Franklyn Delano Roosevelt had already developed universal political and economic institutions (the United Nations and its associated agencies, Bretton Woods), continuing Wilson legacy while giving it a pragmatic shift: FDR's order was negotiated with his war allies (Great Britain and the Soviet Union) and China, to make sure that there was a possibility of introducing power politics (the UN Security Council) into an all-American framework of market economy, human rights, and collective security. However, the beginning of the Cold War led President Henry Truman to make an addition to his predecessor's agenda: it was necessary to build a separated peace among democracies (NATO and the permanent security alliance with Japan) and to reinforce the idea of democratic legitimacy (Ruggie, 1996: 38, 40) to face an ideological enemy. The second consequence was a change in the relationships with states outside the permanent alliances spectrum. Since the beginning the of Cold War, the rivals of democracy were no longer states yet to transition to democracy – as in Wilson's time – but Communist states, or states that sympathized with Communism. As we will see in the next section, the Cold War opened a wound in the U.S.-Indian relations that is yet to be completely overcome (Kapur, 2010: 265).

As goes without saying, the United States won the Cold War and the major consequence of the victory was the reinforcement of the liberal international order. Wilsonian principles were further institutionalized in international organizations (Paris, 2004: 3); market economy became the official tool for pushing for democratization around the world; there was a reinforcement of long term commitments among democracies – materialized first and foremost in the enlargement of NATO to the former Warsaw Pact countries (Golgeier, 1999: 57); and the individual became the center of international law, allowing forceful interventions, robust arbitrations, and a considerable number of state-building operations planned under the twin values of democracy and market economy (Paris, 2004: 19). After the end of the Cold War, the United States were a fully "extroverted democracy": the American hegemony was globalized and consolidated along with a radicalization of the liberal values, and the crystallization of democracy as the only legitimate regime type in the world (Collier, 2009: 3).

This was manifested in several ways: one was the development of the "End of History" narrative. Its argument was that the U.S. had defeated all forms of progressive approaches to political affairs and it was a matter of time until democracy and market economy would spread around the globe (Fukuyama, 1992: xi). The liberal version of the theory of modernity (see Lipset, 1960) was rescued, and there was a consensus in Washington that the U.S. should pursue policies to stimulate market openness that would lead to the creation of a middle class ready to progressively demand more freedom (Bacevich, 2002: 101). As the "End of History" became the dominant doctrine, it introduced the possibility for the United States to act openly in the name of those values. Debates on "promoting democracy", "aiding democracy" and "supporting democracy" became widespread (Carothers, 1999; Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000). This narrative also consolidated the idea that America was the model that all democracies should follow (Oren, 1999: 267).

As such, it is not surprising that liberal internationalists became a very preeminent group among decision makers in Washington, introducing a number of changes in the international order. The most important was a normative revolution: state sovereignty was removed from its central place at the heart of international law and replaced by the individual (Badescu, 2011: 20; Paris, 2004: 11). The "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) rule was instituted by the United Nations in 2005, creating a legal framework that allowed interference and even intervention on other states' affairs in case of incapacity (or impossibility) of fulfillment of the social contract.

Convinced that these rules would be generally accepted by any democratic power, welcome to join the "opened" and "flexible" liberal order (Ikenberry, 2011: 20) – a bipartisan commission summed up the necessary attributes to be accepted in a hypothetical league of democracies (yet another incarnation of Wilson's project) for the twenty first century:

> "Membership would be predicated not on an abstract definition of liberal democracy or on the labels attached by states to other states, but rather by the obligations that members are willing to take on themselves. Members would have to: pledge not to use force or plan to use force against one another; commit to holding multiparty, free-and-fair elections at regular intervals; guarantee civil and political rights for their citizens enforceable by an independent judiciary; and accept that states have a "responsibility to protect" their citizens from avoidable catastrophe and that the international community has a right to act if they fail to uphold it" (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006: 26).

This excerpt sums up the ongoing rigidity of what is the expected behavior of a democracy in the international system according to the declining but still hegemonic power. Democratic international actors are expected to maintain and enhance their democratic internal practices while being an example to their neighbors; to

comply with the liberal international order; to open their economies to globalization; to participate in collective security; to accept and participate in the R2P; and to agree with the idea that autocracies are less legitimate actors in the international system (Doyle, 2012: 25).

Two things must be added before we turn to India's reaction. First, the liberal international order had, so far, positive results. It kept the Western democracies cohesive, allowing economic prosperity and a degree of stability (the provision of public goods that Hegemonic Stability Theory mentions widely)[13], and was key to the Western victory in the Cold War.

Second, Barack Obama's administration was a lot less enthusiastic about this surge of liberal internationalism. It does not mean it totally disappeared, as the war in Libya and the Obama Doctrine are evidences of, but the war fatigue, the strategic restraint[14], Obama's penchant for more dialogue and less interventionism are reasons to believe on a less interventionist pattern that might or might not be followed by his successor.

However, this more recent period before Barack Obama, along with tensions during the Cold War, deeply influenced India's current perceptions towards the United States, both in what concerns its overall behavior and the values it imprinted on the liberal international order – in relation to which, India "never fully felt part of" (Stuenkel, 2001: 179). As Hurrell (2006) also describes despite years oscillating between tensions and some sort of neglect, the U.S. seems to expect at least cooperation from India as the regional Asian power. But India's answer to Washington demands has been mixed, to say the least. Many may have benefited with this American Wilsonianism and the United States distribution of public international goods (including India that received international aid in a few moments of its history). But that did come with a price.

India Introverted Democracy

The Bilateral Relations with the United States

The problems started in 1917-1919 when the Indian Liberation Movement realized that President Wilson was not referring to their claims of independence when he pledged for self-determination (Manela, 2007: xxi). That promise was only directed to the Western European states from the dismantled Austro-Hungary Empire. Hopes felt again on the ground when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared more than once his abomination for colonialism, but decided to do nothing about

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13 See for example Keohane (1984) and Gilpin (2001).

14 In the last State of the Union Address in January 2016, the President acknowledged that the world was already multipolar.

it, as he did not want to be hostile to its major allied – Great Britain (Khilnani, 1999: x) – and he believed colonialism was a condemned institution that would fade by itself. It was just a matter of time.

During the Cold War, India started to be seen, almost since the beginning, as one of the frontline sympathizers of the Soviet Union. Nehru claimed repeatedly that the Non-Aligned Movement was a third way for developing countries who did not want to take any side on the bipolar conflict. They could "keep away from power politics of groups align against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may lead again to disasters at an even larger scale" (Nehru, 1946 quoted by Raghavan, 2010: 20). India's choice and leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement as well as its unequivocal preference for a centralized economy (Tharoor, 2002: 77) were perceived as moves against the United States, only to be confirmed by Indira Gandhi's signing of a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1971 (Mansingh, 2015: 106).

From an Indian perspective, the United States struggle against Communism deeply jeopardized India's position both internationally and regionally. Washington did not support India in the United Nations dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, and made an agreement with Islamabad in 1954 that empowered India's neighbor and enemy (Kapur, 2010: 265). Finally, in 1971, Kissinger and Nixon started the *détente* policy with China, leaving India, then the only democracy in the region, and a non-aggressive power, isolated (Tharoor, 2012: 9) and in the verge of a war with Pakistan over Bangladesh.

As such, Indian tends to see the agreement with the Soviet Union in 1971 as the only possible way out of the third Indo-Pakistani War and only possible line of defense from Washington's quasi-alliance with China (Raghavan, 2014: 237). On top of this, the nuclear proliferation problem also caused a number of tensions, especially due to the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Act (NNPA), a bill passed during Jimmy Carter's administration (Chaudari, 2014: 220) and the sanctions imposed by the U.S. after the first Indian nuclear trials in May 1998. As suggested before, tensions alleviated with Bill Clinton's official visit in 2000, which was meant to create the opportunity for a fresh start in the relationship between the "two world largest democracies". George W. Bush followed the lead – due to reasons already explained – but the enthusiasm lowered again in the Barack Obama tenure and the UPA2 administration.

This also explains India's negative reaction when Obama announced the "pivot to Asia" policy – that brought back old fears of intromission and imperialism. Even today, New Delhi tends to see Washington as "the primary imperial power after the Second World War" (Bajpai, 2015: 21) which directly shocks with India's strong notion of "post-colonial sovereignty" (Bajpai, 2015: 24) still very influenced to this day by "a deeply rooted aversion to both colonialism and imperialism" (Ganguly, 2013: 6). Some authors' say that this resentment is fading away, or at least it should

be (Tharoor, 2012: 15) but many still believe that "even 60 years after the end of the British colonial rule, post-colonial rationalizations (…) remain alive" (Ganguly, 2013: 6). This makes India's cooperation with the United States hegemony difficult in many ways.

An Introverted Democracy

Its own comparison with the United States led New Delhi to look for a place in the world where it could still be a democracy (despite its difficult neighborhood and estrangement with the United States) without being forced to follow Washington's footsteps, especially in what concerns promotion of democracy. In other words, as the model predicts, India resorted to its own collective ideas to come up with its renewed worldview.

This led to an internal debate (still ongoing). However, it is already possible to iden-tify a raising narrative around concepts from the past that boasts the endorsement of many among elites around and public opinion (Soller, 2014: 17).[15] First and fore-most, India believes on its ability to become a great power (Khilnani *et al.*, 2014: xxix), with size, structure and political positions to represent many other southern countries' interests through a "mediatory" role, gained by being one of the most heterogeneous nations in the world (Bajpai, 2015: 42). Being a non-aggressive power, India is willing to be regionally predominant (without creating fear and resistance in other states) while using the same concept as a way of legitimizing its more global aspirations. Its peacefulness is also a way of reassuring other great powers that New Delhi will not generate unnecessary conflict and will try to solve any problem that arises through peaceful means.

Second, there is the tradition that started with Nehru's of the almost sacred concept of "autonomy" in Indian foreign policy (sometimes the terms used are "freedom" or "independence"), that dictates that India can never lose its independency of decision making (Tharoor, 2012: 9). As recently reinforced by an author "India maintains a serious preoccupation with autonomy" (Narlikar, 2013: 598). Together, New Delhi's almost pacifist way of relating with other states (Pardesi, 2007: 211) and carefulness of being "not too interventive in the region" (Xavier, 2013: 252), does not preclude the existence of an authoritative role. On the contrary: it gives India a specificity related to off-shore balancing (in a continent of aggressive states) and leadership by example, which creates a relationship with the value of democ-racy that can be translated by an "isolationist stance [that] is often associated with a 'prudent' realist India, a democratic city upon the hill that refuses to impose its democratic regime as an 'advantage' and a 'model'" (Xavier, 2013: 252).

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15 Besides this relative consensus, it is important to remember that India in a *de facto* democracy. Therefore there is dissent and it is impossible to determine if the dissent is going to grow or not.

Therefore, it is not fair to say that India does totally disregard democracy as an international value. It is just a *different* sort of democratic foreign policy. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once wrote "any meaningful solution must be based on principles of *democratic pluralism and inclusivism*, the respect for law and of diversity of states" (Singh quoted by Muni, 2009: 16) (emphasis added). Someone familiar with India's history could easily hear the echoes of Nehru's conception of India as a democratic actor: non-entanglement, and the ideas of "freedom" and "self-respect" (Chauduri, 2014: 68). As such, it is central to acknowledge that when Indian leaders refer to a "democratic order" they mean two things: that each state is free to have the regime type, religion, or culture of its choosing (as long as they do respect other states rights and integrity), and to an international order where all great powers are recognized as such, independently from their regime type. Unlike the United States, it does not mean that democracy is the only legitimate regime type.

Third, India is not demoting itself from its democratic role in the world. But it prefers to lead by example. This is why New Delhi has been developing stronger relationships with other democracies in Asia (such Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Japan) while betting on institutionalizing some democratic values (ASEAN and the Bali Initiative are good examples). At a global level India is founding member of IBSA (with Brazil and South Africa), a consulting mechanism to curtail problems that are common to southern democracies.[16] But New Delhi always acts democratically within the limits of its introversion, imposed, in the past, by the regional and the international systems (for most its history India was surrounded by autocracies, and until recently it was a relatively weak state) and now self imposed.

This behavior has disadvantages. On the one hand, a state that puts so many limits on the use of force (as a normative imperative) might be seen a "passive" (Khilnani *et al.*, 2014: 12); on the other, India's conception of international democracy, expressed in Singh's words, differs considerably from the U.S. conception, precluding the possibility of a strong partnership based on values, between the two states. However, it also has had, so far, a few advantages: despite Indian *de facto* very powerful position in South East Asia, other states, even non-democracies, tend to see it as trustable state, essential to the traditional multi-vector foreign policy in a troubling neighborhood (Xavier, 2007: 5). It can also help multilaterally: instead of allying in a group against another, India found a "distinct break from the motivations of multilateralism in the twentieth century" (Saran, 2015: 624). In other words, one

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16 So far, we believe it became evident that India perceives itself as a southern democracy, with responsibilities of leadership over southern countries. It does not mean automatic confrontation with the West, but the representation of a number of people who had a different history from the United States and its allies.

of the other sides of the coin of autonomy is what an author calls "plurilateral engagements [that] essentially serve to position India firmly within the established order and in some instances at the global high table of governance" (Saran, 2015: 624). These are also "groupings that act as bridge between India's old avatars of NAM and G77 and its new role as an emerging power" (Saran, 2015: 624), which shows again some attachment with its own roots.

Therefore, its democratic but non-discriminatory foreign policy gave India the possibility of being engaged, multilaterally in the world but not entangled to to anyone in particular. India is a democratic international actor, but not in sense of de-legitimizing non-democratic states. Not only for the reasons already suggested – its geographical location in a troubling neighborhood, the advantageous cordial relations with non-democratic states, a particular definition of democracy (different from the United States), and a scrupulous and introverted use of democracy as an international value – but also, and maybe more importantly, the political will of securing autonomy, that is still, and it will likely continue to be – a more important internal/external value than democracy.

An Unfair International Order

Stephen Cohen makes a persuasive link between the first and third problems, related to the perception of the U.S. behavior and the perception of fairness or lack of it in what concerns the international order (expressed in our model): "The United States and India have clearly grown distinct over the years, not only because of the abundant misperceptions on both sides but also because of fundamental differences on the best way of peacefully organize the international system, the nature of the Soviet Union, the virtue (or sins) of alliances, and above all, the degree to each in Indian eyes, the United States resisted India's emergence as a major power" (Cohen, 2001: 287, 288).

A few of the problems are partly solved. In the last State of the Union Address, President Obama declared that the world is already multipolar. The Soviet Union is no longer the U.S. rival. However, other problems, especially in what concerns justice in the international order and the virtue of permanent alliances, are not. As mentioned before, three values (again, inherited from Nehru) underlie India's identity: autonomy, democracy, and pluralism. Those values were learned through the experience of colonialism. Independence generated autonomy, and the leaders of the newborn country chose democracy (as well as secularism and the rule of law) as the basis to create a common framework of equality for the future of the Indian people, immersed, since immemorial times, in religious, cultural and linguistic diversity (Guha, 2007: 103) – hence pluralism is almost natural in the subcontinent. As the model presupposes these internal values have international order equivalents – which India will tend to try to project in the international system, as Kiss-

inger and other classical and neoclassical realists quoted right at the beginning of this article assert. Five values emanate from "autonomy". One of them is international pluralism.[17] Democracy is the best regime for India, and the most desirable one for every country in the world, but all states are entitled to their own model of development and society. Two other values are equality, as every state is entitled to the same rights under international law (therefore, there is a rejection of the America idea that democracy is the basis of legitimacy), which is attached to reciprocity. States are perceived by India in equality of circumstances; the dichotomy New Delhi prefers, to distinguish friends from foes is reciprocity, or, in other words, the way a state behave towards New Delhi, independently of regime type, is going to define their relationship.

Thus, the most important international organization is the United Nations, universal (any state is welcome) but not universalist (in the sense that it does not exclude in terms of regime type), as the UN is the guardian sovereignty (the fourth value emanating from autonomy), which, for reasons already explained, is seen as a central and inalienable right. This also closes the circle of democracy: it is expandable, perhaps, but only to the point it does not interfere with sovereignty. And that, from an Indian perspective, seems that is not up for negotiation.

The last value is pluralism. Being India a heterogeneous nation and subscribing values of negative freedom (see note 15) India believes that exclusionism is not only unfair, but dangerous. It created international institutions that are against Indian interests. It prefers an international environmental regime where great powers do not jeopardize the development of industrializing countries, and it believes that human rights are more secure through sovereignty than through the will of a discretionary power that due to its position in the international system cannot be truly tamed.

As such, the Indian "imaginary" order is multipolar, pluralist, equalitarian (in the Vattelian sense), based on reciprocity and sovereignty. Its introversion and taste for autonomy will tend to make it try to correct the perceived liabilities of the American order, especially its more extroverted incarnation[18].

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17 My research makes me believe that this sort of international pluralism has two origins: one was already mentioned – the inherent pluralism of the Indian society. The other origin is western pluralist liberalism. The Indian Liberation Movement took many its ideas of India from Western Europe where philosophers like Adam Smith, David Hume and Voltaire accepted and enhanced the concept that there was no single way of organizing societies, relaying heavily in the idea of context. These two origins were harmonized into a single concept of pluralism very present in the Indian discourse, policy making, and "imagined" order.

18 For reasons of space it is not possible to discuss the questions related to other international regimes that India dislikes.

Final Notes: Bond to Disagree?

Independently on how the debate is going to turn out, if we look at the model developed in this article and the description of India's response to the U.S. challenges, it is fair to acknowledge that New Delhi is uncomfortable both in its relationship with its the United States (except for a few positive moments described above) and the liberal international order Washington created during and after World War II.

Therefore, it is natural that India will look for its own role in a new world order that allows it at least two things: to try to retain, as a long as possible its profile as an "introverted democracy" (based on its own self-image) that helps its regional relationships and its global multi-vector policy; and to keep on making use of its international influence to stop the United States from being an "extroverted democracy"; that, according to many among Indian elites, jeopardizes Indian interests and specially goes against its most cherished values.

Due to its relative weakness compared to the Washington, New Delhi has actively tried to mitigate the U.S. power in three ways: by aligning with other states, namely the BRICS, to build alternatives to the liberal international order; by using the existing international institutions to contest the United States power (especially norms related to human rights, economic ordering, climate change regimes, or even to stand by states over which the U.S. has reservations, such as Iran); and by claiming India's right of a greater intervention in international policy and norms making, that could be achieved if the international organizations would accept further leadership from the emerging states. The classical example of this position is India's claim of a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

New Delhi's overall goal seems clear: it does not wish to overthrow the United States from the status of a great power in the international system, (the rhetoric of the "two largest democracies" serves India well) but it wishes an international multipolar order where great power can tame one another: New Delhi sees unipolarity as dangerous, as it tends to unleash the hubris of the United States). Furthermore, it is looking for way to influence the values of the international order toward a more pluralist and sovereignist framework.

Putting it simply, the *de facto* order and India's "imaginary" order are not completely divergent. But they are also far from being convergent.

However, if Robert Gilpin is right, this is only the first phase of an upcoming power transition. Therefore, there is much still to decide (including in what concerns India's internal debates, where a new generation of more pro-American scholars is gaining terrain). Furthermore, China's rise will also create and/or deepen a number of questions in New Delhi. As power is relative, weakening the United States-led international order empowers China (India's most dangerous rival) as some analysts have been pointing out, and this is the true downside of

India's policy towards the multilateral dimension of world affairs. It seems to ignore that China is being rewarded by India's behavior. This indicates that the debate about Indian positions in the world is far from being finished, and that shocks, as defined by John Owen quoted earlier in this article, can lead to a rapid change of plans.

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India and China's
'One Belt, One Road' Initiative

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Abstract

India's response to China's 'new Silk Roads' or 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative is a good example of the problems that best the India-China relationship. Neither country has quite managed to put in the effort required to pull their bilateral ties out of the deep freeze of suspicion and distrust that came about as a result of the conflict of 1962. And with China's economic and political rise in addition to its military build-up, doubts about Chinese intentions vis-à-vis India and its South Asian neighbourhood have grown even if India too is growing and gaining economically including through its economic relationship with China.

This article examines the 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative and the reasons why it creates concerns in India. It looks at India's response and the weaknesses of that response before examining two cases of Pakistan and the Indian Ocean in the context of 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative and the India-China relationship.

Resumo
A Índia Face à Iniciativa *'One Belt, One Road'* da China

A resposta da Índia às 'novas Rotas da Seda' ou à Iniciativa da China *'One Belt, One Road'* é um bom exemplo dos problemas que pautam as relações entre os dois países. Nenhum deles ainda logrou empenhar-se num esforço capaz de descongelar as relações bilaterais caraterizadas por suspeitas e desconfianças resultantes do conflito militar de 1962. Com a ascensão económica e política da China, reforçada pelo seu programa de modernização militar, dúvidas crescentes existem sobre as suas intenções face à Índia e aos países seus vizinhos apesar do crescimento indiano, em parte graças à sua relação económica com a China.

Este artigo analisa a Iniciativa *'One Belt, One Road'* e as preocupações que ela gera na Índia. Descreve a resposta da Índia bem como as suas debilidades, antes de examinar os casos do Paquistão e do Oceano Índico no contexto da Iniciativa *'One Belt, One Road'* e o respetivo impacto nas relações Indo-Chinesas.

The modern history of Sino-Indian relations is marked – or marred, perhaps one should say – by the brief border conflict of 1962, now already over 50 years old, and which ended in defeat for India. As the weaker of the two powers – from an economic perspective, in terms of military hardware and acquisitions and seemingly also from the point of view of regional and global political clout – India has been extremely wary in the presence of Chinese foreign and security policy manoeuvres. Things have not been helped either by post-1962 history and close China-Pakistan ties – including the nuclear arming of Pakistan and the reluctance to criticize it for its role in fomenting terrorism in India – and the slow pace of negotiations on the boundary dispute.

Nevertheless, China continues to rise and India too, and the two countries must deal with each other not only the best they can but with a sense of mutual responsibility towards their own populations and the rest of the world. The social well-being and economic prosperity of a third of the world's population is not a light responsibility and requires the two governments to cooperate, if anything, more intensely than they have hitherto in the fields of poverty alleviation, clean energy, infrastructure development, protecting the global commons and the like.

The level of mutual trust required for such efforts however, is far from adequate and China's launch of the *One Belt, One Road* Initiative – an ostensibly economic initiative but with politico-strategic implications writ large – is the latest instance where the two countries have found themselves unable to communicate clearly and effectively for the greater good.

One Belt, One Road Initiative

China's Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the Silk Road Economic Belt (*sichouzhilu jingjidai*) in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013) and the Maritime Silk Road (*haishang sichouzhilu*) during his visit to Indonesia, the following month (Wu and Zhang 2013). The two Initiatives – collectively termed the *One Belt, One Road* (*yidai yilu*, OBOR) – taken together with his declaration of a new neighborhood policy in October 2013 (Xinhua, 2013) – constitute a major Chinese foreign policy initiative. It is designed not just to increase China's influence, but also to put forward a new way of doing business, different from the Western/American approaches, while assuaging fears of an impending Chinese regional and global hegemony.

The OBOR also has a very strong domestic logic. It is in essence a project to transfer abroad China's excess of capital, infrastructure capacity, and polluting industries. China, of course, does not have a choice in the matter given the problems of local government debt due to unsustainable GDP-boosting infrastructure development

over the last decades and the huge environmental crisis it faces today. However, Beijing does have a choice about how and where it will employ its capital and capacity, for there is simultaneously a demand across not just the developing world in Asia, Africa or Latin America but also in the developed world that only China, at the moment, appears both willing and able to meet. In this context, India provides the biggest demand for such Chinese economic investments and infrastructure capacity, anywhere in the world and hence, the OBOR is of no small consequence for New Delhi.

The OBOR, however, is not simply economic in nature but also about converting Chinese economic might into diplomatic and political advantages. Thus, even as China faces international heat on a number of territorial disputes, it has simultaneously tried to engage with its neighborhood and overcome suspicions by promoting people-to-people contacts and media management. Beijing is providing thousands of scholarships to foreign students and sending its media personnel and researchers across the world to learn how it can do better and to construct positive narratives about China.

The OBOR is not a short-term effort and it is designed to be the overarching framework of Chinese foreign policy under the Xi Jinping leadership. It builds on the economic reforms and opening up legacy of Deng Xiaoping and the military modernization, indigenous technological development and strengthening of strategic sectors and enterprises in the economy under his successors. The OBOR is a legacy issue for Xi that will be relentlessly promoted by the Chinese leadership with all instruments at its command. Indifference or opposition, such as the kind that India seems to represent, will likely be viewed in Beijing as an unfriendly act.

However, what exactly is defined as a success under the OBOR and how exactly it will go about achieving it, is probably not clear even to the Chinese. And this is a reality that Indian policymakers and many analysts do not seem to have realized while expressing their concerns and fears about China's initiative.

In other words, the OBOR is not exactly a grand Chinese strategy though it comes pretty close. What the Chinese have done – pushed by structural economic imbalances at home and the need to take charge of reshaping their external environment – is simply displaying both creativity and willingness to take risks by wrapping its national interests in the form of a grand economic plan for its wider neighborhood. This is a plan that can and will change and adapt to the circumstances. Thus, participation in the OBOR also offers opportunities for other countries, including India, to themselves shape Chinese actions and narratives.

The View from New Delhi

India, however, appears to be waiting for greater 'clarity' from the Chinese establishment on what the actual contours of OBOR are – this despite several commu-

nications from Beijing on the subject, including during high-level visits, and if nothing else in Xi Jinping's major statement at the 2015 Boao Forum in Hainan island (Xi Jinping, 2015). Nevertheless, India is not just any country in China's neighborhood and Beijing does not seem to have invested enough effort into convincing Indian policymakers of both China's good intentions and its willingness to see India as an important player in Asia and the world in its own right. For the moment, the impression India gets from the Chinese, especially at academic or think-tank interactions, is that it does not count for much in Beijing's calculations and can be ignored at China and the United States talk shops. This is without doubt reflective of attitudes within China's foreign policy and other top decision-making establishments.

