Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.7458/SPP2013712334Résumé
This article tests two inter-related theories on the situational causes of violence in illicit drug markets: (i) drug markets that are unstable are more prone to violence and (ii) there is a higher risk of instability, and hence conflict and violence, in drugmarkets characterized by pure competition. These theories are applied to the violence that occurred between the Hells Angels and its rivals over dominance in Quebec's lucrative cocaine market during the 1990s. The theory that violence stems
from instability in an illicit market is applicable to this case study. However, Quebec's cocaine marketwas characterized by oligopolistic conditions and the ensuing violence stemmed from the Hells Angels' efforts to maintain hegemony in that market. This paper argues that oligopolistic and monopolistic conditions in illicit drug markets may heighten the risk of conflict and violence because such conditions inhibit competition.
Téléchargements
Publiée
2013-02-07
Numéro
Rubrique
Artigos
Licence
Authors who publish in this Journal must agree the following terms and conditions:
- Authors retain copyright and grant the Journal the right to first publication, while simultaneously agreeing to a Creative Commons Attribution License, which allows others to share their work on condition that they cite the original author(s) and recognise that the latter’s work was first published in this Journal.
- Authors are authorised to enter into additional contracts separately, for non-exclusive distribution of the version of the work that is published in this Journal (e.g. publication in an institutional repository or as a book chapter), subject to recognition of initial publication in this Journal.