Gobierno corporativo y estructura de la deuda
el caso de las pymes portuguesas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29352/mill0205e.36.00234Palabras clave:
propiedad, gobierno corporativo, estructura de la deuda, PYMEResumen
Introducción: El estudio del gobierno corporativo en las decisiones financieras ha ganado relevancia, particularmente en la estructura de la deuda, mientras permanece abierto cómo sus características influyen en tales decisiones. En este estudio, se consideraron tres formas de deuda (total, corto plazo y mediano/largo plazo).
Objetivos: El estudio tiene como objetivo analizar si el gobierno influye en las decisiones de financiamiento corporativo, teniendo en cuenta la naturaleza de la propiedad (familiar versus no familiar).
Métodos: Se estimaron modelos de regresión lineal múltiple para explicar las variables de deuda utilizando el método de mínimos cuadrados con errores estándar robustos.
Resultados: Las empresas familiares tienen un mayor endeudamiento total y la propiedad gerencial desempeña un papel relevante. Independientemente de la naturaleza de la propiedad, un mayor rendimiento está asociado con una menor deuda, mientras que el tamaño tiene un impacto positivo en la deuda total. Por otro lado, en las empresas familiares, la concentración de la propiedad establece una relación no lineal (en forma de U) con el endeudamiento total, pero en empresas no familiares la relación entre los dos no fue significativa.
Conclusiones: La propiedad interna y la concentración de propiedad determinan la estructura de la deuda de manera diferente en las empresas familiares y no familiares.
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