Certainly, India was not consulted by the Chinese when they launched the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road both in India's immediate neighborhood, with the latter at least showing India as part it in maps put out by China's official news agency, Xinhua.[1] However, Liu Youfa, Chinese Consul-General in Mumbai, India, until early 2015, has suggested that it was because the time between policy announcements in Kazakhstan (on the Silk Road Economic Belt) and Indonesia (about the Maritime Silk Road), was too short and hence, it was not possible to hold consultations with India. Yang Jiemian, former head of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies gives a more plausible answer in the form of a question, asking what if the Chinese proposed the new Silk Roads to India, and India said no? He also pointed out that China had also not consulted with Vladimir Putin in Russia before the announcement of the Silk Road Economic Belt.[2]

Whether or not there was any intention to consult India, this backs other accounts by Chinese scholars who say that they were by and large taken by surprise by these major initiatives announced by President Xi Jinping on foreign soil. In any case, Liu insists that when the Chinese meet Indian policymakers, OBOR is definitely an item on the agenda. This stands in contrast to what Indian foreign ministry officials themselves say – that the Chinese have not discussed OBOR with India in any substantial manner. It might be the case that both sides are correct – the Chinese raise the subject but are unwilling or unable to provide any more details on an Initiative that they think is still a work in progress.

Why however, should China consult India or anybody else on what is after all its own initiative and which remains open for others to join if they wish to? The fact that the Chinese are trying to defend themselves on this question might be a case of

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1 For a copy of the map see Dickey (2014).
2 Both these statements were made at a conference in Shanghai titled, *The Political Economy of China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia* at the East China Normal University, in mid-November 2015.

their trying to give the impression that they are solicitous of the concerns of other countries, especially major powers like India, when, in fact, they are not and would have gone ahead with the Initiative one way or the other. And despite the Indian foreign ministry's grouses, it needs to be noted that India did join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, another Chinese initiative on which, too, it was likely not consulted prior to the announcement.

China's Reinterpretation of History

At the moment, the view from New Delhi is that China's OBOR Initiative is about consolidating Chinese leadership in the region, particularly in opposition to the United States. Thus, there are questions in India when China stresses both greater economic integration with the neighborhood and its determination to defend its 'core interests'. The latter, referring to issues of sovereignty and territory, is, of course, a normal consideration for all countries, including India, but China's formulations at the moment are not entirely free of ambiguities about the use of its greater economic and military might vis-à-vis its smaller, weaker neighbors. Together, these developments seem to constitute the beginnings of a form of Chinese hegemony, what this author has called elsewhere, a new form of *tianxia* – an ancient Chinese concept that placed China at the centre of the universe and all the rest of the world under it in an order of hierarchy.[3] Indeed, this Chinese historical conception appears more appropriate to understanding China's foreign policy intentions – political, military and economic – than what the expression, 'Silk Road', can convey.

From a historical perspective, the 'Silk' in the Silk Roads while referring to a Chinese product should not lead to the interpretation that the road itself was Chinese. This is far from being historically true but this reality is generally elided in Chinese conferences on the subject. In fact, it was the many ethnic groups of Central Asia and West Asia who constituted the trading communities linking China with the rest of the world, carrying European, Indian and West Asian products to China and Chinese products to other regions (Silk Routes.net., n.d.). It also needs to be remembered that cotton from India has an equally long history of being traded along the ancient trade routes as silk, if not even longer. While it is well-known that the name 'Silk Road' was originally coined by the German explorer Ferdinand von Richthofen only in the late 19th century less known is the fact that his explorations and studies also covered the spread of Buddhism from India into China along these Silk Roads (Waugh, 2007). Thus, China's modern reconstitution of the Silk Roads cannot stay true to their legacy if its government does not acknowledged that they were

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3   For more on this framework for explanation of China's OBOR strategy, see Jacob (2015).

also both a means and a metaphor for the exchange of ideas and dialogue between peoples and communities, and heavily involving India, too. In fact, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has laid stress on this cultural dimension of Sino-Indian ties, including the Buddhist connection during his interactions with Chinese leaders. This might constitute one kind of Indian response to the OBOR, even as Modi visited Xian – considered the start of the ancient Silk Road – during his first state visit to China as Prime Minister in May 2015.

Similarly, the historical basis that Chinese commentators seem to find for the Maritime Silk Road might not be all that sound or at the very least might just as well be true of other nomenclature for ancient maritime routes. For example, the Maritime Silk Road might just as well be called the Maritime Spice Road, referring to Indian products that also found transport to distant markets in China, Southeast Asia and Europe in history. Here too, it was mainly Arab and Indian traders who connected China and Southeast Asia with India, West Asia and Africa in the past.

Clearly, the OBOR initiative offers huge potential for cooperation between China and India and for the two countries to develop their relations with third countries. The question for New Delhi is simple – how willing is China to acknowledge India's historical role and influence in the areas it now seeks to service through the OBOR initiative? How capable is China of understanding Indian interests and sensitivities on both the Asian landmass and in Asian waters? The 'Asian Century', after all, will have to be one in which both India and China have to work together – and not just with each other but also together with their neighbors – to establish, if it is to be truly a source of peace, development and prosperity for its peoples.

Indian Responses

While there are important voices in India arguing for its participation in the OBOR, whether actively or by picking and choosing those projects that suit its national interests (Saran, 2015), the Indian government has, by and large, remained aloof and reticent on the OBOR. In fact, India has had widely differing responses to the OBOR and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which the Chinese consider very much part of their OBOR framework – a cold shoulder to the former and a founding member in the latter.

First, the justification given in New Delhi is that unlike the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which displayed a specific purpose, utility and structure, the OBOR seemed to possess more form than substance or clear objectives, there was little against which it could be compared or measured. This distinction forgets, of course, the fact that even the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank appeared to not have been very warmly welcomed by New Delhi – it sent only a middle-ranking bureaucrat to the first meeting of the founding members which was otherwise attended by ministers and heads of state (The Indian Express, 2014).

Further, Indian policymakers might also ask themselves what is to become of the BRICS New Development Bank set up in 2014 and for which they fought long to create mechanisms to balance China in the decision-making process, and which presently has an Indian as its head sitting in the headquarters in Shanghai. The BRICS nations, including even far-away Brazil, are also members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, possibly undercutting the relevance of the BRICS bank.

Next, waiting for greater clarity on an initiative that the Chinese have spared no effort to promote since 2013, speaks of laziness, at best or an inability to comprehend the scale of Chinese ambitions, at worst. If India's diplomats and analysts were really watching closely and participating in the numerous conferences the Chinese themselves were organizing on the subject, they should have figured out sooner that the Chinese were not going to let the ball drop on OBOR. Indian indifference or churlishness should simply not have been an option.

Third, given how the Chinese were going about literally rewriting or modifying history to create a positive narrative about the 'new Silk Roads', Indian observers should have understood faster the seriousness of the Chinese project and the need to respond to it quickly. Coming from a great civilization themselves and as inheritors of long history of trade and cultural contact with the other countries, it is only India that can challenge the Chinese narrative of the 'Silk Roads' being exclusively Chinese and its ignoring of the contributions made by other ethnic groups and civilizations.

The Indian response, such as it has been, can perhaps be explained as the result of a vicious cycle of its own making.

There simply are not enough Indian diplomats and analysts watching China full-time. Area and foreign language studies are famously underfunded in India. At least a decade's worth of committees and plans to expand the Indian Foreign Service have yielded little or no gains. India's Ministry of External Affairs is 4,000-odd strong of which only less than a quarter are actually of the Indian Foreign Service officer cadre. Lateral entry of experts from both within and outside the government remains limited or actively opposed.[4] India is, therefore, unable to act and respond quickly, leave alone come up with initiatives. This inability is then covered up by suggesting that the Chinese are not to be trusted, that India has nothing to gain from their plans, and so on. In the process, India loses the opportunity to challenge and/or influence the Chinese agenda.

Meanwhile, India's project Mausam Initiative which has been touted as a strategic response to China's OBOR (Parashar, 2014) is in fact, merely a cultural outreach

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4   By contrast, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is presently some 6,000 strong has plans to expand to about 15,000 by 2020. It is also far more open to integrating military officers, scholars and other experts from outside into diplomatic activities and missions abroad.

programme begun in mid-2014 focused on archaeological surveys and digs in the Indian Ocean littorals (Press Information Bureau, GoI, 2014).

Another problem currently might be that the BJP's historical and cultural agenda is largely directed inwards rather than outwards; even directing it at non-resident Indians abroad counts as an inward-looking agenda. Further, reinterpretations of history do not always find traction outside a country's borders where other competing narratives exist. China, too, faces this problem but has managed to deal with it by a nimble-footed reliance on backing its attempts with economic largesse in its neighborhood and because India has not yet offered challenge. For instance, India's own great maritime traditions under the Pallava and Chola dynasties of its south, could challenge China's Maritime Silk Road narratives in Southeast Asia. But this maritime history is something that even educated Indians are largely unaware of.

OBOR and India's South Asian Neighbourhood

The OBOR initiative has several implications for China's immediate neighborhood that includes India. The Silk Road Economic Belt connecting China with Central Asia and onwards to Europe with Xinjiang at its core is of a piece with similar initiatives such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Along all three economic corridors India is a directly or indirectly influential presence. In the case of the BCIM Economic Corridor, India is a formal member. It needs to be noted however that while the Chinese have now placed the BCIM Economic Corridor within the OBOR framework, the Indians do not see it as such. The CPEC meanwhile, will inevitably have to develop and draw on connections with the large Indian market in order to reach its full economic potential.

It would seem to be the case that China's poorer, weaker neighbors whose economies are rather closely tied to that of the Chinese or hoping to develop such ties – including India's neighbors in South Asia – or those countries that are too far away to feel threatened by China's foreign policy goals are more easily persuaded than India by China's foreign policy rhetoric on the OBOR. China's diplomats and scholars use figures for trade volumes and potential increases that come from doing business with China under the OBOR while also subtly and not so subtly conveying messages about American hegemony in the neighborhood and its proclivity for conflict and how Chinese presence would be completely different in nature, or 'win-win' as they put it. The picture fits in also in the South Asian context where its neighbors view India as the hegemon. Issues such as trade deficits these countries run with China or cheap and defective Chinese goods are brushed away as phenomenon that will disappear as economic linkages with China grow and it scales up its economic structure to enter higher-end manufacturing and adopts more environment-friendly policies.

In this regard – and with significant implications for India – it is possible that the near unseemly haste with which China announced its huge US$46 billion investment package in Pakistan under the rubric of the CPEC is as much a marketing ploy as it is about a strong Sino-Pak relationship. In other words, China needed a showcase nation that could be a test-bed for its OBOR in action while also being capable of suppressing domestic dissent and providing fast clearances for projects. A few projects in Pakistan quickly completed or properly advertised as being successful will also give the impression that if the Chinese can do this in a country as unstable and insecure as Pakistan, imagine what they could do in countries with greater stability and better governance.

The other significant area of operation of the OBOR that India is watching cautiously is the maritime dimension. The Maritime Silk Road has, like its land-based counterpart, sought to bring in existing sea routes and connections under its single rubric and in effect, provides additional reasons for China's ever-expanding maritime presence. While statements emanating out of China that the Indian Ocean was 'not India's ocean' are not new, they seem to have picked up in tempo and volume since the announcement of the Maritime Silk Road.

The following sub-sections will look at Pakistan and the Indian Ocean in more detail from the perspective of OBOR and the India-China relationship.

Pakistan

Pakistan's infrastructure currently is woefully inadequate and its economy short of maturity to develop and provide the returns that Chinese investors seek. Even if political stability through economic development within Pakistan were the objective, this could be achieved much faster and sustainably through an opening up to the Indian economy. Pakistan could thus avoid the roundabout and wasteful current situation of routing Indian imports through third-countries instead of receiving them directly over its land borders and direct sea links with India. As Pakistan's Minister of Finance and Revenue Mohammad Ishaq Dar has himself noted while praising China's Silk Road projects, 'international trade is the only option to sustain economic growth and development' (Zhang, 2014). At least one Pakistani commentator has, in fact, conflated the Silk Road Economic Belt with a 'China-Pakistan--Afghanistan-India Economic Corridor' and the Maritime Silk Road with the 'China-Myanmar-Bangladesh-India sea route' (Abrar, 2015). According to official Chinese sources, too, the Silk Road Economic Belt through Xinjiang and Central Asia is seen as having a population of 'nearly 3 billion' (see for example, Deng, 2013) and therefore, must also include India in its calculations. It seems clear thus, that the Chinese government and its state-owned and private enterprises must see the benefits of including India as part of any long-term and sustainable Silk Roads strategy.

China, more so than India, seems to have understood the fact that while Pakistani state institutions necessary for public welfare are weak, those facets that are capable of creating regional discord and instability have always been and continue to remain strong. This reality damages not only Indian security interests but potentially, also Chinese national interests. It has therefore, through the CPEC tried to reorder priorities in its 'all-weather' friendship with Pakistan. Can New Delhi afford to be any less ambitious?

India must also recalibrate its own approach to the Sino-Pakistani relationship. Indeed, the new turn in China-Pakistan ties under the rubric of the OBOR/CPEC is something that puts pressure on New Delhi to initiate breakthroughs in its own policy towards Pakistan and in this sense, the Chinese might be doing India a favor. Indeed, Prime Minister Modi's stopover in Lahore *en route* to India from Afghanistan in late December – the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister in 11 years and something arranged at short notice and in great secrecy (The Times of India, 2015) – might also be interpreted at least partly as being the result of a need to respond to China's creativity and risk-taking.

For Beijing to give greater weight to Indian concerns and to stop deferring to Islamabad, India must also be seen by both the Chinese and the Pakistanis as being reasonable and accommodating. New Delhi could start by dialing down its noise on the fact that the CPEC passes through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Instead, Prime Minister Modi could, without prejudice to India's position on Kashmir, cultivate important constituencies in both neighbors by declaring his government's openness to connecting the Indian economy with the CPEC.

While neither the Pakistanis nor the Chinese have given any indication that they are interested in such a possibility, China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) will certainly be looking for quicker returns than the Pakistanis can provide. Chinese SOEs are a politically powerful interest group within the CPC and under pressure at home both from the anti-corruption drive as well as turbulence in the domestic economy. Going abroad is therefore, an escape in more ways than one and despite Sino-Indian tensions, they are aware that the Indian market is the real prize in China's much vaunted '*One Belt, One Road*' Initiative.

Pakistan then remains an opportunity for India that can be mediated through China's OBOR. An improving Sino-Indian relationship expands the definition of 'strategic goods' for the Chinese in their relationship with the Pakistanis from just deliverables on the military side.

However, there is another implication of the above discussion on the possible Chinese motivations for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, namely that the Chinese might not have infinite patience for Pakistan. Yang Jiemian has, in fact, noted the need on the Chinese side to show results 'immediately'. The Chinese scholar Shi Yinhong, meanwhile, has remarked that Chinese SOEs, in fact, 'secretly worry about

profits'[5] in Pakistan suggesting that they are there under central government duress. All told, Beijing probably realizes that the CPEC by itself cannot change Pakistan's domestic security situation any time soon and so a few key or prominent projects done, they might decide to get out of Pakistan or more likely go slow or halt CPEC projects citing security problems. They, however, cannot be blamed for not trying.

If this is the case, then both New Delhi and Islamabad have cause to be worried. India, because Pakistan's stabilization is a long-term effort and can only benefit Indian interests. Pakistan, because this is another opportunity lost to place economic development and social stability at the heart of the Pakistani state's primary goals as opposed to fomenting terror and instability outside its borders. The Chinese have nothing to lose for now from a continuing cycle of Indo-Pak confrontation over issues of religion or territory which is exacerbated because of under-development and thus also the lack of domestic credibility for Pakistani rulers.

This realization however should also push both India and Pakistan to talk to each other more and see if they cannot create a virtuous cycle in which stability in their ties and promotion of economic exchanges, allow Pakistan to concentrate on improving security at home and thus, keeping the Chinese interested in the CPEC. It might be noted here that at least one Chinese scholar has stated that it was not the case that China did not want to connect the CPEC with India but that it feared that India would not be welcoming of the Chinese suggestion or initiative.[6] Another Chinese scholar also suggested that it India also had the opportunity to upgrade the quality of the CPEC initiative.[7]

The Indian Ocean

The Maritime Silk Road from China to its west is envisaged as touching important Indian cities on its way to West Asia and. In addition, of course, Southeast Asia through which the Maritime Silk Road will first traverse before entering the Indian Ocean is an area of long-standing historical and cultural ties to India in addition to ever-growing political and economic linkages. While New Delhi makes no claim to the Indian Ocean being India's ocean, the Maritime Silk Road will inevitably depend on Indian resources for order and protection if it is to function smoothly, safely and successfully.

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5   Both remarks were made a conference in Shanghai titled, *The Political Economy of China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia* at the East China Normal University, in mid-November 2015. Shi's views were echoed by another Chinese scholar at a conference in New Delhi, involving the India's National Maritime Foundation and China's Academy for World Watch held in New Delhi on 30 November 2015.

6   At a discussion at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies on 27 November 2015.

7   At a discussion at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies on 27 November 2015.

Meanwhile, China is clearly looking to develop a two-ocean presence as part of its ambitions of being a global superpower. To this end, a robust presence in the Indian Ocean is *sine qua non* for China and Beijing realizes that the island countries of Sri Lanka and the Maldives will be crucial cogs in this strategy. In fact, given Pakistan's problems and the CPEC long gestation period, it is likely China's multiple smaller--scale projects in the islands might be the more serious long-term threat to Indian interests. One could well ask if the CPEC is not merely a Chinese feint to draw attention away from its more significant actions elsewhere.

Indeed, Sino-Sri Lankan and Sino-Maldivian maritime cooperation must cause the Indian government some considerable anxiety. The sudden appearance of a Chinese submarine at Colombo in September 2014 followed by another one some weeks later caused consternation in New Delhi (Aneez and Sirilal, 2014). To a specific question asking him to explain the presence of Chinese submarines in Sri Lanka, Yang Jiemian put forward four reasons – anti-piracy, countering terrorists and extremists, dealing with natural disasters and because China needed 'to build up our naval forces along with the general development of our economy' – in that order. Yang specifically mentioned the case of how the terrorists responsible for the Mumbai 26/11 attacks came through the sea.[8] However, it is not clear what role actually submarines would play in the case of the first three objectives; most Indian and foreign naval experts at least are dismissive of these reasons for a Chinese submarine presence in the Indian Ocean. This is not to say that the last reason is not valid but the order in which the reasons were presented gives rise to doubt about China's true intentions as it promotes the Maritime Silk Road in India's neighborhood.

Meanwhile, in July 2015, the Maldives passed a constitutional amendment making it legal for foreigners to buy land. Earlier, foreigners could only lease land up to 99 years. Moreover, under the new amendment, foreigners who wish to purchase land must invest over US$1 billion and 70 per cent of the land should be reclaimed from the sea (South China Morning Post, 2015).

While the Maldives has the right to attract large-scale foreign investment to promote its economic development, the new law also fits in neatly with capabilities that China more than any other country at the moment possesses in ample measure. For instance, China has both private individuals and enterprises – including state-owned ones – that possess the kind of money to meet the conditions set by Male. Further, given Chinese expertise at reclamation – note the rapid pace of reclamation by Chinese vessels in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, for example – the reclamation clause is practically an open invitation to the Chinese to take

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8   At the conference titled, *The Political Economy of China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative and South Asia* at the East China Normal University, 20 November 2015.

possession of territory in the middle of the Indian Ocean even if Male will exercise sovereignty. Conveniently, such infrastructure development also happens to be part of the OBOR strategy of promoting regional economic development.

There is a point of view that the Chinese People's Liberation Army has not been very involved in the formulation of the OBOR strategic initiative and that, at least for the moment, it is largely an economic initiative albeit with important diplomatic goals and potential political consequences. Nevertheless, if one takes into account the history of China's expansion of its interests, as in the case of its gradual deployment of combat troops in UN peacekeeping operations, its movement from simple territorial claims in the South China Sea to active patrolling and construction activity there and, from saying it would not ever seek military bases overseas, its acquisition of a supply outpost in Djibouti (Perlez and Buckley, 2015), reasons will be found soon enough for the People's Liberation Army to be involved in OBOR in the name of safeguarding national security and development interests. In fact, there appears to be a mutually reinforcing relationship between China's anti-piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean and the Maritime Silk Road strategy.

From the Indian point of view, it is well understood that China has a right to use the Indian Ocean for peaceful purposes just like any other nation. The Indian military establishment has an open mind on, and even welcomes, greater Chinese participation in the provision of public goods such as in the case of the anti-piracy operations. However, lack of transparency or of adequate justification on issues such as the submarine visits to Sri Lanka or Pakistan throw a spanner in the works as far as building trust on China's Maritime Silk Road specifically and OBOR in general, goes. It needs to be noted further that the maritime dimension is an area that involves two armed services that have hitherto had no history of conflict or confrontation and therefore could be a useful opportunity for a fresh start in India-China relations. However, the fact is that India and China have been talking of holding a maritime dialogue since 2012 but this has yet to see the light of day some three years later. This in turn suggests that the two countries prefer to let suspicion rule rather than creating a better understanding of each other's sensitivities in the maritime domain.

Conclusion

It is often difficult to ascertain whether any country has a grand strategic vision that animates its foreign policy but China's 'new Silk Roads' Initiative might be the closest to such a strategic blueprint. It is a foreign policy project of a scale and scope unlike any other that China has hitherto undertaken.

Responding to concerns and criticism over OBOR from India or the developed West, China has naturally highlighted its economic benefits but it has also not been shy of suggesting these countries have hegemonic intentions and pointing out their

failures of policy and propensity to create conflict in different parts of the world. The Chinese argue in the case of India that it does not have the capacity to drive forward even its own internal infrastructure development and so why should New Delhi object to Chinese investments elsewhere in South Asia?

This Chinese assertion is not far off the mark – it is doubtful that Indian enterprises have the capacity to plug into the Maritime Silk Road even if they wanted to, since India in reality falls short sometimes even in the basic infrastructure and logistics required to support them. While China's rise has been led by or supported by its SOEs, in India's case, traditionally there is very little support that the government and India's largely private sector have provided each other. Sometimes, like Chinese SOEs, Indian public sector enterprises have, in fact, to be dragged in most unwillingly into difficult areas even if the country's strategic interests demand it, but unlike the former, Indian public sector enterprises have even less incentive to see opportunities in far-away lands. The Chinese appear to be aware of this reality as also of the structural weaknesses of India's foreign policymaking establishment.

It is evident then that India faces a new strategic challenge in its relations with China with the latter's OBOR Initiative. Given the reinterpretation, rewriting even, of historical facts that China's OBOR Initiative involves, India is wary of joining in. However, given also the potential of the Chinese initiative to transform the economic, and possibly, the political landscape of Asia, it must seriously consider if staying out is an option. Rather, despite its shortcomings in terms of capabilities and resources, or perhaps because of them, it becomes all the more imperative that New Delhi both engage and balance China and, attempt to influence and shape Chinese responses. This is a role, many Asian nations are actually hoping India will play.

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Evolving Symmetries in Asian Economy: India's Chances and China's Stakes

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Abstract

The economic growth of India has been consistent since last two decades when it decided to open up the economy further and de-regulate the state control over key areas of economy. Though a few schools of thought compare the 1991 reforms of India with that of China's 1978 'opening up', with less doubts at both instances, 'crisis' forced a rethinking of the development strategy. The Indian opening up was triggered by more economic reasons than political, which was the case in China. Over two decades of economic reforms and experiments have made India's economic policies more robust and scaled better, even better than the Chinese economy. In terms of growth rate and new start-ups, the Indian industries are cruising at a phenomenal speed.

The comparative literature on the India-China economy and debates such as 'Can India overtake China' hold no ground in the present context when India has mature economic policies as China is looking for more opportunities in India to grow. India's growth is in favor of China and the more the policies of Indian economy remain open and progressive for foreign investors, it is in China's advantage. The recent slowing down of Chinese growth and its policy of internationalization can well be explained in the emerging economic symmetries in Asia.

Resumo

Simetrias Envolventes na Economia Asiática: As Possibilidades da India e as Apostas da China

O crescimento económico da Índia tem sido consistente nas últimas duas décadas quando decidiu liberalizar a sua economia, reduzindo o controlo estatal sobre áreas-chave. Ainda que várias escolas de pensamento comparem com poucas dúvidas as reformas efetuadas na Índia em 1991 com as da China em 1978, a 'crise' forçou a um reequacionamento das estratégias de desenvolvimento. A abertura da Índia foi espoletada mais por fatores económicos do que políticos, como foi na China. Duas décadas de reformas económicas e experiências tornaram as políticas económicas da Índia mais robustas e com maior e melhor escala, mesmo se comparadas com as da China. Em termos de crescimento e de *start-ups*, as indústrias indianas estão agora numa velocidade de cruzeiro que é deveras impressionante.

A literatura comparativa sobre as relações económicas Indo-Chinesas e os debates como 'Pode a Índia Ultrapassar a China' não têm suporte no atual contexto no qual a Índia apresenta políticas económicas mais maduras, onde a China procura explorar oportunidades de investimento. O crescimento económico da Índia favorece a China e quanto mais as políticas económicas de Nova Deli forem progressivamente liberalizadas e se tornarem ainda mais recetivas ao investimento externo, maiores serão os benefícios para Beijing. Neste contexto, a desaceleração do crescimento chinês e a sua política de internacionalização podem muito bem ser explicadas pelas emergentes simetrias económicas da Ásia.

In 2016, China will launch its 13th Five Year Plan and complete the procedure to become the premium currency by being a part of IMF's SDR basket of currencies. It may mark the conclusion of talks related to Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where the Chinese are leading the discussion and moderating the negotiations among the prospective member countries and also the attainment of full membership at WTO with the recognition of a market economy. The year ahead would also mark China's struggle to look for stakes around its neighboring regions to transfuse its own growth. The slowing down of its GDP rate indicates that the country would grow slower over the next decade.

On the other hand, the Indian economy is keeping Asian hopes high by cruising at a modest rate, rather competitive than China's. Even if the Indian economy grows slower as per the projections by global rating agencies such as Fitch and Moody's, often well below the state's projections, the growth rate would be better than China (Mehra, 2015). 2016 would witness India's growth surpassing that of China's 7 percent growth (NBS, 2015). India with its upward growth offers a vast number of opportunities for the world economies, including China, to find complementarities and benefit from this upward swing. As China learns to lay low, India offers the best of opportunities.

