Social citizenship rights - a critique of F. A. Hayek and R. Plant

Abstract

This paper discusses and criticises two rival views of social citizenship rights, as they are presented by two authors who are taken as representatives of two broader currents of thought: Friedrich A. Hayek and Neo-liberalism, and Raymond Plant and Socialism. The main argument consists of saying that, in spite of their views on social rights being opposed, Hayek and Plant share in fact an important common assumption. They both view social rights as giving rise to (Hayek), or being the expression of (Plant), a common and positive pattern of distribution or social justice. The paper argues that this common assumption is mistaken. Social rights should not be identified with any overall theory of justice. They are better seen as giving rise to a common floor below which nobody needs fear to fall, but above which social inequalities may flourish. In order to emphasise this limited scope, they have been sometimes called here basic social rights. It is claimed that this view could still be regarded as liberal, and that it would be part of an active view of Liberalism, or a self-restrained constructivism, that should be distinguished both from Neo-liberal evolutionism and Socialist egalitarianism.