Neurorights and Cognitive Autonomy in the Context of Contemporary Human Rights and Multilevel Governance

Abstract

The accelerated development of neurotechnologies poses unprecedented challenges for human rights law, as it enables the recording, inference or modulation of mental processes in areas such as health, consumption, work, or security. In this context, the debate on neurorights emerges as a legal response aimed at preserving the core protection associated with human dignity, personal freedom and the integrity of the person against technological risks that go beyond the external sphere of conduct and directly affect the mental domain prior to decision-making. This paper analyses neurorights from the perspective of cognitive autonomy, conceived as a specific and transversal legal interest, connected with freedom of thought, privacy and mental integrity. The hypothesis argues that neurorights do not necessarily constitute a new autonomous category of rights, but rather a space of tension that requires an evolutionary reinterpretation of existing safeguards and the establishment of material limits and clear obligations for public and private actors. Methodologically, a dogmatic and analytical legal approach is adopted, based on recent doctrine, international and European instruments of technological governance and comparative regulatory experiences, highlighting the role of soft law in shaping standards of protection. The study also identifies regulatory tensions arising from normative fragmentation and from the risk of protection asymmetries between jurisdictions, including dynamics of regulatory forum shopping. It concludes that the effective protection of cognitive autonomy depends less on the symbolic proclamation of new rights and more on the consolidation of coherent legal frameworks that translate the principles of dignity, freedom and integrity into enforceable safeguards compatible with scientific innovation and the democratic rule of law.