1991 Reforms and India's Early Attempts to Develop Economic Complementarities

As far as the policy augmentation is concerned, India introduced market oriented reforms in 1991 with its own characteristics but the policy reviews in the earlier years made the growth look evenly transplanted throughout the sectors (Virmani, 2005). The external and internal borrowing that supported the fiscal expansion was unsustainable and culminated in a balance-of-payments crisis in June 1991, which however, the government turned the crisis into an opportunity. Instead of reversing the course of liberalization, the government launched a truly comprehensive, systematic, and systemic reform program (Panagariya, 2004). As a result, India is often termed as a latecomer to economic reforms (Ahluwalia, 2002) but following the swift decisions during the tenure of the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, India pursued a successful recovery and followed a 'gradual' but convincing liberalization process and economic uptrend. Since 1991, India's GDP has quadrupled, its forex reserves increased from US$ 5.8 billion to US$ 316.31 billion (The Hindu, 2014) and exports from US$ 18 billion to US$ 360 billion (NDTV, 2014). In 1991, India's GDP growth vis-à-vis China was non-competitive and the economy had less to offer to the investors who sought reforms in industrial and trade policies, liberalizing of foreign direct investment and the infrastructure development. In 1990-91, India's real GDP recorded 5 percent of growth which hovered around 5.7 percent per annum throughout the decade of 1990-1999 but accelerated further

to 7.3 percent per annum in 2000s. Similar to the growth-led economies around the world and in the neighborhood East Asian countries, post-1991 economic growth featured acceleration of industry and services sector at the cost of agriculture.

To note, some of the complementarities which the Indian economy engaged in creating throughout the 1990s include abolition of import licensing, the trade policies which were introduced with the aim of accentuating competition in the industrial structure that had become highly inefficient under a protective trade policy (Ahluwalia, 2002). Moreover, the tariff rates were brought under control and made more trade friendly. Although the existing rate of tariff is not considerably lower than the other developing countries, it is significantly lower than the level of 1990. For example, between 1991 and 2004, under the liberalized regime, the quantitative restrictions over imports of manufactured products, especially consumer goods and agricultural products, which were about 90 percent before the economic reforms (end-1990), were finally removed on April 1, 2001 (Virmani *et al.*, 2004; Ahluwalia, 2002; Panagaria, 2004). Moreover, the import-weighted average tariff rate on manufactured products was progressively reduced from 72 percent in 1990 to 24.6 percent in 1996-97 and further brought down to mere 15 percent in 2004. But the present average applied tariff of 12.4 percent is still high compared to China's 7 percent (Sarkar and Patrick, 2015). During 1990–91, the highest tariff rate stood at 355 percent, the simple average of all tariff rates at 113 percent, and the import-weighted average of tariff rates at 87 percent (Panagaria, 2004). As a result, India's trade with countries like China grew from dismal to billions within a short span, especially after 2001.

Liberalizing foreign direct investment was another important part of India's economic reforms, driven by the belief that this would increase the total volume of investment in the economy, rally production technology, and increase access to world markets. Hence, the de-licensing of investment and FDI was as critical as tariff liberalization. The restrictions on FDI and portfolio investment were eased with regular intervals. But it was not until 2001 that the government decided to allow 100 percent foreign investment in several industrial sectors (Srinivasan, 2001). According to the noted economist and present Vice Chairman of NITI Aayog of India (National Institution for Transforming India Aayog)[1], Arvind Panagariya, the FDI and foreign investment was crucial for India's stellar growth, as it happened in China's case. Panagariya further argues that the differences between India and China on this front are noticeable: FDI into China rose from US$ 60 million in 1980 to US$ 3.5 billion in 1990 and then rocketing to US$ 42.1 billion in 2000. On the other hand, even though China was slower in opening its market to portfo-

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[1] The Union Government of India announced the formation of NITI Aayog on 1 January 2015 to replace Planning Commission.

lio investment, inflows quickly surpassed those into India after the opening, reaching US$ 7.8 billion in 2000 (Panagariya, 2004). The response of FDI to India's policies was relatively modest between 1991 and 2000.

While the economic reforms of 1991 forced India to look for economic engagement with the outside world, major world economies also looked at India as a potential growth-led economy with underperformance and sub-optimal use of its potentials (Kronstadt and Morrison, 2004). On the external front, the major policies which were launched post-1991 were aimed at cultivating extensive economic and strategic relations with the neighboring countries as well as great powers. Although, the trade relations started gaining momentum after the gradual reforms were launched in trade and investment policies in the 1990s, India had to create a space when the East Asian economies and China were at the centre of global economics. The economic policies had to be appended by more liberal trade and investment policies along with overhauling of foreign policy priorities. Initiated in 1991, India's '*Look East Policy*' mirrored evolving strategic views and shift in India's perspective of the world. The consecutive central governments supplemented this forward looking policy with more pro-active policy initiatives which included Indian Prime Minister's visits to the major economic powers in Asia Pacific, including China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Singapore. Moreover, India's recognition by ASEAN as an important dialogue partner in 1992.

Another striking feature of India's geo-economics was its growing economic outreach in the world. The Indian state not only revised the inbound investments but also let the outbound investments grow. More than the policy directives, with the liberalization in capital account and India's increased participation at multi-lateral forums, the outward FDI started to increase in the mid-1990s. The intensification of these reforms during the first term of Manmohan Singh led to a surge in outflows since 2005 following a significant capital account liberalization. With the reforms in outward investment, Indian businesses ventured in new geographies. Measures, such as removal of foreign exchange restrictions on capital transfers for acquisition of foreign ventures by Indian firms, have in particular boosted outward FDI from India. India's share in total developing economy FDI outflows remained below 0.5 percent throughout the 1990s, but increased consistently since 2005, reaching 3.8 percent in 2011 (EXIM Bank of India, 2014). The Indian businesses' interest in the international market been aptly supported by the foreign policy decision by the government. The policy planners emphasized developing multi-faceted relations ranging from political, strategic to economic and commercial. The head of the Indian state made diplomatic overtures to Western Europe, the United States, and China. The policy of engagement was pursued by consecutive prime ministers of India. The last Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also continued the pragmatic foreign policy which was initiated by former Prime Ministers, Narasimha Rao and Vajpayee.

Growth and India's Pursuit for Investments: Recent Policy Initiatives by the Modi Government

After Narendra Modi became the 15th Prime Minister of India in May 2014, the India's external economic policies became the centerpiece of foreign relations. The major policy initiatives focus on maintaining the growth of past two decades. The impact of these policies on trade flows, efficiency, growth and the future direction of trade policies is evident in its efforts to revitalize India's ties with smaller states in its immediate neighborhood as well as engaging the world's major powers. Various policies which were proposed by the government aimed at making India hub of global supply, value and production chain. The aim looks amicable with more global industries and businesses favoring India over China and other smaller countries in South East Asia. With the South African and Brazilian economies deep in economic trouble, India, among the BRICS countries, offers best opportunities to invest and multiply the businesses. Here are a couple of initiatives by the Indian state to naturalize its foreign economic policy interests:

June 2014: Brazil – 6th BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil. The New Development Bank (NDB) headquartered in Shanghai was established. India took interest in establishing the bank and will have initial capital of US$ 50 billion. China is expected to make the biggest contribution of US$ 41 billion, followed by US$ 18 billion each from Brazil, India and Russia and US$ 5 billion from South Africa (The Economic Times, 2014a).

August 2014: Nepal – as part of its 'Neighborhood First' policy, where the government focuses on its immediate neighbors in South Asia, India offered Nepal a US$ 1 billion line of credit for infrastructure development. Japan – as part of his strategic visit to one of its largest lenders and investor, Modi paid a visit to Japan and was promised US$ 35 billion in infrastructure. As a special measure to facilitate the investments smoothly, the Indian government set up a channel named as 'Japan Plus' to expedite investments (The Economic Times, 2014b).

September 2014: U.S. – during the visit to U.S., India offered U.S. industry to be the lead partner in developing smart cities in Ajmer (Rajasthan), Vishakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh) and Allahabad (Uttar Pradesh). Moreover, a plan to set-up Indo-U.S investment initiative with special focus on capital market development and financing of infrastructure was also finalized (MEA, 2014).

November 2014: Australia – 'The Indian Ocean Outreach' is another policy initiative by the present government to help connect with its maritime neighbors. Though the bilateral trade volume is much smaller of US$ 15 billion,

India hopes to offer Australia best deals in the field of economic cooperation and aims to conclude the ambitious Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement by December 2016. Not to forget, India maintained its position as the largest source of skilled migrants, with the latest data recording over 40,100 Indians applying to migrate to Australia during last financial year, much above Chinese and British nationals (The Economic Times, 2014c).

May 2015: China – along with Western countries and Japan in Asia Pacific, India gave immense importance to the investment from China as well. In September 2014, during his visit to India, the Chinese President Xi Jinping promised to invest US$ 20 billion over five years. During Prime Minister Modi's visit to China, both countries signed 24 agreements worth US$ 22 billion in infrastructure development and other areas (Basu, 2015).

So far, the aggressive foreign economic policies and more foreign investment in India has been the key policy feature during Modi's rule. Incidentally, FDI inflows in the country in 2014-2015 jumped 27 percent to US$ 31 billion from US$ 24.30 billion in 2013-2014 (Basu, 2015). The process of liberalizing the Indian market is still being gradually pursued by the government. Along with his bilateral visits, Indian leadership's visit to the United Nations, the East Asia Summit (EAS), the G20 bloc, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the India-Africa Summit and the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation indicates the prognostic importance of multilateral diplomacy to support the economic interests.

China Re-aligns its Economic Strategy and its Internalization Policy
China's bid for WTO membership and its urge to re-align its policies in the 21st century were critical for its economy. The engagement with the international economies became the basis of China's foreign economic policies especially in the wake of economic slowdown and rising monetary uncertainties. China did initiate a few efforts towards securing international economic interest but it was not until President Xi promulgated 'Silk Road Economic Belt' (SREB) (September 2013) and 'Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road' (MSR) (October 2013) that its strategic thinking of economic development became more clear and drove the internationalization of its economy (CPMJ, 2015). SREB and MSR were instrumental in providing critical thrust to China's new round of international engagements. As some Chinese term it, the '*One Belt One Road*' (OBOR) offered China a natural docking (*youji duìjie*, 有机对接) with international systems (China Economic Net, 2014).
More than just creating new markets, Chinese planners are systematically engaged in identifying geographies which would absorb Chinese competencies in production, supply and consumption. The Asian countries which neighbor China have varied capacities to respond to Chinese expansion. For obvious economic and geo-

graphical reasons, all Chinese international monetary architecture in the form of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank have immediate interests on Asia. India's prominence in the international economic and financial terrain is seen as complementary to Chinese desperate expansion.

China's Search for Complementary Properties in India

The introduction of *zou chuqu* (走出去) or the '*going out*' strategy by China to facilitate its global rise along with evolving mechanisms aimed at coping with various economic risks such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Given their timeline and complementary properties, China's '*going out*' strategy attributes India's pro-FDI policy (IBD, 2015). The Indian states are playing a crucial filling in role. This was not practical during the pre-liberalization time (pre 90s) as discussed in earlier sections. The pre-liberalization division of federal responsibilities restricted the role of sub-national interests in India. The economic liberalisation in the early 1990s set off these interests and this brought the Indian sub-national forces an international attention. The CCPIT actively studied the legal as well economic dimension of Indian state during this period (CCPIT-EIC, 2007). The new market space, sources of production (including land and labour) at the sub-national level turned the sub-national geographies a hotspot for foreign direct investment (FDI) (FFD, 2014). This is attributed in a study conducted by Atri Mukherjee, which indicates that market size, agglomeration effects and size of manufacturing and services base in Indian states have significant positive impact on FDI flows (a reason why Chinese looked at India as an investment market) but what disrupts this flow is taxation and cost of labour (a deterrent to slow down the investments) (Mukherjee, 2011: 99). Hence, the sub-national forces in India, which remained over-dependent on federal facilitations in 1990s, underwent phenomenal transformation.

The rising pressure over existing local resources to meet the fiscal deficits by falling revenue and receding capital resources forced these sub-national actors in India to adopt conscious efforts in line with the national policy reforms. One more sub-national aspect, which turned India into a favourite world FDI destination (for China) was the land-use permits which only local governments could use to promote investments (FFD 2014). In fact, this is a major reason why Chinese investments in India are directed to those states which are using land-use permits and related incentives to attract foreign investments. Consequently, the Indian states are engaged in a fierce competition to attract overseas investments, including China. For instance, the newly divided Andhra Pradesh is offering several concessions to investors including tax holidays, excise duty exemptions, concessions in entry tax, interest-free loans of central sales tax and free land (Yinduabc, 2014).

Such opportunities complement the Chinese guidelines of protecting existing sales revenue and increasing market share abroad, increasing profit margins through

backward integration and entering into a new market. Thus, the Indian market and especially the sub-national drive in India to make the states a hub for investment promotion and facilitation, is turning India into a lucrative destination for Chinese companies seeking to achieve each of their investment objectives and justify significant long-term investments. Consequently, these phenomena, Chinese '*going out*' and India's sub-national need for growth, were corresponding and provided opportunities for engagements.

With the sub-national economic interest surfacing, new approaches made an easy gateway for the overseas commercial entities to engage with the sub-national geographies. Prior to the rolling of China's '*going out*' policy and the birth of sub-national ambitions among Indian states, the economic reforms in the early 1990s formed a solid base for these cross-subnational energies. The steep rise of the Indian economy from 2000 onwards provided further momentum. Chinese noticed that the Indian economy's progress was consistent, considering its performance vis-à-vis Chinese industries. For example, the investment by the Indian industries in new plants and equipment was equivalent to that of China's but in terms of its share in foreign direct investment (FDI), the Indian investments were just half of China's inbound FDI resulting in the impressive growth rate for India, nearing to 10 per cent (Huang, 2009). A number of Chinese provinces that do not had substantial presence in India have begun exploring possibilities to partner with India and are looking for opportunities especially at the local geographies (CNW, 2014). These engagements cover trade as well as investments. As the business between the two countries increased, Chinese provinces are taking a lead role in facilitating these engagements because the opportunities for the Chinese investments in India sub-national economies are immeasurable in number (Yinduabc, 2014).

The provincial priorities play a critical role in deciding the limits of the cross-sub-national interactions. A detailed profiling of Chinese provinces, which are already investing in India, also presents a diverse picture. Beijing and Shanghai, along with Jiangsu, Liaoning and Guangdong were the top five provinces and municipalities, which invested in India between April 2000 and February 2014 (DIPP, 2014). Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin and Hebei trailed in the list. The leading investments came in sectors like metallurgical industries, automobile industry, industrial machinery, services sector and power. Investments from provincial China have been consistent after 2007 and comprised a large share of bilateral commercial engagements with India (DIPP, 2014). This resulted partly due to the Chinese provincial scheme of encouraging private enterprises and provincial state-owned enterprises to look for local partners among the Indian states (Deloitte, 2012; Xinhua Network Television, 2014; Maritime China, 2014). There has been an increasing mobilisation of provincial party secretaries and officials on trade missions to India. For instance, the Guangxi and Zhejiang provinces saw Party Secretary-led business delegations in

2014 (March and November, respectively) setting the trend for *'going out'* to India (Guangxi News, 2014). The Zhejiang delegation headed by the provincial Party Secretary Xia Baolong signed 11 cooperation projects and contracts totaling amount of US$ 2.5 billion (Livemint, 2014). In another case, a MoU was signed between the Maharashtra government and the Wenzhou municipality (under the Zhejiang provincial administration). The motive of the MoU between Wenzhou and Maharashtra was to set up power plants, power plant supply industries and equipment in the state (Trade Fair News, 2014). Similarly, in another example, the second largest and industrial city of Guangxi Autonomous Region went a step ahead and signed a letter of intent to establish a 'Sister City' programme between Liuzhou and Indore (Wang, 2009). This underlines a new dynamics, where the Chinese municipal or prefectural level entities are exploring possibilities of tie-ups with any of the federal tiers. It looks beyond the canvas of state-systems, thereby enabling prefecture-level industries to communicate with their counterparts in Maharashtra by sharing the latest information on technology and machinery, for instance.

Apart from these delegations and trade fairs, there is another *'going out'* to India model employed by the Sichuan province. This particular model gives us a different blueprint for proactive measures introduced by the Chinese provinces in India. Although, Sichuan entered into the Indian market a little later than the coastal Chinese provinces, this province has been one of the important players in India. Comparing Sichuan province's '*going out*' policy vis-à-vis that of the coastal provinces will be unfair. Because the bases of these provincial economies are different and hence its intensity towards India as a choice for overseas commercial engagements, also differed drastically. However, when one compares the strategies towards India of Sichuan with say, Guangxi province (a relatively weaker in terms of its GDP contribution and share in country's total exports province and newer entrant into India), it is comparatively easy to make out the intensity of '*going out*' exertions.

In 2009, Guangxi Liugong Group specializing in excavators, loaders and other heavy machinery and equipment, established its first overseas production unit in Madhya Pradesh near Indore. The setting up of actual plant took over seven years right from conducting two year feasibility study and four intensive site visits in India (Peng, 2014). Presently, Liugong covers over 60 percent of Indian market, it has a remarkable pool of customers, for example, out of India's top ten engineering contractors, seven are customers of Liugong (Peng, 2014).

The Provincial Council of CCPIT Sichuan Council, on the other hand, developed a model of holding the South Asia Economic and Trade Roundtable in Chengdu since 2010 to provide more integrated exposure to its local industry. Officials from embassies and consulates in China, SAARC countries, Chamber of Commerce representatives of each country, and representatives of Sichuan infrastructure construction entrepreneurs are invited every year to attend this two-day conference. The theme

of the latest roundtable held in June 2014 was 'New opportunities in South Asia countries' infrastructure construction and development' (CCPIT-SC, 2014a; CCPIT-SC, 2014b). Moreover, Sichuan has also shown interest in setting up a specialized industrial park in Madhya Pradesh which may consist of Chinese companies interested in agricultural industries and enterprises. In May 2013, the Madhya Pradesh Tourism Bureau signed a property development project agreement with Sichuanese partners, an example of how the Chinese are also trying their luck in public non-manufacturing industrial sectors (CCPIT-SC, 2014c). Looking at the prospects involving these sun-national entities, the Sichuan administration may look to Madhya Pradesh as its partner of choice to develop their sister-state program.

More than trade and global supply of commodities, in a broader sense, the global investments are looking at emerging economies as strong potentials to surge the global growth and Asia, predominantly, India and China, dominated the top position. As per Schroders Global Investment Survey 2015, the regional breakdown of the asset classes that investors plan to invest in to achieve a regular income, which includes direct stocks & shares investment, funds (equity, multi-asset and bonds funds combined), real estate (directly in or via Real Estate Investment Trusts) and ETFs (Exchange Traded Funds), Asia dominates the scene (Schroders, 2015). It is evident that the discernible pattern of investment is moving towards developing and emerging economies and Asia was the biggest recipient of funds with maximum funds invested in China, Korea and Taiwan. The new trend of these economies, especially China, becoming a net exporter by receiving more funds than it invests is evident as China's worldwide investment, from 2005 to mid-2014, was accounted at US$ 840 billion. Although, China's investment soared in 2013 with top investment destinations being North America, Australia, Africa and Gulf countries, the Chinese Investments in India from 2005 to 2015 grew consistently. China's cumulative investments in India are close to US$ 15 billion with the promised figures staying around US$ 50 billion.

The Chinese non-state investment activities in India are on rise. These private equity investments are made in the field of e-commerce, electrical and IT sector. The amount of investment made was highest in Services, IT and Manufacturing. Compared to Chinese PEs, Western PEs had a traditional entry in India compared to a late entry of Chinese PEs; they also took lesser risks with lesser liquidity to invest in India. Moreover, non-Chinese PEs demanded substantial stake in the companies it invested in, in contrast to the picture of Chinese PEs, which have flexibility. Hence, with the higher liquidity, smaller stakes and substantial risk appetite help Chinese PEs get much needed traction. Apart from equities, the Joint Venture also covers part of non-state Chinese investments in India. As a rising economy and largely infrastructure deficient country, India is preferred by Chinese to do the Joint Ventures (JVs) in Energy and Infrastructure sector.

Conclusion

While India's appetite for investments and market is growing, the Chinese intend to fill the cavity. The above description shows that the Chinese state, sub-national actors as well as the Chinese non-sate actors are engaged in a number of economic diplomacy endeavors and most of these trajectories are building on the potential of untapped Indian markets. The over-saturation in European markets and the risks of remedial trade measures provided an added advantage to the Indian market. The increasing number of European trade remedies against Chinese companies has coincided with its rising trade volume with India. From 2002 to 2005, the bilateral trade between India and China recorded about 50 percent year-on-year bilateral trade growth (Mohanty, 2014). Chinese provincial investments in Indian states have been a significant source of sub-national economic drive in India, with the states and their political leaderships giving immense importance to attracting Chinese investments. The visits of Indian states' delegations to China have become more common in recent years (MEA various years). With its US$ 40 billion trade deficit with China, India would be looking for more gains in its trade with China and this can be done through investments and lesser trade restrictions.

It has also to be noted that the Chinese investments are not solely driven by the logic of dominance in the Indian market, but also by the fact that the Chinese investments are meant to build regional hubs that could be connected to China's global supply chains. The Indian tryst with the Chinese investment is something new which has a history of mere 15 years and it allows Indian market to recover even if there is any error in judgments. Moreover, with the rising competition to investments in India by Japanese, Taiwanese and other western investors (both state and non-state), the Chinese would refrain from adopting hedging techniques which they were seen adopting in African and Latin countries. As a result, all new initiatives in Asia, where Chinese expect to intensify their influence through regional economic integration would witness some reciprocal changes wherein China will be seen giving away more benefits to India to keep its centrality in the Asian and global sphere of economic dominance.

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The Lusophone Potential of Strategic Cooperation between Portugal and India

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Abstract
Despite their starkly different profiles and global trajectories, Portugal and India can develop a strong partnership by focusing on cooperation in the Portuguese-speaking countries, where Lisbon continues to enjoy disproportionally high influence and where India seeks to pursue its new external interests. This paper reviews the development and convergence in bilateral relations, explores India's rising interest and engagement with the lusosphere, and forwards specific recommendations for Lisbon and New Delhi to tap into the political, economic, strategic and cultural potential of cooperation in the Portuguese-speaking world.

Resumo
O Potencial da Lusofonia na Cooperação Estratégica entre Portugal e a Índia

Para além de significativas diferenças em termos do seu peso e perfil internacional, Portugal e a Índia partilham um interesse conjunto pelo potencial dos países lusófonos, onde Lisboa continua a gozar de uma influência preponderante e Nova Deli procura expandir os seus novos interesses geo-económicos. Este artigo analisa o desenvolvimento das relações bilaterais luso-indianas e argumenta que as políticas externas de ambos os países convergem agora nas regiões de expressão e influência portuguesa. Para explorar o potencial deste cruzamento de interesses, são apresentadas várias recomendações e iniciativas concretas nas áreas do diálogo político, económico, estratégico e cultural.

Introduction

500 years ago, the Portuguese were busy transforming the Indian subcontinent into a commercial and strategic hub for their empire in Asia, which opened the way for the world's first era of globalization. Today, the tables have turned, and while Portugal struggles with the impact of economic recession and policies of financial austerity, India is emerging globally as a great power sustained by a vibrant democracy, high economic growth rates, the world's second largest population, new military and nuclear capabilities, and a hub for entrepreneurship and scientific innovation.

This paper argues that despite such starkly different profiles and global trajectories, Portugal and India can develop a strong strategic partnership by focusing on cooperation in third areas, in the Portuguese-speaking world, where Lisbon continues to enjoy disproportionally high influence and where India seeks to pursue its new external interests. After reviewing the historical background of bilateral relations, I argue that the foreign policy trajectories of both countries currently converge in the lusosphere: Lisbon seeks to rebalance its European focus and regain its post-colonial influence beyond the West, in Latin America, Africa and Asia; while India's increasingly global profile and economic interdependence require it to develop global capabilities to penetrate and influence new areas beyond its traditional regional zone of influence in South Asia. Following a brief review of India's current relations with each of the eight Portuguese-speaking economies, I then recommend specific areas in which Lisbon and New Delhi can cooperate in the lusosphere, to mutual benefit.

Bilateral Relations: Towards Convergence

Portugal and India share excellent diplomatic relations today with a deep dialogue across a variety of sectors, both at the bilateral level and at the multilateral level, including via the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the Asia-Europe Meeting, and a variety of other institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Foundation.

However, this relationship has a background of many ups and downs, marked by protracted hostility and an unusually late normalization in diplomatic relations. The Portuguese colonial presence in South Asia was at the heart of a conflicted relation and diplomatic tensions from the 1940s to the mid-1970s. After India's independence in 1947, its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, explored a variety of strategies to approach Lisbon about the future of Goa, Daman and Diu, but the bottom line was clear, as well as unacceptable to the *Estado Novo* regime led by António Salazar: the territories were to ultimately be integrated into the Indian Union. While France acquiesced, and was able to negotiate a peaceful transition, with significant rights for French language and identity in Pondicherry and its

other Indian enclaves, the situation with Portugal escalated after 1954, with the occupation of Dadra and Nager-Aveli, an economic blockade imposed by New Delhi on Portuguese India, and an intense diplomatic and legal battle at the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. The stand-off had important geopolitical contours, as Lisbon aligned with the United States as a NATO ally, and New Delhi experimented with non-alignment and eventually fell into the Soviet orbit after the 1960s.

Just ten months after mass riots in Angola marked the beginning of the colonial war in Africa, and possibly under pressure of his Defence Minister Krishna Menon and fearing Goans could opt for independence, rather than integration with India, Nehru gave green light to Operation Vijay, which, in less than 48 hours, ended Portugal's 451-year long sovereignty on the subcontinent (Bègue, 2007). While a Soviet Union veto at the United Nations Security Council prevented any formal international condemnation or response, bilateral relations swiftly moved to a period of open hostility with direct or proxy juridical, diplomatic and intelligence battles played out in New York, Brazil and across Africa: for example, Lisbon mobilized diaspora Goans against New Delhi, and New Delhi supported anti-colonial organizations in Mozambique and Angola.

With Portugal's democratic revolution of April 1974, and the end of its *Estado Novo* regime, the relationship was rebooted, with Lisbon recognizing India's sovereignty over Goa, Daman and Diu in December, 1974, and respective diplomatic missions opened in 1975. Almost three decades after India's independence, Portugal thus became one the last Western European state to establish full diplomatic relations with New Delhi, and with the added burden of a hostile past. More importantly, both countries were now on diametrically different trajectories, which explains why, despite a few agreements, relations remained stagnant until the 1990s.

For Portugal, the priority was a dramatic shift away from its overseas colonial, political and economic profile, and towards integration into the European Union as a multiparty democracy and market economy, with a clear transatlantic commitment to NATO and the United States. With punctual exceptions in regard to Macau and the Timor-Leste issues, Asia almost disappeared from its foreign policy, which devoted its resources almost exclusively to Brussels, the European neighbors and the larger transatlantic axis from Washington to Ankara, including the Mediterranean region.

