The European democratic surplus

Abstract

This article argues that the European constitutional problems are merely new representations of three paradoxes of constitutionalism: the paradox of the political community; the paradox of the «fear of the few» and of «that of the many» or the fears of tyranny on the part of the minority and dictatorship on the part of the majority; and the paradox of the competence of those with competence or «who decides who decides?». Through the analysis of these paradoxes it is equally possible to identify national constitutionalism as a mere contextual representation of constitutionalism which does not benefit from any a priori presumption of superior validity in the face of European constitutionalism. The article concludes arguing a discursive model for the relationship between national constitutionalism and European constitutionalism and the search for legitimacy of the latter in its democratic and constitutional value by adding reforms in the national political communities.