On the other hand, for India, the priority was to strengthen its strategic autonomy under the Soviet security umbrella, institutionalized through a treaty in 1971, and an autarkic economic model that was indifferent, if not overtly hostile, to the United States, the European integration project, and free market economics. From New Delhi's perspective, the new Portugal, divorced from its former colonies and dependent on Brussels, thus offered little of interest.

The 1990s saw the advent of a third, more positive phase in bilateral relations, one based on mutual testing and exploration. This includes the visit of Indian President R. Venkataraman to Portugal (1990), of Portuguese President Mário Soares to New Delhi, Mumbai, Goa and Daman (1992), as well as the opening, in Goa, of a Portuguese Consulate (1994) and of a delegation of the Orient Foundation (1995). The mutual probing culminated in 2000, with Lisbon hosting the first EU-India summit and Indian Prime Minister Atal B. Vajpayee for an associated bilateral visit – the first-ever to Portugal.

The 1990s thus marked the beginning of a normal relationship, but as expected more substantial engagements also brought out limits and new obstacles, mostly based on different outlooks on the past and lack of mutual understanding rooted in the long period of estrangement since the 1940s. Portugal's still small and fragile economy was unable to explore the new opportunities presented by India's economic reforms after 1991, and Lisbon's almost exclusive focus on Goa and cultural, historical and heritage issues gave out a negative signal to New Delhi, reinforced by the Portuguese government's efforts, in 1998, to officially commemorate the 500th anniversary of the colonial 'discoveries' and arrival of Vasco da Gama in India precisely at a moment where the nationalists of the Bharatiya Janata Party formed a durable government in New Delhi. Naturally, bilateral relations were thus high jacked by conservative fringes both in Portugal and India, further delaying any substantial and economic engagement geared towards the future.

It is therefore only in the mid-2000s that Portugal-India relations moved beyond formal normalization to a more significant level, just short of a strategic partnership. The Portuguese President visited India in early 2007 with a large business delegation, followed a few months later by the first-ever visit of a Portuguese Prime Minister (José Sócrates) to India, as part of Portugal's rotating presidency of the European Union. Besides a variety of new agreements in the economic, education, social security and defence sectors, Portugal also appointed new honorary consuls in Mumbai and Kolkata and actively assisted in the extradition of terrorist Abu Salem to India, which led to an extradition treaty and proved to be a relevant bilateral confidence-building measure.

More importantly, between 2006 and 2011, total trade duplicated from US$ 400 to US$ 800 million (mostly favorable to India), assisted by the creation of a new India-Portugal Chamber of Commerce in Lisbon (2006) and the opening of a Portuguese AICEP trade and investment office in New Delhi. For the first time, Portuguese infrastructure companies such as CIMPOR, EFACEC and Mota-Engil, and a variety of others in the textile, services and industrial sectors, started to invest and operate in India.

In the other direction, beginning with the energetic ambassadorship of Ms. Latha Reddy in Lisbon, after 2004, Portugal also became an important investment desti-

nation for Indian companies, highlighted by the opening of an office of Tata Consultancy Services for Latin America, the purchase of Sonae's Enabler by Wipro, and the investment of Ranbaxy in the pharmaceutical industry. On the scientific and cultural fronts, besides continued engagement from the Orient and Gulbenkian Foundations, bilateral relations were also enriched by the creation of the Champalimaud Foundation and its world-class medical research program involving several Indian partner institutions.

This last ongoing phase is also marked by converging interests in the diversification of the bilateral relationship to encompass the immense potential of cooperation in third areas, beyond just Portugal and India, in particularly in Portuguese-speaking countries, regions or areas of influence across Latin America, Africa and Asia.

Meeting in the Lusosphere

More people speak Portuguese as their native language than French, German, or Italian. With close to 250 million speakers, it is the fifth most spoken language in the world and official in eight countries across four continents, six being in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe) and one each in Europe (Portugal), South America (Brazil) and Asia (Timor-Leste). Portuguese is an official language in Macau (China) and is also spoken by thousands of people in smaller regions across the world, including in Goa, Daman and Diu.

At the diplomatic level, the language enjoys an official status at several international institutions and regional organizations, including in the European Union, Mercosur, the African Union and the Organization of American States. There is also an active movement to make it the seventh official language at the United Nations. For Portugal, the rediscovery of this lusophone space coincides with the completion of its integration cycle into the European Union, pursued since the late 1970s and formalized with its full membership since 1986. For two decades, fueled by generous structural funds from Brussels, Portuguese governments focused on developing a world-class infrastructure and services sector, gearing its economy towards the highest global standards and attracting European investors with its comparatively low labor costs. However, in the 2000s, a variety of factors came together, forcing Portugal to look beyond Europe, and redirect its internationalization efforts towards opportunities in new high-growth economies in Latin America, Africa and Asia. With the enlargement of the EU and new competitors in the emerging economies, Portuguese labor costs and productivity lost competitiveness, which was further aggravated after the country joined the European monetary union and by the devastating impact of the 2008-09 global financial crisis.

At the same time, however, Brazil entered its rising economic trajectory, and both Mozambique and Angola ended decades of civil war and political turbulence, becoming the object of attention of China, India and other rising, non-Western

economies. This offered a new opportunity for Portugal to re-engage with its former colonies, either by making strategic investments there or by facilitating their penetration through triangulation.

This was rapidly recognized by China, which established one of its first strategic partnerships in Europe with Portugal. Over the last years, as Portugal grappled with the impact of recession and austerity, Chinese investors – both public and private – made a succession of acquisitions of Portuguese companies with important holdings in Brazil, Angola and Mozambique. Chinese total investment in Portugal per capita is now the second highest in Europe, after the United Kingdom (Hanemann and Huotari, 2015). While significantly weakened by the financial crisis over the recent years, Portugal's diplomacy maintains this new lusophone orientation as one of its cardinal priorities, in tandem with the European and transatlantic orientations. It may now be the turn for Brazilian and Angolan investors to take advantage of Portugal's dire economic situation to make high-profile acquisitions, but that only strengthened the extraordinary diplomatic and political capital Lisbon continued to enjoy in Brasilia, Luanda, Maputo or Díli.

On the other hand, for India, the economic reforms initiated after 1991 under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao have translated into a steady average of 5-10% in economic growth rates and an interdependent and extrovert economy that is increasingly reliant on resources and markets worldwide. This economic entanglement leads, in turn, to expanding security interests, as foreign trade and strategic investments require greater political influence abroad, often in distant countries hitherto absent from New Delhi's diplomatic radar.

More than 90% of India's trade is now sea-based, around 10 to 15 million Indian citizens reside abroad (besides 20 million people of Indian origin), and India imports more than 70% of its domestic oil requirements. Trade to GDP ratio has therefore increased from around 20% in the early 1990s to close to the current 60%, but the trade balance remains in a spiraling deficit trend, as exports continue to lag. Prime Minister Modi's new "Make in India" policy to fuel the manufacturing sector seeks to gap this imbalance, especially by targeting new high-growth consumer markets in the rising economies of Latin America, Africa and Asia. The recent India-Africa Summit, recently held in New Delhi, in November 2015, with the presence of over 40 African heads of government and state, and the "Act East" policy to connect with Southeast Asia, are further examples of how India seeks to expand its footprint abroad through economic engagement.

India and the Lusosphere

It is within this context of Indian foreign policy diversification that the Portuguese-speaking countries assume a particularly important role for New Delhi's interests. Besides Portugal, important for its own location on the Atlantic and within the

European Union as discussed in the previous sections, India has steadily developed close links with the other seven Portuguese-speaking countries on three continents. While diplomatic relations exist since 1948, India's links to Brazil have witnessed unprecedented growth since former President Lula came to power in 2003 – he visited India three times in four years. The BRICS country, which is also the world's largest Portuguese-speaking country both in size (approximately that of the USA) and population (almost 200 million people) emerged as a central partner in India's efforts to re-engage with the "Global South", most notably under the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) axis. Bilateral relations are now at their best, and Brazil, in particular financial hubs like São Paulo, now plays a larger role as India's gateway to Latin America.

As a consequence, economic relations have witnessed an impressive growth, with a triplication in trade volume over the last five years alone, with several opportunities for India to explore further, from potential oil reserves to a booming industry and services sectors, especially in IT, energy and pharmaceuticals. Defence relations have also prospered, from naval exercises such as IBSAMAR to the acquisition of several Embraer jets by the Indian Air Force. While Brazil's economic recession has affected some of Indian interests, including divestment by Indian companies, most recently the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister, Mauro Vieira, spoke of the huge scope of collaborative work India and Brazil can develop in Africa and underlined his country's "deep bond with Africa due to our historical and linguistic connections as there are countries like Mozambique that are Portuguese-speaking" (Bhattacherjee, 2015).

While India fostered close relationships with the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) even during colonial times, and was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Mozambique after 1975, relations only intensified following the opening of a Mozambican High Commission in New Delhi, in 2002, and the establishment of a Joint Commission for Economic, Cultural, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Former Indian External Affairs Minister, S. M. Krishna, even proposed to establish a "strategic partnership" and his reference to the coastal country as one of India's "gateways" to Africa reflects the privileged position Mozambique now enjoys in New Delhi's eyes. India is among the eight major trading partners of Mozambique and, with a total of US$ 64 million, the fourth largest source of foreign investment. Mozambique's coal and gas reserves have been of particular interest to India's growing energy demands. Finally, Mozambique also plays a central role in India's expanding security interests in Africa. The strategic importance of the Mozambique Channel and the country's proximity to sea lines of communication affected by resurgent piracy off the East Africa coast, have led India to develop close security relations, which include a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence cooperation, in 2006.

Less developed and diversified, India's relations with Angola are anchored in historical relations with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). India set up its embassy in Luanda, in 1986, and bilateral relations now seem to have recovered from the 2006 energy debacle, in which state-owned ONGC lost out to its Chinese rival SINOPEC on a major oil exploration bid. Angola's enormous oil and gas reserves were the main driver of bilateral relations for the last years, and India at one point imported 5% of its crude oil needs from the Southwestern African country. Total bilateral trade, which was a mere US$ 10 million by the end of the 1990s, witnessed an exponential boom, settling close to the five billion mark in 2009-10. This increase is partially motivated by India's import of Angolan raw diamonds, which are then polished in Maharashtra and Gujarat, before being re-exported. However, unlike Mozambique, India's engagement with Angola remains largely focused on natural resources and infrastructure development. Technical cooperation on defence issues remain relatively underdeveloped, and the lack of any significant number of Indian citizens or people of Indian origin poses a difficulty for investors seeking to gain expert insights on the economy.

India has no formal diplomatic representation in Guinea Bissau, on the Western African mainland, nor in Cape Verde, the archipelago facing it. Here, again, India played an important role in extending diplomatic support to the freedom struggle against Portuguese rule, led by revolutionary Amílcar Cabral and his African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). Economic relations and total trade (close to US$ 200 million in 2009-10) with Guinea Bissau are based on the export of almost the entire local cashew crop to India for processing. The country is also awarded ten annual slots under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program, under which five Guinean women underwent training at Rajasthan's Barefoot College to install and maintain solar energy facilities. Guinea Bissau has also been extended a line of credit of US$ 25 million under the Team-9 project, of which it is one of the members. Under the IBSA Trust Fund, India also contributed towards projects for renewable energy and agricultural capacity building in Guinea Bissau.

India's relations with Cape Verde are the less developed among all five lusophone African countries, perhaps reflecting the country's peripheral location, lack of economic weight and overall underdevelopment. The visit of Cape Verde's Foreign Minister to India, in November 2009, signaled some change, with the country joining the Pan-African E-network, but trade relations remains almost insignificant, at less than one million USD in 2009-10. India has thus been expanding its role in terms of development aid and technical cooperation. This includes five slots under ITEC and a line of credit in the value of US$ 5 million for a Technology Park Project. This reflects Cape Verde's ambition to see India emerge as a "strategic partner" in its efforts to modernize its IT sector. Both Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde are also

entitled to access India's line of credit to Ecowas Bank, set up in 2006, in the value of US$ 250 million, and directed towards investments in energy, telecommunications and transportation infrastructure.

India's relations with Sao Tome and Principe are routed through its embassy in Luanda and have witnessed a dramatic turn after the discovery of vast oil reserves off the archipelago. The Nigeria-Sao Tome Joint Development Zone is being developed in a 60-40 split with Nigeria and includes two blocs in which ONGC Videsh and Aban Offshore have a stake in exploration. More recently, ONGC has also expressed its interest in exploring seven further blocks located within Sao Tome's exclusive economic zone.

At the same time, total trade grew threefold over the last five years. These new developments have led Sao Tome's Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit New Delhi in November 2009 – the first-ever high-level visit between both countries – resulting in a MoU on business relations and a protocol on foreign office consultations. A US$ 1 million grant, and a US$ 5 million line of credit for capacity building, agriculture and infrastructure are under discussion.

Finally, the most recent Portuguese-speaking country, Timor-Leste, is strategically located between Southeast Asia and Oceania. In 1999, following a United Nations-sponsored referendum, Indonesia relinquished control of the territory and East Timor became the first new sovereign state of the 21st century. It is one of only two predominantly Roman Catholic countries in Asia, and remains a least developed economy with important natural gas reserves. Analysts have underlined the importance of India upgrading its presence by opening a diplomatic representation in Dili, expanding its development and aid programs, and facilitating further private investments, especially to counter massive Chinese presence there. Former President Ramos-Horta, and a variety of Timorese officials, have in turn expressed their interest in reactivating links with India, especially via Goa.

Lusophone India

Fifty years have now passed since the end of the *Estado Português da* Índia, the Portuguese precursor and equivalent to the British *Raj* on the subcontinent. No other colonial encounter lasted as long in modern history. Parts of Goa were tied to the destinies of the Portuguese empire for as long as 451 years without interruption. As the political, administrative and religious capital of the Portuguese Orient, the little region on the Konkan coast was thus often at the heart of a vast empire and trading network that spanned two oceans, connecting India to Latin America, Africa and Asia.

Much before the advent of the East India Company and India's integration into the British imperial context, India had already played a central role in the very first era of globalization, exchanging its mangoes for Brazilian cashew and chilies,

harboring African slave communities, and sending off Goan priests and Gujarati merchants to Mozambique, Macau and Timor. Portuguese served as the lingua franca for all these movements that persisted well into the twentieth century.

1961 interrupted that colonial chapter and while it brought the vital air of political freedom to Goa, in many ways it also represented a cut with the past as Goa turned inland and towards Delhi, naturally prioritizing its economic, cultural and political integration into India. Excepting for a brief period in the 1950s and 1960s, during which India's leadership supported the liberation movements in Portuguese colonies such as Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique (many of which were led by Goans), the links to the lusosphere were partially severed. At the same time, India's post-independence anglophone intelligentsia either ignored or actively despised the different colonial encounter produced by the Portuguese in India and its wider links to the Global South. Political relations with all lusophone countries remained cordial, but lacked any substance.

All this changed in the 2000s, during which India started to reactivate its latent connection to the Portuguese-speaking world. Three factors explain this transformation. First, Goa attained statehood in 1987 and thereby consolidated and closed its chapter of transition as political integration into India – allowing it to now feel more comfortable in reorienting seawards, towards its southern and lusophone dimension. There are now even proposals for the state to host a regular strategic dialogue between New Delhi and other lusophone governments, as the Chinese have done since 2003 in Macau, and it was none other than a BJP nationalist state government, under the leadership of Chief Minister (now Defence Minister) Manohar Parrikar, that hosted the 2013 Lusofonia Games in Goa and spoke of the importance of building stronger economic linkages between India and Brazil and other growing economies in the Portuguese-speaking world.

Second, a new generation of Indian historians exposed to European continental thought and sources started to liberate Indian historiography from the myths and prisms inherited from the British, thus learning to appreciate rather than just deride the specific Portuguese, Dutch and French experiences in South Asia and its global ramifications. This paved the way for Indian scholars, writers and artists to study and represent Goa's social and cultural singularity. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh remarkably signaled this new approach in a statement on the occasion of the Portuguese Prime Minister's visit to New Delhi in 2007, in which he noted that "the richness of Portuguese culture in Goa, Daman and Diu is well known to every Indian, and we celebrate this legacy" (Singh, 2007).

But most importantly, as discussed in the previous section, India's newly opened economy and consequent quest for natural resources and markets forced New Delhi to diversify its foreign policy and look beyond the Anglophone world it had focused on for so long. Brazil, Angola and Mozambique now assume a strategic

importance and the legacies of history offer an immense potential to be explored to foster closer links with these resource-rich, strategically located and high growth countries that speak Portuguese.

Facilitating Convergence: Recommendations

For many years in the mid-2000s, Portuguese governments approached India and, to a certain degree also China, with the proposal of serving as a strategic platform for Asian investments in Latin America and Africa, particularly Portuguese-speaking countries. While, as noted above, China has responded massively – especially by acquiring large Portuguese companies with interests in those regions – there remains considerable potential for Indian interests to explore this niche, too. While the current economic scenario in Portugal looks dramatically different from just ten years ago, and it would be myopic to assume that Indian and Chinese interests somehow depend on Lisbon to enter Africa or Latin America, there are several concrete areas in which Portugal and India could strengthen their bilateral relationship by coordinating policies and collaborate to operate in the lusosphere.

Institutional

CPLP

India would benefit from a closer association with the political dimension of the lusosphere as institutionalized in the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), founded in 1996. It is based on the inter-governmental models of the Commonwealth and Francophonie organizations and has all eight Portuguese-speaking countries as its members. Established in 2005, the associate member (observer) category allows states to attend the biennial summits and get privileged access to a variety of CPLP forums and initiatives, ranging from economic and technical to security and military cooperation, as well as parliamentary and cultural exchanges, some sectors being discussed in detail below. Associate members can also become full members, as with the recent case of Equatorial Guinea.

There is little in the way for India to achieve this status, especially given that smaller states like Cape Verde or Timor-Leste would benefit dramatically from using the CPLP to expand their institutional channels with New Delhi. India also fulfills the requirements regarding democratic governance and the respect for human rights that guide the CPLP founding charter, unlike China. By joining the CPLP as an observer, India would also be signaling its strong commitment to strengthen existing multilateral settings, rather than a narrow bilateral approach so often pursued by China, as embodied in its Macau Forum.

Senegal and Mauritius already enjoy observer status, with Turkey, Japan and Indonesia having joined most recently (in 2014), and while these countries' links to the

Portuguese-speaking world may be significant, they are certainly less strong than those of India, which has thousands of Portuguese speakers and an invaluable lusophone heritage.

Timor-Leste is holding the current rotating Presidency of the CPLP and has informally expressed interest in supporting an Indian application to become an observer member – and there are indications that the Indian government is considering this possibility with interest, especially if Portugal assumes the presidency in 2016. Furthermore, the CPLP's current Executive Secretary, Murade Murargy, a Mozambican diplomat of Indian origin, has also expressed interest in supporting closer links between CPLP and India.

Goa Forum

Beyond a formal association of India to the CPLP at the multilateral level, there is also scope for a bilateral dimension with various official and other stakeholders from the Portuguese-speaking world. China opted, since 2008, to establish the Macau Forum to officially engaging with the lusophone countries at the ministerial and economic levels. India could benefit from hosting a less formal, semi-official and annual Track-2 Dialogue hosted in Goa, which would focus on sectors of potential cooperation. The idea has been taken up by India's former Minister of State for External Affairs, Eduardo Faleiro, who in 2009 called for a "biannual structured dialogue" to be held between India and the CPLP countries, possibly located in Goa itself" (Times of India, 2009).

Economic

Trade and Investment

India's trade volume with the eight Portuguese-speaking economies and Macau has witnessed a revolution in the last years, growing six-fold, from US$ 3.5 billion in 2005-2006 to the current US$ 20 billion, slightly less than India's total trade with Germany and more than that with Japan. This is only a fifth of China's comparatively bigger trade volume with the lusosphere (around US$ 100 billion), but it already accounts for 2.5% of India's total trade volume, more than its trade volume each with its neighbors Pakistan or Myanmar. Data on investments is less reliable, but Brazilian and Portuguese companies have invested several dozen millions in the Indian economy, even while Indian private companies have made key investments in Brazil, Portugal, Angola, Mozambique and Timor-Leste, especially in the oil, gas, energy, pharma, banking and telecom sectors.

Besides the Goa Forum suggested above, these trade and investment flows could benefit from a parallel conclave focusing exclusively on the economic and business angle, with investors and other economic agents from India and the Portuguese-

speaking countries, possibly in collaboration with organizations like the Confederation of Indian Industries or the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, in partnership with their various lusophone counterparts. Such an initiative would also facilitate the emergence of Portugal as a facilitator in India's lusophone engagement, for example by encouraging strategic cooperation initiatives between India and Brazil in Africa.

Development Assistance

Despite the economic recession, Portugal has preserved its key role as a predominant development assistance partner to Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, and also in Timor-Leste. The Portuguese Institute for Development Support (IPAD) had a pre-crisis (2009) budget of around 400 million Euros, of which more than two thirds were spent in the five Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa alone. Several studies point to its extraordinarily high effectiveness through this concentration strategy, having developed a network of expertise, experience and influence that is often unmatched by other American and European development agencies.

Brazil has over recent years also developed the development dimension in its foreign policy, in particularly in Africa. Finally, India has set up a new Development Partnership Administration, in 2012, and contrasting with China, India is also more open to work in partnership in third countries. Given Portugal's extraordinary experience and assets in development sector in lusophone Africa, Brazil's new capabilities, and India's willingness to become a collaborative player in the sector, there is a great potential for triangulating aid policies, from strategy to implementation and monitoring mechanisms.

Dialogue on Development Policies

On the softer economic side, there is also potential for a closer dialogue on development policies in the employment, social security, health and educational sectors. The case of Portugal is less relevant to India's concerns, but there are striking similarities between India and Brazil that have led to a variety of research and policy initiatives to stimulate comparative studies and exchange of information between both countries.

This was especially the case during the early years of the IBSA dialogue, with several dialogues, for example on Brazil's "*Bolsa Família*" that have been discontinued but could be reactivated under India's lusophone engagement, also with Mozambique. Except for Portugal, all other seven Portuguese-speaking countries face similar development challenges, most of which in a context of political freedom and democracy where civil society and private initiative are crucial.

Strategic/Defence

Naval Cooperation
Historically neglected by India's strategic orientation towards continental security threats, the Indian Navy has undergone tremendous modernization in recent years, with a specific focus on expanding its presence across the Indian Ocean. The straits of Malacca and Ormuz assume particular importance in consolidating the country's naval strategy, but so do the South African link waters with the Atlantic Ocean. This Indo-Atlantic naval connection will also rise in importance as India expands its economic presence in Latin America and Western Africa, and as its Navy starts cooperating more closely with its counterparts in Brazil and among NATO member states such as Portugal.

From a broader perspective, the security of the Indian Ocean begins in the Atlantic, and vice-versa, demanding greater cooperation and coordination. The continued success of IBSAMAR, the joint exercise held off South Africa with the naval forces of the IBSA member-states, despite the overall decline in other IBSA-related initiatives, reflects the importance and potential of this sector, as does India's agreement with Mozambique to patrol the Channel of Mozambique.

As with its Indian counterpart, the Portuguese Navy remains committed to freedom of navigation, the UNCLOS and other liberal institutions and norms regulating the coastal and maritime domains. A closer dialogue between the Portuguese and Indian navies should be established, especially on issues such as maritime history, shipbuilding and a self-reliant defence industry, or out-of-area deployment and addressing non-conventional security threats (Portuguese and Indian navies having jointly addressed the piracy issue in the Gulf of Aden) – and selected Brazilian as well as Angolan and Mozambican navy officials should be roped in to discuss strategic trends in the Southern Indo-Atlantic region.

Peacekeeping
India is among the top contributors to UN-mandated peacekeeping missions worldwide. In Africa alone, by 2008 India's military had emerged as the largest contributor to UN-mandated peacekeeping and other operations, with more than 30,000 personnel involved in 17 of 22 total missions on the continent since 1960, with significant roles played to enforce the peace processes in Angola and Mozambique. India's peacekeepers and other personnel have also been deployed to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, under the leadership of its diplomats Atul Khare and Kamalesh Sharma. New Delhi also hosts a United Nations Center for Peacekeeping, whose training courses have been so far attended by almost 200 officials from over two dozen African countries. Finally, as reflected in the recent announcement that India and the USA will jointly train military forces in six African countries for peacekeeping missions, New Deli is

also increasingly willing to work with Western countries on enforcing peace in third countries.

Portugal has also played a crucial role in peacekeeping missions in Africa and Timor-Leste, and gathered valuable experiences on the ground, even while Brazil is also committed to play a more assertive role in this domain, especially in Africa. This offers a specific area of potential convergence in various military-technical cooperation domains, including under the CPLP umbrella, which has been strengthening its strategic and defence cooperation dialogues and continues to consider a joint CPLP peacekeeping force.

Defence Industry

One of the best examples of trilateral Brazil-Portugal-India cooperation can be found just outside Lisbon, in Alverca, where Portugal's flagship aerospace company OGMA is now a leading player in the maintenance, repair and overhaul and aerostructures business, held 35% by the Portuguese government and 65% by Brazil's Embraer. The Indian Air Force has, over the last ten years, made a variety of acquisitions from Embraer, including VIP jets. As Embraer is expected to make further inroads into the Indian defence market, OGMA may assume an increasingly important role in these new contracts. While Portugal's naval industry has suffered serious setbacks in recent years, its experience in the construction of offshore patrol and other vessels could be explored for potential cooperation with India. As India's defence industry seeks to be more competitive and export-oriented, lusophone countries like Angola, Mozambique or Timor-Leste may prove to be important new markets to be tapped with Lisbon's assistance.

Cultural

Language, Education and Research

A recent analysis of the titles of current and awarded doctoral (PhD) and masters (MPhil) theses at Delhi University's Department of African Studies (the oldest such department in India), notes that only 18 out of a total 468 theses specifically relate to any of the lusophone countries, and those who do focus mostly on a historical approach. This indicates the tremendous lack of information and knowledge on Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, especially as New Delhi seeks to customize its outreach efforts to specific regional and linguistic communities across the continent. India's former French colony of Pondicherry has developed into a knowledge hub that connects France, India and the francophone countries around the world, with various active research programs that have benefitted Indian scholarly and scientific communities. Despite the presence of the Orient Foundation and the Camões

Institute in Goa, which are mostly focused on cooperation with Portugal, there is a dearth of similar institutions in Goa, with exception of the newly-created Luso-phone Society of Goa.

A Lusophone Institute in Goa, pooling the efforts of public and private sector cultural agents, could play a catalytic role as hub to increase research collaboration between Indian and lusophone institutions. Goa University successfully hosted an India-Brazil dialogue in 2012, and a new institution could build on these early efforts. Also, since 2006, a record number of students have registered for the Master in Arts in Portuguese offered at Goa University (36, almost as many as in the previous 20 years altogether), and two colleges in Goa now have a BA in Portuguese. The same trend can be observed across India, where the Portuguese language has become a professional asset for thousands of young Indians wishing to work in the business process outsourcing (BPO) sector or for Indian companies investing abroad.

This is particularly important as 90% of the 200,000 Indian students abroad are enrolled in only four countries – all of which English-speaking: the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand. Language cannot be an excuse: French and German universities each attracted thousands of new Indian students in recent years, while only 99 Indians (against 201 Chinese) enrolled in Portuguese universities in 2011. The numbers are equally dismaying for Brazil: 16 Indian students in total (354 from China).

While since 1970, for almost half a century, only 13 Indian citizens (against 53 Chinese) obtained a PhD from a Portuguese university, all of these were awarded in just five years, since 2006. Many young Indians now also prefer MBA programs in Portugal and Brazil to the far more expensive, but not always more prestigious programs in English-speaking countries. This highlight the potential of greater cooperation in the education sectors between India and the Portuguese-speaking countries.

Official Training

Thousands of students and government officials from across the world study or are trained every year in India under various programs sponsored by the Indian government, especially the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) and the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programs.

The beneficiaries from Portuguese-speaking countries alone have swollen in last years from a few dozens to several hundreds. But the language factor or cultural barriers are the most frequent reasons invoked by these students to explain vacant slots or negative experiences while in India. An Angolan or Mozambican would, however, be certainly far more open to the idea of studying or training in Goa, either in Portuguese or in English, in a much more familiar context. Recognizing this potential, former Mozambican minister of Indian origin, Oscar Monteiro, recently called for Goa to play a "driving role" in such efforts to bring India closer to his country (Times of India, 2010).

If India can offer training in French language, there is no reason why it should not be able to add Portuguese to its offer and thus increase the attractiveness and effectiveness of its technical and educational cooperation programs. Similarly, Portugal and India could develop triangular initiatives to host Portuguese-speaking officials from Africa to be trained jointly in both countries. India already posts several of its younger diplomats at its mission in Lisbon for language training, where most CPLP states have large diplomatic missions.

The Soft Power of Science and Technology, Heritage and Culture

451 years of Portuguese colonialism have left a deep imprint on India's built heritage and architecture, reflecting a rich connection with other Portuguese colonies. In 2008, for the first time, Brazil sponsored Goa's Carnival celebrations. Goa's state archives include thousands of valuable historical documents on India's links with Brazil, Mozambique, China and Timor that are in dire need for closer study and preservation. All along India's Western coast, a variety of monumental forts, religious structures and colonial cities reflect hundreds of years of lusophone influence. Similarly, the histories, museum collections and built heritage in Brazil, Mozambique, Macau and Timor, cannot be studied, renovated and put to tourism and educational use without taking into consideration the vibrant influence of India. Rather than approaching this monumental heritage from a bilateral, post-colonial approach, Lisbon and New Delhi could explore the immense potential of multilateral cooperation to begin a dialogue on how best to fund its cataloguing and rehabilitation efforts – especially by involving Brazil's tremendous interests and resources. At the science and technology levels, there is also great potential for research in the maritime domain in the Indian and Atlantic Ocean, in collaboration with India's National Institute of Oceanography. Finally, at the cultural level, there is no better bridge between India and the lusosphere than sports, in particular the passion for football. Reflecting the driving role of sports, the Indian Olympic Association agreed in 2006 to become a member of the Association of the Portuguese-Speaking Olympic Associations. This was the first-time ever that the Indian Government officially recognized, even if implicitly, the lusophone character of Goa at the international level. New Delhi has since then agreed to participate in the first two editions of the Lusofonia Games (Macau and Lisbon), and, in a historic move, backed Goa's initiative to successfully organize the third edition, in 2013. Dozens of Portuguese-speaking football coaches and players now work in India, and Portugal and Brazil can play a tremendous role in developing the needed infrastructure and skills for Indian youth to finally excel globally.

Conclusion

Despite strikingly different foreign policy trajectories, India and Portugal today face an immense potential to strategically couch their bilateral relationship in the

context of the Portuguese-speaking countries and regions of influence. China has, in many ways, been the flavor of the day in recession-hit Portugal, where it has developed a strategic partnership and acquired a variety of assets in the infrastructure, retail, banking and energy sectors. This does not mean, however, that India has lost the train.

Given the changing capabilities of power, and its limited capabilities in contrast with China, India can't do it alone: it will have to develop partnerships to implement its external engagement in coordination and alignment with other great and smaller powers that can facilitate its access to new regions beyond South Asia.

While still reluctant to do so with the United States and other traditional European great powers that are part of the NATO block, New Delhi may be, however, more amenable to pursue such tactical alignments with smaller countries that have a comparative advantage in certain niche regions or sectors, which is the case of Portugal in the lusosphere. Rather than a strictly bilateral approach, this alignment will necessarily have a multilateral dimension, and thus the importance for Lisbon and New Delhi to triangulate with Brazil and other Portuguese-speaking countries, as well as via the CPLP. At a low-cost, if implemented, many of the recommendations set out in this paper, could help to increase the foreign policy leverage of both India and Portugal.

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The Trilateral Nuclear Dynamics in South Asia

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Abstract

When addressing nuclear issues in South Asia, most scholars focus solely on India and Pakistan. Although we should acquiesce that the problematic diplomatic ties between Islamabad and New Delhi includes a nuclear dimension, facts demonstrate that China has a paramount role in the regional nuclear dynamics. In order to understand these dynamics, the article analyses the historical background of the nuclear weapons programs and the strategic imperatives which underlined their origins. Subsequently it shows how they influence each other, constituting a trilateral nuclear dynamic with risks to the regional stability brought under an "action-reaction" cycle.

Resumo
A Dinâmica Nuclear Trilateral no Sul da Ásia

Quando se abordam as questões nucleares no Sul da Ásia, a maioria dos investigadores tem a tendência para se focar somente na Índia e no Paquistão. Apesar de termos que reconhecer que os laços diplomáticos conturbados entre Islamabad e Nova Deli incluem uma problemática dimensão nuclear, factos demonstram que a China tem um papel central nesta dinâmica nuclear regional. De forma a compreender as dinâmicas nucleares entre estes três países, o artigo começa por abordar o enquadramento histórico destes programas de armas nucleares e os imperativos estratégicos subjacentes às suas origens. De seguida analisar-se-á a forma como estes programas se influenciam, formando uma dinâmica nuclear trilateral, com riscos para a estabilidade regional advindos deste ciclo de "ação-reação".

"I'm not afraid of nuclear war." (Mao Zedong, 1965)

"As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest scientific devices for its protection. I hope Indian scientists will use atomic power for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal." (Jawaharlal Nehru, 1946, quoted in Udgaonkar, 1999: 154)

"If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own." (Ali Bhutto, 1965, quoted in Pillalamarri, 2015)

Most of the nuclear weapons research on Asia revolves around countries such as North Korea, Russia, China, India and Pakistan. Although the latent turmoil that persists in South Asia generally embeds the already mentioned countries of this subcontinent, a more insightful analysis on the regional nuclear dynamics reveals that it involves additional countries. This article shows that the nuclear dynamics in the South Asian region directly involves not only India and Pakistan but also China's nuclear weapons developments.

We start by making a brief historical account on nuclear weapons developments made by the three countries in order to understand the origins and strategic drivers behind it. By adopting this historical perspective it will be possible to understand the impact that nuclear weapons programs had in exacerbating the already present regional security dilemmas.

Subsequently the article focus on how the nuclear weapons programs – and its delivery platforms – of China, India and Pakistan impact each other, thus forming the South Asian trilateral nuclear dynamic. Finally, after addressing the "action-reaction" cycle that characterizes this dynamic, we point out some potential nuclear stability risks that need to be addressed in order to prevent an increase in the regional instability.

Historical Background of the Trilateral Nuclear Dynamics in South Asia

China

The inception of the Chinese nuclear program can be traced to the 50's decade mostly due to the 1954-55 skirmish between the United States (US) and China over two strategically important islands in the Taiwan Strait. Additionally, another reason behind this weapons program was the Chinese leadership preoccupation regarding a hypothetical nuclear attack by the US at the end of the Korean War (Sagan, 1996: 58-59). While understanding how difficult it would be to offset the US nuclear forces, the Chinese President Mao Zedong, in the beginning of 1955,

authorized the initial development of a nuclear weapons program. As the US placed nuclear weapons in Taiwan and another Taiwan Strait crisis arose, the Chinese leadership decided to create the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research Institute (later known as the Ninth Academy) and build uranium enrichment facilities throughout the country in 1958.

Two years later, work began on the construction of a plutonium production reactor, at the Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex, and a nuclear test site in western China. While the Soviet Union gave initial support for a plutonium production facility, the assistance was terminated in 1959 without the transfer of any sensitive technology (Burr and Richelson, 2000: 57-58). The ideological animosity between the Soviet Union and China and their border confrontations "exposed the limited value of China's conventional deterrent" gave the final incentive for the Chinese develop-ment of a nuclear arsenal (Sagan, 1996: 59; National Intelligence Estimate number 11: 13-69). Years later, the continuing growth of the Sino-Soviet tensions led the communist superpower to consider a preemptive attack on the Chinese nuclear facilities (US State Department, 1969).

On the 16th of October 1964, China detonated its first nuclear engine based on highly-enriched uranium (HEU) with a 12-22 Kilotons (Kt) yield. Surprisingly, only three years after its first nuclear test, the Chinese authorities were able to test its first thermonuclear bomb with 3.3 Megatons (Mt) yield.[1] Over the next three decades, unlike other nuclear weapons states, China's evolution of its nuclear arse-nal was gradual and slow which made it systematically vulnerable to opponents. Authors provide two different explanations for this extended vulnerability. One of the explanations is based on ideology. Both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping believed that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons was to prevent nuclear aggres-sion and coercion. In order to achieve that, the nuclear arsenal would be solely based on the ability to retaliate an initial nuclear strike and impose unacceptable damage. A second explanation for the slow development of the Chinese nuclear arsenal lies on the political and technical restrictions that prevented the further improvement of these weapons and their delivery systems.

Regardless of the reasons for the vulnerability of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, since its inception it had a specific trait, namely its small size and vulnerability. In 1985, Beijing had around 151 nuclear warheads which was about half of the French and the United Kingdom nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the nuclear ballistic missiles just had intermediate and medium range, which prevented China from reaching the full extent of the Soviet Union's and the US' territory. In terms of vulnerability, although nuclear capable, these missiles' propulsion relied on liquid fuel which

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1   One kiloton (Kt) is equivalent to one thousand tons of TNT and one megaton (Mt) is equivalent to one million tons of TNT.

requires several hours of preparation making them vulnerable to a first strike. It was only during the 80's that China was able to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-5 (Lewis and Di, 1992: 18-19). Nevertheless, the DF-5 was silo-based and had intricate operational requirements that undermined a second strike capability. Still, if Chinese nuclear land capabilities presented some shortcomings, the maritime and air dimensions of the nuclear triad present additional limitations to the military leadership (Manning *et al.*, 2000: 18).

In 1964, when China developed nuclear devices, even without a declaratory strategy or operational doctrine, its leadership defined two policies that would serve as guidelines for its nuclear weapons. The first is the "No-First Use" (NFU) policy. Under this policy China pledges to other nuclear powers that will not use nuclear weapons unless it is firstly attacked by the opponent's nuclear forces. Another nuclear policy advocated by China is the opposition to a nuclear arms race. The main idea behind these policies is that China's nuclear posture is not based on equivalence but on retaliation capability (also known as second strike). Even without an official nuclear strategy, it is possible to still see the influence of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping during the first few decades of the Chinese nuclear policies. Only in a 2006 Defense White Paper, and for the first time, did China clearly state its official nuclear strategy.[2] Although named as "Self-Defense Nuclear Strategy", its two guiding principles ("counterattack in self-defense" and "limited development of nuclear weapons") are still based on the NFU and the "opposition to nuclear arms race" policies defined decades earlier. It should also be noted that in 2000, the Chinese strategic forces had already developed some military theory for nuclear operations, namely nuclear counterstrike campaigns and the central role of survivability of the nuclear weapons forces (including mobility and concealment). Nevertheless, these does little to alter the core of the Chinese nuclear strategy – the deterrence of nuclear weapons attack – which relies on the second strike capability. This raises an interesting point. While some authors defend that China has a credible minimum deterrence, others disagree as China's nuclear strategy is not uniquely focused on counter-value strikes and on a specific number of weapons, traditional signs of this minimum deterrence policy (Fravel and Medeiros, 2010: 48-79). Likewise, some accounts report that around a third of the Chinese nuclear arsenal has tactical yield weapons (Manning *et al.*, 2000: 17).

India

The Indian quest for nuclear deterrence represents one of the most complex, although interesting, pathways towards nuclear weapons development. Unlike

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2   The Chinese Defense White Paper of 2006, is available at http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html.

most nuclear powers that planed nuclear tests as a preliminary step to develop their strategic arsenal, India's development of nuclear weapons had two distinctive phases. A first phase with the sole purpose of having a nuclear program without contemplating the option of nuclear weapons development and a second phase where the Indian leadership clearly decided to achieve a nuclear deterrence capability.

As mentioned, India initiated its nuclear journey by developing a civilian nuclear energy program, namely by commencing a nuclear physics research program in 1945 at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR). A couple of years later this research got further support by India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who saw in the civilian nuclear infrastructure an instrument to improve Indian economic self-reliance and eradicate poverty. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Nehru publicly disagreed with both the production and the use of nuclear weapons in international politics, a likely sign of the influence of Gandhi's non-violent conflict resolution beliefs in Indian political decision-makers.

In 1956, India built its first nuclear infrastructure, the Apsara nuclear light-water reactor, with the assistance of the United Kingdom that also supplied 80% of the enriched uranium (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003). Four years later, New Delhi began to operate a CIRUS nuclear heavy-water reactor built with the support of the US and Canada as the Indian authorities vowed to both countries that the reactor, and its plutonium, would be solely used for peaceful purposes (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003). This particular reactor had a nine to ten kilogram plutonium output per year, enough to produce one to two nuclear fission devices per year.

Although with access to plutonium, and consequently the ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon, India refrained – for 14 years – from performing its first nuclear test. Such prolonged chronological intermission raises questions on the major factors behind the decision to carry out a nuclear test more than a decade later. The Chinese factor proved to be a major influence in this particular aspect. More specifically, the direct influence of China on India's policy-makers can be traced to two important events. The first one occurred in 1962, when India and China were involved in a border conflict which led to a Chinese incursion on Indian territory thus creating what currently remains the biggest border disputed area in the world, comprising over three thousand kilometers. As China advanced and occupied Indian controlled areas, a growing sentiment of insecurity began to rise among India's policy-making circles. Furthermore, politicians from the North of India as well as some Indian nuclear scientists began to defend the necessity of performing a nuclear test in order to deter China's armed forces from further territorial incursions. As previously mentioned, Gandhi's principle of non-violence and international cooperation had a profound influence over the Indian National Congress Party which later decided to refrain from performing any nuclear test. The decision

was based on the belief that by not carrying out a nuclear explosion, India would maintain a moral superiority vis-à-vis China (Izuyama [and] Ogawa, 2003: 60-61).

Two years later, a second Chinese related event had a significant impact on Indian strategic circles, namely the 1964 nuclear test. Since 1960 that Indian policy-makers were anticipating the Chinese nuclear test but got increasingly worried as this proved to be a massive advantage for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in a time when India was investing significantly on conventional weaponry following its 1962 military defeat (Kennedy, 2011: 124-125).

Still, Prime Minister Nehru maintained his strong opposition to nuclear weapons albeit months later, after his death, the new Prime Minister Lal Shastri decided to pursue a different strategy: assure nuclear protection from nuclear powers. Although easier than developing nuclear weapons, some Indian politicians feared that such decision could compromise India's international non-alignment posture. In this particular aspect, the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 proved to be pivotal. As this border dispute erupted, China supported Islamabad and threatened to open a second war front against India in the Himalayan border. Once again pressure mounted against the Indian Prime Minister in order to develop nuclear weaponry leading to a minor change in India's nuclear options. According to Prime Minister Shastri, if China developed enhanced nuclear delivery systems, India would revise its nuclear options. Faced with the possibility of a two front war against its main regional opponents, India – now under the leadership of a new Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi – begun to procure nuclear assurances from either the US or Soviet Union against an hypothetical Chinese attack (Mohan, 1998: 378).

Indian efforts proved to be unsuccessful as both countries failed to provide the explicit guarantees sought by India. Years later, in 1969, as the relationship between China and Soviet Union deteriorated further, the latter begun to approach India with the intent to create a collective security system in Asia to counterbalance China. Although initially uninterested, New Delhi later accepted to debate the idea as soon as the Soviet Union offered to cease military assistance to Pakistan. In 1971, the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed mostly due to the war in East Pakistan (presently Bangladesh) and the improved US-China diplomatic ties. This last aspect was particularly concerning to India, as the US Secretary of State admitted to the Indian ambassador in Washington that his country would not help India against China in case New Delhi took military action against Pakistan (Kennedy, 2011: 135-136).

Other strategic decision made at the time by Indian policy-makers entailed the support of international disarmament agenda which ultimately impacted the option of performing a nuclear test. In order to follow upon this particular diplomatic agenda, India initially supported the negotiations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but failed in the purpose of including "nuclear peaceful explosions"

for non-nuclear States in the draft text of the Treaty. Other purposes envisioned by India for this Treaty also proved to be unsuccessful. For example, achieving an adequate balance between non-nuclear and nuclear powers, namely in terms of access to civilian nuclear technology as well as the adoption of a nuclear nonproliferation policy as a core pillar of this Treaty with the final purpose of universal nuclear disarmament, specifically for nuclear powers. Furthermore, after failing to assure the previously mentioned nuclear protection from both superpowers, India adopted a less active posture in the negotiations. Finally, in 1968, when the US, Soviet Union and the United Kingdom signed the NPT, India chose not to do so for two specific reasons. Firstly, China became a NPT recognized nuclear State and secondly, the Treaty sought to maintain the non-nuclear weapons status of states without reciprocal nuclear disarmament obligations from nuclear weapons states. Unlike in the past, this decision was less based on moral grounds but more on strategic imperatives that required India to maintain its nuclear weapons option available (Ganguly, 1999: 152-158).

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was another important factor behind India's decision to carry out a nuclear test. Even though India came victorious from this confrontation with Pakistan, for the first time in its history it felt the direct pressure from a nuclear weapons State, namely when the USS Enterprise aircraft carrier entered the Bay of Bengal to compel India into accepting a cease-fire that clearly benefited Pakistan. Ultimately that bluntly demonstrated to India the coercive power present in the mere possession of nuclear weapons and its strategic impact (Ghose, 1997: 242-243).

As New Delhi's leadership begun to realize that the major powers will not properly assuage the Indian security needs and witnesses the increase in Chinese nuclear capabilities, in 1971 the decision is made to perform a nuclear test. Due to domestic political reasons, the test was delayed for three years and, in May of 1974, a 15 Kt nuclear fission device was detonated in what was described as a "peaceful nuclear explosion". The test itself was not only a way to prove the international community that India had the ability to develop a nuclear engine but also as a political independence demonstration towards great powers namely the Soviet Union (Kennedy, 2011: 140). Consequently, Canada and the US issued strong criticism against this test and ceased any nuclear cooperation with India. China and Soviet Union followed suit and voiced their disagreement against the Indian nuclear test. Without external support India was left with no other choice than to develop a self-sufficient domestic nuclear program (Ganguly, 1999: 160).

At this stage it is important to bear in mind that detonating a nuclear engine and possessing a nuclear weapon are two distinct technical achievements. In 1974, while India successfully achieved the former it was still far from developing the latter. Nevertheless, unlike other countries, after the nuclear test, India did not

immediately pursue a nuclear weapons capability. Instead it claimed that it had no desire to develop nuclear weapons and kept the option open, which became known as the "option policy" (Izuyama and Ogawa, 2003: 61).

Before New Delhi decided to enter on the second phase of its nuclear endeavors and initiate its weapons development, Indian policy-makers decided to suspend any progresses in this field. Different reasons explain why it took so much time to begin building its nuclear arsenal. Besides international pressure, domestic reactions after the 1974 nuclear test were among some of the reasons behind such delay. Due to domestic political turmoil, Indira Gandhi had lost the elections and Morarji Desai replaced her. The new Indian leader opposes nuclear weapons on moral grounds and suspends any efforts linked to its development (Latif, 2014: 133). Notwithstanding the aversion towards nuclear weapons present in some Indian political circles, high costs behind the development of these weapons were factors important for Indian decision-makers.

The enhancement of the Indo-Soviet ties was also a pivotal factor behind the decision to postpone the development of a nuclear arsenal. As the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the US renew its military support to Pakistan including the sale of nuclear capable F-16. Facing the possibility of losing the conventional superiority over Pakistan, India sought military assistance from the Soviet Union (Vohra, 2013: 250). For example, in 1987, the CIA estimated that the Soviet military assistance and sales had largely surpassed the $ 10 billion limit. This assessment also stated that 65 per cent of the combat aircraft, 40 per cent of the tanks and 70 per cent of the warships in India had Soviet origin (Central Intelligence Agency, 1987: 41-42). Considering such facts, it is no surprise that between 1964 and 1985, India became the largest Soviet trade recipient in the developing world (Lee, 2014: 63).

Additionally the 1979 Soviet invasion, besides renewing the approach between the US and Pakistan, would have another significant impact as it decreased the US-restrictions on the Pakistani nuclear program (Kennedy, 2011: 141). At this time, not only did the Pakistani nuclear efforts begun to concern India but the situation in Kashmir further aggravated and preliminary evidence on the Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan emerged, namely on warhead designs (Ramana, 2011). Anticipating the increasingly palpable Pakistani desire for nuclear weapons, the Indian policy-makers begun to gain interest in nuclear weaponry. Several facts corroborate this interest. Firstly, the government decided to initiate an indigenous ballistic missiles program in 1983, named "Integrated Guided Missile Development Program", as an early response to the Pakistani nuclear developments (Kampani, 2014: 88). Secondly, in 1984, during an interview, A. Q. Khan – the mentor of the Pakistani nuclear program – declared Pakistan as a nuclear power. During the same period, an article of the *Washington Post* claimed that Pakistan had already tested explosives of nonnuclear components and could manufacture a bomb in less than a

week. The Indian media immediately picked up on this story and exacerbated it by claiming that Pakistan had already tested a nuclear device. Although the government tried to correct that misperception, all the efforts proved to be unsuccessful. Thirdly, as India carried out a series of large scale military exercises near the Pakistani border, known as "*Brasstacks*", it failed to properly inform the Pakistan's military authorities. As Islamabad saw the Indian military moves near its border, it responded by placing a significant number of its military units on the same area, while Pakistan stakeholders hinted a likely use of nuclear weapons (Izuyama and Ogawa, 2003: 62). Already having the impression that Pakistan had some nuclear capability, the Indian military planners envisioned a preemptive strike against Pakistan, including to its nuclear facilities so to prevent any nuclear retaliation. In the aftermath of this crisis, the domestic pressure begun to pile for India to achieve a nuclear weapons status to counter any Pakistani development in this field (Perkovich, 2001: 279-282).

Although it is hard to pinpoint the precise moment when Prime Minister Gandhi decided to start the development of nuclear weapons, sometime between 1987 and 1989, due to the Pakistani advancements on the nuclear weapons field, a concern also shared by US officials at the time (Weisman, 1987). Concomitantly, New Delhi also accelerated its missile program and in 1989 tested the first Indian manufactured intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with nuclear weapons capability and based on a civilian space program (Milhollin, 1989). Additional progresses included the ability to reprocess plutonium and the acquisition of sufficient fissile material for 25 nuclear weapons.

At the same time, India's nuclear security assurances started to fade. For example, in 1986 during an Indo-Chinese border clash the Soviet Union failed to support India and with the end of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Moscow approaches Pakistan. Finally, with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, New Delhi recognized that it no longer could rely on nuclear powers to counterbalance Pakistani and Chinese nuclear weapons programs (Kennedy, 2011: 141-144). Moreover, although the US ceased to support Pakistan in 1990, five years later the Clinton Administration approved legislation to support military and economically Pakistan, an attempt that had the ultimate purpose – although fruitless – of preventing the additional development of its nuclear weapons.

Additionally, India's renewed nuclear diplomacy efforts failed once more to yield the desired outcomes. As Indian diplomats expected the NPT to cease, after its initial 25 years duration expired, the State-Parties decided to indefinitely extend the duration of the Treaty, thus increasing the pressure for India to accede the NPT. Simultaneously, the international community was also attempting to draft a Treaty to ban nuclear tests – the Complete Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). While India supported the initial negotiations of the first CTBT drafts, it ultimately decided to walk away

from it for two specific reasons. First, it feared the effects of the CTBT on its nuclear program and, secondly, China performed a nuclear test prior to signing this Treaty. This development allowed China to have a better understanding of nuclear weapons, unlike India that just performed one nuclear test (Kimball and Taheran, 2015). Embedded in this diplomatic and regional security context, the Indian domestic support for nuclear weapons increased as the *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP) won the 1998 general elections after campaigning for the development of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding the technical and political conditions that allowed India to initiate the production of a nuclear arsenal, the prompting factor was the 1998 Pakistani test of the nuclear capable *Ghauri* medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (Ganguly, 1999: 167-171). Between 11 and 13 May of 1998, India performs *Pokhran-II*, a series of five nuclear weapon explosion tests, including four fission-based weapons and one (attempted) fusion-based weapon, thus announcing to the international community that it was a *de facto* nuclear weapons State. Even though this test came as an expected outcome for some countries, others were not expecting it. For example, the US was caught by surprise as a CIA report written a month before the tests had no mention to the possibility that India might carry a nuclear weapon test (Central Intelligence Agency, 1998).

One year later, India presented the first draft of its Nuclear Doctrine, issued by the National Security Advisory Board, only approved years later. A press release published by Indian Prime Minister's Office clearly summarizes India's nuclear doctrine. First, and foremost, the Indian nuclear posture aims to achieve and maintain a credible minimum deterrent. This sort of posture lies on the premise that the adopted nuclear strategy is based on containment. Operationally, it means that the nuclear forces will be equipped and operate with the purpose of surviving an initial nuclear strike (known as first strike) and be capable of retaliating with nuclear weapons. To reinforce these particular aspects, the second mentioned aspect of India's nuclear posture is the "No First Use" policy. By adopting this particular policy, India reinstates that the use of nuclear weapons is purely defensive and will only be considered if attacked with similar weapons. A third central element states that "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage", which leads us to assume that India nuclear retaliation strategy is based on counter-value targeting. Nuclear doctrine outlines that counter-value targeting is aimed at valuable civilian targets, such as cities and civilian population, unlike counterforce targeting that looks for the destruction of military targets. Other elements of the Indian nuclear doctrine include a pledge to not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states as well as to maintain its nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation diplomacy commitment. Finally, the nuclear posture designates the entities that control and authorize the use of nuclear weapons, in an attempt to bluntly demonstrate that the nuclear arsenal is under civilian con-

trol (Indian Prime Minister's Office, 2003). A deeper analysis at the Indian nuclear posture also allows us to understand that by adopting a nuclear stance that resembles the one embraced by China, India openly assumes that China is the primary strategic opponent. This is an important point that bears consequences in South Asia trilateral nuclear dynamics, which will be discussed later.

Pakistan

The Pakistani interest in a nuclear program began in the 50's decade and basically with civilian purposes. Taking advantage of the "Atoms for Peace" Program inaugurated by US President Eisenhower, Pakistan created the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1956 and the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) seven years later. Initially, the US supplied Pakistan a nuclear research reactor and, in 1972, the Canadian KANUPP-1 nuclear reactor was finished and Islamabad had its initial nuclear infrastructures.

For several reasons, while holding the position of Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto developed an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. First, as China conducted its initial nuclear test, in 1964, the Pakistani political decision-making circles begun to understand that it would be a matter of time before India followed suit. Second, the diplomatic ties between India and Pakistan begun to deteriorate. Ultimately, this *status quo* created the framework from which the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1965 and 1971 erupted. Third, due to what was perceived by the Pakistanis as an insufficient support by the US during the 1965 clash with India, Islamabad begun to grow increasingly suspicious of the real consistency of its alliance with the US – at the time the main Pakistani military supplier. Furthermore, because the 1965 war clearly showed an Indian conventional superiority *vis-à-vis* Pakistan, Washington's decision to put both countries under a weapons embargo was seen by Islamabad as clearly beneficial to India. Finally, as international nuclear disarmament diplomacy started to gather a growing amount of supporting countries, Pakistan feared that a Treaty banning nuclear weapons would either impede its access to the latter or bring additional isolation for Islamabad. This political anxiety got more exacerbated as India decided to reject the NPT in 1968 (Ahmed, 1999: 180-183).

Addressing these issues is important to understand that the major factors behind the Pakistani decision to develop nuclear weapons predates the 1974 Indian nuclear test. Moreover, as the 1971 Indo-Pakistani confrontations led to an additional defeat of Pakistan and the loss of East Pakistan, the perception that India constituted a strategic threat was reinforced. Consequently, in 1972, President Ali Bhutto held a meeting with Pakistani nuclear scientists in which he requested the development of nuclear weapons. So when New Delhi decided to conduct its "peaceful nuclear explosion" the decision to follow suit had already been taken and solely reinforced the Pakistani goal of achieving a nuclear weapons capability.

In order to access nuclear weapons, Pakistan intended to develop both HEU and plutonium. Because purchasing HEU was not a viable option, the decision was made to start building uranium enrichment facilities and Pakistani authorities entrusted A. Q. Khan with the task. Moreover, not only he succeed in producing HEU for military purposes as he developed a complex and efficient illicit network of nuclear materials trafficking that allowed Pakistan to successfully build nuclear weapons. According to A. Q. Khan itself, Pakistan began to enrich uranium in 1978 and achieved 90% uranium enrichment capability around 1983 (Kerr and Nikitin, 2013: 3-4, 21).

Plutonium, on the other hand, required the development of reprocessing facilities. In 1976, Pakistan signed an agreement with the French *Societe Generale des Techniques Nouvelles* (SGN) for the construction of plutonium reprocessing facilities. Several reasons explain why Pakistan looked for the French nuclear know-how to build a nuclear reactor and a reprocessing facility. First, like Pakistan, at the time France had yet to become a State-Party of the NPT and possessed one of the most advanced civil nuclear technology. Second, Pakistan did not had many options to access to nuclear technology. The US and the United Kingdom were substantial sponsors of the nuclear nonproliferation movement and the Soviet Union was reinforcing its diplomatic ties with India. West Germany was also under US influence so it would not be a viable nuclear technology supplier. Third, there was a belief in Pakistan that France was interested in this deal. Not only did French companies competed with US rivals in the nuclear field but it was assumed that France wanted to expand its influence in third world countries. Finally, Pakistani policy-makers thought that France could withstand US pressure to cease the deal (Dar, 2015: 218). Nonetheless, in 1977, the French authorities unilaterally withdraw from this deal due to pressure exerted by the US. Interestingly enough, in the same year, a military coup led by General Zial-ul-Haq overthrew the then Prime Minister Ali Bhutto. As the Pakistani population began to link the US pressure on the plutonium reprocessing deal and the military coup, the nuclear weapons program started to be seen as a symbol of sovereignty and prestige. Furthermore, with Pakistan's constant progresses in its nuclear program the Carter Administration decided to impose sanctions, which may have accentuated Pakistanis nationalistic view of their nuclear endeavors (Cohen, 2010: 84).

As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had a pivotal effect on the Pakistani nuclear program. The nearby presence of Soviet troops turned Pakistan into a strategic ally for the US once more, which in turn allowed a significant progress in the nuclear infrastructure throughout the 80's decade. With the retreat of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War, Pakistan lost its strategic importance to the US thus bringing additional scrutiny to the former's nuclear program. This allowed Washington, for instance, to

pressure Pakistan to limit its enrichment capabilities to 5 per cent. However, this pressure came a bit too late as Pakistan had already understood how useful could nuclear weapons be not only to deter opponents but to serve as a bargaining chip in international diplomacy. For instance, in 1990, as relations between Islamabad and New Delhi deteriorated, Pakistani nuclear threats against India brought the US as a mediator in the conflict.

As a consequence, Pakistan decided to remove the limits on its enrichment capabilities, abandoning its nuclear ambiguity policy while acknowledging its nuclear weapons production capability. The US quickly imposed sanctions once more and in 1991 Prime Minister Sharif restored the previous uranium enrichment limits. Albeit with limitations on developing HEU, the Pakistani nuclear program kept progressing, namely on the production of enriched uranium (although it was still low-enriched uranium), the development of warhead designs, the expansion of uranium enrichment capabilities and the construction of a Chinese-supplied plutonium production reactor (Cirincione *et al.*, 2005: 245).

Simultaneously, while understanding the potential that nuclear weapons could have in the diplomatic arena, Pakistan starts to support international nuclear non-proliferation initiatives – namely the NPT or the CTBT – on the premise that any Indian nuclear weapons efforts would cease. Although the Indian nuclear threat was a pivotal factor behind these initiatives, the clear objective behind these actions was the removal of the US sanctions. Nevertheless, with the election of the Hindu-nationalistic *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP) in India, the nuclear *status quo* in the region was transformed. For once, during the campaign the BJP advocated the abandonment of India's nuclear ambiguity doctrine over a policy that openly supported "nuclear weaponization" which will be later followed by a rejection of any negotiations over the Kashmir issue. Notwithstanding the nationalist approach of the BJP, the Pakistani military apparatus also did not approve Prime Minister Sharif's attempt to initiate negotiations with India over Kashmir (Ahmed, 1999: 190-193).

In order to match the Indian short and intermediate range missile capabilities, Pakistan decided to test the nuclear capable *Ghauri* medium-range ballistic missile in April of 1998. As previously mentioned, India responded to this missile test with a series of nuclear weapons tests on the following month (Synnott, 1999: 26). Although facing pressure not to respond to the Indian nuclear explosions, the Pakistan did not complied with international requests and carried out five nuclear underground tests two weeks later. Albeit it seems obvious the reasons why Pakistan followed the same nuclear path as India, other motives also played an important role in Islamabad's decision. For instance, Pakistan would not accept a non-nuclear status when India had just openly admitted its nuclear weapons capability. It was not just a matter of balance of power in the region but also a matter of international prestige.

Currently, Pakistan does not have a publicly declared nuclear doctrine but it is possible to identify four of its major aspects. First, although Pakistan clearly states that its nuclear arsenal aims to deter all forms of external aggression, its primary deterrence target is India. Second, the Pakistani nuclear doctrine is based on a minimum credible deterrence. Although it sounds very similar to India's nuclear posture of credible minimum deterrence, the difference is more than semantical. Contrary to an Indian posture based on a minimalist nuclear arsenal, Pakistan's policy relies on credibility in order to assure its opponents that it can cause unacceptable damage. Third, contrary to China and India, Pakistan does not have a "No First-Use" nuclear policy. The reason lies on the premise that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal does not have the sole purpose of balancing the Indian nuclear capabilities but also to deter any hypothetical Indian conventional incursions inside the Pakistani territory. Notwithstanding the absence of a formal declaration stating how Pakistan may contemplate the initial use of nuclear weapons, revelations from Pakistan's General Kidwai have highlighted some circumstances in which such may be considered, including: (1) if India attacks Pakistan and occupies a significant portion of its territory; (2) if an Indian attack destroys a significant part of Pakistani ground and air forces; (3) if India strangles the Pakistani economy, namely through naval blockages or by altering the course of the Indu river and; (4) If India politically destabilizes or provokes a "large scale internal subversion" in Pakistan. Although the last two circumstances are not seen as likely to trigger nuclear weapons use, the same cannot be said about the first two. Nonetheless, Pakistan has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States unless they are a part of a coalition with a nuclear weapons country.

Fourth, the strategic requirements of Pakistan's nuclear posture are dynamic as they are highly dependent on the threat perception emanating from India. Consequently, any modernization or upgrade efforts made by India – either in terms of its conventional or nuclear arsenal – will resonate on the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. This is one of the reasons why Pakistan is highly ambiguous on its (unwritten) nuclear doctrine. It creates uncertainty and avoids supplying India with any course of action below the nuclear threshold (Fitzpatrick, 2013: 27-32; Krepon, 2012: 7-11). Next we will explain how these three nuclear doctrines and postures interact with each other.

Trilateral Nuclear Dynamic in South Asia
Understanding how the nuclear dynamics works in the South Asia requires a deeper look on how the nuclear arsenals have developed over the past years and how do they impact the other countries involved in this regional dynamic.

Starting with the Chinese nuclear arsenal. This country has been basing its nuclear modernization efforts into two specific areas. First, the current modernization pro-

cess aims to be gradual with the aspiration to replace the old missiles based on 60's and 70's technology. Second, strategic imperatives created the need to have more credible and mobile missile capabilities upgraded with missile defense counter-measures in order to ensure a second strike capability (Fravel and Medeiros, 2010: 81-82).

To achieve these two major goals, China decided to take a number of steps. On its ground missile forces, efforts have been directed to substitute liquid fuel vectors for solid-fuel ones while increasing the mobility of the latter. Additionally, China has been pursuing substantial investments on building a credible naval second strike capability including a new Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and is already planning for the next generation of SSBN, the Type 096. To better enhance the naval branch of the Chinese nuclear triad, Beijing is also developing new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), which according to estimates made by the US could reach as much as 7400 kilometers and have MIRV capabilities. By 2020, the Chinese military apparatus expects to develop a new SLBM, the JL-3, with 11 thousand kilometers range and with MIRV capability as well. In terms of its Air Force, China is upgrading its nuclear bombers and producing its first nuclear long-range cruise missiles, the CJ-10k (Galamas, 2015: 31-33).

But why is China investing so much in the upgrade of its nuclear platforms? As previously mentioned, one of the major factors behind Chinese development of nuclear weapons was the fear of an US nuclear attack. Nowadays, albeit the Chinese need to replace some of its nuclear vectors, the strategic competition in Asia still mandates that China can be able to uphold an effective deterrence capability *vis-à-vis* the US. To keep such capability, China has been reacting to two specific technological platforms that the US is slowly implementing in its military doctrine and could impact China's assured second strike capability, which its nuclear doctrine is based upon.

The first is the placement of antimissile intercepting systems in Northeast Asia. Due to the fear of a North Korean ballistic missiles launch, the US placed in Japan seven destroyers equipped with the Aegis antimissile systems in order to support Tokyo's four layered missile defense structure. Over the last months, there was negotiations between the US and the South Korean government over the placement of a THAAD antimissile system. Notwithstanding that these systems are supposed to intercept any missile launches from North Korea, they could also undermine China's nuclear deterrence capabilities. To properly deal with this threat to its second strike capability, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been modifying some of its nuclear missiles. For instance, some missiles, like the DF-41 ICBM (which is still under development), are planned to have MIRV and MaRV warheads incorporated as well as other missile defense countermeasures. Beijing is also trying to develop an antimissile intercepting system. In 2014, according to government sources, it con-

ducted its third antimissile test without providing further details, after previous tests in 2010 and 2013. However, China is also conducting anti-satellite weapons tests which rely on the same "hit-to-kill" principle that the antimissile interceptors do so it is currently unclear what the final purpose of this technology is (Keck, 2014).

The other US development that could have an impact in China's strategic arsenal is the adoption of the *Prompt Global Strike* (PGS) system. When operational, the PGS will allow the US military to strike any target, in less than one hour, with high precision, resorting to hypersonic platforms. Faced with the risk of having its nuclear delivery platforms destroyed in a preemptive nuclear strike, China has been upgrading its nuclear arsenal. As already mentioned, the Chinese nuclear ground forces have been modified in order to have enhanced mobility and therefore more difficult to target (Galamas, 2015: 35-39).

Albeit the US is the main driving force behind the Chinese nuclear modernization, the nuclear progresses verified in India have an impact on the latter process as well. Point in fact, in 2015, the Pentagon mentioned in one of its report about China's military capabilities that India's nuclear endeavors were an additional driver for the Chinese nuclear modernization (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015: 31-32). Since India carried out its first "peaceful nuclear" explosion that China has been following closely New Delhi nuclear efforts. After the Indian 1974 nuclear test, the Chinese authorities responded with a thermonuclear test and throughout this decade expanded its ballistic missiles reach in order to cover Indian cities. However, China has avoided a direct competition with the Indian nuclear program and instead decided to support Pakistani nuclear capabilities opening another nuclear front forcing India to divert military capabilities away from China (Pardesi, 2015: 341).

This Chinese-Pakistani nuclear cooperation probably began in 1976, although it took more than a decade for both countries to sign a formal treaty on this topic, and it has allowed Islamabad to achieve significant nuclear progresses. According to published reports, in 1982 China supplied 50 kilograms of HEU to Pakistan to build two nuclear bombs and a year later a design for a 25Kt nuclear weapon was also given to the Pakistani military. But the nuclear assistance was not solely related to weapons as the cooperation included technical support in fissile material production. In 1985, Chinese technicians supported Pakistan's Kahuta facility in the production of weapons-enriched uranium and, seven years later, China announced the construction of a nuclear power plant in Pakistan. After the Pakistani 1998 nuclear tests, the joint nuclear efforts picked up pace and China agreed to support the construction of four nuclear reactors in Pakistan. More recently, the Chinese authorities announced further support for the construction of 5 additional nuclear reactors (Parameswaran, 2015). Moreover, additional Chinese assistance to the Pakistani

ballistic missile program has been also granted over the years. In 1988, Pakistan had access to Chinese M-11 nuclear capable short-range ballistic missiles and other accounts mention China's (as well as North Korea's) pivotal role in the *Hatf-1*, *Hatf-2* and *Shaheen* missile programs (Paul, 2003: 4-5).

All these efforts struck a nerve on India's strategic elite as New Delhi has yet to achieve an assured second strike capability against China. In order to achieve it, India has been upgrading its missiles (especially their range), developing a maritime nuclear deterrence and antimissile systems. For example, due to the limited range of the Indian nuclear bombers as the country lacks air-refueling capabilities – besides being unable to surpass the Chinese air defenses – a decision was made to start a missile program in 1983 (Kumar and Vannoni, 2004: 20). With the specific purpose of deterring China, ballistic missiles such as the *Agni-III* (3500 kilometers) and *Agni-V* (5000 kilometers) were developed (Chansoria, 2011: 2). Still, India wishes to add new nuclear delivery platforms as the currently and under development *Agni-VI* ICBM with 10 thousand kilometers range clearly demonstrates (Panda, 2015a). For India, the most important strategic nuclear objective is to have an assured second strike capability and, more importantly, capable of reaching the majority of Chinese cities.

Other missile upgrades include development of mobile canister-launchers to allow quicker missile launches as well as the addition of MIRV warheads to the Indian ballistic missiles in order to tackle the Chinese missile defense upgrades (Kristensen, 2013). Furthermore, factors as international prestige and great power aspirations are also important aspects to be considered when debating the development of long range missiles in India. A point worth mentioning is that India does not seek a quantitative parity towards the Chinese nuclear arsenal but aims to adapt its arsenal to the current security context and to the technological upgrades made by regional opponents in order to maintain its nuclear credibility.

If we consider nuclear tests, for instance, China has carried out around 45 tests with several types of nuclear devices while India has only performed six. Similar differences are also present in other aspects of the Indian atomic arsenal. Indian strategic community believes that an assured nuclear retaliation capability will only be achieved once India fully develops maritime nuclear delivery platforms (Pardesi, 2015: 343-344). Efforts in this direction have been made. India has already built a SSBN – the INS *Arihant* – which is currently undergoing sea trials while another three additional SSBN are planned for construction until 2020 (Saksena, 2015). The problem currently lies on the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) for these SSBN. India's only successfully tested SLBM, the K-15, has a 700 kilometers range which is insufficient to reach the major Chinese strategic assets. Another SLBM has been under development by India, the K-4, but its range (between 1500 and 3000 kilometers) is still insufficient to uphold a maritime nuclear deterrence capability

vis-à-vis China. Analysts consider that without a SLBM with 5000 kilometers range it is highly doubtful that India can target the majority of the cities in China without exposing their SSBN to the superior Chinese naval capabilities (Pardesi, 2015: 345). Other problems arise from command and control issues that the SSBN bring may also prove to be a significant hurdle for New Delhi.

Finally, India is developing an antimissile intercepting system. The idea for an Indian domestically-built missile defense system appeared in the 1990's after Pakistan acquired the Chinese supplied M-9 and M-11 missiles (Sharma, 2009: 1-5). Currently, the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is trying to develop a two-layered antimissile system (comprising the *Prithvi* Air Defence system and the Advanced Air Defence system) in order to intercept missiles (Narang, 2013: 146). Still years away from achieving operational status, the last tests have proved to be unsuccessful but carry a strong strategic impact to the region.

As India is seeking MIRV warheads to counter the possibility of a Chinese antimissile system, a similar impact could be witnessed in Pakistan. The lack of confidence in its nuclear delivery means may lead Pakistan into a quantitative and qualitative missile arms race to develop countermeasures for this particular Indian system. Another probable consequence could be a stronger Pakistan-China cooperation on nuclear and missile related topics.

Even though India has nuclear forces more than capable of deterring Pakistan, New Delhi has adapted some of its arsenal to the nuclear challenges brought by its western-neighboring country. Tactical ballistic missiles, such as the nuclear capable *Prahaar*, were developed to complement the Indian "Cold Start" limited war doctrine and to strike counterforce targets. It was likely a response to the Pakistan's development of the nuclear capable SRBM *Nasr* (O'Donnel, 2013).

Another important factor in the region's nuclear calculus is the 2008 US-India civilian nuclear cooperation deal, known as the 123 Agreement. Under this agreement, India would separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, place the former under IAEA safeguards and receive US civilian nuclear technology. The US also campaigned for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) approval of this deal and helped India to gain a "waiver" exempting it from fulfilling all of the NSG rules to access the civilian nuclear trade (Squassoni, 2010). Most importantly, these arrangements allow New Delhi to access uranium for its nuclear reactors and thus diverting its own uranium for military purposes. Some reports claim that the deal might put 8 Indian nuclear reactors, with a combined capability to produce enough fissile material for 280 nuclear weapons, outside of the AIEA's safeguards scope (Kerr and Nikitin, 2013: 7).

As a consequence, Pakistan has been improving its capabilities to increase the production of HEU and plutonium stock and, consequently, its nuclear arsenal (Squas-

soni, 2010). As China was also not pleased with this deal as well, it decided to support the Pakistani nuclear fuel endeavors and the construction of more nuclear reactors, such as Chasma-3 and Chasma-4 (Pant, 2012: 91-92). Notwithstanding the strategic importance of the US-India civilian nuclear deal, it is important to bear in mind that the latter does not constitute an alliance as India wishes to keep its strategic autonomy. On the other hand, it is highly doubtful that India will achieve an assured second strike capability in the short-term against China as its investments on its nuclear arsenal – like the new and mobile delivery means, MIRV warheads or missile defense systems – are likely to keep the nuclear military gap between New Delhi and Beijing. Still, the nuclear dynamic concerning these two countries is likely to remain stable over the short term as China clearly has a reliable second strike capability vis-à-vis India while the latter has an *existential deterrence* capability vis-à-vis China. This particular type of deterrence implies that although the Indian second strike capability is uncertain, the mere presence of nuclear weapons and delivery platforms generate sufficient risk of nuclear escalation thus creating a *de facto* nuclear deterrence between both countries (Narang, 2014: 6). Regarding Pakistan, India not only has a nuclear arsenal capable of deterring the former country but its conventional military apparatus is more than capable of handling any Pakistani conventional threat.

Concerning Indian conventional superiority, Pakistan's nuclear progresses present a specific challenge to the region. They do not solely represent a reaction against Indian nuclear developments but also to New Delhi's conventional military superiority. The justification for this posture lies on Pakistan's inferior military capabilities and the country's lack of strategic depth. It is also necessary to take into account the perception that exists in some Indian policy-makers that the country could survive a nuclear clash with Pakistan. The growth of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal also represents the necessity to have the ability to provoke unacceptable damage on India, in case a nuclear confrontation arises. Such "victory denial" strategy aims to prevent India from exploring any loophole in the Pakistani nuclear deterrence posture (Krepon, 2012: 22-23). Finally, and contrary to other nuclear weapons countries, Pakistan has no desire to international prestige or great power status (Izuyama and Ogawa, 2003: 66).

As India shifted its focus towards establishing a maritime nuclear deterrence capability and developing antimissile systems, Pakistan reacted accordingly. It began to develop cruise missiles in an attempt to surpass any India antimissile system. Besides, as India dedicates substantial investments to develop a SSBN with SLBM capability, Pakistan tries to overcome the absence of its own SLBM by developing cruise missiles for naval platforms, namely for its submarine fleet. Some analysts claim that the *Babur* cruise missile is being modified to be deployed by Pakistani submarines. Once more, China will support Pakistan in this endeavor as, in Octo-

ber of 2015, both countries signed a deal to build eight submarines (Ansari, 2015). All of these ballistic missile improvements are envisioned to reinforce Pakistan's second strike capability.

Another reason behind the progresses made on the Pakistani SRBM is the Indian "Cold Start" Doctrine. This limited war doctrine was developed in 2004 by the Indian Army in order to properly respond to Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir. It consists on the offensive use of India's conventional superiority to occupy small portions of the Pakistani territory (between 50 to 80 kilometers) in order to gain concessions from Islamabad (Ladwig III, 2008: 163-165). Basically, India wanted to devise a doctrine that would permit a retaliation against Pakistani support of violent non-state groups without crossing the nuclear threshold (Kanwal, 2010). As a response, Pakistan lowered the nuclear threshold and included tactical nuclear weapons as a response to the "Cold Start" Doctrine. For the first time, in October of 2015, Pakistan – through its Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhary – admitted the country's intention of using tactical and theater level nuclear weapons against India (Panda, 2015b). For this particular purpose, Pakistan has been testing SRBM like the *Nasr* and *Abdali* as a clear demonstration of its intention to employ tactical nuclear weapons if necessary (Dalton and Tandler, 2012: 17). As we look into the "action-reaction" cycle that characterizes this particular nuclear dynamic, it becomes clear that some of the reactions above described may jeopardize the regional nuclear stability.

Stability Risks in the Trilateral Nuclear Dynamic

When looking at the progresses made or planned by these three nuclear weapons countries, it is possible to identify some issues that may be able to have some destabilizing effects in the region. For example, the installation of MIRV warheads in nuclear delivery systems can yield a number of consequences. First, missiles with MIRV warheads significantly increase the first strike capability and, second, by creating a security dilemma in the opponent country, these vectors become a desirable target therefore inviting an opponent to strike first. If China or India pursue their intentions of installing MIRV warheads in their ballistic missiles, it is likely that the countries in the region may react accordingly.

The regional proliferation of cruise missiles and sea-based nuclear platforms may also be another element of instability. Not only are cruise missiles difficult to detect but they also are "dual-capable" which means that they can carry conventional warheads as well nuclear ones. This particular aspect is likely to create additional uncertainty in the opponent because it may misinterpret a conventional missile launch for a nuclear one (Krepon, 2012: 29).

Furthermore, bringing naval platforms into the regional nuclear deterrence formula could also provoke similar results for different reasons. India is building its

first SSBN and is trying to produce a SLBM with sufficient range to establish a more effective nuclear deterrence towards China. Pakistan, to counter these break-throughs, is planning to adapt nuclear cruise missiles for submarines. Both of each platforms require highly sophisticated and survivable communications systems so these can withstand an initial nuclear strike and be able to receive or cancel a retaliation order. The lack of these systems may lead to unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. Other identified issue is the changes in the nuclear force posture that these platforms provoke. For an adequate sea nuclear deterrence posture, the warhead and the delivery vector must be assembled instead of being separated as they usually are while on ground platforms. Such posture increases the level of readiness and requires that both navies do the utmost to prevent unintended use of nuclear weapons (Thomas-Noone and Medcalf, 2015: 10).

Another problem lies in the "action-reaction" cycle behind this trilateral nuclear dynamic. If we look into the particular case of China, as it aims to consolidate a great power status it is modernizing the nuclear arsenal to deter the US, which is likely to influence India to improve its own nuclear weapons which will then fuel a regional arms race with Pakistan (Hagerty, 2014: 309).

The nuclear posture of India itself also presents some destabilizing elements. As already explained, the official doctrine is based on a credible minimum deterrence in order to dissuade two opponents with different nuclear forces. Because China is India's main nuclear opponent, it attempts to balance its nuclear arsenal mainly with Beijing instead of Islamabad. The instability rises as India's endeavors to maintain a credible minimum deterrence with China will logically unbalance its nuclear dynamic with Pakistan. Another element of this doctrine that requires further analysis is the "No-First Use" policy. When looking at the Indian Prime Minister's Office press release describing the nuclear doctrine it is possible to read "however, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons" (Indian Prime Minister's Office, 2003).

By admitting the use of nuclear weapons against biological or chemical attacks, India is falling into a "Commitment Trap".[3] Such decision can bring additional

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3   The "Commitment Trap" is a terminology used by nuclear theorist Scott Sagan in his article "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks" in which he addresses the unnecessary risks present when States threaten the use of nuclear weapons against chemical or biological weapons attacks. More specifically the author claims that "… the current nuclear doctrine creates a 'commitment trap': threats to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack are credible, because if CW or BW are used despite such threats, the U.S. president would feel compelled to retaliate with nuclear weapons to maintain his or her international and domestic reputation for honoring commitments". See Sagan (2000: 85-115).

misperceptions risks that could ultimately lead to an unjustified use of nuclear weapons, thus steering away from what truly constitutes a "No-First Use" policy. Finally, India must be aware that the improvements made in its nuclear arsenal will not only fuel the described nuclear "action-reaction" cycle but lead to a reinforced nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and China as well.

Regarding Pakistan, its nuclear strategy and attempt to have "full-spectrum" deterrence also generate additional risks for the regional nuclear stability (*e.g.* the inherent problems linked to the presence of submarine-based cruise missiles). Accordingly, tactical nuclear weapons can present Pakistan with similar situations linked to the required pre-delegation of launch authorization given to tactical/operational commanders or the pre-mating of warheads in the delivery systems that can undermine some of the safeguards against unauthorized/accidental use of nuclear weapons. As the assembled weapons make their way to the battlefield, one should also assume the possibility that they might be stolen by non-state groups. Finally, the geographical proximity and the lack of real-time surveillance create a challenge for deterrence stability especially when it includes the use of tactical nuclear weapons possibility (Fitzpatrick, 2013: 51).

Conclusion

Analyzing the nuclear issues that hang over South Asia is not an easy task as it goes well beyond the bilateral conundrum that embeds the India-Pakistan diplomatic relationship. To properly interpret the facts that surround South Asian nuclear weapons issues requires that we do not overlook the dynamic that exists between India and China. Changing the analysis framework from a bilateral perspective to a trilateral one enables us to adequately understand the nuclear dynamics in this region and its impacts.

Considering this particular aspect, addressing the tensions between India and Pakistan – as advocated in some published analysis – will only solve some of the causes behind the nuclear tensions in South Asia. The strategic dynamic between China and India – including its nuclear dimension – has been an overlooked topic in most of the nuclear weapons literature focusing on Asia. Still, and albeit overlooked, in order to further stabilize this trilateral nuclear dynamic, it is pivotal to understand how these nuclear arsenals influence each other to further mitigate their mutual impact.

Another important issue surrounding this trilateral strategic dynamic is linked to the US nuclear arsenal and its impact on the Chinese nuclear weapons arsenal. Trying to address the strategic problems regarding nuclear weapons in South Asia will also need to take into consideration this latter aspect. As the dimensions of the Chinese and Indian nuclear arsenals are difficult to compare in terms of quantity and quality, it would make more sense to have China negotiating with the US and

Russia on nuclear weapons limitations.[4] Even if with a very specific scope, such agreement could serve as an incentive and a confidence building measure for India to engage in a similar initiative with Pakistan.

Finally, in order to tackle the problematic diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and India, policy-makers must understand that nuclear weapons are not the cause but one of the symptoms of the latent instability between both countries. Accordingly, basing any bilateral negotiations on the core issues behind the Pakistan-India animosity, instead of focusing solely on the nuclear weapons, could have a positive spillover effect and possibly allow for a decrease of the nuclear threat in South Asia.

Finally, the stabilization of the trilateral nuclear dynamics in South Asia requires not only the involvement of China, India and Pakistan but also of other countries that, albeit not directly involved, still directly exert a strong influence in this dynamic, namely the US. Failing to do so will only perpetuate the South Asian nuclear "action-reaction" cycle and exacerbate the threats that undermine the fragile regional stability.

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4   For further details see Federation of American Scientists reports on the Chinese Nuclear Forces at http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/4/77.full.pdf and on the Indian Nuclear Forces at http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/5/77.full.pdf.

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Extra Dossiê

Mulheres nas Fileiras:
Os Papéis das Militares da NATO
nos Teatros de Operações na
Primeira Década do Século XXI

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Resumo

Perante a existência de mulheres nas fileiras das Forças Armadas dos países da NATO, importa aprofundar o conhecimento sobre a sua participação em operações. Neste sentido, faz-se uma caracterização da situação dos militares femininos nas Forças Armadas de alguns países, antes e durante a primeira década do século XXI, compara-se a taxa de feminização das forças destacadas com as das organizações militares a que pertenciam e identificam-se as principais funções que desempenhavam, no quotidiano e em operações. Nesta análise é dada especial atenção às militares portuguesas. Adicionalmente, apresentam-se diversas situações onde a presença dos militares femininos era considerada essencial para a eficiência e eficácia das missões e operações de paz, bem como as razões para a necessidade de inclusão de uma perspetiva de género nas organizações militares.

Abstract
Women in the Ranks: The Roles of NATO's Military Women in Operations During the First Decade of the 21st Century

Considering the presence of women in the ranks of NATO countries Armed Forces, it is important to further the knowledge about their participation in operations. Towards this, a characterization of the situation of female soldiers is made in several countries, before and during the first decade of the 21st century. The rate of female participation in deployed military forces is compared with that of the military organizations to which they belong to and the key tasks assigned to military women, daily and in operations, are identified. In this analysis, a special attention is given to Portuguese military women. Additionally, several situations where the presence of female militaries was considered essential for the efficiency and effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations are presented, as well as the reasons for including a gender perspective in military organizations.

Introdução

> *"We can no longer afford to minimize or ignore the contributions of women
> and girls to all stages of conflict resolution, peacemaking, peace-building,
> peacekeeping and reconstruction process. Sustainable peace will not be
> achieved without the full and equal participation of women and men."*
>
> (Kofi Annan, 2002)[1]

Ao longo da História, as mulheres têm desempenhado papéis em situações de con-
flitos armados que não devem ser ignorados. Os conflitos, armados e violentos, não
pressupõem apenas a fase de violência pública e declarada. Incluem, igualmente, a
fase anterior ao conflito e a fase pós-conflito. Em todos estes momentos as mulheres
estão presentes, seja enquanto vítimas diretas, seja enquanto sobreviventes das
guerras e agentes de resolução de conflitos e de construção da paz ou, ainda,
enquanto atuantes diretos na violência.

A comunidade internacional tem vindo a ganhar consciência da necessidade de
uma maior participação das mulheres nos processos de tomada de decisão e na
condução das missões de paz, reforçada pela Resolução 1325 do Conselho de Segu-
rança das Nações Unidas (RCSNU) e pela *Bi-Strategic Command* (Bi-SC) 40-1 da
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), nas quais se afirma a importância da
plena participação das mulheres, em pé de igualdade com os homens, nos esforços
de manutenção e de promoção da paz e da segurança. Também as políticas nacio-
nais, que visam a implementação de uma perspetiva de género, têm assumido rele-
vância nas organizações militares, onde se incluem as Forças Armadas e as equipas
destacadas para os teatros de operações (ONU, 2000; NATO, 2009a).

Os Papéis das Mulheres nos Conflitos Armados

Os efeitos dos conflitos armados nas sociedades são diversos e afetam a população
de forma diferenciada. Embora sejam os homens os que mais morrem, são igual-
mente os que mais matam em tempos de conflitos armados. Embora as mulheres
também participem na violência, acima de tudo, resistem-lhe e sofrem as suas con-
sequências. Como tal, os diversos papéis desempenhados pelo sexo feminino,
voluntaria e involuntariamente, nos teatros de guerra e nas missões e operações de
paz e segurança internacionais devem ser observados (Keyser, 2006).

A Mulher enquanto Vítima

Os impactos dos conflitos armados na vida de mulheres e meninas podem fazer-se
sentir de diversas formas. Em resultado da sua condição, além de ser uma das prin-

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1 Kofi Annan, ex-Secretário Geral da ONU, no seu relatório sobre "Mulheres, Paz e Segurança",
de outubro de 2002.

cipais vítimas de violência estrutural e cultural, o sexo feminino tem sido, ao longo dos séculos, vítima de violência doméstica ou intrafamiliar e de violência sexual (assédio, violação, escravatura sexual, prostituição forçada, doenças sexualmente transmissíveis, gravidez forçada, esterilização forçada, tráfico sexual) que, em cenários de guerra, ocorrem tanto na esfera pública como na privada (Keyser, 2006). Adicionalmente a estas formas de violência, o fenómeno das "crianças soldado", comummente associado apenas às crianças do sexo masculino, afeta de forma particular as meninas, pois também elas são recrutadas por grupos armados que as coagem a lutar, muito embora sejam utilizadas, sobretudo, como cozinheiras, enfermeiras e escravas sexuais – sendo, por vezes, intituladas de "esposas" (Enloe, 2007).

As mulheres e meninas, por serem as principais sobreviventes das guerras, constituem a maioria dos refugiados internacionais e dos deslocados no seu próprio país. Após o término dos conflitos, as mulheres ficam, frequentemente, sozinhas, com a responsabilidade de criar os filhos e de reconstruir as suas comunidades. Para além disso, permanecem sujeitas a todo o tipo de violência que já tinha sido tornada quotidiana ao longo da guerra e que não desaparece com o cessar do conflito. Porém, este e outro tipo de questões sociais tendem a ser descurados, porquanto os programas da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) e dos governos tendem a referir-se, unicamente, à reconstrução pós-bélica material, de instituições e estruturas (Moura, 2003).

A Mulher enquanto Vetor de Paz

Se, no passado, a defesa das fronteiras, a luta pela glória e a coexistência de crenças e culturas distintas consistiam nas principais razões para os homens se agruparem e se confrontarem e, se num passado mais recente, os conflitos existentes eram, essencialmente, os "tradicionais" confrontos entre Estados, em que o antagonista era amplamente conhecido, presentemente, e desde o fim da Guerra-Fria, já não é fácil identificar as verdadeiras razões que conduzem aos conflitos e nem reconhecer a força opositora, que se camufla entre a população civil, que usa armas que não as convencionais e que é motivada por fundamentalismos religiosos, difíceis de entender à luz da cultura ocidental (Kaldor, 2001).

É a par com uma disparidade de realidades concomitantes que, na última viragem de século, a comunidade internacional sentiu que devia adaptar-se, de forma a ser capaz de enfrentar os novos desafios. Nem sempre o recurso à força é a solução, o poder militar não é sinónimo de vitória e é imperativo respeitar o direito, liberdade e garantias dos povos. Cada vez mais se recorre à diplomacia, ao uso de armas com elevada precisão, que permitem minimizar os danos colaterais, e pessoal altamente qualificado, capaz de manusear os sistemas tecnologicamente desenvolvidos que se encontram ao dispor da prática da guerra (ONU, 2009).

Perante estes desafios, seria expectável que, na primeira década do século XXI, já existisse uma maior partilha do poder e da decisão e, consequentemente, as mulhe-

res estivessem mais presentes nos processos de negociação, manutenção, consolidação e de imposição da paz, não só pelos impactos das guerras nas suas vidas mas, também, porque trazem perspetivas distintas para as negociações que influenciam o seu próprio destino. Elas experienciam mais claramente o conflito como um continuum e possuem uma perceção mais abrangente, vendo para além da violência pública direta (Anderlini, 2000; Moser e Mcilwaine, 2004).

Porém, as mulheres encontravam-se limitadas, regra geral, a atividades de cariz informal, mais ou menos visíveis, na sua maioria ao nível das comunidades, com um campo de ação reduzido, embora fosse reconhecida a importância das organizações locais de mulheres na desmobilização, reconciliação entre comunidades, defesa dos direitos humanos, democratização, desenvolvimento, combate à pobreza e iliteracia, recuperação económica e promoção da tolerância intercultural (Moura, 2003). Para conseguir uma atuação mais marcante, as mulheres precisaram de conquistar os lugares de topo e penetrar nas estruturas de domínio tradicionalmente masculino, incluindo as instituições militares (Elshtain, 2000).

As Mulheres enquanto Vetores de Guerra

As análises sobre a participação das mulheres nos conflitos armados têm sido moldadas por estereótipos, fazendo com que esta se resuma, essencialmente, aos papéis das mulheres enquanto vítimas de guerra ou enquanto agentes de paz. No entanto, alguns acontecimentos trazidos a público, provocando ondas de grande indignação, demonstram que as mulheres, tal como os homens, são capazes de desempenhar papéis mais violentos que contrariam esses estereótipos socialmente construídos. O escândalo de Abu Ghraib, revelado pela imprensa em 2004 através da divulgação de fotografias das torturas e humilhações impostas a prisioneiros iraquianos, perpetradas por militares, homens e mulheres, dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA), é disso um exemplo (Wright, 2006; Enloe , 2007).

As mulheres bombistas suicidas, cujo número tem aumentado nos últimos anos, são outro exemplo. Várias causas têm sido apontadas para explicar este fenómeno: a primeira é inerente ao afastamento dos planos político, económico e social a que algumas mulheres têm sido votadas, particularmente nos países islâmicos; a segunda diz respeito ao fundamentalismo religioso, que faz apelo ao martírio e encontra eco junto dessas mulheres que procuram a igualdade e o reconhecimento social; a terceira tem por base a mediatização generalizada destas situações e o seu impacto sobre jovens vulneráveis, aumentando a atração pelas ofensivas suicidas, na esperança de a sua morte trazer honra à sua família (Keyser, 2006).[2]

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2   Nas sociedades islâmicas a violação de uma mulher constitui um crime de honra contra toda a família, que se sente no direito de assassinar a vítima para recuperar a honra perdida. Os suicídios ofensivos ganham adeptos junto de jovens mulheres que, depois de violadas, são poupa-

Por outro lado, as mulheres, muitas vezes socialmente desvalorizadas e excluídas da esfera política, revelam-se fontes de informação importantes. Não é pelo facto de viverem "aprisionadas" dentro do seu próprio lar que deixam de ouvir, ver, sentir e de ter opinião. A Eurodeputada Ana Maria Gomes[3], pela sua experiência enquanto Embaixadora de Portugal na Indonésia, não tem dúvidas de que as mulheres nativas se socorrem da invisibilidade, que lhes é conferida pelas próprias comunidades masculinizadas, para encobrir a sua participação nos conflitos, quer como "correios", agentes de guerrilhas e elementos das forças da resistência, quer auxiliando pessoas escondidas.

A Presença das Mulheres nos Campos de Batalha: uma Retrospetiva Histórica
Embora haja infindáveis escritos sobre as façanhas masculinas em campanhas, poucos são aqueles que fazem menção à participação das mulheres nas mesmas. Porém, algumas imagens que retratam acampamentos militares seculares, assim como as poucas referências escritas sobre a presença de mulheres nos mesmos, indicam que estas, durante muitos séculos, acompanharam as deslocações dos exércitos, cabendo-lhes as tarefas diárias de apoio à vivência dentro dos acampamentos. Elas eram lavadeiras, cozinheiras, aguadeiras, "enfermeiras" e afiançavam a satisfação sexual dos militares. Ou seja, as tarefas desempenhadas pelas mulheres no círculo militar eram uma continuação das tarefas que desempenhavam no círculo doméstico.

Esta presença começou a ser mal vista, e até mesmo proibida, quando os comandantes se aperceberam que perdiam mais homens vítimas de doenças sexualmente transmissíveis do que em combate (Carreiras, 2004). Outro fator que terá contribuído para fazer desaparecer a presença feminina dos acampamentos foi a impossibilidade das unidades militares transportarem, sem encargos, as mulheres que as acompanhavam. Talvez por isso, em nenhum outro momento, as Forças Armadas foram tão exclusivamente masculinas como durante as décadas anteriores à Primeira Guerra Mundial (van Creveld, 2000).

A presença de mulheres nos campos de batalha volta a emergir de forma marcante com a necessidade de assistência médico-sanitária em campanha. Por exemplo, no ano 1934 apareceram em França as primeiras "enfermeiras do ar", enfermeiras que possuíam formação em para-quedismo para poderem ser empenhadas no serviço da guerra, nos próprios campos de combate (Grão, 2006).

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das à morte mas, porém, são estigmatizadas e excluídas do plano social. Face às suas reduzidas expectativas de vida, estas mulheres sentem-se compelidas a vingarem-se do inimigo que as desonrou (Keyser, 2006).

3   Entrevista à eurodeputada Ana Maria Gomes em 22 de Abril de 2010, no Gabinete do Parlamento Europeu em Portugal, sito em Lisboa.

Posto isto, e não obstante o facto de, ao longo dos tempos, a maioria das mulheres ter desempenhado os papéis que socialmente lhes foram atribuídos, elas optam, cada vez mais, por áreas tradicionalmente masculinas, assumindo papéis que eram exclusivamente da competência dos homens. A existência de mulheres uniformizadas nas Forças Armadas e, consequentemente, nos teatros de operações são disso bons exemplos.

O Recrutamento Generalizado de Mulheres para as Forças Armadas dos Países NATO

O início da presença de mulheres militares nas Forças Armadas dos países NATO ocorreu, em regra, durante a Primeira e Segunda Guerras Mundiais, altura em que as mulheres começaram a assumir papéis mais diretos nos conflitos, envergando os uniformes das respetivas Forças Armadas. As mulheres foram chamadas para o esforço de guerra com o intuito de prestarem auxílio aos exércitos na retaguarda, libertando, assim, os homens válidos para as tarefas de combate. Embora recrutadas, essencialmente, para os serviços médico-sanitários, surgiu, igualmente, a necessidade de recorrer à mão-de-obra disponível – as mulheres – para garantir o normal funcionamento dos serviços de apoio dentro das organizações militares. Apesar dos países admitirem o valor, coragem e sentido patriótico do contributo destas mulheres, estas foram sendo desmobilizadas nos anos seguintes, após o término da guerra (NATO, 2001).

A par com a consciencialização social de que homens e mulheres devem ter os mesmos direitos, começaram a surgir leis nacionais e internacionais que fomentavam o recrutamento das cidadãs para as organizações militares, indo ao encontro do que era estabelecido na Constituição de diversas nações: a não discriminação com base no sexo. Contudo, na génese do recrutamento feminino estiveram outras questões para além da igualdade de oportunidades e a eliminação da segregação com base no sexo. A reestruturação das Forças Armadas que ocorreu no seio da generalidade dos países NATO, despoletada pela criação da *"All-Volunteer Force"* nos EUA, deu, igualmente, um enorme contributo. Esta opção americana em conceber uma força militar profissionalizada, alimentada unicamente por voluntários, e que foi sendo adotada pelos restantes países da Aliança, levou à redução da dimensão das forças militares e ao influxo de mulheres, que surge para colmatar as lacunas criadas pela falta de candidatos homens (NATO, 2001).

Na verdade, das dinâmicas sociais que começavam a emergir, particularmente em meados do século passado, uma que assumiu bastante relevância foi o desapego dos jovens do sexo masculino pelas instituições militares, com as quais já não se identificavam, e que resultou num desinteresse pelo alistamento voluntário. Este desinteresse, associado à necessidade de compensar a diminuição da taxa de natalidade e ao facto de muitos governos não quererem recrutar cidadãos das minorias éticas e

raciais, nas quais não depositavam confiança, conduziu à abertura das fileiras às mulheres. O alargamento do recrutamento aos jovens do sexo feminino surge, assim, como a melhor solução. Esta solução acarretava, ainda, duas vantagens: as mulheres traziam consigo níveis de formação elevados e contribuíam para a imagem de modernização que as forças militares pretendiam transmitir (Enloe, 2007).

É, pois, no seio desta conjuntura que, entre as décadas de 70 e 90 do século XX, ocorre o recrutamento generalizado das mulheres para as forças militares dos países da NATO, revelando-se um processo demorado. Se em muitos países existia o serviço militar obrigatório para os homens, em simultâneo com a contratação de voluntários, o recrutamento de mulheres foi, desde o início, na base do voluntariado. No entanto, o recrutamento feminino apresentava muitas restrições, nomeadamente no que respeitava às funções permitidas. Elas eram recrutadas, na sua maioria, para os serviços de apoio e médico-sanitários, estando excluídas das funções de combate, próximas do combate e submarinos. Também o número de mulheres recrutadas estava, muitas vezes, limitado às quotas máximas estabelecidas. Estas restrições deviam-se, principalmente, aos condicionalismos materiais, como a falta de capacidade das infraestruturas para acomodar mais elementos femininos, e às barreiras culturais. Em termos de postos, muitos países optaram, primeiro, pelo recrutamento para os estabelecimentos de ensino superior militares e, consequentemente, para a categoria de Oficiais. Somente numa fase posterior, é que o recrutamento foi alargado às categorias de Sargentos e Praças (NATO, 2001).

As Mulheres Militares da NATO na Primeira Década do Século XXI
Na viragem de século, a NATO encontrava-se a estudar a melhor forma de atrair, selecionar, treinar e empregar as mulheres, de modo a maximizar a sua contribuição para a eficiência e eficácia das missões, permitindo que homens e mulheres trabalhassem juntos sem dificuldades (ONU, 2002).

Durante a primeira década do século XXI, o fim generalizado do serviço militar obrigatório, a redução das forças militares, a falta de candidatos, especialmente homens, e a influência dos instrumentos nacionais e internacionais de promoção da igualdade de género, levaram a que as Forças Armadas, na maioria dos países NATO, se preocupassem em recrutar mais mulheres e em retê-las nas fileiras (figura 1).

Estas preocupações geraram um conjunto de medidas que pretendiam, do ponto de vista externo, tornar a carreira mais atrativa e, do ponto de vista interno, criar igualdade de oportunidades entre homens e mulheres e a facilitar a conciliação entre a vida castrense e a familiar (Carrilho, 2007). Neste sentido, as restrições ao serviço militar feminino foram sendo abolidas, as quotas removidas e as barreiras culturais derrubadas. Na verdade, muitos países, extinguiram as limitações à presença feminina, optando por introduzir alterações aos locais de trabalho, incluindo nos navios

e submarinos, bem como aos procedimentos e à ergonomia dos equipamentos, para que determinadas tarefas e funções pudessem ser desempenhadas igualmente por mulheres (NATO, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b; 2010a).

Figura 1 – Percentagem do Pessoal Militar Feminino nas Forças Armadas dos Países NATO – 2001 a 2009 (Adaptado da informação disponibilizada nos relatórios nacionais anuais elaborados no âmbito do NCGP[4])

Em termos de recrutamento, regra geral, os critérios de seleção baseavam-se nas capacidades pessoais e nas qualificações profissionais. Na avaliação física, com a exceção das funções que exigiam requisitos físicos específicos, como por exemplo nas forças especiais, todos os requisitos físicos básicos aplicados tinham em consideração as diferenças fisiológicas entre géneros e a idade dos militares. Embora em muitos países as mulheres tivessem acesso a todas as funções, era-lhes difícil atingir os requisitos físicos específicos exigidos para as armas combatentes. Como tal, e também em virtude das suas preferências, a maioria continuava a servir nos serviços de apoio e médicos, embora muitas já desempenhassem funções operacionais e técnicas e, outras, assumissem as funções de comandantes de pelotão e, até mesmo, de navios (NATO, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b; 2010a).

No que concerne às promoções, os critérios aplicados eram iguais para todos os militares. No entanto, em determinadas armas e especialidades um dos critérios prendia-se com a experiência operacional no terreno, que no caso das mulheres ainda era muito reduzida, consistindo, por isso, num entrave à progressão na carreira. Quanto aos postos ocupados pelos militares femininos, questão dependente da longevidade da carreira, os militares femininos já tinham ascendido à categoria de Oficial-General em alguns países, nomeadamente na Alemanha, Canadá, EUA, Holanda e Noruega, embora numa percentagem muito reduzida. Esta dificuldade em ter mulheres em posições de liderança resultava da dificuldade em reter os elementos femininos nas Forças Armadas que, por não conseguirem conciliar os deve-

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4   *NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives.*

res profissionais com a família, abandonavam a vida militar (NATO, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b; 2010a).

Em 2010, os Estados-membros prosseguiam, assim, com os seus esforços para encontrar a melhor forma de integrar as capacidades individuais e a diversidade existente no seio das fileiras, traduzidos, por exemplo, na constituição de equipas mistas em proveito da prontidão e flexibilidade das suas Forças Armadas e, consequentemente, para incluir uma perspetiva de género nas organizações militares, nacionais e internacionais, particularmente na preparação e condução das operações militares de apoio à paz (NATO, 2007a; 2008a; 2010b; ONU, 2010b, 2010c).

A Representação dos Militares Femininos nos Contingentes Destacados ao Longo da Primeira Década do Século XXI

Na maioria dos países NATO, as mulheres fizeram-se representar nas operações militares internacionais desde o início do seu recrutamento. Paralelamente, os países foram adotando medidas, impulsionados grandemente pela RCSNU 1325 (2000), para incentivar a participação das suas militares nas missões e operações de paz, de forma a atingir um equilíbrio homem/mulher das forças destacadas (ONU, 2002). Porém, no ano em que se comemorou o décimo aniversário da referida resolução (2010) constatava-se que a presença de militares femininos nos teatros de operações era, ainda, muito diminuta (ONU, 2010a).

Algumas razões podem ser apontadas para justificar esta reduzida taxa de feminização dos teatros de operações. A sub-representação das mulheres militares nas operações militares era, sobretudo, um sintoma da baixa representação feminina nas Forças Armadas da generalidade dos países nelas envolvidos, consistindo, por isso, na razão principal (NATO, 2010a; 2010b; ONU, 2010b; 2010c).

Porém, a percentagem de militares femininos a participar em missões e operações de paz e segurança era muito inferior à percentagem total de militares femininos nas Forças Armadas de cada país (tabela 1). Uma explicação possível prende-se com o facto de, na generalidade dos países NATO, a seleção do pessoal para integrar os contingentes a destacar ser com base no voluntariado. Atendendo a que a maioria dos destacamentos tinha uma duração entre três a seis meses, existindo a possibilidade de se estenderem no tempo, e sendo a conciliação entre os deveres familiares e profissionais uma das maiores preocupações e dificuldades sentidas pelas mulheres militares, uma participação nas missões sem carácter obrigatório inviabilizaria qualquer tipo de participação, porquanto não havia voluntárias. Este facto foi confirmado pelas entrevistas efetuadas a militares femininos de vários países NATO[5].

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5   Entrevistas realizadas durante 2010 a oito militares femininos estrangeiros (países NATO e parceiros para a paz) com experiência em teatros de guerra (uma Tenente-Coronel holandesa,

Para fazer face a esta dificuldade, as Forças Armadas de muitos dos países da Aliança, como forma de atrair e reter os jovens nas fileiras, trataram de criar legislação com vista a proteger todos os elementos com filhos menores a seu cargo, de modo a restringir o destacamento das militares mães e o destacamento dos pais nos casos de famílias monoparentais, assim como o destacamento simultâneo dos elementos de um casal, nos casos em que ambos os cônjuges são militares (NATO, 2008a).

Tabela 1 – Situação das Militares dos Países NATO em 2010
(adaptado da informação disponibilizada nos relatórios nacionais anuais
elaborados no âmbito do NCGP)

Situação das Militares dos Países NATO (2010)						
País	% Total Militares Femininos	% Generais Femininos	% Oficiais Superiores Femininos	% Capitães e Oficiais Subalternos	% Sargentos Femininos	% Praças Femininos	% Militares Femininos a Participar em Operações Militares
Alemanha	8,9	0,24	5,58	1,12	6,62	12,31	-
Bélgica	8,0		8,9		6,6	9,1	7,9
Bulgária	13,0	0,0	0,08	0,6	2,61	9,7	6,6
Canadá	15,0	3,7	11,3	18,7	12,5	15,2	10,1
Dinamarca	5,2	0,0	4,5		3,9	6,2	6,1
Eslováquia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eslovénia	15,54	0,0	12,44	7,29	25,47	35,68	7,89
Espanha	21,1		6,0		2,0	17,7	9,0
EUA	15,5	9,2	10,0	18,6	13,8	17,9	4,3
França	14,2	0,15	9,8		13,5	14,2	5,5
Grécia	13,5	0,81	2,96	15,68	21,15	15,27	1,46
Holanda	9,0	2,0	5,0	11,0	7,0	11,0	7,0
Hungria	20,0	0,0	10,0	24,0	26,0	10,0	-
Itália	0,97	0,0	0,0	0,16	0,32	0,49	3,38
Letónia	21,7		14,6		23,2	13,1	0,45
Lituânia	11,5	0,0	7,1	11,7	10,4	12,0	2,9
Luxemburgo	5,79	0,0	4,34	11,76	6,28	5,44	5,86
Noruega	8,6	2,0	6,0	8,8	11,4	8,9	6,6[5]
Polónia	1,79	0,0	0,79	5,87	1,46	0,70	1,30
Portugal	13,95	0,0	1,89	22,74	7,65	18,26	4,74
Reino Unido	13,6		9,7		9,5		-
Rep. Checa	13,3	1,42	4,7	13,7	17,45	-	0,2
Roménia	3,16	2,63	4,55	6,18	5,46	0,47	-
Turquia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,57

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uma Major francesa, uma Capitão americana, uma Tenente e uma Sargento alemãs, uma Tenente e uma Sargento irlandesas e uma Tenente turca). Algumas das militares entrevistadas confessaram terem sido voluntárias numa altura em que ainda não tinham filhos a seu cargo. A Tenente da Irlanda referiu mesmo que, no seu país, muitos Oficiais Subalternos eram voluntários para participarem em operações militares no exterior, situação que se alterava quando começavam a ter filhos. Também a Tenente turca, pertencente aos quadros da força naval, considerava os constantes destacamentos a que estava sujeita como condição necessária para fazer parte da guarnição de um navio e que tal não acarretava dificuldades para a sua vida pessoal por não ter responsabilidades familiares.

Nação e Defesa

Outra razão para a reduzida representação feminina nos teatros de operações pren-dia-se diretamente com os objetivos da missão à qual os contingentes destacados prestavam apoio. Para a sua maioria eram requeridos militares de armas combaten-tes e de unidades terrestres de combate-próximo, áreas onde as mulheres ainda estavam sub-representadas (NATO, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b; 2010a).

Quanto às funções e tarefas desempenhadas, os militares femininos serviam nos teatros de operações nos mesmos serviços em que serviam no seu quotidiano e para as quais receberam formação e se encontravam qualificadas, ou seja, nos serviços médicos e de apoio. Porém, começavam a prestar apoio às operações militares em funções tradicionalmente masculinas, nomeadamente, em áreas técnicas e opera-cionais, como operadores de rádio e pilotos de caças (NATO, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b; 2010a).

Quanto aos postos das militares destacados, estes eram os mais baixos de cada categoria. Embora, em 2010, já existissem militares femininos a desempenharem funções de comandante de serviços, pelotão ou companhia nos teatros de guerra, a atribuição de funções de liderança aos elementos femininos era ainda muito redu-zida, fruto de, na generalidade dos países, a taxa de feminização dos postos mais elevados – Oficiais-Generais e Oficiais Superiores – ser ainda muito diminuta. Assim, não existiam muitas mulheres militares que reunissem as condições neces-sárias (posto e especialidade) para comandar as tropas no terreno (NATO, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b; 2010a).

De acordo com a ONU, em 2010, a percentagem de mulheres civis a participar nas missões e operações de paz e segurança das Nações Unidas tinha atingido os 30% (ONU, 2010a). Inclusivamente, em julho desse ano, duas mulheres encontravam-se a conduzir operações de paz como Representantes Especiais do Secretário-Geral (RESG) da ONU e três eram vice-RESG. O progresso para as componentes unifor-mizadas apresentava-se mais moroso, embora a ONU se encontrasse a desenvolver esforços junto dos Estados-membros para aumentar o número de mulheres farda-das neste tipo de operações. A título de exemplo, em junho de 2010, apenas dois por cento dos 87 mil militares eram mulheres. No entanto, já existiam contingentes em operações de manutenção de paz constituídos unicamente por mulheres como, por exemplo, o "*Formed Police Unit*" da Índia, destacado em 2007 para a *United Nations Mission in Liberia* (UNMIL), onde a própria função de *Deputy Force Commander* foi atribuída a uma mulher[6].

Assim se conclui que, no fim da primeira década do século XXI, as missões e opera-ções militares internacionais continuavam a ser um contexto onde a representação

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6   Informação disponível em http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/gender.shtml.

masculina era muito superior à feminina, a atribuição de funções de comando e chefia às mulheres militares era ainda muito reduzida e as tarefas por elas desempenhadas nos teatros de guerra, tal como no seu trabalho diário dentro das organizações militares em que serviam, eram, sobretudo, nos serviços médicos e de apoio, apesar de se ter registado um aumento de militares femininos a desempenharem tarefas em áreas mais técnicas e operacionais.

As Militares Portuguesas nos Teatros de Operações

Também em Portugal é com a necessidade de assistência médico sanitária em campanha que se inicia o recrutamento feminino. Em Junho de 1918, durante a Primeira Grande Guerra, 12 enfermeiras da Cruz Vermelha Portuguesa solicitaram a incorporação no Corpo Expedicionário Português (CPE), formando o primeiro Grupo Auxiliar das Damas Enfermeiras e tendo sido as primeiras mulheres a serem aceites pelo exército. No total, meia centena de Damas Enfermeiras, graduadas em Alferes e Tenente, viria a servir no CPE (Grão, 2006).

Posteriormente, entre 26 de maio de 1961 e 1 de junho de 1974, 42 enfermeiras para-quedistas foram largadas nas áreas de combate nas províncias Ultramarinas, com o objetivo de aí prestarem assistência médica, em locais de difícil acesso, a bordo de aeronaves e em missões de especial responsabilidade, muitas vezes debaixo de fogo. Estas seriam mesmo as únicas mulheres que, nesse período, em todo o Ocidente, se encontravam a prestar serviço na frente de combate (Grão, 2006).

No fim do século XX, as militares portuguesas já haviam sido destacadas para prestarem apoio a várias operações militares, nas quais desempenharam um leque alargado de funções. Entre estas militares encontravam-se Oficiais médicas, especialistas de comunicações, cozinheiras, mecânicas e elementos dos serviços administrativos. Os destacamentos eram com base no voluntariado e tinham, por norma, uma duração de seis meses. Só no caso de não existirem voluntários em áreas e especialidades criticas, como por exemplo Oficiais médicos, a nomeação era obrigatória. Na viragem do século, esse princípio manteve-se, significando que o pessoal feminino, tendo as qualificações necessárias, podia ser voluntário ou nomeado para participar em operações militares internacionais, sem quaisquer restrições (NATO, 2001).

Durante a primeira década do século XXI verificou-se um aumento dos militares do sexo feminino nas armas combatentes, o que explica o facto da participação de militares femininos nas missões internacionais ter tido maior expressão, particularmente, no Exército (NATO, 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007b; 2008b; 2009b; 2010a).

Em bom rigor, o ano em que se registou uma maior percentagem de militares femininos a participar em operações militares foi 2009 (MDN, 2006; 2009a; 2009b). O ramo com uma maior proporção de efetivos femininos destacados era o Exército

(13,39%), seguindo-se a Marinha (11,11%) e, por fim, a Força Aérea (4,69%). Em 30 de Janeiro desse ano, concretamente, 70 militares femininos (5 Oficiais, 11 Sargentos e 54 Praças) encontravam-se destacados em apoio a várias operações de paz, nomeadamente, *Kosovo Force* (KFOR), *United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon* (UNIFIL) e *Standing NATO Maritime Group* 1 (SNMG1), representando cerca de 10% do universo de 706 militares destacados.

De acordo com a informação facultado pelo Ministério da Defesa Nacional (MDN), em 2010, não existiam quaisquer restrições na nomeação de militares do sexo feminino para as forças nacionais destacadas. Nesse ano, as Forças Armadas possuíam contingentes em vários teatros de operações, designadamente, no Kosovo, Afeganistão, Líbano, Bósnia-Herzegovina, Timor-Leste, Etiópia, República Democrática do Congo, Guiné-Bissau e Somália. A percentagem dos efetivos femininos que participaram em operações militares até 30 de Abril 2010, ou que se encontravam a participar nessa data, era de 4,47%.

A participação de Portugal nas missões internacionais não se resumiu apenas à participação das Forças Armadas. Também os militares da Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR) haviam participado neste tipo de missões, especificamente, em Timor, Bósnia e Iraque. As funções desempenhadas por estes militares abarcavam quer a investigação criminal, quer o apoio direto às populações e às ações humanitárias. Estas últimas, quando em apoio às organizações que se ocupavam de feridos ou que promoviam as regras de saúde e higiene, implicavam, muitas vezes, um contacto próximo com as populações locais. Ao nível da investigação criminal, os elementos da GNR integravam, frequentemente, equipas de investigação da ONU, incluindo as unidades de apoio às vítimas vulneráveis (MAI, 2010).

Os dados fornecidos pela GNR permitem confirmar a participação significativa da GNR em missões internacionais. Até ao ano de 2009 contabilizaram-se 2.306 presenças nos teatros de operações, garantidas por 1.715 elementos da GNR, significando que 591 efetuaram mais do que uma operação.

Neste contexto, os militares femininos da GNR também estiveram presentes em todos os teatros de operações, embora nem em todos os contingentes (GNR, 2008). Dos dados facultados pela GNR verifica-se que, até ao ano de 2009, um total de 50 presenças femininas foram garantidas por 38 mulheres militares, tendo 12 participado em mais do que uma missão de paz e segurança internacionais. No total destas 50 presenças, 44 foram garantidas por mulheres da categoria de Guardas, na sua maioria Soldados, duas da categoria de Sargentos e quatro da categoria de Oficiais, sendo Tenente o posto ocupado mais elevado. As funções desempenhadas eram maioritariamente nas armas combatentes, como Infantaria e Cavalaria, na Administração Militar e em Transmissões.

Os referidos dados permitem, ainda, concluir que a taxa de feminização das equipas destacadas da GNR, correspondente a 2,1%, era mais baixa que a taxa de femi-

nização desta organização em termos gerais (6,0%). Não obstante, comparando o número de militares, homens e mulheres, que serviam a GNR em 2010, com o número dos que estiveram destacados em missões internacionais, verifica-se uma redução nessa diferença: somente 4,2% dos cerca de 900 militares femininos e 7,1% dos cerca de 23.640 militares masculinos contavam com experiência nos teatros de operações.

De forma a recolher mais informação sobre a participação das militares portugue-sas nos teatros de operações, foram entrevistadas oito militares femininos, quatro das Forças Armadas e quatro da GNR, das três categorias (Oficiais, Sargentos e Praças/Guardas), com experiência em operações de paz e segurança[7]. Em resposta às questões que lhes foram colocadas, todas disseram ter sido voluntárias para inte-grar as forças nacionais destacadas. Quanto à maior dificuldade sentida, referiram--se à adaptação a culturas e climas diferentes. Igualmente, todas pareceram concor-dar que as melhores experiências vividas no terreno prenderam-se com a oportunidade de contactar com outras culturas, ajudar populações carenciadas e com a possibilidade de trabalhar com militares de outras nacionalidades. No que concerne à pior experiência, referiram ser a miséria a que assistiram, resultante das condições precárias em que a maioria das populações locais vive, em particular as crianças. Dependendo do teatro de operações em que estiveram presentes, algumas referiram o receio constante de possíveis atentados e a preocupação com os seus companheiros de armas.

Resumindo, à semelhança dos restantes países da NATO, também no caso de Por-tugal, a percentagem de militares femininos nas forças nacionais destacadas era, em 2010, muito inferior à percentagem total de militares femininos das organiza-ções a que pertenciam (Forças Armadas e GNR). Embora se verificasse um aumento de mulheres nas armas combatentes, operacionais e técnicas, estas con-tinuavam a servir, principalmente, nos serviços médicos e de apoio. As militares portuguesas que possuíam experiência em operações militares no exterior, ocupa-vam, na grande maioria, os postos mais baixos dentro de cada categoria, signifi-cando que a atribuição de funções de liderança às militares portuguesas nos tea-tros de guerra era ainda muito reduzida. Conversas informais tidas em 2010 com diversos militares femininos, Capitães e Oficiais Superiores, que, se integradas nos contingentes destacados, podiam ter desempenhado funções de comando e chefia, confirmaram que o principal fator inibidor para participarem voluntaria-mente neste tipo de missões encontrava-se alicerçado nas responsabilidades familiares.

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7   Entrevistas efetuadas ao longo de 2010.

A Importância da Presença dos Militares Femininos nas Forças Nacionais Destacadas

No fim da primeira década do século XXI, todos os países NATO reconheciam a importância de aumentar a participação das suas militares nas forças destacadas, não só para garantir a disponibilidade do número de efetivos necessários para empregar nas operações militares, como também porque a sua presença contribuía para aumentar a eficácia e eficiência das missões, especialmente as que decorriam em teatros de operações onde existiam particularidades culturais que impediam o contacto direto dos militares masculinos com as mulheres da população local. Adicionalmente, as Forças Armadas dos países NATO reconheciam a existência de tarefas e funções nos teatros de operações onde a presença dos militares femininos se revelava de uma enorme utilidade, traduzindo-se numa vantagem no cumprimento dos objetivos das missões, designadamente, naquelas onde não era necessário utilizar a força e, pelo contrário, era importante mostrar sensibilidade, simpatia e, simultaneamente, firmeza.

Assim, em 2010, a comunidade NATO já tinha chegado a algumas conclusões sobre a importância da presença das militares nas forças destacadas: as militares, pelo facto de poderem contactar diretamente com as mulheres de outras culturas e aceder a lugares interditos aos homens (como por exemplo, prisões femininas e alguns mercados), têm um papel fundamental na promoção das organizações locais de mulheres e na recolha de informações junto às mulheres locais (as militares tendem a ser mais sensíveis às necessidades e aspirações destas mulheres que, por sua vez, se sentem mais à vontade para falar sobre todo o tipo de assuntos, o que dá a oportunidade aos dois géneros de exprimirem os seus pontos de vista e, consequentemente, permite aos decisores construírem uma imagem da situação envolvente mais completa e inclusiva); as mulheres militares conseguem mais facilmente estabelecer relações de confiança com a população local; a existência de militares femininos contribui para uma imagem menos "masculinizada" dos contingentes destacados, ajudando a uma maior aceitação da presença de militares estrangeiros por parte das populações locais e à disseminação de informação sobre a própria missão (questão decisiva quando se pretende realizar eleições em ambiente seguro); a presença de elementos femininos nas equipas de busca porta a porta, bloqueios de estrada e de patrulhamento torna estas equipas, aos olhos da população local, mais amigáveis (verificam-se diferenças na reação da população quando encontram patrulhas masculinas ou mistas, sendo que, no primeiro caso, a população mostra-se mais hostil e apenas os homens e crianças se aproximam dos militares, tornando-se, assim, difícil contactar com as mulheres diretamente e, consequentemente, informá-las devidamente); a existência de mulheres militares nos postos de identificação ("*check-points*") permite que tanto as mulheres como os homens sejam revistados, ajudando a impedir o tráfico de armas praticado pelas próprias mulheres; a

existência de equipas mistas permite mostrar à população local, particularmente às mulheres, que estas podem ter um estatuto social e profissional igual ao dos homens; e, além disso, a participação de pessoal militar feminino dos serviços de saúde permite levar os cuidados médicos até às mulheres e crianças. Como tal, os militares femininos eram, cada vez mais, designados para funções de intérpretes, tradutores, "*Gender Advisors*", interrogadores (particularmente das mulheres e raparigas vítimas de violência sexual), observadores, assim como, para funções na cooperação civil-militar, serviços de inteligência e nas relações públicas (NATO, 2007a; 2008a; 2009a; 2010a; 2010b; ONU, 2010b; 2010c).

A Presença de Mulheres nos Teatros de Operações: a Necessidade da Inclusão de uma Perspetiva de Género

A existência de mulheres, quer militares quer locais, nos teatros de operações, em especial nos localizados em regiões islâmicas, como o Afeganistão, levantou a necessidade de incluir uma perspetiva de género nas organizações militares, particularmente nas destacadas. Assim, em 2010, para além da urgência de incentivar a presença de militares femininos nos teatros de guerra, também se considerava ser necessário garantir a inclusão de uma perspetiva de género no planeamento, preparação e condução das operações, alinhada com os objetivos finais da operação e presente em todos os níveis da linha de comando, incluindo na sensibilização do conjunto de decisores e na formação e treino dos militares, especialmente dos nomeados para integrar as equipas destacadas em apoio às missões e operações de paz (Olsson *et al.*, 2009).

Neste sentido, começavam a surgir algumas recomendações no seio da comunidade NATO sobre a formação e treino nas questões de género, de forma a garantir a coordenação destas matérias entre todos os países contribuidores com forças militares para as operações de paz, a par da interoperabilidade das equipas multinacionais existentes no terreno. Uma das principais recomendações prendia-se com a importância de se elaborar doutrina padrão (ou seja, *standards* NATO com a uniformização de procedimentos), destinada a ser utilizada e respeitada por todos os Estados-membros na formação e treino dos seus militares. Como tal, os tópicos a abordar, objetivos e metodologias deveriam ser previamente definidos e a doutrina deveria ser consistente e orientada para cada tipo de teatro de operações existente, visto teatros de operações diferentes apresentarem especificidades igualmente diferentes. Pretendia-se, do mesmo modo, que a formação e treino fossem destinados a todos os participantes, logo a partir da fase de pré-destacamento e, posteriormente, no terreno. Adicionalmente, dever-se-ia atender às categorias/funções de todos os militares a destacar (designadamente, Comandante, restantes Oficiais, Sargentos e Praças) pelo facto de todos terem funções distintas – enquanto que a uns cabe a responsabilidade de tomar decisões, a outros o dever de trabalhar no terreno, fre-

quentemente em contacto direto com as populações). Recomendava-se, igualmente, a definição de regras de conduta e disciplina, a respeitar nas sedes e no terreno, que asseverassem a política "tolerância zero" relativa aos abusos e exploração sexual (*Sexual Exploitation and Abuse* – SEA) cometidos pelos próprios militares no decorrer do cumprimento da missão, indo ao encontro de uma das prioridades da ONU, que adotou uma estratégia global visando três aspetos fundamentais – prevenção, repressão e recuperação – para tratar esta questão (NATO, 2007a; 2008a; 2009a; 2010b; ONU, 2002; 2010b).

Paralelamente, os países da Aliança começavam a reconhecer a importância da presença de um conselheiro para as questões de género, designado por "*Gender Advisor*", durante o planeamento de todas as missões e nos próprios teatros de operações, sendo o responsável por: aconselhar o Comandante das forças e sensibilizar as restantes tropas para as questões de género; no terreno, integrar a perspetiva de género no trabalho diário das equipas destacadas e elaborar relatórios periódicos sobre estas matérias; estabelecer contacto e cooperar com a população, especialmente com grupos de mulheres locais e organizações não governamentais; esclarecer as mulheres locais sobre os seus direitos e utilizar os recursos ao seu dispor para incentivá-las a participarem na vida pública (NATO, 2008a; 2009a; 2010b; ONU, 2010b; 2010c)).

Era assumido que as funções de "*Gender Advisor*" podiam ser desempenhadas por militares quer do sexo feminino quer do masculino. O Capitão Krister Fahlstedt das Forças Armadas Suecas[8], que exerceu, ele próprio, a função de "*Gender Advisor*" no Afeganistão, considerava que, em ambos os casos, existiam vantagens e desvantagens. No caso de ser uma mulher, as suas funções podiam ser menosprezadas e podia ser mais difícil explicar o contributo do seu trabalho para o objetivo final da missão aos seus pares masculinos. No entanto, os militares femininos tinham mais facilidade em contactar e estabelecer relações com as mulheres locais. No caso de ser um homem, este tinha maior facilidade em fazer-se ouvir, em ver o seu trabalho reconhecido e em obter o respeito dos restantes militares masculinos. Porém, não podia aceder aos locais interditos aos homens.

A importância da inclusão de uma perspetiva do género nos teatros de operações foi igualmente confirmada pelas entrevistas aos militares e civis, nacionais e estrangeiros, com experiência nos teatros de operações[9]. Os casos práticos descritos pelos

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8   Capitão Krister Fahlstedt das Forças Armadas Suecas durante a sua intervenção na reunião "NCGP-2010".

9   Para além das militares nacionais e estrangeiras anteriormente referidas, foram igualmente entrevistados militares masculinos com experiência na inclusão da perspetiva de género em organizações militares (um Coronel holandês, um Tenente-Coronel francês e um Capitão sueco).

entrevistados realçaram a importância dos militares terem de saber agir correta-mente em todas as situações que possam surgir no terreno, por forma a minimizar o risco de se originarem incidentes diplomáticos. De modo a evitar possíveis cons-trangimentos, alguns sugeriram a utilização de cenários durante o treino que retra-tassem realisticamente essas situações, permitindo aos militares aprender e treinar a melhor forma de atuar. Como exemplos destas situações referiram as buscas porta a porta, a entrada em locais onde os militares masculinos têm que lidar com as mulheres locais e a necessidade de revistar mulheres suspeitas de transportarem armas escondidas. Outro exemplo respeitava à convocação de reuniões, em parti-cular, nos casos em que se pretendia solicitar a participação de mulheres, por ser essencial saber, de antemão, a respostas a algumas questões: se é permitido às mulheres participar em reuniões, se podem ser contactadas diretamente, se podem comparecer sozinhas e até que horas podem estar ausentes de casa.

Considerações Finais

A presença de mulheres nos teatros de operações, quer militares quer civis, é evi-dente e indiscutível. Sobre a matéria em análise, pode concluir-se que, em 2010, os países da NATO demonstravam uma grande vontade em aumentar a taxa de femi-nização das organizações militares, incluindo as destacadas. Consequentemente, procuravam a melhor solução para incluir uma perspetiva de género nas referidas organizações militares, em particular nos teatros de operações. Nessa data, era já reconhecida a importância de garantir a interoperabilidade e a consistência da atu-ação dos militares em apoio às operações e missões de paz, independentemente da nacionalidade, através da formação e treino, baseados em *standards* NATO. Para além disso, tinha também sido identificada a necessidade da presença de um "*Gen-der Advisor*" no processo de planeamento e na condução das operações militares, incluindo no próprio terreno.

Porém, da análise à informação que foi possível recolher, identificaram-se algumas lacunas nas preocupações demonstradas pelos países da Aliança no que se refere à presença de mulheres nos teatros de operações. A primeira diz respeito à inclusão das questões e perspetiva de género na formação e treino dos militares. A doutrina deve atender, ainda, às diferentes formações académica, moral e religiosa dos mili-tares destacados, bem como à própria origem e, consequentemente, às diferentes intensidades que o choque cultural pode assumir, em particular, quando são desta-cados para países como o Iraque e Afeganistão.

Por outro lado, a formação, treino e, sobretudo, a sensibilização das mulheres mili-tares não dever ser esquecida porque, também elas, devem tomar os devidos cuida-dos para os seus hábitos e comportamentos não colidirem com a cultura local. Se as comunidades ocidentais concordam e aceitam que os seus militares do sexo mas-culino devem respeitar as restrições a que as mulheres locais estão muitas vezes

obrigadas, analogamente, não se pode negligenciar a importância dos militares do sexo feminino adotarem uma conduta adequada às características do contexto cultural em que se encontram, para não ofenderem culturas mais masculinizadas.

Outra lacuna encontrada prende-se com o próprio incentivo à participação das militares nas missões e operações de paz e respetiva legislação. É do senso comum que, no decorrer dos conflitos, as partes beligerantes fazem frequentemente reféns. Em muitos teatros de operações as milícias armadas nutrem, por norma, um total desrespeito pelo Direito Internacional, incluindo as Convenções sobre os direitos dos prisioneiros de guerra e das mulheres. Na eventualidade de um militar ser capturado por uma dessas milícias, existe a forte possibilidade de ser torturado e ser vítima de violência e abusos sexuais. Se a vítima for um militar do sexo feminino, dessas práticas poderá resultar numa gravidez. Para fazer face a este tipo de situações, além de ser fundamental assegurar o apoio psicológico às vitimas, importa colmatar o vazio legal existente, elaborando-se legislação adequada, nacional e internacional, que proteja os direitos das mulheres que sejam vítimas de violência sexual no cumprimento dos seus deveres militares, assim como, os dos filhos que daí possam ser concebidos.

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